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PREFACE
This is a case study of the relations between the Eisenhower Administration and the American press*--the printed media.
Radio and television coverage is not included.

The periods

examined are the Suez crisis of 1956, and the Lebanon crisis
of 1958.

Specifically, it is a probing of the working arrange -

ments between the Eisenhower White .House, the Dulles State
Department, and the American press during two crucial phases
of American foreign relations in the turbulent Middle East i n
the late 1950's , and the reaction of major American daily news papers, newsmagazines , opinion journals, and scholarly journa l s
to various aspects of Administration policy.

It represents a

look at Administration methods and efforts to manage political
news , and their effectiveness.

And it considers the success of

the purveyors of printed, political news in presenting a representative , accurate , and responsible picture of these crises
for the information of the American reading public.
In my research , I found invaluable the Personal and Private
Papers of John Foster Dulles deposited at Princeton University
Library .

These Dulles Papers includes letters, memoranda of

conversations , personal notes and records, drafts of speeches
and articles, newspaper clippings, photographs, momentos and

memorabilia.
"Oral history" refers to the research technique of tape*The foreign language American press was not included.
Only the American press published in the English language was
studied in depth.
ii

recording spoken reminiscences and transcribing them nearly
verbati m into manuscript for m.

TWo collect ions of or al history

interviews were consulted for this study: The Dulles Oral
History Project, deposited at the Prince t on University Library,
and The Eisenhower Administrati on Oral History Project,
depos i ted a t Col umbia University Library, and the Eisenhower
Libra r y, in Abilene, Kansas.
The Dulles Oral History Project consists of tes timony from
near l y 300 men and women.

Included are: top of ficials of the

Eisenhower Administration, heads of state and f oreign ministers ,
officers of the American and foreign diplomatic corps, Dulles
fami ly members and their close friends, Dulles• associates at
the Versailles Peace Conf~rence, on Wall Street, on the Federa l
Council of Churches, in the United Nations, and in Congress,
newsmen, Dulles• secretaries and staff assistants, class mates,
and others.
The Eisenhower Administration Oral History Project gathered
firs thand testimony from those who played major role s in the
Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961), and the r e collections
of observers and of those knowledgeable about special aspects.
Included ares Eisenhower and members of h i s family, member s of
the White House staff, Cabinet members, political advisers,
members of Congress, administrators, sci en tists, journalists,
amba$sadors, military and civili an speciali sts, and others.
Transcribed interviews we re reviewed and edi ted by thei r
authors.

The transcripts in both collect ions are, the refore,

the nearly verbatim recor ds of i nformal and unrehearsed int eriii

views; they should not be regarded as literary statements.
Usually textual changes were made to improve the clarity of
the meaning.

These oral history collections are invaluable

aids to the serious student of the Eisenhower Era.
I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to various
individuals for their help and comment.

I owe a special thanks

to Mr. Alexander P. Clark, Curator of Manuscripts, and Mrs.
Wanda M. Randall, Assistant to Curator of Manuscripts, Princeton
University Library, for their help and direction in the use of
the Dulles Papers and Oral Histories.
Thanks are due to Mrs. Elizabeth B. Mason, Associat e
Director, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University
f

.'

Library, for her assistance in my gaining access to the Eisenhower Oral Histories.
Special thanks are due to my former professor, and dear
f riend, Dr. Lawrence Marwick, Head, Hebraic · Section, Orient alia Division, Library of Congress, for his many kindnesses
to me while I conducted my research at the Library of Congress.
For their help and advise, I would like to express my
gratitude to the staff of the Stabley Library, Indiana Universi ty of Pennsylvania, especially Mr. Chamberlin, Mr

Kaufmann,

and Mrs. Freeman, and to the staff of St. Vincent College
Library, especially my former coworker, .. and good friend, Dr.
J ack Macey,
I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to my

principal advisor, Dr. Isaiah Friedman, for his counsel,
iv

encouragement, and fairness during many grueling months .

My

deep appreciation is given to Prof. Solomon Grayzel f or his
interes ted and understanding help, and to Dr. Ben-Horin f or
his timely and penetrating comme nt.
To my wife and her family for their encouragement and
assistance, a very special thanks.
And to all others too numerous to mention, thank you .
The opinions expressed are my owh.

For them, I assume

ful l responsibility.
Blairsville, Pennsylvania

Robert J. Kirsch
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INTRODUCTION
Congress shall make no law••• abridging the freedom
o f speech, or of the press••
First Amendment, The Constitution of
the United States of America
I n American representative demoor
plays a very important role.
adult education.

I

y, the responsible press

is the major means of gener a l,

The function of the press has not changed

greatly since the Commission on Freedom oft e Press, i n 1947 ,
released its findings ( The Hutchins Report) on the duties of a
respons ible press.

In a world in which the United States had

come t o assume a leading role in the effort to maint ain world
peace , the Commission found that the American press was charged
with the responsibility of providing the information needed by

a free society in order to effectively govern itseles
Today our society needs, first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day•s events in
a context which gives them meaning; second , a forum for
t he exchange of comment and c riticism; third , a means of
projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in
t he society to one another; fourth, a method of presenting
and clarifing the goals and values of the society; and,
f ifth, a way of reaching every member of the society by
t he currents of informat ion, thought, and feeling which
t he press supplies.!
1commiss ion on Freedom of the Press, Robert M. Hutchins,
Chairman, A Free And Responsible Press, A General Report On
Mass Communicationss Newspapers, Radio, Motion Pictures,
Maga zines, And Books (Chicagos Uni vers ity of Chicago Press,
1947) , pp. 20-21.

1

2

The Hutchins Report, therefore, envisioned a comprehensive role
f or the respons ible press.
Fir s t Amendment to the
of the press.

u. s.

"Responsible" is the key word.

The

Constitution protects the freedom

No other Ame rican industry enjoys this right.

The Constitution guards the press in order that, unrestrained
by government, the press may serve the public interest by providing the people--the voter s--with the proper information
about what transpires in Washington, in the rest of the country,
and in the world at large, so that an informed American citizenry may cast its votes conscientiously, and perform its civic
duties well.

Thus, the corps of correspondents must "find out

what is going on under the surface and beyond the horizon, to
infer, to deduce, t o imagine and to guess ••• what is going on
inside, and what it meant yesterday and what it could mean
tomorrow." 2
In order to s e rve the public interest effectively, the
press must endeavor to uncover the truth, and to publish it
accurately.

It must not shrink from publishing both good news

and bad, and it must present both sides of public issues. 3
Truth-telling is an "inexact science" observed Jenkin Lloyd
Jones who discussed some of the factors preventing the telling
of the whole truth.

Jones noted that the newspaper which sought

2walter Lippmann, quoted by Peter Edson, "Interpretation
and Analysis of Washington News,'' in Ray Eldon Hiebert, ed.,
The Press In Washington (New Yorks Dodd, Mead & Co., 1966),
p . 36.
3zechariah Chafee, Jr., "The Press Under Pressure," in
Louis M. Lyons, ed., Reporting The News: Selections From Nieman
Reports (Cambridge a Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 66.

3

to publish all the facts all the time wouldt
(1) lay itself open to ruinous libel suits, since many
things that are true and provable are not privileged,
(2) be an accessory to blackmail and stand guilty of bad
taste, since much that is privileged is also merely
degrading ,
(3) be responsible for many injustices since some truths
which are privileged and neither profane nor pornographic
are cruel and unnecessary, and
(4) paralyze our popular government by insisting on a
level of reporting so free that it would destroy
deliberation.

Nevertheless , Jones regarded the duty of the press to remove
those barriers to the truth that are based upon elitist theories
of social justice, or that are raised by bureaucrats to protect
themselves from the consequences of their mistakes, or to conceal those things which the American public have a right to
know. 4
The effort to arrive at the truth should be made, and the
picture presented should be accurate.

Carelessly or unfairly

reporting accurate facts can be as misleading as publishing
factual errors.

The wrong impression can be given by placing

too much, or too little, emphasis on certain facts, of by omitting important details.

For a story to be accurate, it must

be balanced and objective, as well as factually correct.

In

5
'
'
h . way, the rea 1 meaning
tis
o f the news can be given.

4Jenkin Lloyd Jones, "The Inexact Science of Truth-Telling,"
in Warren K. Agee, The Press And The Public Interest: The
iilliam Allen White Lectures (Washington, D. C.t Public Affairs
Press, 1968), pp. 115-116.

5Mitchell

v.

1959), pp. 24-25.

Charnley, Reporting (New York: Henry Holt,

4

The critical importance of this distinction was noted more
than 25 years ago by the Commission on the Freedom of the Press.
,rhe commission pointed out that the greatest danger of r e porting

an accurate fact in a misleading or untrue manner lay in the
communication of international information.

The Commiss i on

commenteds
••• The press now bears a responsibility in all c ountries,
and particularly in democratic countries, where f o r eign
policies are responsive to popular majorities, to report
international events in such a way that can be understood.
It is no longer enough to report the fact truthly. I t is
now necessary to report the truth about the fact.6
However, the American press all too often is hampered in
its efforts to present important news by its tendency t o stress
"the exceptional rather th.an the significant."
the American citizen is

.
not

As a cons e quence,

always supplied with the information

and discussion needed to exercise his civic responsibilities in
a mature and informed fashion. 7

Charnley has argued tha t the

press is eager to cover the odd and unus ual because the reading
public is almost always more interested in such events t han in
t he routine pattern.

While acknowledging the danger t hat empha-

sis on the unusual can lead to a glorification of the uni que,
the strange, or the atypical, he argued that such news s hould
not be suppressed for that would create a worse misrepres entation--" the false impression that there is no atypical or e vil
activity •••• (T)he news media must report activities of this
6 c ommiss ion on Freedom of the Press, A Free And Responsible

Press, op. cit., p. 22.

7 Ibid., PP• 54-56.

5

kind.

Since the first necessity for combating any evil is

Jmowledge, the news media have an evident obligation to inform
the public of the abnormal or unusual as well as of the
•
8
routine."

In its efforts to uncover the truth about politically
significant news, the press interacts with the Government on
many different levels.

There is a very basic rivalry between

the Government and the press deriving froms 1. the press s
desire to know and make Jmown; and 2

the Government's incli -

nation to conceal and withhold until policy becomes faite
accompli.

The Government official is wary of premature disclo-

sure, fearful that it will jeopardize policy formulation.

The

reporter, on the alert fo:t:t".. a story, often rejects the idea that
'

policy should not be discussed until it is finalized. 9
Reporters depend upon sources for their information.
Therein lies both a temptation and a risk.

The temptation is

that, in order to keep his channels of information open, the
reporter will not develop stories which are critical of his
news sources.

The risk is that a reporter will develop so clos e

an identification with a particular news source that he becomes,
in effect, a public relations conduit for that source.
In the simplest sense, on virtually any beat in
Washington, or possibly elsewhere, there are likely to
be two kinds of reporters--the "ins .. and the "outs."
The "ins" are those who play along with the news source,
handle it their way, tend to overlook minor indiscretions
and in general protect their sources. The 0 outs 0 fight
8charnley, Reporting, op. cit., p. 44.
9Thomas Schroth, "The ole of the Press in a Democratic
Government,tt in Hiebert, Press in Washington, op. cit., PP• 5-6.

6

t heir sources, or at least needle them. They get their
news by insisting on thei r r ight to it or by sheer perseverance. They let the source know that they intend to
play it s traight
They get their news the hard way ,
r unning the risk of being ost racized not only by the
s ources but by the reporters who are "ins." A good
r eport er can probably do it e ither way, depending on
the c i rcumstances.10
One of the great paradoxes of the American press is that
it is , at one and the same time, the means by which the people
are informed about their Gove rnment, and, by virtue of this
educational function, it serves as watchdog of the public
inter e st by holding the Government up for close r scrutiny.
consequently, the press which att empts to expose all sides of
an issue i s in perpetual rivalry with Administrations which
seek t o advertise the best side. 11 Rivers commented succinc tlya

.

"(I)f anything is clear about press-government relationships
throughout our (American) history, it is this, in theory,
America's leaders have wanted a free and independent press as
a check upon government; in pract ice , they wanted no such
thing . .. 12

Not only do Administrations withhold infor mat i on

from t he press, but they also attempt t o use the press to
announce thei r policies and to win public s upport f or them.
This f act led Thomas Schroth, Executive Edi tor, Congre ssional
Quarterly, to comment:
10James McCartney, "Vested Interests of the Reporter," in
Lyons , Report ing the News , op. cit., pp. 103-104 .
11Louis M. Lyons, "Government and t he Pres s," i n ibid.,
p . 337 .

1 2wi11iam L. Rivers, The Adversaries , Politics
Pr ess (Boston : Be acon Pres s, 1970), p . 8.

nd The

7

••• It may be that a really warm friendship be t ween a high
official and a member of the press corps is basically
impossible, for the press must always look with a certain
amount of suspicion on the acti ons of public officials
and the press must always be ready to criticize, regardless of how close personally the reporter is to the public
official. Criticism and constant surveillance of government by an alert and intelligent press is essential to
the successful working of a democracy 13
How successfully can the American press act as a viable
critic of a national Administration in contemporary

u s

society

with its greatly expanded Federal Government bureaucracy?
resourcefully does it ferret out accurate information?

How

With

which forces does the Washington press corps have to contend?
The occupational group with which the Capital press corps has
the most immediate contact is the federal press agentry.
had its small beginnings in 1910.

It

In the mid-1930•s, Senator

Harry Byrd of Virginia headed an investigating committee which
uncovered 270 public-information employees under President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's control.

By the end of Harry

Truman s Presidency, the Executive branch had 3,632 employees
working in the "Information" and ,.Editorial." Civil Service
classifications .

There were also an unknown number of bureau-

crats who held such titles as "Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs," ••Administrative Assistant," and "Executive
Assistant to the Assistant secretary."

Because Truman's

publ.icists were protected by civil. Service regulations, the
Eisenhower Administration added many new men of its own choosing,
men it felt it could trust.

By 1957, there were 6,878 .,Infor-

13Thomas Schroth, "The Role of the Press in a Democratic
Government," loc. cit.

8

mation and Editorial Employeesff listed by the civil service
Commission, or nearly twice the 1952 figure.

The increase

continued during Eisenhower's second term. 14

In theory, the

function of the federal publicity complex is to serve the public
by providing useful information about the Government.

In prac-

tice, federal public rela.tions specialists have tended to
become personal press agents for the incumbent Administration. 15
The question becomes, how does the Washington press corps
-penetrate this formidable Government propaganda army?

How

successfully did the press pry into foreign affairs questions
during the Eisenhower era?
The problem of cutting through the propaganda bureaucracy
to learn the truth has long been a matter of concern to members
of the Washington press corps.

As long ago as 1950, James Reston

colorfully called attention to the dilemmas
The conflict between officials and reporters in Washington over what information about foreign affairs should
be made public is now becoming an important issue, In a
country whose action depends upon consent of the people
and whose actions now affect the interests of the whole
world, an understanding between reporters and officials
on the obligations and rights of the reporter is imperative, but no such understanding exists today.
Instead, responsible officials and responsible
reporters ••• are now playing cops and robbers with each
other. The object of the cops seems to be to conceal
information. The object of the robbers is to disclose
information. The cops seldom ask themselves why they want
to conceal the information, and the robbers don't analyze
very often why they want to disclose the information.
1 4.~illiam L. Rivers, The Opinionmakers (Bostons Beacon

Press, 1965), PP• 138-142.
15James Reston, quoted by Rivers, ibid., p. 143.

9

Both sides just go on waging their own private l i ttle Cold
War behind the gas works and the State Department in Foggy
Bott om, to the despair of each other and t he detriment of
t he public.
While r ecognizing that bureaucrats have legitimate concerns
about premature disclosures , Res ton warned of the growth of
Administr ation power, and the need for reportorial skepticism
to grow with i t .

The reporters duty to i nform the American

people, 'in the face of Government reluctance to do so, remained.
Reston r e commended that, to penetrate off icial secrecy, the
brash young report er should " ask sticky questions and keep
using his legs." 16
While the Government exercises great power over the press,
it is also dependent upon the press for information about its
own day-to-day functioning.

Because the Government is so large,

and its functions are so numerous, no one individual could
possibly know all that transpires, both authorized and unauthorized.

Thus, Government of ficials us e the press t o keep

tabs on the Government itself.

The pres s also provi des them

with valuable feedback on existing policies, and pol icy
propos a ls.
Abroad,

u. s.

diplomatic representative s and f oreign s erv-

ice personnel r e ly on t he American press to inform them of the
happenings back home.

On the other hand, they extract informa-

tion f rom the fore i gn pres s to supplement their reports to the
State Department.

Contacts with American reporters permanently

16J ames B. Reston, .. Cops and Robbers in Foggy Bott om, in
Agee , The Press and the Publ ic Interest, op. cit., pp . 1-11.
0

10

stationed in the host country give

u. s.

diplomatic personnel

valuable insights into the affairs of their country of ass i gnment.

17

The flow of information between the Government and t he
press is two directional .

The question arises which direction

o~ flow dominates during normal times, which during times of
crisis?
The study of the interrelationships between the

u. s .

Gov-

ernment and the American free press during international crise s
is worthy of special attention for the light it could shed on
the workings of the nations Government and press in times o f
stress.

The specific purpose of this study is to examine

critically American press . coverage of the Suez crisis (1956-5 7 ) ,
and the Lebanon crisis (1958), with a view to determinings
1. the accuracy with · which the actions, attitudes, and aims of

the Eisenhower Administration were transmitted to the American
people during the crises; 2 . the extent to which the American
press grasped the issues and correctly informed the American
public; 3. the impact of the Administration on press coverage
of personalities and events; and 4. the impact of the press on
Administration policy- makers and on

u. s .

policy.

It is important to know how information is transmitted in
17Rivers, Opinionmakers, op . cit . , pp. 17-19; and John
Kenneth Galbraith , ''Why Diplomats Clam Up," in Lyons, Reporting
the News, op . cit., p. 376.

11
American democracy in order to be able to appreciate the
mechan ism of that system, particularly t he sphere of i nformation .

Does the pr ess serve as a vehicl e of foreign policy

through which proposed actions are tested?

Finally, is t he

press used to send veil ed messages to international friends
and adversaries?

our study of the press will be preceded by efforts t o
determi ne: 1. the means by which the Eisenhower Administration
disseminated information; and 2. its working relationship with
the American press.

Through consideration of published s ources

and unpublished documents, it is hoped to arrive at a more well
rounded understanding of Adminis t ration policies, and, with

.

this background information, to achieve a more meaningful i n t erpreta t ion of press content.
However, before proceeding to our s tudy of t he relationship between the Eisenhower Administrati on and the American
press during the Suez and Lebanon crises , it should prove
helpful to consider briefly the history of these two crises.
The Suez Crisis
The Suez crisis was preceded by an increase in tensions i n
the Middle East along the Israeli-Egyptian armistice line , and
by t he efforts of both sides to obtain add itional arms.

Egyp-

tian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to obtain arms from
the Western Big Three, Britain, France, and the United States.
The United States Department of State res ponded to Nasse r's
request for $27 million worth of arms by demanding payment in
cash when it knew, on the bas is of intell i gence, that Nasser

12

could not meet the terms. 18
I n 1955, Egyptian fedayee n raids into Israeli ter r itory
were followed by I sraeli reprisals against military bas es in
the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli r aid against Khan Yunis, i n which

39 were killed, prompted Nasser to accept Soviet offer s of arms

after his efforts to procure arms from the West had not been
successful.

Nasser disclosed the "Czech" arms deal on Septem-

ber 27, 1955.

The Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement was far bi g-

ger than the earlier unsuccessful bid for $27 million worth of
American arms.

The initial Egyptian purchase was augmented

by a second ma jor arms agreement in response to reports of
continuing shipments of French arms to Israel.
agreements were approxima~ely equal in value.

The two arms
Ten years l a t er,

Nasser disclosed that the combined worth of the weapons Egypt
had purchased in the two arms deals from the Russians totaled
$336 million . 19

Israel regarded the arms agreements with apprehension.
It was feared that Egypt would employ its newly acquired arms
against Israel.

The arms deals upset t he comparative arms

balance between Israel and Egypt--there was now a disparity
in quantity and Egyptian superiority in quality of arms.

The

18owight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peaces 1956-1961 (New Yorks
Doubleday, 1965), p. 24.

19Kennett Love, Suez, The TWice-Fou9ht War (New York: McGrawHill, 1969), p. 117; and Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo
Documentsc The Inside Story Of Nasser And His Relationship With
World Leaders, Rebels, And Statesmen (New Yorke Doubleday, 1973),
pp . 62-63. Heikal, the influentia l editor-,:i.n-chie·f of the powerful Cairo newspaper, Al- Ahram, and former Nasser confident ,
estimated the value of the first arms deal at n80 million with
repayment spread over 12 years. "So Egypt was paying not more than
n7 million a year. That was not mortgaging Egypt•s cotton."
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arms deals, the fedayeen raids, and continued Egyptian closure
of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping led Israeli Premie r
David Ben-Gurion to decide upon the need to launch a prevent i ve
war against Egypt. 20
Despite the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreements, the United
states, Great Britain, and the World Bank offered Egypt a i d to
construct its major development scheme, the Aswan High Dam
project, on December 16, 1955,

This project was of crucial

importance to Egypt for it would permit an expansion of agricultural land by at least 1,000,000 acres, produce 10,000
million kilowatt-hours of electricity annually which would
facilitate the further development of Egyptian industry and
reduce dependence upon imported fuels, and regulate river
flow to eliminate flood damage and make possible better drainage, thus, contributing to higher crop yields.

The High Darn

project was given priority among Egyptian development
programs by the Nasser regime.

However, Egypt balked at

accepting the Western offer which contained stipulations-"strings"--that Egypt found objectionable.

According to the

proposed terms, the United States and Great Britain were to
make Egypt an initial grant of $70 million ($56 million from
the United States; $14 million from Britain) to prepare the
site for construction.
million.

The World Bank was to lend Egypt $200

Later, Egypt was to receive an additional American

loan of $130 million.

As its share of the costs, Egypt was to

20Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New Yorks
Schocken, 1967), pp. 3-19.
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contribute $900 million in local currency to cover the supply
of men, local materials and services.

Terms of the loans also

stipulated that Egypt was to harmonize its economy with the
Aswan High Dam project for ten years.

The Egypt ians would

also be expected to limit expenditures not only on arms but
also on social and health services.

"The Bank was ready to

advise the government which in turn was not to assume 'any
other obligation above a limit to be agreed upon between the
two parties or to weaken its credit in raising its share of
the money needed.'"

These were the strings to which Egypt

objected s therefore, the Nasser Government delayed accepting
the Western offer while it sought to obt a in better terms . 21
Meanwhile, the Western powers were beginning to have second
thoughts about participating in the project.

Nasser encouraged

Western disenchantment when, in an effort to protect Egypt from
a proposed United Nations arms embargo, suggested by Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev on April 27, 1956, during his visit
to Great Britain, Nasser recognized Red China on May 16, 1956. 22
This angered American officials who feared Nasser's too warm
relations with the Communist powers. 23
By early 1956, growing dissatisfaction in British and
21 Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt In Transition (New York:
Criterion, 1958), p. 468.
22Love, Suezs The TWice-Fought Wa r, op. cit., p. 18; and
Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

23Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 31.
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American circles with Nasser's politics led to increased reluc tance to continued participation in the Aswan High Dam project.
The British Government maintained that it was concerned about
t he ability of Egypt to cover its share of the expenditure fo r
the project since it had directed a growing proportion of its
cotton exports to pay for Soviet arms.

In addition, the Briti s h

were apprehensive of expanding Soviet influence in the Middle
East .

British "allies," particularly Iraq, were exerting pres-

sure on the British because they objected to what seemed to t hem
to be a Western policy of rewarding Egyptian "bullying" of the
West while nations friendly to the West were having difficulty
getting Western aid.

Furthermore, there was said to be evidence

throughout the Middle East of activity by Egyptian agents.

And

the ,.Voice of the Arabs" broadcast daily from Cairo hostile
propaganda against the West. 24

The American Administration,

t oo , was becoming disenchanted with Nasser (see belows Chapter I.),
and f or somewhat similar reasons.

In addition, there was Congres-

•
.
' t opposi' t 'ion t o ai'd ing
'
E gyp.
t ZS
sional
and Z1on1s

On July 19, 1956, Secretary of State Dulles told Egyptian
Ambassador Ahmed Hussein of the American decision not to partici pate in the Aswan High Dam.

In its official announcement the _

State Department cited as reasons for the American withdrawal
from the projects "Agreement by the riparian states has not
been achieved, and the (economic) ability of Egypt to devote
24Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Bostons Beacon
Press , 1960), pp. 47-48; and Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm,
1956-1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 93-94 and 97.
25Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
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adequate resources to assure the project's success has become
more uncertain than at the time the offer was made • ., 26

Within

days Britain and the World Bank also withdrew from the project.
Mohamed Heikal claimed that Nasser knew by April, 1956,
th~t the Americans were going to renege on their offer.

Heikal

attributed the intelligence to an Iraqi Minister who had passed
the Egyptians photographs of the documents and complete notes of
the top secret meeting in March, 1956, of Baghdad Pact ministers
in Teheran.

During the first week in July, in a discussion with

Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, Nasser
told Hussein that he had concrete evidence that the Americans
would not go through with the Aswan High Dam project.
demurred that the problem was with Congress~

Hussein

Heikal wrote that

Nasser told Hussein to go and tell Dulles that Egypt accepted
all

u. s.

conditions.

Nasser said: "Go and tell him that we

have accepted everything.

But don't humiliate us.

are not going to get the High Dam ... 27

Because we

In 1966• the British

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) produced a series of eight programs on the Suez crisis.

In a broadcast interview with Erskine

B. Childers, Nasser indicated: "I was surprised by the insulting
attitude with which the refusal was declared.
itself.•• 28

Not by the refusal

Yet, Nasser, who repeatedly expressed his preference

forwestem. aid, 29 sent Hussein to Washington to accept the

26 nAswan High Dam~(press release 401 dated July 19)," The
Department of State Bulletin (Hereafter: State Dept. Bul.), ·
Vol. 35, No. 892, July 30, 1958, P• 188.
27Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
28Anthony Moncrieff, ed., Suez: Ten Years After (New Yorks
Pantheon , 1967), pp. 43-44.
29tove, Suez, The TWice-Fought War , op. cit., PP• 317-318.
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American offer, perhaps, because he felt he had nothing to
loose by making one last effort to secure Western help 30
When Nasser first learned of the American decision on the
flight back from Brioni, Yugoslavia, he said to Dr. Mahmoud
Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister, and to Heikals "This is not
a withdrawal.

It is an attack on the regime and an invitation

to the people of Egypt to bring it down."

On July 21, 1956,

Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, and, according
to Heikal, on July 24, he broke the news to two or three members
of the Revolutionary Command Council.

In an Alexandria speech

to the Egyptian people on July 26, Nasser proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and announced Egyptian intentions
to use canal revenues to finance the Aswan High Darn project.
Heikal wrote: "The way in which Nasser announced the take-over,
the violence of his speech , and the insults he hurled at Britain
and the United States surprised (British Prime Minister) Eden ,
but there was no reason for his surprise because the insults
were deliberately calculated as a reply to the insulting fashion
in which Dulles withdrew his offer of help for the Aswan High
Dam."

After review of the Revolutionary Command Council's

situation report, which indicated that Britain did not have a
sufficiently powerful force in the area to intervene immediately,
and which estimated it would take two months to assemble s uch a
force, Nasser announced his decision.

Nasser estimated that if

Egypt could buy two months time by diplomacy, it would be safe
30J Bowyer Bell, The Long wars Israe l and the Arabs since
1946 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.1 Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 284.
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f rom attack because pressures against Eden would build. Although
be fore saw the possibility of combined Anglo-French intervention,
Nasser could not conceive the possibility that Britain would
ali gn itself with Israel against Egypt because, he felt, such
action would jeopardize the security of Britain's f riends and
Brita in's own position in the Arab world. 31
western reaction to the Egyptian announcement was sharp.
Bri t ish Prime Minister sir Anthony Eden was d i ning with the
Iraqi King and other Iraqi leaders when news of Nasser s
nationali zation of the Suez Canal arrived.

The dinner party

broke up early and Eden conferred with British Ministers Selwyn
Lloyd , Lord Salisbury, and Lord Home.
invite French Ambassador Chauvel and

The British decided to

u. s .

Charge d'Affairs

Fost e r to participate in their consultations.

In his memoirs,

Eden wrote: "In our judgement the economic life of Western
Europe was threatened with disrupti on by the Egyptian seizure
of the canal.

Here was an issue of the first importance, in

whi ch an international agreement was at stake

We ought

immediately to concert steps between our three Governments.•• 32
I n a BBC documentary on the Suez crisis, broadcast on
July 14, 1966, former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
indi c ated French think ing on Nasser's nationalization of the
Suez Canal.

Pineau noted that Nasser's action was seen by the

Algerian people {then in revolt against French rule) as a sue31Heikal, Cairo Documents , op. cit., pp. 68, 85-107
3 "-Eden,
2~

• i• s, op. cit.,
•
Suez Cris
p. 52 •

19

cess . ~or the entire Arab world.
dangerous if we did nothing."

"For us (France) it was very

Pineau revealed that, a year or

two prior to Suez, France increased military aid to Israel to
enable it to serve as a counter-balance to Nasser s power in
Egypt .

Then Pineau cited the fact that Egypt would not let

Israeli merchant shipping pass through the Suez Canal.

He

expressed his personal apprehension that Nasser might likewise
blockade the Canal to French shipping.

"That (was) very

dangerous for us because at this period we had ••• some very big
interest in the Far East."

An additional factor was French

concern that if the West accepted Nasser's nationalization of
the Canal, it would be "impossible" for developing countries
to obtain private and government investment capital because
of the fear of additional expropriations.

Pineau claimed that

this was a more important consideration than has been generally
recognized.
Later in the broadcast, the Foreign Editor of Le Monde
at the time of Suez, M. Andre Fontaine, explained that there
was a strong .French feeling of solidarity with Israel.

Further,

the Radical components of the French Government felt that "a victory over Nasser would kill the roots of the rebellion in Algeria,
and would bring about a possibility of finding a solution to
that irritating problem."

For these reasons, the French went

to war at Suez, and the war was very popular among the French
people. 33
33Moncrieff, Suez: Ten Years After, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
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Fol l owing receipt of Eden•s proposal for an immedi at e
conference of the British, French and American fore ign ministers,
on Jul y 28, 1956, President Eisenhower authorized the d ispatch Of
Deputy Under Secret ary of State Robert D. Murphy to London.

In a

series of frank , private dis cussions with British and French
leade rs in London, he learned of the seriousness with which they
regarded Nas ser's nat ionalization of the Suez Canal.

Murphy was

informed t hat the British Government r egarded Suez as a t e s t and
that it must make a stand.
British.

The French were in agreement with the

Both were prepared to undertake military action t o re-

turn t he canal to international control.
British and French "seemed to assume"

Murphy noted that the

u. s .

involvement in their

plans , and he cabled Eisenhower to relay what he had learnea. 34
On J uly 31, 1956, Dulles departed for London for three-power
talks on the Suez situa tion.

The discussions between the British,

French , and Americans res~lted in agreement to convene an international conference of Suez Canal users to discuss means to return t he canal to international cont rol.

With this Three Power

decision began a long series of f ruitless international conf erences during which t he British and French made military preparations for invas ion of Egypt to retake the Suez Canal.

Mean-

while , the United States sought to use these conferences to f orestall Anglo-French military act ion .

Early in the crisis the r e

developed a split between the Americans and the British and French
over t he use of f orce to s e ttle the Suez dispute.

The

u. s .

was

opposed t o a f orceful solution ; Britain and France were not.
Britain and France wanted the First London Conference to
3~obert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City,
N. Y. : Pantheon, 1967), pp. 43-44.
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meet a s s oon as possible.
preparati on.

Dulles favored several weeks of

The compromise date of August 16, 1956 , was

final l y agreed upon.

TWenty-four countries were i nvited to

attend the Fi rst London Confe rence; included were the eigh t
surviving signatories of the Constantinople Convention of 1888
and t he sixteen principal us ers of the canal on the basis of
tonnage and trade .
The First London Conference met from August 16 to
Augus t 23, 1956.

The conference concluded with presentation

of a majority proposal and a minor ity proposal .

The minority

proposal, offered by India on August 20, 1958, called for
establ i shment of a c onsultative committee of c anal users while
leaving the canal under Egyptian control.

Backers of the

Indi an proposal were, India, the Soviet Union, I ndonesia, and
Ceylon.

The majority proposal was introduced by Se c retary of

State Dulles on August 20.

Following minor ame ndment, it was

adopt e d on August 23 , 1956, by 18 of t he 22 na t i ons attending
"

the conference.

A committee .~f· r e presentative s of five nations

led by Australian Prime Mini ster Robert Menzi es was appointed
to " present and expla i n " the Plan to Egyptian President Nasser.
On September 3, 1956, the Me nzi es committee me t with
Nasser for the f irst time.

But t he series of meetings between

the Egypt ian leader and the commit t e e were destined to fail.
On September 9, Egypt r e ject e d t he proposa ls of the First
London con ference.

While t he Menzies c ommittee was negoti ating

in Cairo, Dulles was vaca tioning on Duck Island, where it
occurred to him that the c ana l user s "had the equivalent of an
•easement • on t he waterway, a legal r i ght that they could band
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t oge the r to protect and exercise against the man who t hreatened
to deprive t hem of its use ... 35

From this the Suez Canal Users•

Association was evolve d by Dulles and pre sented to the British
and t he French .

Reluctantly they agreed to convene a Second

London Confe rence to discuss ways of implementing the concept. 36
On Se pt ember 12, 1956, Prime Minis ter Anthony Eden announced to Parliament plans for establishing the Users• Association .

The eighteen nat ions which had supported the majority

plan of the First London Conference met on September 19 to
cons ider the scheme for a Canal Users' As sociation.
on t he Association was reached on September 21.

Agreement

As formulated,

SCUA was to collect canal tolls from Users and to furni s h
pilot s f or User ships.

In' the event Egypt could not run the

canal, or attempted to close it to the Users, they would pass
t hrough the canal with the aid of their own pilots.

The suc-

cessfu l Egyptian operation of the canal, following the pull-out
of Eur opean pilots on September 15, 1956, and Dulles• earlier
statement of September 13 that the

u. s.

did not intend to shoot

its way t hrough the canal should Nasser refuse cooperation to
Assoc iation ships, deprived SCUA of all significance.

I t is

difficult to believe that SCUA could have been made to work
without at least having the threat of force to induce Nasser's
compliance.

On the heels of these developments, the British

and Fr ench decided to place the Suez dispute before the United
35John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959 (New
Yor ks Harper, 1959), p. 267.
36E d en, Suez Crisis,
' '
op. c1' t . , P• 113 •
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Nations Security Council.

This they did on September 23. 37

They took the step without prior notification of the

u. s.

Dulles learned of the Anglo-French decision when his plane
landed in the United States. 38 This action signaled a widen ing
rift to American policy-makers between themselves and the
British and French. (see below: Chapter I.)
On October 5, 1956, the United Nations began consideration
of the Suez question.

In secret discussions, the foreign

ministers of Egypt, France and Britain agreed to Six Principles
for further negotiations.
Six Principles unanimously.

The Security Council approved the
However, the Soviet Union vetoed

the British implementing resolution which implied that the
majority plan of the Fir st London Conference met the requirements of the Six Principles
of negotiations ended.

On October 13, the long series

SCUA, weak at birth, lingered and

languished in inconclusive organization efforts.
During the various conferences, British and French preparations for military action against Egypt proceeded.

Britain ,

which had geared its defense forces either to all out nuclear
war with Russia, or to counter insurgency in colonies, had
little potential to wage limited or conventional war.

There-

fore, there could be no immediate British response to the
Egyptian challenge.

It would require a minimum of six weeks

37Michel Bar-Zohar, Sueza Ultra-Secret (Parisi Fayard,

1964), pp. 132-133.

38aerman Finer, Dulles Over Suezs The Theory And Practice
Of His Diplomacy (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1964), P• 261.
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to prepare the assault. 39
The military operation was to be under the general
direction of the British Middle East theatre with the French
participating in an integrated system of command.
retained final say in decision-making.

The British

Initial plans called

for an Anglo-French landing at Alexandria, with an advance on
Cairo.

The landing was to take place on September 15.

The

plan was altered around September 10 to provide for an attack
at Port Said, with an advance along, and confined to, the Suez
Canal.

40

In the months of military planning and international
conference-holding, the British gave the French the impression

.

that they were hesitant to undertake military operations
against Egypt due to American pressure and Dulles• diplomatic
acrobatics.

As a result of British hesitation, the French

decided in September, 1956, to seek Israeli participation in
the venture.

Towards the end of 1955, Israeli spokesmen Moshe

Sharett, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres went to Europe in search
of arms.

Dayan and Peres attempted to discover the French

attitude toward an Israeli preventive war against Egypt.

They

learned that the French were not averse to the idea. 41
39Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1967), pp. 41-43; A. J. Barker, Suez, The Seven Day
~ (New Yorks Praeger, 1964), pp. 25-26; and Townsend Hoopes,
The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973),
p. 347.
40Andre Beaufre, The Suez Expedition 1956 (New York:
Praeger, 1969), pp. 27-28, 37 and 49.
41 Bar Zohar, Sueza Ultra-Secret, op. cit., pp. 135-138.
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In renewed discussions between French and Israeli leaders,
beginning in September, 1956, a Franco-Is raeli accord was
reached.

I srael would attack Egypt in a preventive war pro-

viding France with the pretext to sei ze the canal i n order to
keep it open.

Fr ench leaders then pers uaded the Br i tish to

agree t o the operation with I s rael,

On October 16, 1956,

British Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Se c retary Lloyd met
for t a l ks behind closed doors in Paris wi t h French Premier
Moll et and Foreign Minister Pineau.

At that mee ting, the Br itish

gave t heir agreement to the Franco-Israeli scheme, 42
On October 29, Israel launched an a t tack against the undermanned Egyptian positions in Sinai.

In anticipation of an Anglo-

French attack, Nasser had previously ordered the rede ployment
of troops from the Sinai to defend Alexandria, where he expected
the Franco-British attack to come, 43
On October 30, the British and French issued an ultimatum
to Israel and Egypt to withdraw t heir t r oops t e n miles from
either side of the Canal.

If either failed to c omply, there

42 rbid. , pp. 149- 158; and Beaufre, Suez Expedition,
op . c i t., pp, 65-74.
43Love, sueza The Twice - Fought War, op. cit., p. 490; and
Bell , Long Wa r, op. ci t ., p . 310. Bell commented, "This move
left (Egyptian Sinai Commander } General (Ali Ali} Amer with a
few more than 30,000 troops and, sti ll worse, with an impression
that t he main threat would not be to Sinai •••• To complicate
matters, the transport bringing the Egyptian officers back from
Damascus (following the s i gning of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian
defense pact) was shot down on t he eve of Kadesh (code-name for
the I s r aeli battle plan), r e moving at one stroke most of the
Egyptian senior commanders. Amer, who had taken a different
plane back to Cairo, escaped. On October 29, therefore, the
Sinai command had too few troops, a disoriented high command,
vulnerable positions, and no hint of dange r ...
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would be an Anglo-French occupation of the canal.

The ultimatum

would have required Egyptian forces still fighting in Sinai to
withdraw from the Peninsula to the opposite side of the Suez
canal .

As expected, Egypt rejected the ultimatum.

to accept it, if Egypt would also accept.

Israel agreed

Following the Anglo-

French ultimatum, the remaining Egyptian forces were also ordered
by Nasse r, at noon on November 1, to fall back in order to avoid
their being trapped in the Sinai . by the anticipated Anglo-French
'
advance along t he canal. 44 The order
was given too l ate.
Heikal reported that Nasser spent a l most the entire previous
night debating with General Abdel Hakim Amer, Egyptian commanderin-chief, whether to evacuate the Sinai.
drawai . 45

Amer opposed the with-

Delay of the or der contributing to the ensuing

chaos . Bell commenteds

0

If a general evacuation order had gone

out much earlier, immediately after the Anglo-French ultimatum,
there would have been a far better chance to withdraw in an
orderly fashion, maintaining cohesion for a defense against the
anticipated landing.

By November 1, however, with little hope

of air support, the disorganized columns were extremely vulnerable to air strikes and armored pursuit •••• By evening the Sinai
defense had t urned into a shambles , for once withdrawal began
the army had turned into a mob." 46 The fighting performance of
those Egyptian units which did stand and fight seemed to justify
4 4r.ove, Suez: The TWice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 490; and

Bell , Long War, op. cit., p. 327.
45Heikal
•
'
Documen t s , =o,._p__........
t.
, Cairo
c ...1'....
46

Bell , Long War, op. cit. , p. 327.

,

P• 109 •
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Bell ' s conclusion, "Cert ainly, if the Egyptians had felt free
to commi t their total f orces, the campaign would have lasted
slight l y longer, but the outcome could hardly have been
differen t . 047
On Octobe r 30, in the Secur ity Council , Britain and France
vetoed

u. s .

and Soviet resolutions c a ll i ng for a cease-fire

and withdrawal of I sraeli f orces behind the Egypt ian-Israeli
armistice lines.

In the days to follow, there was strong

opposition to the armed invasions of Egypt.
ous

u. s .

u. s.

There were strenu-

dipl omatic efforts i n the Unite d Nations to halt t he

aggr ession in the Middle East.

Following Israeli, British , and

French acceptance of the Uni t ed Nations General Assembly ceasefire resolut ion of November 2, the Eisenhower Admini stration
continued

u. s.

pressure to compel withdrawal of all British,

French , and I sraeli forces f rom Egypt in compliance with United
Nations resol utions .
Al l that lay in the future as British and French air force s
struck at Egyptian airfields on October 31.

The security Council

called an emergency sessi on of the General Assembly which, on
November 2, called for a Middle Eastern cease-fire , and the
withdrawal of all attacking forces.

The following day, I srael

agreed to the cease-fire, provided Egypt did likewise .
On November 5, Briti s h pa ratroops landed a t Port Said, and
French paratroops landed a t Port Fuad.

The Br itish pound ster-

ling came under intense spe c ulat ive pre s s ure.
47 I bid., P• 356.

The United States
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blocked British drawing of funds from the World Bank.
was great Labor Party outcry within Parliament.

The

There

u. s. s.

R.

sent Britain, France, and Israel notes threatening the use of
nuclear force to end their aggression.

This combination of

pressures led Britain to induce France to accept
sored cease-fire.

au.

N. spon-

On November 7, all hostilities were termi-

nated along the Suez Canal.

British-French forces stopped

their advance 23 miles south of Port said at El Cap--far shor t
of their objectives of retaking the Canal, and of unseating
Nasser.

48

On November 7, the United Nations General Assembly agreed
to establish a United Nations Emergency Force composed of troops
from non-permanent members of the security Council.

The purpose

of the Emergency Force was to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt.

Egypt agreed formally to

accept the United Nations force on November 12, provided Egyptian sovereignty would not be infringed.
tingents arrived ' in Egypt on November 15.

The first UNEF conThe last British and

French troops withdrew from Suez on December 22, 1956.

The

question of Israeli withdrawal remained to be settled in the
new year.
American policy during the Suez crisis was quite unpopular
among many sectors of American public opinion.
raised about the

u. s.

u. s.

Questions were

role in causing the crisis and about

refusal to support its friends--Britain and France, in

particular.
48

Calls were made repeatedly for a new American

h
,
Antony
Nutting,
No End Of A Lessons The Story Of Suez
(New York: Potter, 1967), pp. 17-18, 27, 31-35 and 58; and
Beaufre, Suez Expedition , op. cit., p. 31.
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policy towards the Middle East.

(see, Chapters IV and

v.)

Apparently bowing to popular sentiment, and recognizing
the growth of a Middle Eas·tern power vacuum following on the
heels of the abortive Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, the
Eisenhower Administration sought a Congressional resolution
to fill the "power deficit" and to counter Soviet penetration
of the Middle East.

On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower

appeared before a joint session of Congress to request legislative support for an Administration proposal for granting
Middle Eastern nations economic and military assistance, and
for employment of

u. s. armed forces pon behalf ,of 'l;latiohs ·of

the region requesting such aid "against overt armed aggression
from any nation controlled,; by International Communism ... 49
Eisenhower s address became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Congressional support was given on March 9, 1957, in the Middle
East Resolution .

On March 16, Lebanon was the first and only

Arab state to subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

This Lebanese

step later contributed to the outbreak of the Lebanese crisis of
1958.
Eisenhower reported that as early as November 8, 1956,
Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban had transmitted a message from Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion to him indicating
Israeli intentions to withdraw from Egypt "upon conclusion of
satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection
49 "The Eisenhower Doctrines Special Message to the Congress
on the Situation in the Middle East , January 5, 1957," Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States senate, A Select Chronology
And Background Documents Relating To The Middle East (Washington,
D. c.: u. s. Govt. Printing Office, 1969), p. 148.
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with this international force entering the Suez Canal area." 5 0
After stating that the Israeli Government never declared
any intention to annex Sinai , Ben-Gurion•s paraphrased account
of his November 8th letter to the

u. s .

the substance of Eisenhower's report.
then he "poin

President confirmed
Ben-Gution recalled that

d out that,although as a result of our operation

fedayun bases had been destroyed, it was necessary to repeat
our urgent request to the United Nations to call upon Egypt to
renounce her status as a belligerent, implying war with Israel,
to abandon her policy of blockade and boycott, to cease sending
murder gangs into Israeli territory, and to enter into direct
peace negotiations with Israel."Sl
On December 3, the d~y, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn
Lloyd announced that Britain and France would withdraw from
Egypt, Israel began its pull-back of troops in Sinai.

However,

with the coming of the new year, Israeli troops still controlled
much of the •sinai Peninsula.

Israel was extremely reluctant

to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and the Straits of
Tiran until it received guarantees of open transit through the
Straits and assurances that the Gaza Strip would not once again
become a base for fedayeen operations against Israeli territory.
Israel argued that the latter could be achieved through United
Nations administration of the Gaza Strip.
comply with repeated

u.

Israeli refusal to

N. withdrawal resolutions caused a tense

diplomatic drama whose purpose was to win Israeli compliance with
General Assembly resolutions.

The United States played a key role .

50Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 95.
51 oavid Ben-Gurion, Israeli Years of Challenge (London:
Anthony Blond , 1964), PP• 140-141.
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On February 2, 1957, the United Nations General Assembly
passed two resolutions supported by Ameri can United Nations
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., demanding, for the sixth
t i me , Israel 's immediate withdrawal, and calling for restoration
of t he 1949 I srael-Egypt a rmistice line.

u.

I srael rejected the

N. resolutions the next day.
On February 11, American Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles h anded Israeli Ambassador Eban an aide memoire which
i ndicated the American position that no nation had the right
to prohibit free and innocent passage through the Strai ts of
Ti ran , and that the

u. s.

was "prepared to exercise the right

of free and innocent passage and to join with others to s ecure
general rec ognition of this right." 52
t

'

Israel continued to stall.

This forced the United State s

to cons ide r support for United Nations sanctions against Israel
as a means to compel Israeli adherence to
r esolutions.

u.

N, withdrawal

In a nationwide radio and television address on

February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower repeate d the prior

u. s .

pos ition of s upport for

u.

N. administrat ion of the

Gaza St r i p , with Egypt's approval; and on free and innocent
passage of the Straits.

Noting Israel's continued r e luctance

to wi thdraw without firm guarantees, the President argued
t his threa t ened the surviv al of the United Nations f or it
r ewarded aggression.

To ward against this, Eise nhower indicated

t hat the United Nations had "no choice but t o exert pres sure
52 "Aide Memoire From Secr etary Dulles to Israeli Ambassador
to the Unite d States Abba Eban , February 11, 1957," Committee
on Fore ign Relations, A Sele c t Chronology, op cit., PP• 156157 ,
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upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.•• 53
On February 22, 1957, Lebanon, Iraq, the Sudan, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Indonesia introduced a resolution calling for
the termination of all military, economic and financial assi stance to Israel.
a vote.

Au. N. sanctions resolution was moving toward

It never was taken.

On March 1, 1957, Israeli Foreign

Minister Mrs. Golda Meir announced to the General Assembly
Israel's decision upon .. full and complete withdrawal" of i ts
forces.

The last Israeli troops left Egypt on March 16.

They

had returned along the coast with armored vehicles from Sharm
el-Sheikh. 54

In the diplomatic maneuvering to convince Israel

to accept American assurances, the French played an important
role. 55

With the withdrawal of Israeli troops the long Suez

crisis came to an end.
The Lebanon Crisis
Unlike the Suez crisis which was international in scope
and origin, the Lebanon crisis was local in origin and initially
local in scope.

It arose from a dispute between indigenous

Lebanese factions and was reinforced by international factors.
There were religious overtones to the dispute.

Support for

Lebanese President Camille Chamoun came generally from among
53 "Question of Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Egyptian
Territory: {Radi o and Television) Address by President Eisenhower, February 20," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 36, No. 924, March 11,
1957, pp. 389-390.
5'\ove, Suez: The TWice Fought War, op. cit., p. 669.
55aar Zohar, suezt Ultra-secret, op. cit., pp. 217-218.
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the Christian sects of Lebanon.

Opposition support c ame

largely, but not exc lus ively, from among Lebanon's Moslem
groups .
Chamoun•s subscription to the Eisenhower Doctrine on
March 16 , 1957 , was very unpopular bot h in Lebanon and in neighboring Arab states.

Lebanese Opposition l eaders c ons i dered

chamoun •s action repudiation of the National Pact of 1943, which
provided for neutrality in international re l ations and cooperation , but not union, with other Arab states.

Lebanese

Opposit i on leaders expressed their objections to the Government 's policy in debates over a vote of confidence for the
foreign and domestic policies of Lebanese Premier Sami es-Solh
on April 4 and 5, 1957. 56
The situation in Lebanon was aggravated by the r eputed
r eadiness of President Chamoun to seek a second six-year term
as Pre s ident.

Since it was unconstitutional f or the Lebanese

Presiden t to succeed himself, the constitution would have to
be amended.

Four important Opposition representatives--Ahmed

al-Assad , Kamal Junblatt, Abdallah al-Yafi, and Saeb Salam-l ost t he ir traditi onal seats in the fraudulent parliamentary
elections of June, 1957. 57

The elections resulted in over-

whelming v ictory for Chamoun supporters, and fed speculation
that the way was being prepared for a constitut ional amendment
56Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation (Bloomington•
Indiana University Press, 1965 ), pp. 125-126.
57Fahirn I . Qubain, Crisis I n Lebanon (Washingt on, D. c.1
Middle East Institute , 1961 ) , pp. 56-57.
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to permit Chamoun to hold a second term. 58
The formation of the united Arab Republic (u. A. R. ) by
Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, and the subsequent v i sit
to Damascus, Syria, by u. A. R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser
on February 24, 1958, contributed to the divisions in Lebanon.
Lebanese supporters of Arab unity--primarily Moslems--welc omed
enthusiastically formation of the

u.

A. R.

Scores of Nas s er

supporters journeyed from Lebanon to Damascus to take par t i n
the festivities surrounding Nasser's visit.

These factors

created strong fears among some segments of the Lebanese public-particularly among the Maronite Christians--that Lebanon ' s
independence was threatened.

"Nasir•s visit also hardened the

lines of division between the opposition and its followers , and
the government and its supporters, and made them extremely
suspicious of each other and willing to give any move the
.
.
59
worst interpretation."
On the night of May 7, 1958, Opposition editor Nassib
al-Matni was assassinated.

His assailants were never found.

The Opposition blamed his death on the Chamoun regime.

Riots

and strikes broke out in Lebanon.

Opposition leaders cal l ed
. a·iate resigna
. t·ion. 60
for Chamoun•s imme
The Lebanese army of 9,000 played a strange role throughout the crisis.

Its entire strength was never committed t o

suppress the revolt, nor to uphold the Chamoun Government.
58Meo, Lebanon , Improbable Nation, op. cit., p. 147.
59 Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., P• 63.
60Desmond Stewart, Turmoil In Beirut (London: Allan
Wingate, 1958), p. 23ff.
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Army commander-in-chief Gene ral Fuad Chehab was reluctant to
commit his ethnically divided army to either side in the crisis
for fear of tearing the army itself apart .

He preferred to

preserve its record of political impartiality, and to maintain
its integrity as a cohesive force .

Thus , Chehab employed the

army to referee the conflict, conta ining the opposing forces
in their respective strongholds.

He ignored orders from the

President and Prime Ministe r to crush the rebels. 61
Following the outbreak of disturbances in Lebanon, Chamoun
inquired of the British, French , and American Ambassador s whether
their Governments would respond to a Lebanese call f or help.
TWo days later, t he three Governments replied in the affirmative.
Chamoun wrote:
/

•

/"

I

•

\

•

•

•

••• cette demarche avait ete faite a titre d 'information.
Esperant en un redressement de la situation par le gouvernement libanaise lui-meme, j•etais decide a n•avoir recours
une i ntervention etrangere
la derniere l imite, au
moment ou elle apparaitre comme la seule mesure capable de
sauver le pays de l'anarchie et de la guerre civile , et de
preserve sa souverainete. Avant d'en arriver la , il ,tait
tout naturel de deployer le maximum de notre effort. Par
ailleurs , nous comptions demeurer dans le cadre de la
legalite internationale tant par rapport a la Ligue des
Etats Arabesque par rapport a l'Organisation des Nations
Unies •••• 62

a

qu•a

Before replying favorably to the Lebanese request, President
61 Meo , Lebanon, Improbable Nation, op. cit., pp. 176-177;
and Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 81.
62 " ••• This step had been taken as a point of information.
Hoping for an improvement in the situation by the Lebanese government itself, I had decided not to have recourse to foreign intervention except as a last resort, at the moment when it appeared
as the only measure capable of saving the country from anarchy
and civil war, and to preserve its sovereignty. Before it came
to that , it was completely natural to deploy the maximum of our
effort. Incidentall y , we planned to stay within the limits of
international law while reporting to the Arab League and to the
United Nations •••• " Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient
(Parisi Editi on Gallimard , 1963), pp. 414-415.
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Eisenhower and Briti sh Prime Minister Harold Macmillan consulted
by transat lantic telephone. 63

In May and June, t he Eisenhower

Admi nistration prepared American public opin ion for a possible

u. s. intervention i n Lebanon.

Initially they based their

policy on a loose interpretation of the Eisenhower Doc trine.
(see: Chapter VI.)
On May 21, 1958, Lebanon placed its complaint of massive

u. A. R. infiltration of arms and men into its territory before
the Arab League, and,on May 22, before the United Nations Security
counci l .

The Security Council adjourned until June 3, pending

the ou tcome of Arab League efforts to cope with the Lebanese
situation.

Following Arab League inability to agree on a resolu-

tion, the Security Council was reconvened.

On J une 11, the

Security Council resolved to establish a United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL) to determine the amount of

u.

A. R. intervention in Lebanon.

On June 13, the Observation

Group began its activities in the tiny Middle Eastern country.
Upon his return from the Middle East,

u.

N. Secretary-

General Dag Hammarskjold told reporters at his news conference
of July 3, that there was "no foundation° to support a judgement of "mass infiltration" of men and arms into Lebanon.

On

63 Eisenhower, Waging Peace , op. cit., p. 266; and Harold
Macmi l lan, Riding The Storm , 1956-1959 (New Yorks Harper & Row,
1971 ), p. 506. If, as Meo and Qubain suggested , Chamoun had
previously informed the American, British, and French Ambassador s in Beirut of his de t ermination to s eek a constitutional
amendment to make possible hi s re-election, and if, as Meo
impl i ed, the u. s. had a t firs t indicated its approval of a
second term for Chamoun, then the Eisenhower Administration had
littl e c hoice but to respond i n the affirmati ve to Chamoun•s
query , or to lose face. See s Qubain, Cris is In Lebanon, .Q.P•
£!:!:.., p. 65; and Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, op. cit.,
p . 1 96.
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July 4, release of the preliminary UNOGIL report indicated
that the "vast majority (of rebels) was ••• composed of Lebanese."64
In early July it seemed to the Eisenhower Administration
that

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon woul d not be called for.

American policy was to support the
and the

u.

N. Observation Group.

u. N. Secretary-General
Secretary of State Dulles

expressed confidence in UNOGIL's ability to ameliorate the
65
.
s i tuation.
On July 14, 1958 , the pro-Western Iraqi regime was
violently overthrown .

The United States was taken by surpri se,

having received littl e advance intelligence of the i mpending
coup. 66

President Camille Chamoun summoned the Ambassadors

of Britain, France, and the United States, e ach in turn, and
requested their help in defending his regime.

Chamoun claimed

that he explained to each Ambassador that he had refrained f rom
requesting the intervention of their respective countries i n
the hope that the Lebanese Government would succeed, without
their military assistance, to reestablish order and securit y .
But the revolution in Iraq created an entirely new and grave
situation, menacing not only Lebanon , but the entire Middl e East.
He felt that it was time for them to honor their commitments. 67
The accuracy of part of Chamoun•s account is called into question
6 4r.indesay Parrott , "U. N. Lacks Proof Of Beirut Charge, "
New York Times, July 4, 1958, p. l; and "Excerpts From Report
of u. N. Observers on Conflict in Lebanon," New York Ti e s,
July 5, 1958, P• 2.
65 .,secreta ry Dulles• News Conference of July 1," State
Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 995, July 21 , 1958 , p . 106.
66Andrew Tully , CIAt The Inside Story (New Yorks William
Morrow, 1962), p. 76.
67chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient , op. cit., PP • 423-424.
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by Charles

w.

Thayer's report that the American Ambassador to

Lebanon, Robert McClintock, received several calls from Chamoun
for

u. s.

assistance.

After renewed rioting in June, Chamoun

sent word to McClintock, through a special emissary, that the
time had come for American intervention.

The Ambassador, who

did not agree, refused to accept the emissary's message,
insisting that Chamoun himself must make so grave a request.
on another occasion, Chamoun withdrew his appeal for help when
McClintock demanded it in writing • • Chamoun, who had been
barricaded in his palace for weeks behind steel shutters,
snatched a piece of paper and began to write.

As he wrote,

his anxiety subsided, and he merely slipped the paper into his
desk drawer. 68

1

The United States decided to intervene in Lebanon "to stop
the trend toward chaos,•• and to protect the remaining Western
interests in the area. 69 u. s. Marines landed in Lebanon on
July 15, 1958.

Simultaneously, the United States initiated

a diplomatic offensive in the Security Council.

In response

to a similar request from King Hussein, British troops were
airlifted to Jordan on July 17, 1958.

The United States

cooperated closely with the British during the period of their
concurrent interventions, airlifting supplies and ensuring
Israeli cooperation on the overflights. 70
68 charles
pp. 24-25.

w.

Thayer, Diplomat (New Yorks Harper, 1959),

69Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 269-270.
70 rbid., pp. 278-280; and Macmillan, Riding The Storm,
op. cit., pp. 523-525.
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United Nations Security Council debate of the Middle
Eastern crises ended in deadlock on July 22, 1958.

American

efforts to get the U, N. to assume the American role of policing
Lebanon, and to guarantee Jordanian peace, were vetoed by the
Russians.
Even before the deadlocked Security Council adjourned,
soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, on July 19, began a long series
of fruitless public exchanges of letters with Wes tern leaders
by suggesting a summit conference of Heads of Government of the

u. s. s.

R,, the

u. s. A. ,

Great Britain, France, and India,

with the participation of U, N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in Geneva on July 22. 71

The Russian proposal was coun-

tered by an Anglo-American suggestion to hold the proposed
summit conference in the United Nations Security Council under

u.

N. auspices , and in accordance with

u.

N. rules of procedure.

Several letter exchanges followed the initial exchange.

The

West and the Russians waged propaganda battle over the form
and setting of the proposed summit.

The matter came to a head

when, foll owing a visit to Peking, Khrushchev backed out of the
summit and called for a meeting of the United Nations General
Assembly .

The United States quickly agreed to a General

Assembly session,
In the meantime, Under Secretary of State Robert D Murphy
had been sent to Lebanon by Eisenhower to attempt to work out
a solution with Lebanese leaders.

Murphy 's e fforts were sue-

71 "First Exchange: Premier Khrushchev to the President
(Unofficial Translation)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX,
No. 998, Aug. 11, 1958, PP• 231-233.
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cessful.

The Lebanese agreed on the need to elect a c ompromise

candidate to the Presidency immediately. 72

On July 31, 1958,

General Fuad Chehab was elected President of Lebanon on the
second ballot.
The United Nations General Assembly was called into session
on August 8, 1958.

Originally the United Nations Secretariat

had prepared a plan for the Middle East to be presented a t the
proposed summit.

When the summit did not materialize, Secr etary-

General Hammarslcjold decided to present the plan to the General
Assembly.

Because some diplomats feared the General Assembly

session would become a propaganda duel , Hammarskjold•s presentation was advanced to the keynote position in order to es tablish a positive tone for the debate . 73
called fora 1. extension of

u.

The Secretary-General

N. activities in Lebanon and

Jordan; 2 . Arab mutual reaffirmation of their intention no t to
interfere in each other's inter nal affairs; and 3. Arab c ooperation in joint economic development through coordination of
Arab oil and water resources . 74
On August 13, 1958 , President Eisenhower addressed the
General Assembly.

The Eisenhower six-point proposal closely

paralleled the Hammarskjold plan.

In addition to elaborating

on the Secretary-Genera1•s points, Eisenhower requested Gene ral
72Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., P• 407.
73 Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjold And Crisis Diplomacy
(New Yorks Oceana, 1962), P,. 198.
740 Texts of Statements at u. N. Assembly Session on Middle
East," New York Times, Aug. 9, 1958, p . 2.
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Assembly reaffirmation of

u.

N. policy against inflammatory

propaganda , creation of a standby United Nations peace force,
and establishment of au. N. body to make arrangements for an
arms control program for the Middle East. 75
Little was made of the Hammarskjold, Eisenhower and other
proposals.

It looked as though the General Assembly was about

to become hopelessly deadlocked.

But ten Arab states--Iraq,

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United
Arab Republic , and Yemen--introduced an Arab Resolution calling
for Arab non-interference in each other's affairs, and calling
upon the Secretary-General to facilitate the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

The Arab Resolution

was passed unanimously by the General Assembly on August 21,
1958. 76

Its passage, to all intents and purposes, ended the

Lebanon crisis.
General Fuad Chehab assumed office on September 24, 1958,
and named Rashid Karami Premier.

Karami appointed an eight-

man cabinet, all but one of its members drawn from the Opposition.

This caused an extremely tense period from September 25

to October 14, during which Chamoun supporters struck, erected
barricades , demonstrated against the Chehab Government, and
clashed with t he police.

The new outbreak of hostilities was

ended when Karami announced the formation of a new four~man
75 .,Program for the Near East: Address by President Eisenhower," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 1001, Sept. 1, 1958,
pp. 337-342.
76 "Text of (Arab) Resolution (U. N. doc. A/Res./1237
(ES-III) )," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 1003, Sept. 15,
1958, pp. 411-412.
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cabinet, two ministers from each side in the controversy. 77

order was restored to Lebanon. The last American troops were
quietly withdrawn on October 25, 1958, bringing the American
involvement in Lebanon officially to an end.
Criteria of Selection .
In the following chapters, we shall try to examine the

relationship between the Eisenhower Administration and the
American press during these two Middle Eastern crises.

our

study will concentrate on the printed news media*--newspapers,
newsmagazines, opinion journals ,

and

scholarly journals--which

treat politically significant news and political opinion,
Specific criteria of selection were used for the separate
categories .

In all cases, accessibility was a prime

consideration .
Newspaperss The American newspaper industry, among world news
systems , is unusual.

In other countries, national newspapers

are issued in one or two major cities, and are distributed
throughout the nation as the primary serious journals .

In the

united States , the news is distributed primarily by a highly
fragmented complex of local newspaper firms .

The United States

has no national newspaper available in all parts of the country
at its time of publication.

The three American papers which

come closest to being national newspapers are the New York Times ,

.

the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science Monitor.
77Qubain , Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., pp. 158-159 .
*In this work, the term .. American press" refers
specifically to the English language press ~rinted in the
United States. Study of the foreign language press printed
in the u. s. was not included.

k
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Despite its great influence, the New York Times, printed
only in New York City, does not displace a significant portion
of national newspaper reading or sales.
The Wall Street Journal, published in six different cities,
is more available than any other American daily.

It specializes

in business and financial news.
The Christian Science Monitor of Boston is distributed
nationwide.

Its readership is small.

Between 1940 and 1968, total American newspaper circulation
increased by 50 per cent.

But two of these three national dailies

out-paced the general rate of growth.

In New York state, the

Wall Street Journal's circulation increased 2,100 per cent, but
outside the state its circulation rose 4,700 per cent.

The~

York Times's circulation in greater New York went up 30 per cent,
but outside that area, it rose 165 per cent.

While the Christian

Science Monitor's circulation in Boston actually dropped, elsewhere in the country it rose 26 per cent. 78 Thus, nationally
these papers are becoming increasingly important as news sources.
Our study of American newspaper coverage of the Suez and
Lebanon crises will concentrate on these three great papers
because of their recognized national prominence.

Their status

was acknowledged by the Eisenhower Administration , as evidenced
by their frequent invitation to background news briefings.
Chapter II and Appendixes Band

c.)

(sees

Their standing has also

78 Ben H. Bagdikian, ,.Some Peculiarities of American News,"
in David J. Leroy and Christopher H. Sterling, eds., Mass Newss
Practices, Controversies and Alternatives (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.1 Prentice-Hall, 1973), PP• 17-25.
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been attes t ed to by newsmen.

In a survey conducted in the middle

sixties, Washington press corps newsmen r anked newspapers they
used in their own work, and graded them on f airness and reliability.

The r e sults of the survey are g i ven bel ows

NEWSPAPERS USED IN WORK
New York Times
Washi ngton Post
Washington Star
Wall Street Journal
Baltimore sun
New York Herald Tribune
Washins,ton News
Christian Science Moni tor
Journa l of Comme rce
The Guardian
NEWSPAPERSs FAIR, RELIABLE
New. York Times
Washington Star
Baltimore Sun
Christian Science Monitor
st . Louis ·Post- Dispatch
Wall Street J ourna l
Washington Pos t
New York Hera ld Tr ibune
Milwakee Journal
Louisville Courier -Journal

Number ans wer i ng--257
per cen t
87 . 5
69.6

47 . 1
33 1
13 . 7
9.7
5.1

3.1
1.9
1.6

Number answering--247
per cen t
90 . 7

33 . 2
31.6

27 . 1
24 .7

17 . 8
15 . 4

6. 5
4.9

4.5

Sources William L. Ri ver s, The Opinionmakers (Bos t on s Beacon
Press, 1965), p . 54 .
In both cases, the newsmen ranked t he New York Times , the
Wall Street J ournal, and the Christian Science Moni tor i n t he
top ten .

The preeminence of the New York Times is clear.

So

great is the impact of the Times that Rivers observeds
•• One of the most striking features of a l most any government office is a copy of the Times. Most high officials
have experienced the irritation o f being briefed on developments by assistants who got most of their i nf ormation from
the same i ssue of t he Times that the official hims elf had
read a short time earlier. For governments here and abroad,

45

the Times is the one indispensible newspaper •
•

•

•
••• every official, even the most powerful, needs a New
York Times, for he is to some extent insulated from the
realities his own administration creates by the fears and
the ambitions of his subordinates, not to mention the
confusion in communications.79

To determine the representativeness of the Times, Journal,
and Monitor during the Suez and Lebanon crises, a check was
made of the editorial policies advocated by four Mid-Western
and Far Western daily newspapersa the Chicago Daily News, the
Chicago Sun Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the!&§.
Angeles Times. Appropriate references will be made in the footnotes, and findings will be summarized at the end of the relevant
chapters.

These four newspapers were also regularly represented

at Dulles• background news briefings.
Newsmagazines, The newsmagazines were chosen on the basis of
their acknowledged importance; they are: Business Week, Newsweek,
Time, and

u. s.

News and World Report. They, too, were frequently

invited to send representatives to Dulles• backgrounders.

Their

importance was further signified by the Washington press corps
newsmen surveyed in the mid-1960's.

The results are listed belows

Number answering--203
per cent
Time
33;5
U:S. News & World Report
33.0
Newsweek
32.5
24.6
The Reporter
11.3
Government publications
· Harper's
11.3
Business Week
10.8
7.9
The Economist
7.3
The New Republic
4.4
Fortune
Source: William L. Rivers, The Opinionmakers (Bostons Beacon
Press, 1965), p. 54.
MAGAZINES USED IN WORK

79Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
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In the period 1940-1968, Time, Newsweek, and

u. s.

News

and World Report increased their national circulation by 585
per cent . 80
Opinion J ournals: The opinion journals of this study--Commonweal,
The Nation , The New Republic, and The Reporter--were likewise
chosen because of their recognized importance.

TWo of the four,

The Reporter and The New Republic , were among the top ten
magazines used by the Washington pr ess corps men in their work.
John L. Hulteng and Roy Paul Nelson have indicated that although
opinion journal circulation is small, under 100,000, some with
circulations under 20 , 000 , they are influential "because the
reader of an opinion magazine typically is an educator, editor,
legislator, or clergyman .

He passes along what be reads to

much larger audiences . 081

The four opinion journals of our

study were indexed in the Public Affairs Information Service
Index.
Scholarly Journalss The scholarly journals chosen are acknowledged organs of the history, law, and political science professions.

The journals considered were selected because either

they carried articles indexed in the Public Affairs Information
Service Index, and/or in the Reader ' s Guide to Periodical
Literature, or, as professional journals, they might be expected
to show an interest in the crises.

Like the opinion journals,

80Bagdikian, "Some Peculiarities of American News," loc. cit.
81 John L. Hulteng and Roy Paul Nelson, The Fourth Estates

An Informal Appraisal of the News and Opinion Media (New Yorks
Harper & Row, 1971), p. 189.
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scholarly journals have a limited circulation.

However, their

readers also hold positions from which they can, and often do,
pass on the information gleaned from these journals to a wider
audience.
since opinion journals, scholarly journals, and newsmagazines are widely distributed to libraries, their pass-along
readership is high.
and Monitor.

This is also true for the Times, Journal,

CHAPIBRI
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS

Preliminary Observations
In this chapter an effort wi ll be made to analyze the h ighlights of American foreign policy during the protracted Suez
crisis.

Public statements of policy will be examined i n the

light of subsequently revealed private interpretations of United
Stats aims , objectives, and reasons for pursuing specific
policies.

This is necessary in order to be able to determine

how accurately and effectively the American press reported and
interpreted

u. s .

policy during the Suez crisis.

Our analys is will rely on three t ypes of primary source
material.

The first of these are published, official documents

r eleased by the White House, and the Department of State.

This

is only a partial record, a t best, for it represents merely
what the American Government wanted its people, and foreign
governments and peoples to know at the time.
The second type of primary source is the published memoirs
of various top government officials actively involved in political decision-making in connec tion with the crisis .
The third type is the colle ctions of oral history memoirs
of prominent, contemporary political f i gures kept in the Princeton
and Columbia university libraries.
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The latter two types of sources suffer from the same kinds
of deficiencies.

Writers of memoirs are known for the inac-

curacies which they record due to memories grown fuzzy over
details with the passage of time.

They suffer from a common

human weakness--they care about their image--so, often, consciously or tmconsciously, they color their interpretations of
past events to conform to their self-image, to cover a mistake,
or to deliberately perpetuate a fiction.

Furthermore, they

often seem unable to analyze past events critically or objectively.

Flaws in one's own character, or another's, are often

glossed over, or simpl y forgotten, in the mellower light of
retrospect and/or nostalgia.
Because most of the documents of this period are not yet
open to the public, there is no way to check the accuracy of
much of the material one uncovers.

Furthermore, the researcher

must often rely heavily on the information revealed by a single
source, without having the opportunity to look for corroborative
evidence from other sources.

Nevertheless, an effort will be

made to determine the accuracy of sources by checking for
internal evidence , and by juxtaposition of evidence from
corollary sources, when available.
The special relationship which existed between President
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is
a further governing factor in an analysis of
policy.

u. s .

foreign

Rarely i n American history has a Secretary of State

wielded such strong and obvious influence over the formulation
and conduct of American foreign policy.
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Writing in penciled long-hand on yellow, legal tablet paper,
Dulles personally drafted many of his major speeches. 1

The

original, hand-written drafts were later typed, and often
revised several times before delivery.

Dulles would submit

a major foreign policy text to President Eisenhower for consideration.

Only after Eisenhower reviewed, edited and approved

the text would Dulles give a major foreign policy address.
Conversely, Eisenhower, prior to presenting a foreign policy
speech, would send the prepared, written text to Dulles "to go
over and give him the benefit of his thinking. 02
Eisenhower recalled that he and Dulles consulted frequently
with each other.

When matters were unusually pressing they

might contact each other eight or ten times a day.

Eisenhower

remarked: "I suppose there was no one I kept in as close touch
with as I did with Foster." 3
Dulles kept Eisenhower informed of his actions and plans
for action.

Herman Phleger, former State Department Legal

Advisor, reported that, when in the United States, Dulles spoke
1The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton
university Library (Hereafters Dulles Project, Princeton), Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, 11 Jan. 1966, pp. 16-18.
Dulles• first Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs,
Carl w. Mccardle, recalled that Dulles used another method in
drafting foreign policy addresses. After Dulles had discussed
a proposed foreign policy speech with Mccardle, he would dictate
it to his secretaries without concern for grammar. The typed
copy would then be reviewed, discussed with area specialists,
and revised several times. Eisenhower Administration Project,
Oral History Research Office, Columbia University Library
(Hereafters Eisenhower Project, Columbia), Interview with Carl
w. Mccardle, 1970, pp. 32-33.
2Eisenhower Project, Columbia, Interview with Andrew H.
Berding, 1967, PP• 27-29.
3Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 28 July 1964, p. 28.
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with the President by telephone three or four times daily,
on the average.

When abroad, Dulles cabled detailed daily

reports to Eisenhower.

Dulles• practice of keeping Eisenhower

posted underscored his conviction that he was answerable to
the President for his conduct of foreign affairs.

While he

exercised great discretionary power in the making and handling
of this country's foreign affairs, Dulles never lost sight of
the fact that President Eisenhower had the last say in major
foreign policy decisions.

Therefore, Dulles always consulted

with h im before making an important move. 4
The Crisis Begins
Late in the morning of July 19, 1956, Egyptian Ambassador

Ahmed Hussein entered the office of Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles .

He came to formally announce the Egyptian

acceptance of the Western offer of help in constructing the
Aswan High Dam project.
Dulles, Geor ge

v.

Waiting to see him were John Foster

Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near

Eastern Affairs, and Herbert Hoover, Jr ., Under Secretary of
State.

Dulles began the conversation by explaining the dif-

ficultie s the Administration was having with Congress.

Hussein

expressed sympathy for the problems facing the Eisenhower Administration , and indicated his strong desire that the United States,
Britain and the World Bank assist Egypt with the project.

He

mentioned further that Dmitri Shepilov, Soviet Foreign Minister,
while in Cairo, had offered Russian help to Egypt in building
4nulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Herman Phleger,
21 July 1964, PP• 40-41.
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the High Dam.

Hussein "touched his pocket to emphasize, •we•ve

got the Russian offer in our pocket.,,.s

The implication was

clear--if the West would not help Egypt, the Soviet Union would.
Dulles did not take favorably to Hussein's tactics, and,
though in the expert opinion of World Bank engineers the project
was practicable and would be beneficial to Egypt, none the less,
Dulles proceeded to tell Hussein that the United States was led
to the conclusion that the project was not feasible under present
conditions, primarily because it would constitute "too great a
strain on the Egyptian economy."

Allen recalled that Dulles did

not mention that Egypt had "mortgaged" its cotton crop for five
to ten years into the future to buy arms from Czechoslovakia.
"(B)ut that's what he had in the back of his mind." 6

If Allen's

recollection is correct, Hussein could understandably have been
miffed at Dulles• slur of the Egyptian economy
Herman Finer, author of the first definitive study of
American Suez policy, recorded that Dulles retorted to Hussein:
"Well, as you have the money already, you don t need any from
ust My offer is withdrawnt" 7

Whichever account in the more

accurate, it must be noted that both methods were highly
insulting to Egypt .
The blow was hardly softened when, immediately after
Hussein 's visit, and before he had an opportunity to consult
5 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with George

29 July 1965, PP• 36-37.
6 Ibid., PP• 37-38.

7Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., P• 48.

v.

Allen,
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with his Government, the u.

s. State Department released to the

press a communique of the official reasons for refusing to go
ahead with the project.

The formal State Department statement

of cancellation indicated,
Developments ••• have not been favorable to the success
of the project, and the u. s. Government has concluded
that it is not feasible in present circumstances to
participate in the project. Agreement by the riparian
states has not been achieved, and the ability of Egypt
to devote adequate resources to assure the projects
success has become more uncertain than at the time the
offer was made.
This decision in no way reflects or involves any
alteration in the friendly relations of the Government
and people of the United States toward the Government
and people of Egypt.
The united States remains deeply interested in the
welfare of the Egyptian people and in the development of
the Nile. It is prepared to consider at an appropriate
time and at the request of the riparian states what
steps might be taken toward a more effective utilization
of the water resources of the Nile for the benefit of the
peoples of the region. Furthermore, the United States
remains ready to assist Egypt in its efforts to improve
the economic condition of its people and is prepared,
through its appropriate agencies to discuss these matters
within the context of funds appropriated by the Congress.a
The official statement was, likewise, insulting to Egypt.
It called into question, before the entire world, the economic
solvency of Egypt, and implied that Egypt was a poor credit
risk.

Within a matter of days, the insult was heightened as

Britain and the World Bank also withdrew from the project.
The renege on the

u. s.

offer to aid the Aswan High Dam

project was primarily a Dulles• decision.
suffered a severe attack of ileitis.

On June 8, Eisenhower

He was kept away from the

80Aswan High Dam (Press release 401 dated July 19)," State
Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 892, July 30, 1956, P• 188.
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White House until July 15 .

The President•s ailment prevented

the full consultations on the High Dam which Dulles normally
had with Eisenhower on all other important foreign policy
decisions.

On July 13, Dulles conferred with the recuperating

President at his Gettysburg farm.

Dulles expressed his judge-

ment that the Egyptian decision to accept the Western offer
probably meant that the Soviets had failed to give Nasser a
firm commitment.

Eisenhower indicated his annoyance that, on

the threshold of a presidential campaign, he should be asked
to take domestic political risks for Egypt.
not resolve this dilemma.

Eisenhower did

While the discussion tended toward

a negative response, the manner, timing, and substance were
left largely to Dulles• discretion.

Consultation with the

British and further consideration were to precede the final
decision.

Dulles, after he had chosen the course of action

he preferred to pursue, discussed the withdrawal statement with
Eisenhower on the morning of July 19, in a meeting which lasted
just 12 minutes.

Eisenhower approved the press release. 9

Nevertheless, the renege was mainly a Dulles• action.
Members of the Eisenhower White House staff later blamed Dulles
for starting the Suez crisis.

They claimed that Eisenhower

would not have approved the move if he had been aware of the
manner in which Dulles was going to do it.

As Love noted:

"Eisenhower s (subsequent ) requests for explanations from Dulles
show that he was not happy at the time about it and he does not
9Hoopes, The Devil and J . F . D., op. cit., PP• 338-340.
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seem to have been fully satisfied with the explanations."lO
Why did Dulles make this decision?
an insulting method to announce it?

Why did he employ such

The official reasons for

cancellation of the Western offer do not furnish a satisfactory
explanation.

The reasoning after-the-fact should also be

considered.
First, there was Congressional opposition.

Early in the

summer of 1956, in a long talk, Senate Minority Leader William
F. Knowland reportedly told Dulles that he would have a hard

time getting the votes required for the Aswan High Dam project.
senators from the cotton-growing states (in t he South and
California) were opposed to the Dam which would increase Egypt's
cotton growing and exporting capabilities, thereby causing
greater competition with American cotton on the international
market.

Pro-Israel Senators were opposed.

Also some Senators

opposed Nasser 's politics of neutralism and his buying arms
.
b loc, il
from t h e Communist

Hoover recalled that "in discussions with Congress on a
purely theoretical basis relating to foreign aid in general,••
the Administration was told that Congress would not appropriate
funds for more than two years in advance.

When they asked how

the Congress would feel about committing an enormous amount of
American money for ten years into the future, they f ound that
Congress was opposed to the idea. 12
10Love, suezs The '!'Wice-Fought War, op. cit., P• 325.
11 Dulles Project, Interview with Allen , PP• 33-34.
12Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with George
Humphrey and Herbert Hoover, Jr ., 5 May 1964, pp. 34-35.
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The argument that Congressional opposition to the High
Dam project figured in the Administration's decision to cancel
the American aid offer has been disputed by Members of congress.
Ambassador James P. Richards, former Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, observed that although Dulles would
have had to fight for Congressional approval for American
participation in the project, he probably would have gotten it,
if both he and President Eisenhower had asked for the funds. 13
A close reading of Eisenhower•s memoirs lends support to Richard's
observation.

Eisenhower wrotet "(I)t would take all the pressure

Foster and I could bring to bear to obtain congressional approval
for our contribution, and we had little zest for an all-out
legislative fight in behalf of a nation that thought it could do
as well by dealing with the Soviets." 14

It seems reasonable to

conclude that Congressional opposition was not a decisive factor
in the cancellation of the American offer.
Second, Egypt's ability to pay was questioned.

The project

was a vast one which would tax Egypt's resources to the limit.
(see above: pp. 13-14.)

American experts estimated that it

would take Egypt in the neighborhood of 25 per cent of its total
gross national product over a 25 year period which would entail
tremendous national sacrifice. 15

Not only had Egypt already

pledged large portions of her cotton crop to cover the Czech
13oulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Ambassador
James P. Richards, 23 Sept. 1965; PP• 26-27; and Dulles Project,
Interview with Senator John Sparkman, 19 March 1966, PP• 34-36.

14Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 31.

15nulles Project, Interview with Humphrey and Hoover,
pp. 32-33.

57

arms deal, but "(o)ther reports of an agreement by Nasser to
:purchase an additional $200 million in arms from the Communists
(mortgaging Egypt's stockpile of cotton) made it obvious that
Egypt could never fulfill her part of the financing on terms
we could accept." 16 (Italics added.)

Administration public and private statements about the
supposed inability of Egypt to finance its share of the project
contradicted the findings of World Bank experts.

Despite Egypt•s

conclusion of a second arms deal with the Russians, the Bank
'
d Egyp t capable o f carrying
' , the econorru.c
' b urd en. l 7
b elieve

Egypt

was to pay for the arms obtained from the Soviets through the
sale of surplus cotton which it could not sell in Western markets.
Far from weakening its economic position, the arms deals enabled
Egypt to diversify its cotton trading markets .

Now Egypt could

trade with both the West and the East.
Third, American officials claimed that the close association
with Egypt, which the agreement would necessitate, was tailormade to fifteen years of quarreling over which Government was
abiding by the agreement. 18 Eisenhower wrote: "In view of the
burdens the project would impose on the Egyptian people, he
(Dulles) was beginning to thinJ~ that any nation associated with
construction of the dam would eventually wind up very unpopular
among the Egyptians . " 19 This argument overlooks the probability
16Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 32.
17Finer, Dulles over Suez, op. cit., pp. 49-50; and Love,
Suez: The TWice-Fought War, op. cit., pp. 316-317.
18Dulles Project , Interview with Allen , pp. 33-34.
19Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 32.
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that by agreei~g to the project the West would have had significant leverage with which to influence Egyptian domestic and
foreign policy.

Such a close relationship for an extended

period of time would have undoubtedly precluded Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Nasser would have been unlikely

to jeopardize completion of the High Dam project when the Canal
was already scheduled to revert to Egyptian sovereignty in 1968 .
Fourth, Americans were distressed with Nasser s obvious
willingness to deal with the Soviets, thereby, affording them
their first toehold in the Middle East.

And they were upset

over Nasser 's recognition of communist China in May of 1956.
The Americans were also annoyed by Egyptian arms deals with the
Russians . 20

It is worth remembering, however, that the first

soviet-Egyptian arms deal preceded the initial Western offer
to assist in the High

Dam

project's construction; it could not

legitimately be used later to justify withdrawal of that offer.
Fifth , the United States · was apparently concerned with
nipping in the bud attempts by Third World countries to play
East off against West in order to obtain better terms.

Nasser

had been bargaining back and forth between the Western World
and the Communist bloc.

The eyes of the whole world, particularly

the Third World--much of which was interested in securing
American aid--were upon the United States.

Therefore, Dulles

made a calculated decision to put a stop to Nasser 's tactics,
and, thereby, to demonstrate to the entire world that playing
East off against West was not the way to deal with the United
ZOibid., P• 31.
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states. 21
Sixth, Eisenhower indicated that he would not submit to
Egyptian "blackmail."

He refused to allow the Egyptians to

win concessions by threatening to go to the Russians to get
what they wanted if they could not get acceptable terms from
the west. 22
Eugene Black, past President of the World Bank, and privy
to much Administration thinking on the subject, has suggested
an additional reason for the withdrawal of the American offer.
Black indicated that neither he nor Dulles felt that there was
any threat of the Soviets backing the Aswan Dam project in the
event of a Western pull-out.

since the project was so important

to Egypt, Dulles felt that if Egypt were unable to get either
western or Eastern help "this would be the death knell of Nasser."
Thus, Dulles "was glad to call this thing off because he thought
if he did call it off, the Russians wouldn't do it--and if they
didn't do it, this would put Nasser in a very difficult spot. 023
Dulles took a calculated risk hoping to expose what he believed
to be the hollowness of Soviet offers of economic aid for the
High Dam, and to trigger Nasser's fall.

This would explain the

insulting manner in which he handled the withdrawal of the
offer.

u. s.

His dual policy of exposing the Russians by undercutting

Nasser failed, for Dulles did not foresee the resilience of the
21 According to a reliable, high Eisenhower Administration
State Department source.
22Eisen
.
h ower, Waging
.
Peace, op. ci' t ., p. 32 •
23 oulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Eugene Black,
15 July 1964, pp. 17 and 27-28.
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Egyptian President, and he did not project correctly the Egyptian response.

Apparently, while hoping to cause Nasser•s over-

throw, Dulles did not wish the West to be openly associated
with it.

In an October 30, 1956, background news briefing, ,
~

Dulles indicated t o the American newsmen in attendf nce that,

prior to the Anglo-French ultimatum and the Israeli invasion
of Egypt, the

u. s .

estimated that Nasser could last no longer

than six months to a year .

Because, Dulles claimed, Nasser's

policies were self-defeating, there was no need for the British,
French, and Israelis to use force,

(see: Chapter II.)

The actual withdrawal decision had been agreed upon by the
Americans and the British before Hussein announced his intention
to return to Washington to accept the Western offer.

The Anglo-

American agreement was to let the offer "lie on the table, •• to
wither on the vine ... 24
of the

u. s.

But the

u. s.

decided to inform Hussein

decision to cancel its offer of help in the

construction of the High Dam project.
Dulles informed Eugene Black in order to prepare him.

He

also notified Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, who notified
his Government .

The British indicated their belief that the

action might be a bit precipitate.

Eden wrote: ••I would have

preferred to play this thing long and not to have forced the
issue , 1125

Dulles overruled his Allies' suggestions.

Initially the American decision was greeted with caution.
24Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Sir Roger
Makins {later Lord Sherfield), 5 June 1964, p. 5.
25 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., P• 49.
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When it did become clear t~at Russia would not immediately lend
support to the High Dam project , American public reaction was
generally favorable, prior to Nasser 's nationalization speech.
During this brief period, the American press also applauded
the Secretary's action.

(see: Chapters IV and

v.)

The evening of July 19 , 1956, following his confrontation
with Ambassador Hussein and r elease to the press of the carefully worded American statement, Dulles communicated his misgivings to his assistant,

illiam Macomber, Jr.

In a brief

encounter in Macomber s State Department office, the following
colloquy took place,
Dulles: Well , this has been quite a day.
Macomber: Yes, sir.
Dullest Well, I certainly hope we did the right thing.
Macomber: I hope so.
Dulles: Yes, I certainly hope we did the right thing.
Then Dulles got up and left. 26
A few days later, Macomber showed Dulles an article in
Time magazine which, Macomber recalled, carried the phrase,
"Master chessman Dulles made his finest move."

Dulles looked

at the article, then he said to Macomber: "It's much too
early to tell.

we

must wait ta see what their reaction is."

Macomber concl\lded that Dulles "was much more guarded and much
more conce~ned about this than the public reaction to it at
the time ... 27
26Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with William B.
Macomber, Jr. , 12 and 19 January 1966, pp. 55-56.

27 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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The Western action in withholding funds from the Aswan
High Dam project precipitated an angry Egyptian response.

on

July 26, 1956, in a public address in Alexandria, Egyptian
President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez canal, and
announced that the tolls would be used to build the High Dam.

The Suez crisis was well under way.
Nasser knew in advance that Western participation in the
Aswan High Dam project would be cancelled • . Therefore, he was
not surprised by the American decision.

Scholars usually agree

that Nasser was angered by Dulles• slur of Egyptian credit,
and by the insulting manner in which Dulles withdrew the
from the project. 28

u. s.

The minority view has it that Dulles

played into Nasser's hands by providing the pretext to nationalize the Cana1. 29 But the High Dam project was of such importance to Egypt that it is difficult to conceive that Nasser
would have risked sacrificing it in order to obtain a pretext
to nationalize the Suez canal.

Apparently he felt there was

nothing to lose by making one last effort.
When the Eisenhower Administration considered the possible
reactions of Egypt, it concluded that Nasser might try to get
help from the Russians, and. that he would accept a Russian offer
if it were forthcoming, which was considered unlikely.

The

28Moncrieff, sueza Ten Years After, op. cit., PP• 43-44;
Erskine B. Childers, The Road To suezs A Study Of Western-Arab
Relations (London, Macgibbon & Kee, 1962), pp. 162ffJ Terence
Robertson, Crisis, The Inside Stor Of The Suez Cons irac
(Londona Hutchinson, 1964, pp. 65-71; Finer, Dulles over Suez,
op. cit., pp. 55-56; and Love, Suezs The TWice-Fouqht War,
op. cit., P• 316.

29Thomas, The Suez Affair, op. cit., PP• 25-26.
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Americans also envisioned "anti-American riots, confiscation
of American property, and things like that."

Nationalization

of the Canal, which intelligence reported Nasser had been contemplating for nearly two years, 30 was not considered "very
probable" because the Canal Charter had only twelve years more
to run until the Canal would revert to Egyptian sovereignty. 31
So little was the nationalization expected that DUlles was in
Peru for the inauguration of President Preda when he learned
of the Egyptian action.
The British and French were very angry; they felt that
Nasser•s action could not go unchallenged.

From the first, they

considered force a legitimate tool to regain Western control
of the Canai. 32

On July 27, Eisenhower received a message from

the American charge d'affairs in London, and a report from
Ambassador

c.

Douglas Dillon in Paris to that effect.

After

consultation with Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State,
Eisenhower approved the sending of Deputy Under Secretary
Robert Murphy to London.
instructions.
told him. 33

Murphy left for London with no formal

"Just go over and hold the fort," Eisenhower had
By that, Eisenhower understood that Murphy was

"to urge calm consideration of the affair and to discourage
.
.
.
34
impulsive
armed action."
30Dttlles Project, Princeton, Interview with William Park
Armstrong, Jr. (Foreign Service Officer--Intelligence Briefer
at Staff Meetings), 10 Sept. 1965, PP• 15-15.
31 Dulles Project, Interview with Allen, P• 39.
32Ed en, Suez Crisis,
. •
i
PP• 53-54J and Murphy,
op.ct.,

Diplomat, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
33~ . , Murphy, p. 379.
3 ~isenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 37.
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In discussions with British and French leaders, Murphy
quickly discerned their willingness to resort to armed force
to resolve the Suez issue.

Further, Murphy noted the tendency

of British officials to assume that the United States would go
along with any Anglo-French action.

Eden indicated that the

British and French were not asking the United States to
participate directly, but they did hope that the

u. s.

would

- -

"take care of the Bear," i.e. neutralize the soviet threat of
counter involvement.

Murphy surmised that Eden was laboring

under the mistaken impression that a common identity of interest
existed among the British, French and Americans over Suez.
Murphy noted that that was not the American view, and that he
gave no encouragement to the idea. 35
Before Congress recessed early for the campaigns for the
November elections, there was scattered comment in both the
House and Senate on Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Representative Emanuel Celler, New York Democrat, charged that
Dulles, Eden, and Pineau had reaped what they had sown through
"a constant policy of appeasement subordinating national selfrespect to the fog of fear."

Caller, who believed military and

economic reprisals would be •t the least satisfactory of policies,"
recommended construction of an alternate canal from Elath on
the Gulf of Aqaba to Ascalon on the Mediterranean. 36

Repre-

sentative James Roosevelt, California Democrat, observed that
35Murphy, Diplomat, op, cit., PP• 381-382.
36Rep. Emanuel Celler, "Building of Alternate Canal Route
Is Answer to Nasser," Congressional Record, July 27, 1956,
p. 15376.
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"Nasser's answer to our refusal to help finance the Aswan Dam •••
vindicates our position for it confirms the view that the Nasser
regime cannot be relied upon to keep its commitments."

Roose-

velt recommended that the Administration sell arms to Israel,
and reappraise

u. s.

Middle East policy. 37

Montana Democratic

Senator Mike Mansfield, who believed that Nasser had the right
to nationalize the Suez Canal, argued that the Western response

to Nasser's action should lie "in the use of diplomacy and the
development of new policies and ideas."

Mansfield, who foresaw

the possibility of Egyptian closure of the Canal to the West,
repeated several suggestions current at the times 1 . To allow

u. s.

oil companies to expand and develop their oil production;

2. To encourage the building of super-tankers to go around the

Cape, or to export oil from the Wes tern Hemisphere; and 3. To
consider construction of a new canal through Israel.
the

u. s.

Above all,

should seek a peaceful solution through the Three-Power

Conference, then upcoming, and, failing that, through the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

In the event of

"aggressive action" by any of the involved parties, the

u_. s.

should take the matter immediately to the United Nations
Security Councii. 38
37Rep. James Roosevelt, "Middle East, 0 in ibid., pp. 1545515457.

38seu. Mike Mansfield, "The Suez Situation, 0 in ibid.,
pp. 15571-15572.
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A Succession of Conferences
When it became clear to Eisenhower just how seriously the
British and Fr ench were contemplating military. action, he
decided to send Secretary of State Dulles to London for the
tripartite conference which Eden had recommended.

This was to

be the first of a series of conferences which, in the American
interpretation, were convened to seek a peaceful solution to
the problems arising from the Egyptian nationalization of the
Suez Canal.

Phleger indicated that upon receipt._of Murphy's

reports that the British and the French .were very angry and
contemplating military action, "the Secretary and the President
••• decided ••• that under no circumstances should the United States
become militarily committed in the Middle East."

Chief respon-

sibility for this decision Phleger assigned to Eisenhower, who.
Phleger felt, would have made this decision regardless of what
Dulles might have advised him.

"But I'm sure that was equally

the secretary' s view, to help the French and the British in
whatever way they couJ.d morally and materially, but not to
become militarily involved." 39

The reasons for the American decision to avoid

u. s.

military involvement in the Middle East, and to discourage
.
40
Anglo-French use of force to settle the Suez d ispute werea
1. The privately-held Administration conviction that Egypt
was exercising its power of eminent domain, i. ~• the power
of a nation to appropriate property within the state to a neces39nulles Project, Interview with Phleger, PP• 46-47.
40The following relies heavily on Eisenhower, Waging Peace,
op. cit., pp. 38ff.
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sary public use, reasonable compensation being made.

In this

view, Egypt was acting legally by nat ionalizing the Suez Canal,
which lay completely within Egyptian territory and under Egyptian sovereignty, provided it paid just compensation, which it
had indicated a readiness to do.

As Eisenhower stated later

in the crisisc "I think no one can cha1lenge the legal right
of Egypt to national ize the Canal. •• 41
2. The belief that the Egyptians could operate the Suez
Canal by themselves, and
3. Fear of both political and military consequences.

Prior

British experience had shown just how difficult sustained occupation of the Suez Canal Zone could be.

Eighty thousand British

troops were in virtual state of s1 ge in the face of violent ·
Egyptian opposition.

Furthermore, military action could lead to

the very blockage of traffic flow which it was meant to prevent.
The pipelines in neighboring Arab states might also be cut,
impeding the flow of oil to Europe.

To reopen them and to guard

them would requir e many troops.
I f the Wes t ern aim were to unseat Nasser by force, conquest
of Egypt might prove necessary.

To conquer and occupy Cairo

alone, then a city of two million, in the face of expected
guerrilla opposition, would entail house-to-house fighting and
involve large numbers of troops.

Dulles later voiced Adminis-

tration fears on NBC TV's .,Meet the Press," September 23, 1956.
41 .,Radio and Television Broadcasts 'The Women Ask The
President,' October 24, 1956," Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States, DWi ht David Eisenhower, 1956 (Hereafters
Public Papers, 1956 (Wash •• D. c.1 u. s. Govt. Printing Office,
1958) • p. 1016.
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Dulles observed, "(T)here are different opinions as to whethe r
a collapse would quickly come about or not but certainly there
is great danger that war started there will bog the parties
down for an almost indefinite length of time; it would be a
terrible drain on their economies and the end is not readily
to be seen." 42
The Tripartite London Conference
John Foster Dulles left for London on Tuesday morning,
July 31, 1956, for two days of intensive talks with the Foreign
Ministers of France and Great -Britain.

In the tripartite talks,

the three Governments agreed to the convening in London of an
international conference of the principal Suez Canal user nations
to consider the problem.
the invitees.

A formula was devised for choosing

Those eight nations which were signatories of

the 1888 .Constantinople Convention, 43 and sixteen other principal users determined by . annual tonnage and trade shipments
thr ough the canal were invited.

The cotmtries asked to attend

42John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings ••• of J. F. D.,
L. 3. Interviews, 1920-1959, Transcript of1 "Meet the Press,"
Sunday, Sept. 23, 1956, NBC Television, pp. 3-4.
43 The Constantinople Convention was drawn up by the major
Ninet eenth Century maritime powers and Egypt to preserve the
freedom of the Canal for the passage of all ships at all times.
Articl e I of the Convention -readss
The Suez Maritime canal shall always be free and open,
in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of
commerce or of war, without · distinction of flag.
Consequently, the High contracting Parties agree not
in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in
time of war as in time of peace.
The Canal shall never be subjected. to the exercise of
the right . of blockade.
Sees "Text of (Constantinople) Convention," Appendix .c, in Hugh
J. Schonfeld, The · Suez Canal in Peace and War, 1869-1969 (Coral
Gables, Floridaa Univ. of Miami Press, 1969), pp. 185-189.
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were, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Spain,
TUrkey, and the u.

s. s. R., and Australia, Ceylon, Denmark,

Ethiopia, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, and the united
States.

Egypt and Greece refused to attend.

The date for the start of the first London Conference was
set for August 16, 1956.

Dulles wanted several weeks for prepa-

ration; the British and French preferred to meet as soon as
ppssible.

so the compromise date of August 16 was fixed. 44

Dulles private remarks during the tripartite discussions
have given rise to considerable controversy since then.

Prime

Minister Eden has subsequently argued that Dulles gave Britain
the impression that the United States ,.did not exclude" the use
of force to settle the Suez controversy, provided sufficient
effort was given beforehand to attempts to find a peaceful solution to the impasse.

Eden quoted Dulles as having said&

A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he
was attempting to swallow •••• we must make a genuine effort
to bring world opinion to favor the international operation of the canal •••• It should be possible to create a
world opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated. Then if a military operation had to be undertaken
it would be more apt to succeed and have less grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately.

Eden remarked, "These were forthright words.

They rang in my

ears for months." 45
While it cannot be overlooked that much of Eden's memoir
44"Murphy, Diplomat, op. ci't ., PP• 385-386; and Eden,~
I

Crisis, op. cit., p. 67.
45 tbid., Eden, PP• 66-67.
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is a defense of his Suez policies, thus raising doubts of his
credibility, there is substantiation in American sources for
Eden's recollection of DuJ.les• remarks although the Americans
sometimes differ on the interpretation.
Murphy, recalling Dulles• statement about the need to make
Nasser "disgorge" the Canal, wrotes
It is true, as Eden reported, that Dulles once
declareds "A way must be found to make Nasser disgorge
what he is attempting to swallowt '' But one never couJ.d
be quite sure of the thoughts in the innermost recesses
of the Dulles mind •••• Perhaps Dulles wanted to show some
sympathy, which I am certain he felt, for our Allies'
indignation about Nasser.46
Winthrop

w.

Aldrich, former American Ambassador to Great

Britain, remarked on the incident in question that he had no
doubt that Dulles gave Eden the impression that the

u. s.

would

not exclude the use of force should every possible peaceful
alternative prove ineffective.

Aldrich commented, "One of the

tragic things about the situation was that Eden did not see
that in (Dulles• diplomatic_) language there was no commitment
to use force and that when it came to the final and formal
decision we might not be willing to use it." 47
It seems clear that in this early encounter Dulles did
lead Eden to believe that the United States was not opposed
to the use of force to settle the Suez dispute should peaceful
efforts fail.

It was the first example during the Suez crisis

of Dulles' penchant for making strong statements from which he
46Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., P• 386.
47winthrop w. Aldrich, "The Suez Crisis1 A Footnote To
History," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 3, April 1967, p. 543.
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later backed down.
This lack of clarity concerning American intentions was

u. s.

hardly improved by public statements of
the crisis.

policy early in

Initially, American statements were ambiguous

regarding a possible use of force by the
Suez dispute.

u. s.

to settle the

In his statement made upon arrival back in the

United States following the conclusion of the tripartite London
conference, Dulles remarked, "We do not ••• want to meet violence
with violence."

Instead the United States supported the concept

of an international conference of the principal user nations to
determine their opinion . . .We would hope that out of this would
come a solution which all the nations, including Egypt, will
respect so that the danger of violence may be averted ... 48
Although Dulles indicated a clea r

u. s.

preference for a nego-

tiated settlement, he did not rule out the use of force.

Neal

Stanford, Christi an Science Monitor, noteda "It may be significant that ••• Mr. Dulles did not say •we will not meet violence
with violence,• but $aid •we do not want to meet violence with
violence.•n 49
Official American attitudes and expectations at this early
point were given further expression by Dulles in his radio and
television report to the nation on August 3, 1956.

Broadcast

from the White House, following an introduction by Pr esident
Eisenhower, Dulles• words transmitted official American attitudes
48 "Report on the Suez situations Arrival Statement b y
Secretary Dulles," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 894, Aug. 13,
1956, P• 262.
49Neal Stanford, "Dulles Airs Position As Egypt Hits West,"
Christian science Monitor, Aug. 4, 1956, P• 1.
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toward Nasser's act of national ization of the Suez canal .

In

Dulles• interpretations
••• The basic reason he (Nasser) gave (to take over t h i s
operation of the Suez Canal) was that i f he took over this
canal it would enhance the prestige of Egypt •
•
•
•
And also he said that by seizing the Suez canal he
would strike a blow at what he called •western Imperialism.•• And he thought also that he could exploit the
canal s o as to produce bigger revenues f or Egypt and so
retaliate for the fail ure of the United States and Britain
to give Egypt the money to enable it to get started on the
$1 b i llion-plus Aswan Dam.
In the official American view Nasser 's nationalization of the
Suez Canal was pictured as "an angry act of -retaliation against
fancied grievances ...

Nasser's speech proved t hat Egypt would

use the canal "to promote the political and economic ambitions
of Egypt and ••• the •grandeur • of Egypt. •• 50
Thus, in the official
canal illegally.

u. s.

position, Nasser "seized" the

The official position did not accurately

reflect the Administration's privately held conviction that
Egypt had the right t o nationalize the c anal under the laws of
eminent domain.

Perhaps, Dulles• public statement was an attempt

to accomodate the views of .America's Anglo-French allies.
In the early statements, American officials were fond of
referring to the Suez Canal as

0

internation.alized by treaty.u 51

Later, following Egyptian protest to the f ormer terminology,
"usage" of the canal was said to be "interna tionalized." 52
SO,.Report on the Suez Situation, Address by s ecretary Dulles."
State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35 , No . 894, Aug . 13, 1956, P• 260.
51 Ibid. See alsoa "Statement by the President Following
Receipt~Sec retary Dulles• Report on the London Suez Conference, Aug. 29, 1956, Public Papers, 1956, PP• 716-717.
52 "The President's News Conference of August 31 , 1956•"
Public Papers, 1956 , P~. 718
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In Dulles• August 3rd address, the former terminology was
used.

Dulles argued that it was inadmissable that a waterway

internationalized by treaty and vital to so many nations should
be selfishly exploited by one country.

He denounced Egypt's

striking down the Suez Maritime canal Company as an act of vengefulness.

"To permit this to go unchallenged would be to encour-

age a break.down of the international fabric upon which the
security and the well-being of all peoples depend.~
words implied that the

u. s.

Dulles•

regarded Nasser's action as illegal.

Therefore, a legal response was required.

It was to take the

form of an international conference of "the nations most directly
involved with a view to seeing whether agreement could be reached
upon an adequate and dependable international administration of
the canal on terms which .would respect, and generously respect,
all of the legitimate rights of Egypt.••
to go unchallenged.

Nasser• s action was not

The road of negotiation was to be followed.

The counsels of immediate resort to force were to be ignored,
for such action would violate the principles of the United Nations
and "would undoubtedly have led to widespread violence endangering the peace of the world."
Dulles depicted Egypt as unreliable and undependable.

He

expressed fears that Nasser would use the canal for selfish
national ends.

He expressed hope that out of the London Confer-

ence would come a plan for the international operation of the
Canal in accordance with the principles of the 1888 Convention.
Dulles indicated that the United States did not anticipate
the failure of the conference.

Concluding his remarks, Dulles
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stated: "We have given no commitments at any time as to what
the United States would do in that unhappy contingency." 53
Dulles again left unresolved the question of possible
use of force to settle Suez.

u. s.

u. s.

The initial ambiguity of official

statements on this crucial point remained.
The First London Conference
With the further development of the Suez crisis, official

American statements of opposition to the use of force t o settle
the problem became more pronounced.
Before the London Conference, on August 16, 1956, Secretary
Dulles repeated his plea for a plan for an °international sys tem"
to operate the Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople
Convention.

The Convention, which provided that passage of the

canal should "be free and open, in time of war as in time of
peace" to all ships of all nations, was never adhered to literally.

When the English ruled Egypt, use of the Canal was denied

to Britain's enemies during World Wars I and II.

And Egypt had, ,

since 1948, restricted passage of Israeli shipping through the
Cana1. 54

Nevertheless, Dulles argued that the Canal should not

become the instrument of national policy of any one nation.
Only this would give confidence to the nations which use the
Canal.
53 "Report on the Suez Situations Address by Secretary Dulles;"

PP• 260-261.
54schonfeld, Suez canal, op. cit., pp. 70-72, 110-111, and
121-123.
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Confidence is what we seek, and for this it is indispensible that there should be an administration of the
canal which is nonpolitical in its operation. That, I
think, is the key to the problem--an operation which is
nonpolitical in character. The canal should not be, and
should not be allowed to become, an instrument of the
policy of any nation or group of nations whether of
Europe or Asia or Africa.
Secretary Dulles• proposal included mention of respect for
the sovereignty of Egypt, recognition of Egypt's right to a
just profit, and the right of the Universal Suez Canal Company
to adequate compensation. 55
on August 20, 1956, Dulles introduced a series of proposals
to the London Conference which embodied the United States official
views and suggestions for acceptance by the conference.

Following

minor amendments proposed by Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey,
the American resolution became the draft declaration supported
on August 23, 1956, by 18 of the 22 countries represented at the
conference.

Mr. Robert Menzies, Australian Prime Minister, was

appointed to head the five-man delegation sent to Egypt to
present the proposals to President Nasser.
The majority resolution of the London Conference called fort
1. Running of the waterway in accordance with the principles
of the 1888 Convention, through establishment- of a system "to
guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use
of the Suez Maritime Canal";
2, "Insulation of the operation of the Canal from the
influence of the politics of any nation";
550 tondon conference on Suez Canals Statement by secretary

Dulles: Statement at Conference, August 16,•• State Dept. Bul.,
Vol. 35, No. 896, Aug. 27, 1956, pp. 337-338.
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3. Fair payments to EgyptJ
4. The lowest possible canal tolls; and

s.

Compensation to the Universal Suez canal company. 56

The last point was mentioned in the preamble.
In his final remarks to the London Conference, Dulles indicated that he regarded the London Conference as a for um for the
expression of majority opinion about the way in whic h transit
through the canal could give the greatest possible economic
security to the nations whose millions were intimately affected
by the reliability of passage.

The majority views were to be

communicated to the Egyptian Government in the hope that Egypt
would agree to negoti• ate a treaty or conventi. on. 57
Eden had requested that Dulles, as the only man capable of
handling the matter, lead the mission to Egypt.
refused, possibly because he feared associating
with a venture that had a high risk of failure

But Dulles

u. s.

prestige

Instead,

Robert

Menzies and party conveyed the majority plan to Nasser, who,
after five days of discussion, rejected it.

Even before the

completion of the Menzies mission, and in anticipation of its
failure, which Dulles had made more likely by not going to Cai r o
himself, Dulles sought an alternative plan.

While vacationing

at his retreat, Duck Island, he conceived the idea of a users•
Association.

He communicated his idea to the British and French

for their consideration. 58
56 uconclusion of London Conference on Suez Canals Text of
Proposals Approved by 18 Nations," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35,
No. 897, Sept. 3, 1956, pp. 373-374.
57 ustatement of August 20," in ibid., pp. 371-372.

58Hoopes, The Devil and J, F. D., op. cit., PP• 355-359.
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The Suez Canal Users• Association
Following Nasser's rejection of the resolution of the London
Conference majority, the Western Big Three put forth Dulles•
scheme for a users• association,

In a speech before the House

of Commons on September 12, 1956, Prime Minister Eden presented
the idea.

Concluding in what he claimed were the exact words

agreed upon with the United States and French Governments, Eden
remarked a
I must make it clear that if the Egyptian Gover nment
should seek to interfere with the operations of the association, or refuse to extend to it the essential minimum of
co-operation, then that Government will once more be in
breach of the Convention of 1888. In that event, Her
Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to
t ake such further steps as seem to be required either
through the United Nations or by other means for the
assertion of their rights,59
Eden's final remarks were interpreted at the time as a veiled
threat to resort to armed force should Egypt not cooperate with
the Use rs• Association.
The following day, September 13, 1956, in his weekly
Washington news conference, Dulles announced the United States
intention to participate in the Users• Association.

"We assume

that such an organization would act as agent for the users and
woUld exercise on their behalf the rights which are theirs under
the 1888 convention and seek such cooperation with Egypt as
would achieve the results designed to be guaranteed by that
convention ... 60
59Eden. Suez Crisis. op. cit., p. 113.
GO"Transcript of Secretary Dulles• News Conference of
September 13," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35~ No. 900, Sept. 24,
1956, p. 476.
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In this and subsequent press conferences, Dulles outlined
his conception of the users • Association.

According to Eden,

Dulles had presented the Users• Association to Britain and France
"as something that 'Egypt would like much less• than the eighteenpower proposals which ••• the Egyptians, having rejected these,
61
.
coul d not expect such good terms again."
In his public
statements, however , Dulles represented the Users• Association
as a volm1tary association binding no one to adhere to its
provisions or to accept its decisions.

It was to be, according

to Dulles, an international organization totally lacking in
military coercive power--muscleless.

It is difficult to imagine

that Dulles seriously believed that an organization lacking in
military coercive power coul d effectuate Egyptian compliance.
Dulles• public temporizing lends weight to the view that the
Users• Association was a stalling device to buy time to allow
European tempers to cooi. 62

61 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 113.
62Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., P• 386. Murphy wrotea "If
John Foster Dulles ever was actually convinced of the possibility
of organizing a Canal users Association to operate the Suez
Canal, I was not aware of it. Perhaps he considered the idea
useful as a negotiation dev ice. Probably he thought that a
legal case could be made, sound enough to be upheld in any
tribunal, which could demonstrate the good faith of the Association in keeping the Canal operating and in paying tolls to
maintain it. A practical effect would be to divert tolls from
Egyptian hands m1til a settlement and compensation for nationalization could be arranged. But Dulles did not spell this out
and it seemed to me that he was skillfully working for time in
the hope that public opinion in western Europe would harden
against a military adventure. He recognized that it would be
almost impossible to arouse Americans to join in defense of the
Canal Company, especially considering the history of the original
Suez concession and its long profitable enjoyment from 1888
to 1956. (Italics added.)
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I n his opening remarks to the Sept ember 13, 1956, press
conference , Dul les sketched the American position.
the

u. s .

He outlined

arguments, 1. that the nations which used t he canal

had usage rights under the 1888 treaty; and 2. that these usage
righ ts could not be ffnullified by unilateral Egyptian action."
Therefore, the user nati ons had the right to organize to seek to
protect thei r right s in association with each other.

Thus, an

attempt would be made a t a second London Conference to organize
the 18 nations which sponsored the London proposals i nto a Suez
canal users• Association.

Dulle s envisioned that the us e rs •

Association's functions would be to:
••• provide qualified pilots for the users• ships; •• • initially receive the dues from the ships of members of the
association pass ing through the canal, which sums would
be used to defray the expenses of the organization and to
pay appropriate compensation to Egypt for its contri bution to the maintenance of the canal and the f acili t ies
of transit; and, so far as practical, arrange for the pattern of traffic of the member vessels through the canal.
It is our hope tha t perhaps practical, on-the -spot
arrangements for cooperation can be achieved without
prejudice to t he rights of anyone. This may provide a
provisional de f acto working ar rangement until f ormal
arrangemen ts can be reached.63
Dulle~ proposed that thes e arra~gements could only be made by
removing.....t;he issue f r om the political arena and placing it i n
the hands of the operators of the canal.

Dulles a rgued t hat

the problems involved in the Suez controversy were not unsolvable, "but they became unsolvable in the context of great concepts such as •sovereignty• and

dignity• and •grandeur• and

'the East versus the West,• and things of that sort. 11

Dulles

advocated that the problems be broken down into "concrete things,
63 " Transcript of Secretary Dulles• News Conference of
September 13," pp. 476-477.
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such as who are going to be the pilots; where are they going
to be; are they qualified pilots; do we have a right to pilots
of our own choosing if they are qualified or has Egypt the right
to impose upon our vessels pilots of its own choosing; what is
the pattern of traffic?"

In order for the matter to be handled

in this way, Dulles suggested that settling the operating problems
be taken from the diplomats, the statesmen, and given to those

who actually operated the canal.

"(T)his is our hope--if we get

operating problems out of the hands of the diplomats, the statesmen, and get it down perhaps into a situation where practical
ship operators are dealing with practical people on the part of
Egypt, maybe some of these problems will be solvable."

How

Dulles envisioned that this intensely political problem could
be surrendered by the interested statesmen is a mystery.

Dulles

argued that he was interested in finding a practical solution
to the Suez dispute.

But no practical solution could survive

unless it had the political support of statesmen.

Besides, the

operators wou1d ultimately be responsible to politicians, both
for approval of their agreements, and for guidelines in their
negotiations.

The real power to enforce negotiated agreements

rested with politicians.

How Dulles imagined this could be

otherwise is difficult to see. 64
In answer to the question, "if Egypt should resist this
plan, are there other peaceful alternatives that you envisage,"
Dulles replied,
64Finer. Dulles Over Suez, op, cit., p. 234.
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Well, if we cannot work out at the working level a
program for getting ships through the canal on acceptable
terms, and if physical force should be used to prevent
passage, then obviously, as far as the United States is
concerned, the alternative for us at least would be to
send our vessels around the . Cape. Now , of course, that
would involve inconvenience, cost.delays. But we have
given a careful study to that whole problem, and we
believe that it is solvable.
This statement proved to be a graphic public example of Dulles•
tendency to overstate

u. s.

intentions during the Suez crisis.

As his strong remarks to Eden during the tripartite conference
were later softened, so, too, his threat to boycott the Canal
was dropped, within two weeks.
Just how effective an American detour of the Suez Canal
would be was doubtful from the moment Dulles made his follow-up
remarks.

Other user nations would not be required to abide by

a "concerted boycotting" of the Cana1.·

0

(E)ach country would

have to decide for itself what it wanted its vessels to do." 65
Dulles had two feasible means to ensure SCUA's operation.
first was economic sanctions.

The ·s econd was force.

The

The chief

economic sanction which Dulles had recommended was for all the
users, or as many as possible, not to use the Canal.

Dulles

threw away one of his principal weapons when he publically disclaimed any intention of a concerted boycott~ 66

Shortly, he

would also renounce totally the second sanction--force.
The degree to which economic boycott, if concerted, could
be expected to compel Egypt to accept the concept of the Users•

65 "Transcript of Secretary Dulles• News Conference of
September 13, 0 pp. 477-478.
66 Finer, Dulles over Suez, op, cit., P• 235,
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Association was questionable.

Secretary Dulles admitted in

his news conference of September 26, 1956, that the amount of
pressure that could be exerted upon Egypt by a boycott of the
Suez Canal was minimal •
••• bear in mind that the amount of money .which Egypt gets
out of the Suez Canal is not a major factor in the Egyptian
economy and the pressures which could be exerted by going
around the canal would be relatively little. There will
still be plenty of boats to go through the canal ••• there
will always be a certain amount of revenue to Egypt from
that source •••
••• The amount of revenue that Egypt has derived from it
(the Suez Canal) ••• and the idea that any grave economic
blow can be struck at Egypt through the nonuse of the
canal is a quite false conception.6"4.1
Thus, it is difficult to see how Secretary Dulles intended the
users• Association to be a viable entity, and to be accepted
by Egypt.

Not only was it to have no means of compelling

member nations to adhere to its policies, it was to have no
means of exacting Egyptian compliance.
By now the earlier ambiguity of public statements by
American officials on the use of force by the United States
was gone.

In his September 13 press conference, Dulles out-

spokenly endorsed peaceful means.

So emphatic was Dulles in

his renunciation of the use of force, that in the context of
Egyptian interposition of force to block the cana1, he indicateds
"We do not intend to shoot our way through •••• If we are met by
force, which we can only overcome by shooting, we don•t intend
to go into that shooting.

Then we intend to send our boats

67"Transcript of Secretary Dulles• News conference of
September 26," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 902, Oct. 8,
1956, PP• 547-548.
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around the Cape." 6 8
By renouncing the use of f orce, the British felt that Dulles
had scuttled his own plan.

Eden claimeda "American torpedoing

of their own plan ••• l eft no alternative but to use force or
acquiesce in Nasser' s triumph." 69
Although he h ad effectively swamped SCUA, Dulles persisted
in public wishful thinking.

As substitutes for the real power

whose use he had renounced before the entire world on September 13,
Dulles resorted t o moralizing and pleading to win Egyptian compliance.

During his September 26 press conference, Dul.les

argued unconvincingly that the key to Egypt's acceptance of the
Suez Canal Users• Association was Egyptian recognition of the
0

obligations of i nterdependence."

In the modern world, nations

must cooperate with . each other for their mutual well-being. No
nation can. ignore world opinion for long.

"When a nation 's

conduct frightens others, there are inevitable consequences."
For example, foreigners and tourists are driven away, foreign
exchange is lost, foreign markets and sources of credit ar e
lost--"these are not readily available to a nation which rejects
the implicati on of interdependence. 1170 Thus, it would be in
Egypt's interest to avoid the undesirable consequences by
cooperating with SCUA.

For these nebulous threats to have suc-

ceeded, Egypt would have to have been convinced that damaging
68 "Transcript of secretary Dulles• News Conference of
September 13, .. p. 479.
69Eden, Suez crisis,
· '
op. ci' t ., p, 119 •

7o.,Trans cript of Secretary Dulles• News Conference of
September 26, '·' p. 543.
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i nterna t ional s anctions would actually be applied .

There is

no evidence that Egypt ever was so convinced .
I n hi s openi ng s t atement at the first pl e nary s ession of
the Second London Conf e rence on the Suez Canal, Secretary
Dulle s outlined t he Amer i c an proposal for the Suez Canal Users•
Association.

The

u. s .

propos a l had six provisions :

1 . That the 18 nations which sponsored the r esol ution of

the First London Conference should continue their assoc iat ion;
2 . Tha t they should continue to accept, as a basis f or the

negotiation of a permanent sol ution , their joint stat eme nt of
August 28, 1956;
3 . Th at they s hould_ set up a s mall operating staff to
ass i s t the shi ps of the us er nat i ons and those that serve the
use r nations in operating through t he c anal;
4 . Tha t they establish a small gove rning board c hosen from
among the user nations;
5 . That a modest working fund be advanced by the members
and re i mbur sed out of the funds paid by member ships for services
rendered ; and
6. That member ship would not involve the ass umpt ion by
member nations of any obl.igation .

Member nations shoul d

"volWltari ly t ake such action with respect to the ir ships and
the payment of canal dues as would facilitate the work of the
association and build up its prestige and aut hority, and
consequently its abilit y to serve." 71
71 t•second London Confer ence on Suez c anal: Secreta ry
Dulles• Statement at Fi rst Plenary Session, September l-9 , "
State Dept . Bul ., Vol. 35 , No. 901, Oct . 1, 1956 , pp . 503-506.
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Since the Users• Association, as established by the second
London Conference, did not require the Administration to submit
it to Congress for ratification, Dulles announced the American
decision to subscribe to the declaration of the Association,

u. s. Treasury officials

and his intention to take steps with

and with the representatives of owners of American flag vessels
to obtain their cooperation with the Suez Canal Users•
• t ion.
'
72
A ssocia
Upon completion of the Second London conference, Dulles
returned to the United States.

After his departure from London,

the British and French announced their decision to take the
Suez Canal issue to the United Nations.

Eisenhower reported,

"The decision was made without our knowledge.

While Selwyn

Lloyd and Christian Pineau had discussed this possibility with
Foster during the Second London Conference, the latter had no
inkling at the time that a decision had been made or would be
made without further consultation ... 73
Britain and France were disgusted with Dulles• contrivances
without sanctions.

They suspected he was merely delaying until

they would be compelled to renounce what they regarded as their
rights.

Dulles failed to dispell their intention to resort to

force, if they deemed it necessary.

But he succeeded in destroy-

ing their momentum, and in dissipating the early support they
had enjoyed . Therefore, they decided to go to the Security
•
.
i
.
h'im or informing
.
.
h'im. 74
Council,
without
ether
asking
72 "Second London Conference on Suez Canals Mr. Dulles to
Mr. Lloyd , September 21," in ibid., P• 507.
73Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 52.
74Finer, Dulles over Suez, op. cit., p. 270.
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The Anglo-French decision to go before the United Nations
effectively killed the Suez Canal Users• Association.

Discus-

sion of SCUA continued, in public and private, for nearly a
year, although it had no chance of coming into a meaningful
existence.
On October 2, 1956, Dulles made a major diplomatic error
during his regular press conference.

He indicated that there

were differences of a "fundamental nature" which split the United
States and its allies, Britain and France, on the Suez dispute,
and that they were related to the "independent role" the United
States sought to play on the colonial issue.

Furthermore, Dulles

admitted that there were no "teeth" to SCUA.

While Du.lles later

sought to correct his "blunder," he was unable to undo the harm
done.

(sees Chapter II.)

Publicly, and, perhaps deliberately,

Dulles had denigrated his own creation, SCUA, and he had linked
the Suez dispute to the thorny issue of Colonialism.
more, he had intimated that the

u. s.

Further-

intended to totally

disassociate itself from Colonialism.
Debate Before The United Nations
The Anglo-French decision to take the canal issue to the
united Nations gave rise to considerable anxiety among American
policy-makers.

The Administration feared that the British and

French were setting the stage for the eventual use of force at
Suez.

An alarmed Dulles intensified his efforts to achieve a

peaceful settlement.

75

,

He sent messages to London and Paris

and to United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.
75childers, Road to Suez, op, cit., p. 223.

When
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the foreign ministers and delegates gathered for the first
Security Council session on October 5, 1956, it was learned
that the real discussions would be held privately between British
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Ll_o yd, French Foreign Minister Christian
Pineau, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr, Mahmoud Fawzi in the
Secretary-General's

u. N. office. 76

When Dulles met separately with Lloyd and Pineau in New
York on the morning of October 5, they indicated to him that
"they did not believe that any peaceful way existed.

They urged

the use of force, arguing that only through capitulation by
Nasser could the Western standing in Africa and the Middle East
be restored." 77

Thus, early in October, the Americans had

partial confirmation of their worst fears.

As the month progressed 1

signs of the widening rift between the Americans and their two
oldest and closest Allies inereased.
In their arguments before the Security Council of the United
Nations in early October, American leaders continued to stress
their belief in the need to find a peaceful solution to the
Suez problem.

They argued for insulation of the Canal from

the politics of any one nation.

Thus, Dulles told the Security

Council:
••• The heart of the problem, as I indicated, seems to me
to be whether ••• we can get acceptance of the principle that
there should be a system to insure that the canal cannot be
used by any country as an instrument of its distinctly
national policy.
76
,:...,. t son,. Crisis,
' ·
· Ro~r
op. ; Cl.' t •

,

. . 128 •
p.

77Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 52.
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If Egypt accepts that simple and rudimentary principle
of justice, then I believe that the subsidiary problems
can be resolved. But if that principle be repudiated,
then it is difficult to foresee a useful role for a
negotiating body. Indeed, under those conditions it is
difficult to foresee any settlement in accordance with the
principles of justice and of international law.
And if this case cannot be settled then the whole
system of peace with justice sought to be established by
this charter will be undermined.78
Again Dulles implied that Egypt had acted illegally by nationalizing the Canal.
upon Egypt.

He placed the burden of settling the dispute

By doing so, he intimated that the Anglo-French

case was valid.

By noting that negotiations could fail, he

raised the issue of the other alternative--force.

But, he con-

cluded by suggesting that none could doubt that the U. s

would

1•

chose the peaceful alternative.
The United States supported the private negotiations which
took place between Lloyd, Pineau and Fawzi at the time of the
Security Council debates.
chaired the discussions,

Secretary-General Hammarskjold
Britain's Lloyd suggested six Prin-

ciples "off the cuff" for a Suez settlement.

Lloyd recalledt

"Dag (Hammarskjold) wrote them down and they suddenly became
the word of God. 079

The Egyptians agreed to the Six Principles,

which were approved by the Security Council unanimously. The
Six Principles were,
1. There should be free and open transit through the
Canal without discrimination, overt or covert ••• ,
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;

78 "The Suez Question in the Security Councils Statement
by Secretary Dulles," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 904,
Oct. 22, 1956, P• 615.
79Love, suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 445.
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3. The operation of the Canal should be insulated from
the politics of any country;
4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be
decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
5. A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to
development; and
6. In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the
Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be
settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference
and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to
be due.80
Eden and Mollet, realizing that Egypt's acceptance of the
Six Principles opened the way to serious negotiations over the
Canal, ordered a rider attached to the proposal which was so
prejudicial that they knew Egypt could not accept it. 81

The

Anglo-French rider for implementing the Six Principles,
1. insisted that the Eighteen Power proposals of the First London

Conference were suitably designed to bring about a peaceful
settlement, and that the Egyptian Government had not yet formulated sufficiently precise proposals to meet the requirements
of the six Principles; 2. invited the Egyptian Government to
make known promptly its proposals; and 3. said that, pending
agreement, Egypt should cooperate with SCUA "which has been
qualified to receive the dues payable by ships." 82

Nasser was

thus requested to recognize the Eighteen Power proposal which
he previously had rejected, and to cooperate with SCUA, an
ao"The Suez Question in the Security Councils Text of u. K.French Proposal (U. N. doc. S/3671 dated October 13),•• State
Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 904, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 616.
81 Love, Suez1 Te
h Twice-Foug
'
h t War, op. cit.,
.
p. 446 •
82 "The Suez Question in the security Councils Text of

French Proposal, .. loc. cit.

u.

K.-

90

organization which he was not likely to accept.

Little wonder

the Soviet Union, which had been supporting the Egyptian position in the Security Council, vetoed the Anglo-French implementing
proposal.
Despite the Soviet veto, it seemed to many diplomats that
the next move would be direct negotiations between Britain,
France, and Egypt.

A further meeting was tentatively scheduled

for October 29, 1956.

Lloyd and Pineau felt that since Egypt

had accepted the Six Principles there was no way out of a peace•
83
ful solution.
The Allies Split

According to Anthony Nutting, former Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, who resigned his post because he could not
support the Prime Minister's warmaking policies, and can at
times be suspected of efforts to excoriate Eden, the Prime Minister "was ••• by no means happy at this turn of events •••• (A)
negotiated settlement was now in sight which conceded Egypt's
sovereignty over the Canal in return for protection for the
users• interests." But Eden wanted war, he wanted to unseat
Nasser.

Hence he set out to wreck prospects for a negotiated

settlement both in public and in private. 84
83Love, Sueza The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., P• 446; and
Thomas, Suez Affair, op. cit., pp 101-102. Robertson, however,
questioned this hypothesis. He indicated that, according to
Pineau, ther e was no definite intention of seeing Fawzi again,
or of returning to New York. He also cited Lloyd's remarks that if
the Six Principles, which he originated, were not liked in Britain,
he would be called an appeaser. Lloyd reportedly said to a
group of non-Asian Commonwealth delegates, u1 would not be surprised if I were handed an umbrella when I get back to London,
perhaps a bowler hat too." Robertson, Crisis, op. cit., PP• 144ff.
8 ~utting, No End of a Lesson, op. cit., PP• 77-79.

See
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American officials have since interpreted Eden's actions
as indicative of the

ritish Prime Minister•s conviction that

Nasser had to be removed, and that Eden was not interested in
a peaceful resolution of the canal iss e.
Assistant

Robert Bowie, former

ecretary of state for Policy Planning, commented,

As you probably know, when the thing was thrown into
the United Nations , Hammarskjold had some negotiations
with the British and the French and Nasser's representative, and they got very close to some resolution of the
issues--so close I think that Eden and the French were
persuaded that if they were allowed to go on to the second
meeting, which was scheduled for Geneva, it was very
likely that they would be forced into a position in Which
there wasn't any really legitimate basis for not saying,
"All right, let's settle" And I think that is why they
cancelled the meeting in Geneva and went ahead with their
own planning for the invasion--basically, because, as I
say, Eden•s own notion vas that the right policy was one
of trying to unseat Nasser, not of trying to solve the
problem of the cana1.ss
Bowie offered no proff.

However, his conclusion seems justified

by subsequent historical developments.

But, Bowie did not note

that Eden seemed to equate solution of the Suez problem with
the fall of Nasser, a major difference between the British-French
and American positions

None the less, at the time, the apparent progress of the
private talks seems to have occasioned the optimistic public
alsoa ibid., Love, pp. 446-447, and Thomas, pp. 105-106. Thomas
wrote, " ••• The Foreign secretary, still dubious on the use of
force but unable to recommend to his colleagues that the UN
discussions, either in New York or Geneva, would really lead to
anything, had become aware that Dulles woUld never back SCUA on
the matter of dues, Exhausted after his flight and weeks of
incessant work, he was swept a1ong by Eden, and no more was
heard of the •six principles.• ..
85nu11es Project, Princeton, Interview with Robert Richardson
Bowie, 10 August 1964, pp. 34-35.
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statements made by American officials.

In them, Administration

figures expressed hope that a peaceful settlement of the Suez
controversy was in prospect.
In his nationwide television broadcast, "The People Ask
the President," on October 12, 1956, Eisenhower announced,
The progress made in the settlement of the Suez
dispute this afternoon at the United Nations is most
gratifying. Egypt, Britain and France have met, through
their foreign ministers, and agreed on a set of principles
on which to negotiate; and it looks like here is a very
great crisis that is behind us. I don't mean to say that
we are completely out of the woods, but I talked to the
Secretary of State just before I came here tonight and I
will tell you that in both his heart and mine, there is
a very great prayer of thanksgiving.86 (Italics added.)
President Eisenhower's optimism was echoed by Secretary
of State Dulles in the opening statement to his news conference of October 16, 1956.

Dulles remarked, "There has, I believe,

been progress toward achieving a just and peaceful solution of
the Suez crisis."

He premised his conclusion on the Security

Council's adoption of the Six Principles and "the substantial
moral support" given the second part of the Anglo-French resolution by the affirmative votes of 9 of the 11 members of the
Security Council.

While acknowledging that "there are many

difficulties still in the way," Dulles observed, "each difficulty
overcome means one less difficulty remaining to be overcome, and
we can thus take satisfaction from what occurred last week at
the United Nations." 87
86 "Television Broadcast, 'The People Ask the President,•
October 12, 1956," Public Papers, 1956, op. cit., p. 903.
87 nsecretary Dulles• News Conference of October 16,"
State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 905, Oct. 29, 1956, P• 655.
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These public statements by American leaders did not reflect
their growing private awareness of the widening rift between
the American position and the Anglo-French stan.d on the Suez
problem.

In his memoirs, Eisenhower observed. -that one of the

first signs of rift between the United States and the British
and French was their decision to take the canal question before
the United Nations. 88

Developments in the Middle East, the

Israeli mobilization, and increased radio traffic between Paris
and Jerusalem, all added to American apprehensions.
On October 15, Foster and several assistants came to
see me about a new situation. The Israeli, for some
reason we could not fathom, were mobilizing. High-flying
reconnaissance planes revealed that the Israeli had sixty
French Mystere airplanes, not twelve, as the French had
reported to us. Obviously a blackout of communications
had been imposed. From about this time on, we had the
uneasy feeling that we were cut off from our allies.89
In the private tallts between the British, French and Americans
in the Waldorf Towers in New York during the security Council
debates on the Suez question, Dulles first became aware of a
breakdown in communications with the French and British.
Ambassador William R. Tyler, former Special Assistant for
Liaison with Foreign Delegations, reported on these discussions
that he was "very conscious of the absence of personal rapport
between Dulles and his opposite numbers."

While the Americans

suspected that the British and French were "in cahoots with
each other," secretary Dulles was not able to learn what they
had in store for the world.
88Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 52.
89 Ibid., P• 56.
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I remember one evening, very clearly, working late
at the delegation offices when Mr. Dulles said to me,
"This whole thing is a nightmare to me because I have the
feeling that we•re talking about things that are not the
reality of the situation--that the British and the French
have other plans which could bring about a very dangerous
situation and that we•re not being told about them." And
that was, also, my feeling.90
Despite private misgivings, official American statements of
optimism continued to emanate from Washington.

On Sunday,

October 21, 1956, on CBS network's program, "Face the Nation,"
in reply to Mr. Peter Lisagor•s question whether the United
States, France and Britain could develop a common policy toward
easing the Suez situation, Secretary Dulles replied, "We have
developed a common policy •••• (T)he fact that there are certain
minor, superficial difficulties as to details ••• doesn•t detract
from the fact that basically we do have a common policy ... 91
But evidence of the split continued to accumulate.

Daily

the Anglo-French intention to resort to force became clearer,
as, finally, did their intention to combine forces with the
Israelis.

American intelligence sources kept the Administration

informed of the Anglo-French buildup on Cyprus, and of the Israeli
mobilization. 92

The Administration knew that the Israelis were

putting mud on their trucks, on anything that might gleam.
90Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Ambassador
William R. Tyler, September, 1965, p. 14.
91 John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings ••• of J. F. D., L. 3,
Interviews, 1920-1959, Transcript of1 Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles on "Face the Nation,° CBS Network, Sunday,
October 21, 1956, 5100 P• m. EST, pp. 15-16.
92Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Allen Dulles,
17 May 1965-3 June 1965, PP• 73-74.
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.,Well , now i f they were doing that there was only one way the y
were going--south t o the de sert."

There were also a l l those

Mystere jets at Israel i airports. 93
The exact point a t which the Administ ration knew of AngloFrench-Israeli intentions to go t o war against Egypt is not ye t
c l ear .

However , by the last twent y-f our to thirty- six hour s,

a ll uncert aintie s were removed. 9 4

Thus, some advance warning

of the i mpending i nvas ion was gi ven t o Secretary Dulles by the
' tell igence
'
Ameri' c an in
communi' t y. 95
Amer ican i n t e l ligence als o knew of the secret meetings in
Paris , a lthough they did not know what was di scussed.
were able to "put two and t wo t ogether ...

But they

John Foster Dulles

was "terribly surprised, and he was terribly hurt" that he was
not informed by the British and Fr e nch of these secret meetings,
or of what was deci ded. 96

Although in the last crucial day .or

two before the outbreak of wa r Ameri can offic ials c ould foresee
wha t was coming, they were unsur e of the timetable on which the
' h , Frenc,
h and• Isr ae 1·i s we r e oper a t 'ing . 97
Bri. tis

Richard M. Bissell , Jr ., forme r Top Assistant to CIA Chief
Allen Dulles , may have shed some light on the apparently contra93nulles Pro ject, Princet on, I nte rvi ew with J ames

c.

Hagerty,

14 Oct . 1965 , PP• 23-24 .
94nulles Project , Pr inceton, I nte rview with Richard M.

Bissell , Jr ., 7 Sept. 1966 , p. 26.
95Dulles Pro ject, Princet on, I nte rview with General Charles
P . Cabell , 22 May 1965, PP• 17- 18.
96Dulles Project, Int e r view wi th All en Dulles, PP • 72-74 .
97Dulles Project, I nt e rview with Arms t rong , p. 19 .
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dietary optimism of American public statements in the latter
half of October, 1956, and the pessimistic intelligence information available to the Administration, when he observed:
It was known that the British and the French were
making preparations. I don't think we knew as much about
the Israeli preparations, but we knew that something was
going on there. The uncertainties ••• concerned whether
these governments would finally talce the plunge and, if
so, exactly when. Now, that uncertainty, in turn, was
dissipated in about the last twenty-four or thirty-six
hours. I've always surmised that Foster Dulles hoped,
up until about the last twenty-four or forty-eight hours,
that he could dissuade, or that his actions would dis- ·
suade, the French and the British.98 (Italics added.)
During the pre-invasion period, the Eisenhower Administration, in its public and private communications, repeatedly infomed
Britain and France of the American commitment to a peaceful
.
.
99 When Israel mobilized in late
solution
o f the Suez issue.
October, 1956, President Eisenhower sent a series of letters to
Premier David Ben-Gurion, indicating his "concern at reports of
heavy mobilization on your side •••• I renew the plea ••• that there
be no forceable initiative on the part of your Government which
would endanger the peace • .,lOO
On October 28, 1956, apparently before the American intelligence community had deduced Anglo-French-Israeli collusion
and informed Dulles, the fuite House released a Presidential
statement on the Middle East and the Israeli mobilization. The
98 oulles Eroject, Interview . with Bisse11; . p. 26.

99seea Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op, cit., Appendixes B,

c, D, and G; and Aldrich, "The Suez Crisis, A Footnote To

History,,. loc. cit.
lOOibid., Eisenhower, pp. 69-71.
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statement announced that Eisenhower had ttgiven instructions
that these developments be discussed with the United Kingdom
'
'
'
t 'ite Declaration
'
and Franee," lOl cosignatories
o f the Tripar
of May 25, 1950, which evoked Israeli Major-General Moshe Dayan•s
comment,
••• From both his signals it is apparent that he (Eisenhower) thinks the imminent conflict is likely to erupt
between Israel and Jordan and that Britain and France
will co-operate with him in preventing this. How uninformed he is of the situationl In all its aspects, the
reality is the reverse of his assumptions. The arena is
not Jordan but Egypt, and Britain and France are likely
to be found on the same front with Israel against United
States opposition, and not with the US against Israel.102
Eisenhower, in his memoirs, indicated that the American Government did indeed, at this point, believe that Israel would attack
Jordan, and that Dulles later recalled this misconception in a
morning meeting in the President's office, November 1, 1956. 103
Israel disregarded Eisenhower's request that it do nothing
to endanger peace in the area.

On Monday, October 29, 1956,

Israel attacked Egypt in force.
Both Dulles and Eisenhower were reportedly exceedingly
angry at the Israeli attack on the eve of the American elections. 104
The Administration resolved to undertake two parallel lines of
actions 1. the

u. s.

would seek a United Nations resolution to

lOl.,Staternent by the President on the Middle East Including
the Israeli Mobilization, October 28, 1956,'' Public P pers, 1956,
op. cit., p. 1034.
102Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, op. cit., P• 74.
lOJEisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 82.
104tove, Suez, The TWice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 504; and
Rich rd Goold-Adams, The Time of Power1 A Reappraisal of John
Foster Dulles (Londona Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), PP• 238-239.
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stop the fighting; and 2. the

u. s. would reassert America's

intention to abide by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and

to assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East. 105
On Tuesday, October 30, 1956, the United States introduced
a resolution to the Security Council of the United Nations calling
for an immediate cease-fire, the immediate withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces behind the armistice lines, and asking all

u.

N.

members, 1. to refrain from the use of force or threat of force
in the area; 2. to assist the

u.

N. in ensuring the integrity

of the armistice lines; and 3. to refrain from aiding Israel
militarily, economically or financially.
with Australia and Belgium abstaining.
vetoed the resolution, 106
Government.

The vote was 7 to 2
France and Britain

much to the chagrin of the American

Just prior to the veto by Britain and France of

the American proposal, the Anglo-French ultimatum to the Egyptians and Israel is to withdraw to a distance of ten miles from
either side of the canal was released.
As soon as the American Ambassador to Britain, Winthrop

w.

Aldrich, heard of the Israeli invasion, he asked Lloyd for an
appointment.

Their meeting was set for 9c30 a. m., October 30.

Lloyd told Aldrich that the French and the British had not yet
decided whether they would use force.

He indicated that he

would let Aldrich know what was concluded after his and Eden's
meeting with the French Premier Guy Mollet, and Foreign Minister
105 Finer, Dulles over Suez, op. cit., P• 355.
106 "u. s . Proposal in the security Council (U. N. doc. 5/
3710)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 907, Nov. 12, 1956, P• 750.
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Christian Pineau, who were on their way to London.
kept a telephone line open to the State Department.

Aldrich
When Lloyd

finally did call Aldrich, he told the American Ambassador of
the Anglo-French ultimatum which was then being released.
Aldrich askeds "Do you realize that will mean that the first
Eisenhower hears of the fact that the British and French are
going to move in is when he reads it in the newspapers because
I can't get to him in time?"lO?

After the Suez crisis had ended,

Aldrich learned that the American Ambassador to France,

c. Douglas

Dillon, had heard privately from Pineau that the British and
French were going to intervene.

Dillon sent a telegram to the

State Department, but because he had promised Pineau that he
would not reveal the information to anybody but the American

Secretary of State, he did not send a copy to Aldrich, which
would have been standard operating procedure otherwise. 108
Apparently for diplomatic reasons, the United States denied
prior knowledge of the Anglo-French ultimatum.

A White House

Presidential press release maintained that the first formal
knowledge the United States had of the ultimatum was "obtained
107Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., pp. 356-357; Love,
Suez, The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 504; and Eisenhower
Project, Columbia, Interview with Ambassador Winthrop w.
Aldrich, 1973, PP• 16-17.
lOSibid., Interview with Aldrich, p. 25. Previously
unpublished, this information indicates that Robertson (Crisis,
op. cit., p. 169.) was incorrect when he stated thats "Washington, from the President down to the most junior official
at the State Department, heard about the ultimatum on the ticker
tapes." Somebody at the Department of State knew. But they
did not tell Aldrich, who found the information, much later,
in the Israel file.
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through press reports."

Upon receiving press accounts of the

ultimatum, Eisenhower sent urgent personal messages to the Prime
Ministers of Great Britain and France, expressing

0

his earnest

hope that the United Nations Organization would be given full
opportunity to settle the items in the controversy by peaceful
means instead of by forceful means." 109
The Israeli a ttack came a little over one week before the
American presidential election on November 6, at the very height
of the campaign.

In a Boston speech on October 29, 1956, the

Democratic Presidential candidate, Senator Adlai Stevenson,
took advantage of the outbreak of hostilities to warn his fellow
countrymen that the Eisenhower Administration had been less
than candid about the situation in the Middle East, a charge
that bore more than an ounce of truth.

The Democratic aspirant

accused:
The Government in Washington ••• that has been continuously telling us that all is well in the world, that there
is peace, that there is--as the President announced only
a few days ago--"good news•• in the Middle East, has not
been telling us the whole truth.
These reassurances--as today•s news (of Israeli
invasion) seems to confirm--have been tragically less than
the truth •••• 110
The following day, in a speech in Philadelphia, Stevenson
reminded his audience that the year before he had warned of the
explosive Middle Eastern situation along the Armistice Lines,
109 "White House Statements Concerning Aggression in the
Middle East (Issued by Presidential Press secretary James c.
Hagerty)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 907, Nov. 12, 1956,
p. 749.

llO"Texts of Stevenson's Documents on the Hydrogen Bomb and
of His Speech in Boston, .. New York Times, Oct. 30, 1956, p. 28.
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which could result in war .
lishment of a group of
Lines.

u.

Stevenson recommended the estabN. guards to police the Armistice

He charged that Eisenhower was either badly informed,

or that he did not want the American people to know the true
situation, or to care about it. 111
In his October 31, 1956 , radio and television address to
the nation, President Eisenhower indicated that the United
States had not been consulted or informed in advance about the
decision of Israel, France and Britain to resort to force in
the Middle East. 112

As indicated above, the United States did

have advanced information from intelligence sources, and Pineau•s
unofficial remarks to Dillon, but it had no such information
through normal diplomatic channels.

For ten days, the United

States had no direct communication diplomatically with either
Britain or France. 113
Eisenhower continued his address by stating1 "As it is the
manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions
and actions, it is our right ••• to dissent.
actions to have been taken in error.

We believe these

For we do not accept the

use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement
of international disputes ... 114
lll,.Text of Stevenson's Speech at Philadelphia," New Yor k
Times , October 31, 1956, P• 24.
112 .. Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle Easts
Address by Pres ident Eisenhower," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35,
No. 907, Nov. 12, 1956, p. 744.
113Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 73.
114"Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East,"

PP• 744-745.
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Recognizing that Britain, France and Israel had "been
subjected to grave and repeated provocations," the United States
nevertheless disagreed with their use of force.

:In

the American

understanding, this difference of opinion was in no way meant
to minimize American friendship with these three states.

The

violent actions of Britain, France and Israel could "scarcely
be reconciled wi th the principles and purposes of the United
Nations."

Furthermore, resort to war could hardly "serve the

permanent interests of the attacking nations."

To the relief,

no doubt, of Americans watching and listening, President Eisenhower went on to announces
In the circumstances I have described, there will be
no United States involvement in these present hostilities.
I therefore have no plans to call the Congress in special
session . Of course, we shall continue to keep in contact
with congressional leaders of both parties. At the same
time it is--and it will remain--the dedicated purpose of
your Government to do all in its power to localize the
fighting and to end the conflict.
President Eisenhowe r concluded his remarks by observing that
"there can be no peace without law.

And there can be no law

if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those
who oppose us and another for our friends ... 115
In his own nationwide radio-TV address on November 1, 1956,
Adlai Stevenson responded to the President 's remarks of the
evening before.

Stevenson charged that the Eisenhower Adminis-

tration's Middle Eastern policy was bankrupt.

It had presented

the Communists with a great double victory: 1. the establishment
of Soviet influence in the Middl e East; and 2. the break-down
llSibid., p. 745.
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of the Western alliance.

"As the climax, the United States

finds itself arrayed in the United Nations with Soviet Russia
and the dictator of Egypt against the democracies of Britain,
France and Israel."

Stevenson also repeated his accusation

that the Administration had withheld information about the international situation from the American people. 116
Return to the United Nations
In his October 31st address to the nation, Eisenhower set
the tone for American policy to be followed in the
on the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt.

u.

N. debates

The United States

would seek an end to hostilities and a peaceful solution to the
problem under the auspices of the United Nations in accordance
with the principles of the

u.

N. Charter.

Following the Israeli invasion, the Anglo-French ultimatum,
and the British bombing of Egypt, Dulles addressed the General
Assembly on November 1.

Dulles began, "I doubt that any delegate

ever spoke from this forum with as heavy a heart as I have brought
here tonight •••• (T)he United States finds itself unable to agree
with three nations with whom it has ties, deep friendship,
admiration , and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest,
most trusted and reliable allies."

The United States believed

that "peaceful processes ••• had not yet ••• run their course."

The

Anglo-French-Israeli action against Egypt must be treated as
"a grave error, inconsistent with the principl.es and purposes
of the charter and one which if persisted in would gravely under116 "Adlai Answers on Middle East--u . s. Policy Makers
•Appeased And Provol~ed Egypt' ( Text of s tevenson • s Address) , "
u. s. News and World Report, Nov. 9, 1956, PP• 77-78.
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mine our charter and undermine this organization."

Next the

Secretary of State read the United States draft cease-fire
resolution to the General Assembly.

Then Dulles indicated

America's hope that the pre-crisis situation in the Middle East
would not merely be restored, but that the United Nations could
be instrumental in arranging a permanent peace.

Advocating

that first things be put first, Dulles continued, "I believe
the first;. thing is to stop the fighting as rapidly as possib.le
lest it become a conflagration which would endanger us all--and
' not beyond th. e rea1 m o f possi'b'l't
that 1s
1. 1. y. •• 117

It is hard to believe that the Administration was entirely
serious about the possibility of a general war.

The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made it clear to Dulles that the
Soviet Union was in no position to act militarily in the Middle
East even by way of a dispatch of "volunteers." 118

Yet Dulles

voiced t~is fear in his November 1 address to the General Assembly, and Eisenhower, later, raised the prospect during his
February 20
leaders

on

threat of

1957, White House conference with Congressional
the matter of compelling Israel i withdrawal through

u N. sanctions.

One suspects that the Administration

stressed this rather remote danger in order to lend urgency to
its calls for cease-fire and withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli
troops from Egyptian territory, and in order to maximize domestic
and foreign support for its policies.

soviet rocket-rattling

117"statement by Secretary Dulles in the General Assembly,
November 1," state Dept, Bul., Vol. 35, No. 907, Nov. 12, 1956,
pp. 753-755.
118Finer, Dulles over Suez, op. cit., p. 186.
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statements and Sino-Soviet threats to send .. volunteers" might
have lent credibility to the American position, but they did not
materially alter the small prospects of general war.

As a former

soldier, Eisenhower was little impressed with Communist threats,
but he was not opposed to letting them increase the pressures on
Britain, France, and Israel , whom he hoped to maneuver into
cease-fire and withdrawal.

There were, in fact, indications

that during this period the CIA fabricated r eports of Russian
military activity, which had no factual basis. 119
In the final paragraph of his November 1 address, DUlles
expressed his conviction that the united Nations faced a severe
challenge in the Suez crisis; that the

u.

N. must demonstrate

in this situation an ability to act to restore peace in the area
and to devise a solution, lest the so-called police action
"develop into something which is far more grave.

Even if this

does not happen, the apparent impotence of this organization to
deal with this situation may set a precedent which will lead
other nations to attempt to take into their own hands the remedying of what they believe to be their injustices.
happens, the future is dark indeed ." 120

If that

The Anglo-French inter-

vention dealt a severe blow to one of the major pillars of the
Administration's diplomacy--the Alliance.

The Administration

felt it necessary to depend heavily on another major pillar-the United Nations. 121

Dulles• statement expressed his own and

11·9Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 384; and
Love, Suez: The TWice-Fouqht War , op. cit., p. 615.
120"statement by Secretary Dulles in the General Assembly,
November 1," loc. cit.
121 Thomas , Suez Affair, op. cit., p. 134,
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Eisenhower's fear that the very existence of the United Nations
was endangerea. 122

The United States determined to make the

united Nations work.

The Administration decideds 1. to secure

an immediate cease-fire; and 2. to show that aggression did not
pay. 123 The· A4ndnistr tion ,.bac~ d the Secretary-General in his
efforts on behalf of peace, and it supported the concept of a
United Nations Emergency Force to police the peace in the Middle
East.
The

u. s.

draft resolution was adopted by the General

Assembly on November 2, 1956, by a margin of 64 to 5 {Australia,
France, Israel, New Zealand, and Great Britain opposed) with
6 abstentions {Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal and
South Africa abstained).

The major provisions of the General

Assembly Resolution on the Middle East urgeds
1. An innnediate cease-fire and the cessation of movement
of military forces into the area;
2. Withdrawal of parties to the Armistice Agreements behind
the Armistice lines: stopping of raids across the Armistice
lines; and observance of the provisions of ~he Armistice
Agreements;
3. That member nations refrain from sending military goods
into the area or in other ways delay or prevent implementation
of the resolution; and
122Robertson, Crisis, op. cit., p. 186; and Love,~=
The TWice-Fought War, op cit., p. 562.
123 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 402.
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4, Effective steps be taken to reopen the Suez cana1. 124

In the General Assembly session of November 2, secretary
Dulles indicated

u. s.

interest in the Canadian proposal for a

United Nations Emergency Force to police the cease-fire, and to
implement and keep peace in the Middle East area of conflict.
Dulles noteda "'rhe United States delegation will be very happy
indeed if the Canadian delegation would formulate and introduce
as part of these proceedings a concrete suggestion along the
lines which Mr. Pearson made." 125
At midnight on November 2, Dulles was awakened by severe
abdominal pains.

He was taken to Walter Reed Army Hospital,

where a three-hour operation revealed serious abdominal cancer.
Before the operation, Dulles had instructed his assistant,
William Macomber , to have Hoover take charge of all policies
in the State Department, except Suez .

Dulles had hoped to

manage the crisis himself from the hospital.

But, because of

the seriousness of the cancer, he was forced to relinquish
control, during a critical period , to the President, who
assumed effective charge of
morning.

u. s.

Mideast policy the following

Dulles did not return to the State Department until

December 3.

Although he kept in close contact with Suez develop-

ments during his period of convalescence, he was not firmly in
charge.

Eisenhower now had full responsibility for

u. s.

Suez

124"An Appeal For A Cease-fire In Egypt And Withdrawal Of
Military Forces To The 1949 Armistice Lines (Resolution 977

(ES-1))," Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology,
op. cit., pp. 139-140.
125 "Statement by Secretary Dulles in the General Assembly,
November 2," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 907, Nov. 12, 1956,

pp. 755-756.
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policy.126
On November 3, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., announced
that the United States thought that the Canadian draft resolution °should be acted on promptly ••• given priority.

We should

like to see it acted on this evening because it contains a real
hope of meeting the very grave emergency that confronts the
world." 127
On November 4, Ambassador Lodge announced that, in order : to
facilitate the success of the united Nations Emergency Force
operation, the United States was willing to give important help
"as regards airlifts, shipping, transport and supplies." 128
In the United Nations General Assembly proceedings, the
United States pressed for cease-fire and the non-introduction
of foreign troops in the area of Suez.

.

.

'
The Soviet suggestion

that the United States and the Soviet Union take joint military action to separate the belligerents unless the fighting
stop within twelve hours was branded "unthinkable 0 by American
officials.

Lodge remarked, "This would convert Egypt into a

still larger battlefield ... 129
Lodge later greeted the news of the Anglo-French accept126Hoopes, Te
h Dev1'1 and J. F.

'
o,, op. cit.,
pp. 380 - 388 •
127usecond Statement (of Ambassador H. c. Lodge, Jr.) in

General Assembly on November 3," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35,
No. 908, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 790.

128 "(Ambassador Lodge's) Statement in General Assembly on
November 4," in ibid., p. 791.
129 "(Ambassador Lodge's) Statement in the Security Council
on November 5," in ibid., P• 791.
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ance of the cease-fire.

The United Nations had achieved its

.,first objective" but much remained to be done, he remarked.
The United Nations must now turn to its "second objective •••
to arrange for the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel,
France, and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory ... 130
Later that day, Ambassador Lodge indicated that the withdrawal, in the United States understanding, would be phased
with the arrival of the United Nations Emergency Force which
the

u. s.

hoped would begin arriving "as soon as possible ... 131

Throughout November and on into December, Lodge continued
to press for Anglo-French-Israeli withdrawal of forces from
Egypt, for an immediate beginning on clearing the canal, and for
the quick consignment of the full United Nations Emergency
Force to the area. 132
When the British and French Governments declared their
intention to comply with the United Nations withdrawal resolution, and to work out with General Burns, UNEF Commander, a
schedule for early withdrawal, the Eisenhower Administration
welcomed their decision and urged that the united Nations now
turn to deal with the remaining issues in the Middle East. 133
130 "(Ambassador Lodge's) First Statement in General
Assembly on November 7, 0 in ibid., p. 791.
131 "(Ambassador Lodge's) Second Statement in General
Assembly on November 7," in ibid., p. 792.
132 "General Assembly Action on the Middle East Question:
(November 24) Statement by Ambassador Lodge," State Dept. Bul.,
Vol. 35, No. 911, Dec. 10, 1956, pp. 914-915.
133 nwithdrawal of British and French Forces From Egypt,
Department Announcement (Press Release 606, dated December 3),"
in ibid., PP• 951-952.
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Before turning t o the pr oblem of I srael i withdrawal , it
might prove worthwhile to br iefly cons i der f actors c ontributi ng to Americ an policy pr ior to t he Anglo-Fre nch withdrawal.
For ne ar ly two-and-a-half months , Secretar y Dulles had
argued with the Bri t i s h and French against bei ng t oo hasty to
take the Suez i s s ue bef ore the United Nations .

Whe n the British

and French did decide t o take the matter t o the

u.

N., this

signaled to the Adminis tration a breach in allied r elations.
At the s econd London Confe rence , Dulles told Eden tha t he
thought i t would be a mis take to take the iss ue to the public
stage.
Ambass ador Tyler has since reported,
I remember very distinctly his saying to Eden , ••Now
look, let us, f or Heaven ' s sake , not r us h this thing. This
is very difficult . Things c ould go wrong ver y e as ily.
Don't go to the Unit e d Nations . Wa it and let us s ee
whether it can be handled with personal talks . " ••• I was
under the impression that the Britis h and we had agre ed ••••
Dulles had no sooner left London , but on his a rri val
in Washington the next day , t he first thing was tha t he was
h it by the press with a request for comments on the u. K.
having thrown the Suez issue into the security Counc i l .
; •• (T)his is really one time when I s aw Mr . Dulles real ly
upset. He felt he had been double-cr ossed- - I don 't t hi nk
the wor d is too hard . He felt tha t Eden had done thi s i n
order to sharpen the thi ng and to make out a cas e , wh i ch
in the l ight of later events , of c ourse, Dulles ' judge ment was probably right • ••• 134
Additional light has been shed upon Dulle s • rel uc tance to s ee
t he British and French take the Suez ma t t e r befor e the Uni ted
Nati ons by former State Department Lega l Advis or He r man Phleger
who noted that Dulles "didn' t want them t o go to the UN with
the obj e c t of simply saying t hat t hey had gone to t he ON, and i t
134Dul les Project , Interview with Tyle r , PP• 11- 13 .
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had been unable to accomplish anything.

I think he would have

cooperated in the idea that they go there seeking a solution ... 135
Dulles feared that the British and French were going to the

u.

N. in order to prepare the diplomatic ground for their

invasion of Egypt by showing that they had exhausted every
peaceful means to a settlement.
maximum of flexibility.

Dulles sought to retain the

He hoped to delay taking the Suez dis-

pute to the Security Council where resolutions favorable to
Britain and France ran the risk of being vetoed by the Soviet
Union, which could provide the pretext for an Anglo-French
invasion of Egypt.

Dulles believed that if force could be avoided,

the propitious time to implement Anglo-French plans for military
action would pass. 136
When the British, French, and Israelis attacked Egypt, it
was President Eisenhower who decided to come down hard on them,
not Dulles.

The decision to press for an immediate cease-fire

in the United Nations, and to pressure the British, French,
and Israeli armies to withdraw was first and foremost Eisenhower's.

Both Eisenhower and Dulles were hurt by the Anglo-

French decision to resort to force and to refrain from official
communication of their decision to Washington.

Eisenhower made

his displeasure known to Eden in a heated telephone ca11. 137
Presidential Press Secretary James

c.

Hagerty reporteds

135Dulles Project, Interview with Phleger, pp. 55-56.
136Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 264.
137nulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Bernard M.
Shanley, 14 July 1966, p. 47.
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••• all the way through this, it was Eisenhower who said,
We cannot permit this to happen. If it does, we will
have to take a different stand on this than our major
allies, France and Great Britain, and one of our smaller
but vitally concerned friends, the State of Israel."
I will always be convinced ••• that this whole timing
of Suez in the closing weeks of the 1956 presidential
campaign was deliberately. timed, because our friends and
allies did not believe that an American President would
take an opposite side in the closing weeks of the campaign,
because of the political reaction of the Jewish voters in
our country.
It was Eisenhower's decision, and no one could make
that decision, but himself, in that campaign. It was his
decision to do exactly what we did •••• 138
0

Throughout the period prior to the Anglo-French withdrawal,
the Eisenhower Administration was concerned with restoring friendly
relations with the British, the French and the Israelis, particularly the British.

Eisenhower has indicated that he "just

couldn't think of anything worse that to have Britain and the
United States completely on the outs on anything." 139 Nevertheless, the

u. s.

did not hesitate to exploit the economic weakness

of the British pound sterling, and the oil shortages of all
Western Europe, caused by the blocking of the Suez Canal and
the rupture of the Syrian pipeline, to extract concessions from
the British and French.

The United States only lent funds to

Britain after it had agreed to cease-fire.

And the

u. s.

allowed

the shipment of Western Hemisphere oil to Europe only after
receiving Anglo-French assurances that they intended to withdraw
promptly from Egypt. 140
138oulles Project, Interview with Hagerty, PP• 24-25.
139oulles Project, Interview with Eisenhower, pp. 36-37.
140Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., pp. 384-387;
Macmillan, Riding the Storm, op. cit., p. 169.
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An additional factor influencing American policy during
this period has been brought out by President Eisenhower in his
memoirs: "We could not permit the Soviet Union to seize the
leadership in the struggle against the use of force in the Middle
East and thus win the confidence of the new independent nations
of the world. 0141 The theme of the growing Soviet presence in
the Middle East is a recurring one, from the time of the Czech
arms deal, in American Middle Eastern policy.

It figured in the

withdrawal of the offer to finance the Aswan High

Dam

project.

Throughout the period of the Suez crisis of 1956-1957, one is
struck by the conscious efforts of the Eisenhower Administration
to restrict the growth of the Soviet influence in the area.
Foremost among these was the Eisenhower Doctrine promulgated in
January, 1957--it was geared to filling the power vacuum left
by the decline of British and French power and prestige in the
area, a decline which

u. s.

Suez policy had accelerated.

The

Administration was too preoccupied with avoiding the stigma of
too close association with Colonialism which it apparently
feared would usher the

u. s.

u. s. s.

R. into the Middle East.

The

was so concerned with keeping the Soviets out of the area,

and with calling the world's attention to soviet repression in
Hungary (seea Chapter I I • .), that the Administration failed to
recognize that American long-range objectives were not endangered by the maintenance of Anglo-French power in the Middle
East.
141 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 83.
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The Israeli Withdrawal
Following the Anglo-French withdrawal from Suez, the
American Government still had to cope with the Israeli presence
in Sinai.

Ben-Gurion indicated in his memoirs that delay of

the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai was of crucial importance to
Israel which needed time so that the issues might be judged
more soberly after the .,fright and hysteria" of the brief war
had subsided.

It would also permit the development of inter-

national understanding for Israel's security problems. 142 Thus,
Israel balked at withdrawing all her forces from Sinai until
she received guarantees of open transit through the Straits of
Ti.ran, and on the status of the Gaza Strip.

But the United

States pressed for Israeli withdrawal, and the replacement of
Israeli troops with Uni ted Nations forces.

On January 17, 1957,

Ambassador Lodge stressed before the United Nations the American
position •that the United Nations Emergency Force move in
immediately behind the withdrawing Israeli forces in order to
assure the maintenance of the cease-fire and to safeguard the
Armistice Agreement ... 143

On January 28, 1957, Lodge repeated

this position.
On February 11, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles handed an
aide memoire to Israeli Ambassador to the united states Abba
Eban, which indicated that in the American view the Gulf of
Agaba "comprehends international waters and that no nation has
142Ben-Gurion, Israels Years of Challenge, op. cit., PP• 158ff.
143 ,.Question of Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From Egypts
Statement by Ambassador Lodge, January 17," State Dept. Bul.,
Vol. 36, No. 921, Feb. 18, 1957, PP• 269-270.
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the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and
through the Strai ts giving access thereto."

Secretary Dulles

added 1 "In the absence of some overriding decision to the .
contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the united
States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is
prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage
and to join with others to secure general recognition of this
. ht • .,144
rig
In a renewal of its appeal to Israel to withdraw her troops
from Sinai, the White House released a statement on February 17,
accompanie d by publication of the February 11 aide memoire.
The White House statement noted thats
The United States believes that the action of the
United Nations of February 2nd and the statements of
various governments, including the United States
memorandum of February 11th, provided Israel with the
maximum assurance that it can reasonably expect at this
juncture, or that can be reconciled with fairnes s to
others.145
In his news conference of February 19, 1957, Secretary
Dulles indicated, in reply to a question about Israel's right
to use the Suez Canal, that the United States interpreted the
Six Principle s to mean "that there should be free and open transit
through the canal without discrimination and that the canal
should be insulated from the politics of any nation.

We have

144"Aide Memoire From Secretary Dulles to Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban, February 11, 1957,"
Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology, op. cit .,
PP• 156-157.
145 "White House Statement, February 17," State Dept. Bul. ,
Vol. 36, No. 924, March 11, 1957, p. 392 .
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no reason to assume that those principles will not be applied." 146
He had been making this point since November, 1956.
When Israel procrastinated, the American Government was
forced to give consideration to the question of sanctions
against it, to compel it to adhere to repeated United Nations
resolutions.

Word that the Administration was considering sanc-

tions caused Congressional opponents to speak out against their
imposition.

Senator Lyndon Johnson led the pro-Israel group

among Democratic Senators, while William F. Knowland, the
Senate Republican leader, threatened to resign from the American
delegation to the

u.

u.

N. General Assembly.

Knowland denounced a

N. "double-standard" of morality in applying sanctions to a

small country, Israel, while "•s ide-stepping•• the question of
sanctions against the
Hungary.

u. s. s.

R. for its "crime" against

such a double-standard was "both immoral and in good

.
.
t a ble." 147
conscience
insuppor

Dulles, American

u.

(sees Chapter III.)

N. Ambassador Lodge, Tr,eaeury,: ·· .·:-.

Secretary George M. Humphrey, and Eisenhower decided on February 16• 1957

"that the White House had to make a stand against

Congress and against Israe1. 0148

In a special White House

conference on February 20, with the Congressional leadership of
both the Republican and Democratic parties, called to secure
1460secretary Dulles• News Conference of February 19,"
in ibid., P• 404.

147"The Double Standard of International Morality at the
united Nations ," Sen. Wm. F. Knowland, Congressional Record,
Vol. 103, Part I, Feb. 7, 1957, P• 1654.
148tove, suez, The Twice-Fought War , op. cit., PP• 665-666 .
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Congressional support for Administration Middle East policy,
President Eisenhower voiced his fears that Israeli noncompliance with the United Nations withdrawal resolution would
ultimately result in increased Middle Eastern economic stagnation.
"(T)hese developments, along with increased influence of Russia
in the Arab states, could lead to interruption of the flow of
oil through the remaining pipeline, continued blocking of the
Canal, possibly a serious crash in the French and United Kingdom
economies and, f inally, an increased possibility of general
war • .,149
Eisenhower was not successful in his bid to secure the
backing of Congressional leaders.

Instead, the Administration

went ahead with its intention to threaten sanctions in the face
of Congressional opposition.

Prior to his nationwide radio a nd

television address of February 20, 1957, Eisenhower cabled Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion about his reluctance to take measures, or
to see the Un ited Nations take measures, "which might have farreaching effects upon Israel's relations throughout the world." lSO
In his broadcast address, Eisenhower noted1 1. that the
aide memoire of February 11 stated that the

u. s.

u. s.

would seek

such disposition of UNEF troops as would assur e that the Gaza
Strip could no longer be used as a source of armed infiltration
and reprisals; 2. that the Secretary of State had orally informed
Ambassador Eban that the United States would urge and support
149.
.
Peace, op. cit. , p. 186.
Eisenhower, Waging
lSOibid., P• 187.
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United Nations pa rticipation in the administration of the Gaza
Strip, with Egypt's approval; and 3. that the United States held
the conviction that the Gulf of Aqaba constituted international
waters and that no nation had the right to restrict passage in
the Gul.f .

The United States Government would join with others

to secure general r e cognition of the right of free and innocent
passage.

Eisenhower procededs

I s r ael seeks somet hing mor e. It insists on firm
guarantee s as a c ondition to withdrawing its forces
of invas ion.
Thi s raises a basic question of principle. Should
a nat i on which attacks and occupies foreign territory in
the face of United Nati ons disapproval be allowed to
impose conditions on its withdrawal?

•

•

•

If the United Nations once admits that international
disput e s can be settled by using force, then we will have
destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our
bes t hope of establishing a world order. That would be a
disaster for us all. 151
I n apparent reply to Congres sional and press critics, Eisenhower noted that it had been suggested that

u.

N. action against

Israel should not be pressed because i n the pas t Egypt had itself
violated the Armistice Agreement and international law.
howe r stated s

Eisen-

"It is true t hat both Egypt and Israel, prior to

last October , engaged in repr i sals in v i olation of the Armistice
Agreements.

Egypt ignor ed -the United Nations in exercising

belligerent rights in rela t ion to I s raeli shipping in the Suez
Canal and in t he Gulf of Aqaba."

Eisenhower indicated that he

did not r egard these violations as suff icient justification for
151 .,Question of Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From Egyptian
Terri tory: (Radio and Television) Addre ss by President Eisenhower, Fe bruary 20,'' State Dept. Bul., Vol. 36, No. 924,
March 11 , 1957, p. 389.
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Israel's invasion of Egypt.

Israeli failure to withdraw would

be harmful to the .,long-term good of Israel," to the United

Nations and to prospects for a peaceful solution of the problems
of the Middle East.

Eisenhower now turned to the key passage

The United Nations must not fail. I believe that--in
the interests of peace--the United Nations has no choice
but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions. Of course, we still hope that the
Government of Israel will see that its best immediate and
long term interests lie in compliance with the United
Nations and in placing its trust in the United Nations
and in the declaration of the United States with
reference to the future.152
On March 1, 1957, Israeli Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir
announced Israel's decision to comply with

u.

N. resolutions

for full and complete withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai.
Israel's decision was met with American statements of thanksgiving.

President Eisenhower cabled Prime Minister Ben-Gurions

"I was deeply gratified at the decision of your Government to
withdraw promptly and fully behind the Armistice lines ... 153
With the pull-out of the last Israeli troops later that month,
the long Suez crisis came to an end.
Although American policy during the Suez crisis often drew
heavy criticism, Dulles regarded

u. s.

policy toward the United

Nations during the crisis as one of his three greatest achievements as Secretary of State.

"If we had not adopted the policy

152Ib'd
_,.!._., p. 390.
15311withdrawal of Israeli Forces From Egyptian Territory,
Letter From The President of the United States to the Prime
Minister of Israel, March 2, 1957, .. Committee on Foreign
Relations, A Select Chronology, op. cit., p. 169.
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we did, the UN might have gone under ... 154
Further light has been shed on the subsequent attitudes of
the two most imp'o rtant formulators of American pol.icy during the
Suez crisis.

Former Special Assistant to the Secretary of state

William B. Macomber recalled Dulles sayings

I believe that we were right, the way we handled the
British, French, Israeli actions there. But in the end,
it ' s for history to judge. Any defense of it simply tears
away the scar tissue--the healing--that we re building up
over this thing . And the important thing now is to get
back together again
It ' s essential that our friendships-not only with Britain--but all the friendships, are put
together again , and defending it will just put back the
process •••• It's a matter of conscious policy that I have
never again spoken out in defense of what we did. I believe
what we did was right, but we'll let history judge it,155
This report seems contradictory of remarks made by Dulles to
British Foreign Secretary Selwyn •Lloyd and British Ambassador to
the

u. s.

Sir Harold Caccia, who visited Dulles in the hospital on

November 17, 1956 . 156

Upon their arrival, Dulles immediately

asked his guests, "Well, once you started, why didn't you go
through with it and get Nasser down?"
didn't you give us a wink?"
do anything like thatl"

Lloyd replied, "Foster, why

Dulles responded, "Ohl I couldn t

Perhaps, the best explanation for this

seemingly enigmatic remark is that it revealed the differences
between Eisenhower's and Dulles• views of the ultimate legitimacy
of force at Suez, and Dulles• complete reluctance to deviate
154Andrew H. Berding, Dull.es on Diplomacy (Princeton, N. J.s
van Nostrand, 1965), p. 2.

155 Dulles Project, Interview with Macomber, p. 67.
156 First reported by Finer, Dulles ove~ Suez, op, cit.,

pp. 446-447.
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from the President's position. 157

Similarly, Dulles' loyalty

to Eisenhower might explain his later insistence to Macomber
that

u. s.

Suez policy was right.

Eisenhower, when asked what the United States would have
done had the British, French, and Israelis succeeded in toppling
Nasser and in taking Cairo, or their immediate military objective,
answereds

"Had they done it quickly, we would have begun to

insist, I'm sure, that they would have to get out ... 158
157Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., P• 381.
158Dulles Project, Interview with Eisenhower, pp. 38-39.

CHAPTER II
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY
In matters of foreign policy, chief spokesmen to the press
for the United States Government have traditionally been the
Department of State and the White House.

During the years of

the Eisenhower Administration, foreign policy was made known
to the public, through the press, in a variety of ways.

First,

were what might be described as the formal channels of public
information, includingc 1. White House and State Department
daily press conferencess 2. the regular press conferences of the
President of the United States and of the Secretary of State;
3. nationwide radio and television addresses by the President
and by the Secretary of State; and 4, President Eisenhower's
television interview program, "The People Ask the President."
Operating parallel to this formal (official) network was an
informal system of communications between the Government and the
press, consisting ofs 1. background news briefings; 2. informal
dinner and cocktail discussions; and 3. personal (exclusive)
interviews.
The Formal Channels
Both the White House and the State Department had daily
press conferences.

Presidential Press secretary James

c.

Hagerty, or in his absence, his Assistant, Murray Snyder, held
these White House press conferences twice daily, Monday through
122
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Friday, and once on Saturday.

None were held on Sunday unless

the White House staff worked that day. 1

The attempt was made to

have these press conferences at 10s30 a.m. and at 4s00 p.m.
whether in Washington, D.

c., or on the road. Sometimes, when

the President was traveling, they would be held only once a
day. 2

These daily White House press conferences were taken quite

seriously by the Presidential Press Secretary and his staff.
Considerable preparation and planning went into them.
The principle aim of these daily press conferences was
rather succinctly outlined by Assistant Press Secretary Murray
Snyder in the following terms,
The principal target ••• was to use these (daily press
conferences) to grind out the routine news. Action by the
President on legislation, action by the President on
appointments, the President's personal plans, travel plans
and this sort of thing, and reports by various study
groups or outside organizations to the President, his
responses, resignations, changes in personnel. Of course,
these were scheduled sometimes days in advance, for
various reasons ••• 3
The daily White House press conferences were also important
from another perspective.

The questions that the Presidential

Press Secretary received during the week would enable him and
his staff to anticipate 90 per cent of the questions in the
.. public domain .. which would be asked the President in his
regular news conference.

It was considered virtually impossible

to "anticipate purely local questions from a local reporter
1Eisenhower Project, Columbia, Interview with James Hagerty,
Vol. III, 1968, PP• 441-442.
2Eisenhower

Project, Columbia, Interview. with -Murray Snyder,

1968, PP• 30-32.
3 Ibid., PP• 31-32.
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representing a local area." 4
In addition to the daily White House press conferences
were the daily Departmental announcements of policy.

There

are scores of minor or routine announcements of policy.

More

importantly, major policy decisions are also announced.
The Presidential Press Secretary held frequent meetings
with the information directors of the different Departments
and the press secretaries of Cabinet officers, follow-up to
Cabinet meetings, to relay to them "what was coming up, what had
been decided .. in order that they might discuss policy more
intelligently with their Cabinet officers or with their
subordinates. 5
In case a policy decision would require cooperation between
a number of different Departments of t he Government, Press
Secretary Hagerty would utilize these meetings to indicate
President Eisenhower's agreement on the policy and his request
that the appropriate Cabinet officers work it out.

The Cabinet

officers would then have to prepare a joint press release. 6
Early in the administration, it was decided that, whenever
possible, major policy decisions would be spread out to avoid
the competition of one policy announcement with another for
public attention.
4Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. III,
PP• 442-443.
51bid., p. 427.
61bid., pp . 427-428.
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••• on the major policy decisions of a Department of state,
or a Department of Defense or the Department of Agriculture
or any of the other Departments, it was felt that you had a
better chance of informing the American people of what you
w~re ~oing, and that the ~ews med~a of the country would
give it fuller coverage, if you did not have two or three
major pronouncements on the same date. Now, there were
times, of course, when you could not hold announcements,
and this does happen. But where possible it was felt that
a Department should know what the other Departments were
going to do on any given date. And this was the reason
for these meetings.7
These meetings were also geared: 1. to ensuring that the
appropriate off icials were knowledgeable so that they would not
"go off half-cocked"; and 2. to see to it that press announcements were well distributed in order to guarantee proper dissemination of information and appropriate recognition for the
Administration's action •
••• the major part was, quite frankly, two fold: one, to
permit the American public to get a fuller story of any
major decision, and secondly, by getting a fuller story,
in effect, to give credit to the Administration for that •••• a
7Ibid., PP • 426-427.
8 Ibid., p. 428. Rivers noted that Hagerty demonstrated how
a clever public relations man creates a favorable image for his
employer. Frequently, Hagerty made subtle decisions about which
news stories should involve the President. For example, news of
the first successful u. s. satellite was released from Augusta,
Georgia, because Eisenhower was vacationing there, not from the
launching site , Furthermore, Hagerty blunted public criticism
of Eisenhower's numerous vacation trips by making each appear to
be a working vacation. He scheduled press releases to keep Eisenhower on the front page by seeing to it that there was rarely a
newsless day. Although the Administration's methods were sometimes heavy-handed, such as its efforts to cut out-of-favor
reporters off from official sources, Rivers concluded that it
won its battle with the correspondents. Only the exposure of
Sherman Adams aroused public displeasure and tarnished Eisenhower• s prestige. ••counter-publicity muffled each of the other
exposures of Eisenhower Administration officials. Hagerty was
especially adept at releasing big, positi~e stories ~o compete
with the headlines of expose. And then Eisenhower himself had a
certain talent for divorcing himself from the mistakes of his
own Administration." Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 143149.
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The rationale employed in the release of information
followed a division of the Executive Branch of Government into
two groups, 1. agencies dealing primarily with domestic affairs,
such as, the Department of Agricultur e (unless the shipment of
surplus food overseas was involved), the Department of Interior,
the Department of Labor, the Post Office Department, and the
likes and 2. "sensitive" agencies dealing with national security
or foreign affairs, such as, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney
General's Office, and the like.

In the domestic field, the

practice, prescribed by President Eisenhower, was to announce
domestic decisions as quickly as possible.

Thus, untimely leaks--

always a possibility given the comprehensive news coverage in
Washington, D. c.--could be avoided, and the Administration
could receive full credit for its policies.

Policy decisions

of the sensitive agencies were treated somewhat differently.
When intelligence was not involved, overt policy decisions were
also announced as .soon as possible.

However, matters touching

on the national security of the United States or its friends
and Allies were not released.

When asked questions on security

issues, Hagerty would reply, "Gentlemen, I'm sorry, I cannot
answer this question.
States."

This deals with the security of the United

Generally this answer sufficed, for the newsmen would

.
9
not usually pursue t h e question.

Before release, information

had to be weighed in this manner.

The Government therefore

exercised the powers of review and suppression of information.
News made available to the press was well scrutinized and
9 Ibid., ,r nterview' ·with Hagerty, pp. 430-431.
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thoroughly digested.
Among the Departments which issued daily announcements
was the Department Of State.

The chief of the news division of

the Bureau of Public Affairs reported to Carl

w.

Mccardle,

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, daily, around
twelve noon, to review developments and to anticipate questions
likely to arise.

As Dulles' press secretary, Mccardle had

access to information on everything that was taking place and
could pass it on to the news division chief.

Following his

meeting with Mccardle , the chief of the news division would
brief the correspondents at 12t30 p.m. 10

Because he dealt with

the reporters during the week, the news division chief was also
called in on weekly pre-press conference meetings with the
Secretary of State to prepare for that week's press conference. 11
In the case of both the White House and the Department of
State, the daily press conferences served as sounding boards for
lODulles Project, Princeton , Interview with Carl w.
Mccardle, December 1964, p . 90. That newsmen who cover the
State Department are thoroughly familiar with this method of
operations was brought out by Marvin Kalb , CBS News• Chief
Diplomatic Correspondent, in one of a series of lectures in
advanced journalism at the American University in Washington,
D. c. Although Kalb was speaking of the State Department under
Dean Rusk in the Johnson Era, the modus operandi Kalb detailed
was essentially the same as that described by Mccardle. Kalb
called attention to the fact that the State Department gives
out a vast number of handouts--a speech or two a day, and
voluminous records about u. s. relations throughout the world.
Kalb commented, "I think all reporters should read all handouts but question them and try to put them into some kind of
perspective.•• Marvin Kalb , "Covering the State Department,"
in Hiebert, The Press In Washington, op. cit., pp. 158-159.
11 Ibid., '. Interview with Mccardle, pp. 105-106.
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much of the material to be covered in the regular press
conferences of the President and the Secretary of State.

The

Secretary of State held his press c onfer ence on Tuesday,
except when a crisis intervened, and the President held his
less frequent news conferences on Wednesday. 12
Preparation for the weekly press conferences of the
Secretary of State entailed a number of steps.

The members of

Dulles• staff would prepare, in their respective departments,
series of questions which might be raised at the press conference, and their suggestions for answers.

These were then

coordinated by the news division chief, who got together a black
book for the Secretary of State, and one for the Assistant
Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

These books were usually

completed around five or six o'clock Monday evening.

Mccardle

would then place a copy in Dulles• briefcase, and request that,
to expedite matters, Dulles read it over at home.

Mccardle

likewise would take home his own copy and read it.
Mccardle attempted to always see Dulles the morning of his
weekly press conference to review the black book with him.
Mccardle observed , "I would mark the places where I felt that
the answers were rather overly cautious and I'd read down below
what the actual situation was.
should have been told about i t .

I thought the American people
There was no violation of

,
security
or anyth'ing e l se." 13
12Ll:_.,
b'd
PP• 92 - 93 •
13 rbid., PP• 104-106. see also: Eisenhower Project, Interview with Mccardle, P• s. Mccardle estimated that 85 per cent of
the news regarding foreign policy could be explained to the
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The news division chief would also be called upon to
report on his daily news conferences and on the results of
staff analysis of the content of the principle stories of all
the available American newspapers, and the comments on them
by top State Department officers.

After discussing the black

book, they considered what was contained in the newspapers,
cables and news service news flashes.

About fifteen or

twenty minutes before Dulles news conference was scheduled to
begin, Mccardle would suggest that the news division chief
check to see that they had all the latest news.

Then Mccardle

and Dulles would rehearse a series of anticipated questions
and appropriate responses.

And he would suggest whete.'.Dul1es •

replies could lead the reporter into further areas, or he would
recommend modifications or enlargements.

Mccardle- was careful

to fully prepare Dulles for possible follow-up questions which
might catch the Secretary by surprise, eliciting the wrong
response. 14
American people. The two criteria which he observed were,
0 (1)
absolute security had to be protected, and (2) pending
negotiation had to be protected." The skepticism with which
newsmen often regard such assertions is evident in the remarks
of Marvin Kalb: "It is important to realize that the philosophy
of the newsman and that of the Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs are at odds. The State Department official says,
'It is our responsibility to steer a line between the people's
right to know and the problems of national security.• He claims
that 90 per cent of the news is released or gets released; he
claims that the crucial thing is timing." Kalb, "Covering the
State Department," loc. cit.
14

114.

IJ2:!g,,
~

·

,

Dulles Project, Interview with Mccardle, pp. 113-
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Following the press conference , Dulles would ask Mccardle
for his opinion about how the conference had gone.

"{H)e always

expected a frank answer." 15 Later, Dulles continued this
·
procedure with
Andrew H. Berding, McCardle's replacement. 16
As might be expected, Presidential press conferences also
required considerable preparation.

Press secretary Hagerty and

his staff would begin preparing for the President's next news
conference almost the minute after the current press conference
ended.

On the basis of the questions he received during his

daily press conference, Hagerty and his staff would compile a
list of questions which it was felt would be asked the President
on Wednesday morning.

The list would then be sent to the appro-

priate Departments for consideration and comment.
he would get the replies back from the Departments.

By Tuesday,
The replies

of most Departments would arrive either in the morning or by
noon; the State Department, which always had more questions,
would send over a book of facts and answers by Tuesday evening. 17
Secretary Dulles always went over the book and made certain
changes before it was sent to the White House.

In the morning,

prior to the President's press conference, Dulles would consult
by phone either with Eisenhower or Hagerty, "just going over
certain points that we felt might be likely to come up on the
part of newsmen questioning the President. 018
15Ibid., p. 117.
16Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, op. cit., P• 150.
17Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. III,
pp. 441-442. see also: Eisenhower Project, Interview with
Snyder, p. 27.
18Eisenhower Project, Interview with Berding, p. 28.
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Wednesday morning, Hagerty and Assistant Press Secretary
Murray Snyder would have a breakfast meeting with the President's
staff and any Cabinet officer with whose Department that days
press conference might deal.

They would go over anticipated

questions and recommend responses.

Then at 8130 or 9100 a.m.,

there would be a meeting with the entire White House staff,
and the list of questions would again be gone over.
Almost an hour before the press conference was to begin,
Hagerty, Snyder and a few top members of the staff would meet
with the President for a "refreshing of his memory."

If a

Cabinet officer were present, he would indicate what his Department had done on the President's orders. 19

Eisenhower would

frequently telephone Dulles and others to talk about last minute
developments, and their final suggestions as to how he should
20
.
answer t h e key ques t ions.
If there was going to be a prepared statement by the
President, mimeographed copies were made for the press; they
were distributed outside the press room when the news conference
broke up.

In between his various Wednesday morning meetings,

Hagerty would meet with representatives of the Associated Press,
the United Press, the International News Service, the networks,
and one or two members of a prominent morning or afternoon paper,
and inform them of the planned, formal Presidential statement,
19Eisen
'
h ower Pro1ect,
'
'
'h Hagerty, Vo.
1 III ,
Interview
wit

PP• 443-444.
20Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, PP• 27-28.
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and that mimeographed copies would be distributed after the
news conference. 21
If the announcement dealt with an area requiring a certain
amount of expertise, Hagerty would suggest that the news offices
send over their experts in a particular field •
••• They appreciated it and we did too. It was much
better for them arid for us to have a man who was fully
acquainted with that field present, than just a regular
reporter who did not have the background of coverage of
that particular field.22
,-...

-

Both Mc Cardle and Hagerty regularly sat in on policy
discussions.

Mccardle insisted on this as a condition if he

were to be effective as the Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs, and "get the knowledge of public affairs out to
the people." 23

Hagerty often sat in on Cabinet meetings.

When

he did not attend, he had access to Cabinet meeting minutes. 24
He was briefed by Cabinet members if he was not present when a
decision was made inside or outside Cabinet meetings.

Hagerty

attended Cabinet meetings when there was going to be a final
decision or a discussion of a developing situation, and he
wanted to have continuity on the discussions within the Government.

He was able to determine which sessions to attend by

consulting the agenda the day before.

In the event he was unable

to attend due to a prior Presidential assignment, Hagerty could
21 Eisen
.
h ower Pro1ec,
. t
.
with Hagerty , Vol. I, p. 56 .
Interview

22 rbid., Vol. II:!, PP• 445-446.
23nulles Project, Interview with Mccardle, P• 90.
2~isenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. I, P• 56.
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avail himself of the working arrangement that he made with
Eisenhower a day or two after his nomination in Denver.
According to their agreement, Hagerty had a right at any time
to find out what Eisenhower was doing, on a need to know basis.
It was not necessary for him to attend all Cabinet meetings. 25
During the Eisenhower years, some important innovations
were made in the handling of Presidential press conferences,
and in the rules for press, radio, and television coverage of
them.

For the first time, Presidential press conferences were

removed from the third person and placed on the record.
were permitted to quote the President verbatim.

Reporters

The Administra-

tion agreed to the suggestion of Tony Leviero of the New York
Times that reporters be allowed to admit their own stenotypists
to Presidential news conferences.

The stenotype operators would

transcribe the President's comments and distribute the texts to
the newsmen who were allowed to print them.
The second innovation was to allow the radio networks to
tape the whole news conference and to broadcast it verbatim.
The third innovation was to permit the filming of the
.
. .
26
entire
press conference for use on television.
Eisenhower never held a news conference on live radio or
live television.

Apparently, the Administration preferred to

reserve to itself the right to edit and to change the tapes in
25 Ibid., Vol. III, PP• 503-504.
26Eisenhower Project, Columbia, Interview with Raymond
Scherer, 1968, pp. 8-9; and James E. Pollard, "Eisenhower and
the Presss The Final Phase," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 38,
No. 2, Spring 1961, pp. 184-186.
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the event the President expressed himself in a way which could
cause diplomatic embarassment.

Usually, about 20 minutes after

the press conference, Press Secretary Hagerty would give the
reporters permission to use the whole news conference. 27

Only

in the beginning did Hagerty make minor corrections.
Hagerty has indicated that a major reason the Eisenhower
Administration encouraged television coverage of the Presidential
news conference was that .. the increased use of television, for a
President or anybody else, has made for more honest factual
reporting in the papers, particularly with those that represent
some slant one way or the other."

l .t . '1 very difficult for a

reporter to slant an article when he knows the person reading
the newspaper is likely to have seen the President on television
the night before in his own living room and to recall what the
President actually saia. 28
Important innovations were also made in the rules for press,
radio and television coverage of the press conferences of the
Secretary of State.

In all previous years, the Secretary of

State, like the President, could not be quoted directly .

Step

by step, Carl Mccardle selected certain portions of Dulles•
press conference transcript and suggested to the secretary of
State that they be put on the record.

Mccardle progressively

27 Ibid., Scherer, pp. 5-6; and Pollard, P• 186. Pollard
noted that technically television recording of Presidential news
conferences, and direct quotation of the President 's replies
were subject to White House release and approval. That these
controls were not exercised (after the initial period) "was
more significant than the fact that they existed."
28Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty , Vol. I,
p. 175.
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enlarged the quotable portions until. finally he convinced Dulles
that a particularly good press conference should be put on the
record in its entirety.

From then on edited texts of Dulles•

press conferences were on the record for direct quotation.
The New York Times and other papers regularly carried the entire
transcript.
Dulles also agreed to television coverage of his press
conferences once he was assured the TV newsmen would use only
what was the approved transcript for the newspapermen and the
magazine writers.

The TV reporters could edit the tapes to

conform to the approved texts. 29
Dulles and Mccardle personally edited the texts before
they were released to the media.

Most of the changes made were

minor, "mainly to prevent any misunderstanding in foreign
countries." 3O

Occasionally a major change was made.

One such major change was made during the Suez crisis of
remarks made by Dulles at his press conference of October 2,
1956.

In answer to a question about reports of a split or a

difference in degree of approach to the Suez issue, Dulles
answered the following, as paraphrased by the New York Timess
There is no detectable change in the formula for the
users• association between what it now is and what was
planned, at least as far as the United States is concerned,
and, as was made known to the British and French before
the project was publically launched. In private consultations a charter of the users• association was drafted.
and what is coming into being today is almost exactly
what was planned then. There is talk that the teeth were
pulled out of it. There were no teeth in it.
29Eisenhow~r Pro ject, Interview with Mccardle, PP• 25-28.
3Oou11es Project, Interview with Mccardle, PP• 102-104.
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There is some difference in the approaches to the
Suez Canal problem. That difference relates perhaps to
some rather fundamental things. In some areas the three
nations are bound together by treaty, certain areas, such
as the Atlantic pact area, the three nations are bound by
treaty to protect. In those areas the three powers stand
together.
Other problems relate to other areas and touch the
so-called problem of colonialism in some way or other.
On these problems, the United States plays a somewhat
independent role.31
Thus, in these brief remarks, Dulles confirmed the worst fears
of critics of SCUA that there were no "teeth" in the organization,
no means of ensuring that it would work.

Furthermore, Dulles

words indicated that there were indeed differences of a "fundamental nature" which split the United States and its allies,
Britain and France, on the Suez question, and that they were
related to the " independent role" the United States sought to
play on the colonial issue.

These remarks, uttered at the very

time when representatives of the users• association were meeting
in London and were awaiting the American decision to pay canal
tolls to SCUA. caused a storm of protest in Western Europe when
reported in the world press.

Not only did Dulles• remarks under-

score the Administration's extreme reluctance to be in any way
associated with European Colonialism, but, made imprudently on
the eve of Security Council debates of the controversy, they
could well have confirmed the British and French in the wisdom
of their decision to go it alone.
Almost as soon as they were spoken, members of the State
Department staff recognized the trouble Dulles• words could
31 ,•Transcript of the Remarks by Secretary of State Dulles
at His News conference," New York Times, Oct. 3, 1956, p. 8.

137
cause.

Inside two hours, the State Department had prepared a

revised version which it disseminated immediately.

The revised

transcript represented the official United States position which
Dulles was willing to stand behind.

The revised text reads

As far as the formula for the users• association is
concerned there is no detectable change, at least not
detectable to me, between what it now is and what was
planned, at least as far as the United States is concerned,
and as we made known to the British and the French before
the project was publically launched in any way. There was
drawn up a draft of the charter, so to speak, the articles
of the users• association, and what is coming into being
today is almost exactly what was planned at that time.
There is talk about the "teeth" being pulled out of it.
There were never "teeth" in it, if that means the use of
force.
Now there has been some difference in our approach to
this problem of the Suez Canal. This is not an area where
we are bound together by treaty. Certain areas we are by
treaty bound to protect, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
area, and there we stand together and I hope and believe
always will stand absolutely together.
There are also other problems where our aJ?proach is not
always identical. For example, there is in Asia and Africa
the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the United
States plays a somewhat inde~ndent role. You have this
very great J?roblem of the shift from colonialism to independence which is in process and which will be going on,
perhaps for another fifty rears, and there I believe the
role of the United States is to try to see that that process
moves forward in a constructive evolutionary way and does
not either come to a hal~ or take a violent revolutionary
turn which would be destructive of very much good.
I suspect that the United States will find that its
role, not only todar but in coming years, will be to try to
aid that process, without identifying itself 100 per cent
either with the so-called colonial powers or with the
powers which are primarily and uniquely concerned with the ,
problem of getting their independence as rapidly as
possible. I think we have a special role to play and that
perhaps makes it impractical for us, as I say, in every
respect to identify our ~olicies with those of other
countries on whichever side of that problem they find their
interest.32
Thus, Dulles attempted to soften his original remarks.

What-

ever teeth SCUA might have had, were not meant to be extended,
32 Ibid. see alsos "Transcript of Secretary Dulles• News
conferen:ce-{Press release 516 dated October 2)," State Dept.
ID!!,., Vol. 35, No. 903, Oct. 15, 1956, p. 577.
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in Dulles' view, to the "use of force . "

While noting "some

difference" in the American approach to Suez-- he placed the
difference in the past tense--Dulles did not spell out what
that difference was; he eliminated reference to the "fundamental
nature" of that difference .

Also secretary Dulles attempted to

separate Suez from the colonial issue by treating the question
of colonialism in the context of Asia and Africa and by handling
it in a generalized and speculative fashion.

He indicated that

this was one of the "other problems where our approach is not
identical" and that Asia and Africa were other areas in which
"the United States plays a somewhat independent role . "

Edwin

L. Dale, Jr ., reporting in the New York Times on October 3,
1956 , indicated that: "Officials said this was what Mr . Dulles
had meant all along--that the Suez was one example of a •some what different approach' and colonialism another."

Speculating

on the possible meaning of the "difference of approach" over
Suez, Dale theorized that it referred to the extensive efforts
of the United States "to moderate , at various stages, the more
extreme British and French positions. 033
Despite the American amendments, the harm had already been
done .

Eden has referred to Dulles • original remarks as a

"damaging statement" which "however unintentionally, was likely
to make Nasser believe that if he held fast, the United States
would fall apart from France and Britain over the seizure of
3311 Differences -li th Allies On Suez Cited by Dulles," Edwin

L. Dale, Jr . , The New York 'l'imes , Wednesday , Oct . 3, 1956, p . 8.
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the canal." 34

Nor could Eden find solace in Dulles• original

remarks on SCUA which formed the first part of his two-part
answer.

In it Dulles remarked, "There is talk that the teeth

were pulled out of it.

There were no teeth in it."

This state-

ment was amended to read, "There is talk about the •teeth'
being pulled out of it.

There were never 'teeth' in it, if

that means the use of force. 0

On this question of .,teeth,"

Eden, referring to the original version, pointed out: "The
representatives of the Users• Association countries were then
assembled in London confidently awaiting the United states
decision to pay the canal dues to their organization.

These

were the teeth. Mr. Dulles statement was in conflict with the
users• understanding of the United States Government's intentions.

our representative on the committee, Lord John Hope,

reported exasperation and dismay in their ranks.'' ( Italics
added.}

Then, returning to Dulles• remarks about colonialism,

Eden observed: "The dispute over Nasser's seizure of the canal
had, of course, nothing to do with colonialism, but was
concerned with international rights." 35
In his press conference of September 25, 1956, Dulles had
indicated that it was a false conception that Egypt derived
large amounts of revenue from the Suez Canal, and that a grave
economic blow could be struck at Egypt through the nonuse and
subsequent denial of revenue.

(see aboves pp. 81-82.)

3 ~den, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 135.

35 rbid., p. 136.

Thus,

140

Dulles doubted the effectiveness of withholding Canal revenues.
Regarding Eden's remarks that nationalization of the Suez Canal
had nothing to do with colonialism, but was concerned with
international rights, it bears remembering that although
publicly Dulles frequently implied the illegality of Nasser's
action, privately The Administration felt that Egypt had acted
legally.

since the Canal lay entirely within Egyptian territory

and under Egyptian sovereignty, Egypt (Nasser) had the right
to nationalize the Canal under the laws of eminent domain (see
above : pp. 66-67.) provided Egypt paid just compensation, which
Nasser, in his nationalization speech, indicated a readiness to
do.

Dulles also recognized , ac cording to Murphy, that it would

be almost impossible to convince Americans to join Britain and

France in defense of the Canal Company, given its long and
profitable enjoyment of the original concession from 1888 to
1956. 36
Still, one is hard put to understand why Dulles made his
original remarks.

Up to that time the United States had refused

to associate the Suez Canal issue with the colonial question,
preferring to concentrate on securing user rights.
Dulles make this association?

Why now did

Was it simply a colossal blunder?

If so, how could a competent Secretary of State make such a
blunder?

Were his remarks, as Finer has suggested, made inten-

tionally in order to cover the imminent collapse of his policies,
and in order to predetermine the conduct of the impending united
36Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., P• 386.
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•
d'1scuss1ons.
.
?37
Na t ions

Or were his remarks geared to demonstrate

to the nations of Western Europe that outside the NATO area they
could not expect the United States to back them automatically?
That this might have been a factor is hinted in a cable sent by
Dulles on October 4, 1956, to American Ambassador to France

c.

Douglas Dillon and quoted by Eisenhower in another context in
his memoirs:
The Western European nations have been preserving
their political divisions which keep them weak, partly
because they have felt that t ey could afford this luxury
so long as they had more or less a blank check on the u. s.
for economic, military, and political support everywhere
in the world. This Suez matter is bringing into the open
the fact that they cannot count upon us outside the North
Atlantic Treaty area automatically and without the
exercise of our independent judgement •••• 38
Perhaps, he sought to teach the nations of Western Europe that
they could not unreservedly expect American backing, and that
this would induce them to greater efforts toward unification .
Whatever his reasoning , Dulles obviously felt that he had overstepped himself, and thus he sought to correct his error by
issuing the revised transcript.
During his October 16, 1956, press conference, Dulles was
confronted by a series of questions concerning the revision of
press conference transcripts, which stemmed from the changes of
the text of the now famous October 2nd press conference.

Dulles

was asked whether the reporters could .. be assured from now on
that what is put out by the Department is a direct quote under
37Finer, Dulles over Suez, op. cit., PP• 294-295.
38Eisenhower, Waging Peace, ~o_p_.__c=i~t., PP• 372-373.
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the heading •transcript.'"

Dulles replied,

No, I am sorry to s ay you cannot be so assured. I
must reserve the right, i n cas e I make a blunder
inadve rtently which does damage t o international relations,
to correct those bl unders. I do not profess to speak with
perfection extemporaneously, and the important thing from
my standpoint and f r om t he s tandpoint of my job is not to
damage the internat i onal re l a tions of the United States,
by seeming to say what I do not intend . som~t±mes my
words convey a meaning I do not intend to convey, and
i f that happens , I must reserve the right to correct them
s o therreflect wha t I intend. That means that those who
carry he exact trans cript can s ay what they want, a
"corrected transc ri~t." But I cannot be put in the
position of jeopar dizing t he fore ign relations of the
United States by being held literally to what I say
extemporaneously , and if t hat i s the only condition on
which I have to h ave a press conference , then we have to
r econsider the concept of the pr ess conferences . 39
{Italics added. )
The reporters presen t continued t o pr ess Dulles on the question
of the transcripts , even a f ter Dulles had indicat ed that he felt
i t was up to the papers which c arried the revised transcript of
his remarks whether the y called i t a •• transcript" or ••corrected
transcript,"

One of t he r e por t ers , indicating the difficulties

revised transcripts caused the newspapermen, remarked,
Mr . secretary ••• ! would like to say that I too have
had the feel i ng many of us are disturbed by the tendency
t o change t he record of a conference and if the changes
c ould be made in s uch a way as to indicate, either by
the title of the t r anscript or some other designation,
that it isn 't precisely what is given in a given press
c onference , I think it would help to give us a feeling of
greater accuracy i n reporting . we make our first transcript out of the news conference without waiting for the
transcript . I f i t comes out and you , as you say, have
blundered i n a s ubstantive way--that is, if it is a point
of substance rather than an erroneous report as compared
to the later account of what has happened . If we could
make the disti nction clear, we would be very happy.40

39.. secretary Dulles • News con ference of October 16,"
Sta te Dept . Bul., Vol. 35 , No, 905 , Oct. 29, 1956 , P • 655.
4 oibid.

, pp. 655-656.
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After observing that in four years of holding press conferences,
this was the only occasion when any question was raised about
the correction of transcripts, Dulles defended his position, the
manner in which the press conferences were held, and the way in
which the transcripts were handled.

Indicating that he did not

believe the purpose of his press conferences was to catch
statements he made inadvertently, Dulles concluded his remarks
on the subject by observing1
••• I believe you all honestly want to know what u. s.
policy is and what our thinking is about some of these
problems. As far as the initial reporting goes, you are
free to report that as you understand it as long as you
don't put it in quotation marks, where it becomes in
effect a state document, then I must reserve the right
to be sure it accurately expresses the policy of the
United States.41
In this instance part of Dulles• difficulties arose from
the manner in which coverage of the press conferences was
handled.

Individual newsmen did not wait until release of the

official transcript before filing their initial stories.

There

might be a gap of as much as three hours before release of the
official transcript.

John M. Hightower has indicated that the

release of the official transcript followed the preparation of
the initial rough draft, to which reporters had access.

The

rough draft was submitted to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs , and normally also revised by Dulles himself.
Hightower recalled:
••• (I)f there was wording in there which seemed to him to be
misleading, he would change it in some way. Actually , his
changes were not picayunish. That is, he did not under41 Ibid., PP• 656-657.
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take to d~ess up ~is prose or that sort of thing. He
stuck basically with what he had said off the cuff except
where he felt there was some point of substance th~t
needed to be clarified or that actually needed to be
changed.
Once or twice--I can't give you the specific examples-but I know there were actual misstatements of facts or
policy in the heat of the moment, which he changed in such
a way as to really change the meaning of what he said.
And we were free to report this and did report it.42
Dulles had good reason for insisting on his right to correct
the transcripts of his news conferences.

He had to guarantee

that they represented the official American position, for the
Government would have to stand behind its policies.

The texts

of his news conferences "were sent to embassies and foreign
governments •••• And he just wanted to be sure that the written
form, as it finally came out, would reflect the policy as he
was prepared to stand on it." 43
The attention given to Dulles• blunder, and its later
correction, by the press, indicate how carefully the Eisenhower
Administration's Suez policy was scrutinized.

It also serves

to underline why the Administration worked overtime in its
ministrations to the press during the crisis.
Press Secretary James

c.

Presidential

Hagerty worked very long hours

during the height of the crisis period.

Usually he left the

White House only after the first edition of the papers had
gone to press, around midnight or 1100 a.m. in the Eastern
United States.

He would return to the White House at 7100 a.m.

Fortunately, he lived only fifteen minutes away from the White
42Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with John M.
Hightower, 8 June 1965, p. 23.
43 Ibid., p. 22.
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House.

At times, he simply slept on the couch in his office or

on a bed somewhere else in the White House . 44
It bears remembering that the Suez crisis took place at the
same time as the Hungarian crisis.
the

u. s.

This was also the period of

presidential campaign and election .

Hagerty observed:

••• (T)hat was the period, as you might suspect, when I said
nothing except what I was ordered to say or requested to
say . I was not going off halfcocked about what I thought
was going on; I had it written out.
Many o f the times. the notes or the sentences were
written in the personal handwriting of the President , and
he said , "Say this ... And r•d get up , and say that. There
wasn 't any answer that I made when I thought I was
reflecting t he President's viewpoints. The only answers
I made were when I knew I was reflecting the President's
views.

•

•

•

••• There wer e some in my handwriting on dictation that he
gave me.
Sometimes I would say, "'What do you want me to say?"
He would tell me, and I'd take it down. Or he would
scribble it on a pad and h and it to me . He used to have
a big supply of them in his desk. He would grab one out,
write on it , and hand it to me.
Or he would say, .,What questions have you got?., or
"What ques tions do you think you're going to get?" And
I would tell him, and I would take down his answers
verbally . Sometimes we'd change it or break up sentences
or something like that.45
Among the formal c h annels of communication , in addition to
press conferences , were the nationwide radio and television
appearances of the President and the Secretary of State.

These

were held on an irregular basis , when a particular need was
felt to address the nation.

Formal statements of policy, care-

fully prepared in advance, were read to the people in these
4 ~isenhower Project, I nterview with Hagerty , Vol . II, P• 227.
451bid., pp. 218-220.
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appearances.

During the period of the Suez crisis, there were

three major appearances.

The first was on August 3, 1956.

Following an introduction by President Eisenhower, secretary
Dulles reported on the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez
Canal, on the tripartite London discussions, and on the upcoming
London Conference.

The second such appearance was on October 31,

1956, when President Eisenhower addressed the nation on the
situation in Eastern Europe and the fighting in the Middle East.
And the third was on February 20, 1957, when President Eisenhower spoke about American displeasure with the Israeli refusal
to withdraw from Sinai, and upon the Administration's willingness to support "pressure" in the United Nations to compel
Israeli compliance with United Nations withdrawal resolutions.
Occasionally, President Eisenhower took part in an interview program for the three television networks called "The
People Ask the President."
million people.

The estimated audience was 30

One such interview was held on October 12, 1956.

In his opening statement, President Eisenhower announced, "(I)t
looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us."
Thus, the Eisenhower Administration had many formal means
of contact with the American press.
with great care.

It employed all of them

Paralleling the formal channels was a network

of informal channels which included background briefings,
informal discussions, and personal interviews.
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The Informal Channels--Background Briefings
A forum which permitted Administration spokesmen a great
deal more latitude and fr~edom of expression than the regular
public press conference was the background news briefing, or
backgrounder.

This was a press conference given to a small

group of journalists on a non-attribution basis.

While they

could use the information, t~ newsmen were not permitted to
indicate from whom they got it.
Backgrounders were not held on a regularly scheduled basis,
they were held as the need dictated, as determined by the course
of events.

Normally background briefings were held at the

initiative of the newsmen.

They were held usually at one of the

hotels, fairly often the carlton. 46

At times, when he wanted

to explain something to the press off-the-record, Dulles would
call one of the reporters and ask, uwould you invite me to
dinner?

Get the crowd together and have me out for a drink." 47

The size of the group varied from 12 to 20 participants.
sometimes the group would be composed only of bureau chiefs,
or interpretive writers such as columnists.

During the period

of the Suez crisis, Dulles held a number of background news
briefings.

There are presently available to the researcher

records of four--these were held on October 5, October 31,
December 6, and one in Paris on December 14, 1956.
When the backgrounder was held at the initiative of members
46oulles Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 33. Often
there is a twenty-four hour moratorium in force on use of
material from background briefings. sees Rivers, Opinionmakers,
op. cit . , pp. 36-37.
47ou11es Project, Princeton, Interview with Mr. and Mrs.
Richard Harkness, 30 March 1966, pp. 55-56.
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of the press, a representative of the press (perhaps, Paul
Ward, John Hightower, Don Gonzales, or Peter Edson) would
contact Carl Mccardle or Dick Wilson, and say something like,

nwe haven't seen the Secretary for a long time.
have a talk.

we ought to

Would he be available for dinner sometime soon?"

If the secretary were agreeable, the dinner would be held in
one of Washington's better hotels.

It was a working dinner

"held specifically for working purposes."

48

Secretary Dulles spoke rather frankly and openly at the
backgrounders, at times releasing information not known to the
press beforehand.

Reporters were permitted to use the infor-

mation they received, but they were not permitted to attribute
the remarks directly to the Secretary of State.

Standard phrases-

such as, "according to reliable sources" or "informed sources
indicate, .. --would be used instead.

Richard Harkness observed

that the backgrounder has beens
••• a very useful mechanism of reporting. I think maybe
the reporters have more to lose, or take more risks than
the government officials •••• They (government officials)
can disown it (the report), if it appears. But, by and
large, if you have the confidence in the official--this
has to be a two-way affair across the table--it can be
very helpful, because obviously a man like Foster Dulles
or a man in the Pentagon ••• can talk more frankly. And
Foster Dulles was fully aware of taking advantage of
this--along with a sense of responsibility--"I can talk
to these men and explain things to them."49
48

Dulles Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 34.

49Dulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Harkness,
pp. 58-59.
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Suez Crisis Backgrounders
In the course of researching this study, the notes of
four backgrounders in late 1956, during the Suez crisis, two
in October and two in December, were discovered.

The guest

lists of the October 30 and December 6 backgrounders are also
available.

They have been rearranged alphabetically by insti-

tution in Table II.*
of things.

Analysis of this table indicates a number

First, an honest effort was made to invite repre-

sentatives of the major press sources in the countrys 1. prominent
city newspapers, such as, the New York Times, the Washington
fQg, the St . Louis Post-Dispatch, etc.; 2. the news services,

such as, the Associated Press, the United Press, etc., and
3. the weekly newsmagazines, such a s , ~ ,
Repgrt, etc.

u.s,

News and World

The national networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, were

invited to the October 30th background briefing; however, they
were not represented at the December 6th Backgrounder.

There

appears to have been no special emphasis either on..specific
reporters invited, or on specific institutions represented,
although institutions are represented more consistently than
individual reporters .

Thus, a given news institution might

have been represented by one reporter on October 30, and by
another on December 6.

Apparently having a representative of

that institution was regarded as more important than having a
specific representative of that institution.

Thus, roughly

half of the institutions represented at both background briefings
were represented by different members of their staff.

Apparently

the invitations were extended by the newsmen instrumental in
*Appendix B.
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arranging the backgrounde rs .

The manner in which the composi-

tion of the group was determined was "sort of handed down from
the old Marshal crowd ... so
In the background briefings held during the Suez crisis,
Secretary Dulles raised a number of significant points which
t he Eisenhower Administration was reluctant to place on the
record .

In hope of shedding additional light on our analysis

of press coverage of the Suez crisis (to be covered in gre ater
depth in later chapters) , it might prove worthwhile to consider
the Suez backgrounders here.

An attempt will be made to concen-

trate the analysis on those matters not brought out in the
regular press conferences .
In the opening statement of his backgr ound briefing of
Oc tober 5 , 1956, held in New York City, Secretary of State Dull e s
indicated that he regarded the meeting of the Security Council
to consider the Suez Canal issue "from the standpoint of the
United Nations , perhaps the most significant meeting of the
Council that has been held • ••• (T)he capacity of the Security
Council to deal with this will be tested here .

The outcome

wi ll be very significant for the future of the United Nations." 51
Noting a tendency in recent year s for the Security Council
to be "by-passed 0 in favor of the General Assembly, thus causing

a shift in their relative roles , Dulles went on to note that in
5 o b'd
!.....!....•, P• 56 •

51John Foster Dull es Pa pers, I . Writings
. , ,
of J , F , D.,
c. sta tements and Testimony , 1956 , in folder , United Nations
s e curi ty Council Meeting on the Suez Canal--NYC , October 5-14 ,
1956 , Transcript of Background Briefing by Secretary Dulles
fo r American Correspondents , 10/5/56 , NYC, p . 1 .
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t h is matter the Security Counc il would be given a chance to
t•prove its worth" in the way it h andled the Suez issue which
Dulles regarded as a proble m "which can only be effectively
deal t with • • • by a relatively small body. "
Dulles proceeded to observe that the meeting of the

u.

N.

Security Council would "go fa r to determine whether or not
t here is a basis for negotiations with Egypt."

Up to that point

in t i me , the discussions had not developed "a clear bas i s for
believing that Egypt is prepared to negotiate on terms that
mi ght be acceptable . " 52 At least this time Egypt was present
fo r the discussions, in the past, it had dealt through intermediaries , India and the Soviet Union.
In the question and answer session which followed, Dulles
indicated that, rather than looking to closed meetings of the
Security Council itself to ascertain Egyptian intentions, he
suspected "that there would be more hope in informal talks which
will probably take place than there would be in formal meetings

of the council even though restricted . ..

However , he felt there

woul d be some value in at least one restricted meeti ng of the
. . 53
securi' t y Council

In Dulles• view, control of the Suez Canal must not be
allowed to become the instrument of na tional policy of any one
nation or group of nations.

This was the "b ig principle" that

was at stake, and unless that principle coul d be resolved,
52 Ibid. , pp . 1-2.
53 Ibid. , P• 3 .
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Dulles did "not see much hope in negotiations. 054
Later, one of the reporters observed that, from what
Dulles had said, his idea was "that the best that might
come out of these Council meetings is a basis for negotiations
rather than a settlement."

Dulles• reply was brief and to the

point. "That's right , .. he said. 55
Dulles indicated that he did not anticipate that the
Foreign Ministers would stay beyond the next week.

By then, he

felt, "the decisive stage would be over. 056
Dulles reaffirmed the American intention to support the
Anglo-French proposal, and not to suggest any alternative
American proposal in the event the Soviets would veto it. 57
In response to the question whether the failure of the
Security Council to "find a peaceful means of settlement, does
that imply that that probably would mean violence," Dulles
responded a
No, I don't know what it will mean. But you know
there are many sanctions which operate against any nation
which defies the principles of justice and international
law. Force by no means is the only one. There are moral
sanctions. There are economic sanctions. Conceivably
there could be forcible sanctions, but forcible sanctions
are not the only ones that come to mind.58
54Ibid., p. 4.
55 Ibid., P• 7.
56 rbid., P• 6.
57Ibid., PP• 8 and 10-11.
58Ibid., p. 11.
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Dulles was careful not to make a statement which could be
misconstrued to mean that failure of the Security council to
find a means · of peaceful settlement would be justification to
use force to solve the Suez Canal issue.
Perhaps, the most enlightening aspect of the October 5th
backgrounder was Dulles• revelation of American expectations of
the Security Council meetings.

At best, all that could be

hoped for was the establishment of a basis for further negotiations.

Once that was found, protracted negotiations to reach

a settlement could be expected to extend over several months.
Even more revealing were Dulles• remarks to the press in
the October 30, 1956, backgrounder.
not yet available.

The official transcript is

However, the researcher has had access to

the notes of Richard Harkness and of James Russell Wiggins.
Harkness• notes, which Wiggins• notes substantiate, will mainly
be used for this analysis.

Wiggins• notes will, however, be

referred to when they appear more complete, or help to better
illuminate a particular point.

This off-the-record dinner discus-

sion of current events dealt specifically with the anti-Soviet
rebellions in Poland and Hungary, and with the invasion of Egypt.
In this backgrounder Dulles pulled all the stops.

He was very

outspoken, and his remarks, as seen through Harkness• and Wiggins•
notes, are very revealing.
Harkness prefaced his notes with observations about the
0

air of emergency" which charged the dinner session.

"Mr.

Dulles• talk was punctuated by telephone calls reporting the
British-French veto in the UN, the Israeli acceptance of the

154

British-French forces toward the Suez," 5

this latter

observation apparently a reference to the Israeli acceptance
of the Anglo-French ultimatum.
In his opening statement , Secretary Dulles made a few brief
remarks about the developments in Poland and Hungary.

He then

moved to consideration of the situation in the Middle East and
the Anglo-French decision to intervene in Egypt in order to
present Nasser with a setback.

Dulles briefly recall d the

American belief that the British and the French seemed to agree
that a return to the canal would be "disastrous,•• but that France
induced Britain to use force.

Dulles theorized that the French,

already engaged in the Algerian war, believed that they must
get the British into North Africa. 60 Dulles argued: "The issue
then is NOT Suez, because Suez is •solvable,•

The goal of keeping

the canal open on reasonable and efficient terms can be achieved."
However, the problem arose out of the Anglo-French determination
that the quarrel over the Suez Canal "be settled on terms that
represent a setback for Nasser in North Africa and on the
Arabian Peninsula." 61
59General Mss . Collection, Princeton Univ. Library, Harkness ,
Richard, comp,, "Memorandum and Notes on Visits and Interviews
with John Foster Dulles ••• , .. Richard Harkness, October 31, 1956,
Confidential, p. 1.

GO!.,__,!__.,
b 'd
PP• 1 - 2 •
61 rbid., p. 2. On the solvability of the Suez dispute, sees
Benjamin Nimer , "Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy," The
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XII, No . 3, Sept. 1959,
pp. 795-796. Nimer wrote1 "A profound discrepency ••• existed
between the actual Suez situation and the Dullesian image of
it •••• (I)t can be said that to the British and French politicostrategic values, far more than economic, were at stake ••••
"Since the central issue of the dispute was politico-
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Dulles pointed out that both he and President Eisenhower
had reminded the British and French of the recent British
experience in the Canal Zone .

With 80,000 troops there in 1953,

they had to send an additional 8,000 troops to defend them.
The President and Dulles argued that reoccupation of the canal
zone, In 1956, would be even more difficult and expensive because
.,the Arabs are now united, Russia is now in the Middle East.••
The British replied, "You may be right, but we'd rather go down
fighting than be sapped of our strength until we become a second
rate power." Dulles, at this point, overstressed Arab unity,
which was, in fact, more theoretical than actual at that time.
And he granted undue significance to the Russian presence in
the Middle East , which was then in its infancy.

But, Dulles

argued, that weak Russian Middle Eastern presence was a factor
likely to contribute to the failure of the Anglo-French venture.
At the same time, Dulles was rejoicing at the rebellions in the
Soviet satellites, Poland and Hungary.

The united States had

been hoping for such developments, and had been "exerting pressure
in the minor way possible to bring about the uprisings. ff

While

the Soviets might suppress the rebellions and subjugate the
people, there could be no picture of happy union with the Kremlin .
strategic for Egypt, too, it was not amenable to settlement
unless one side would agree to give up very important ground.
But the Dullesian image obscured this fact, holding out not
merely hope but expectation that all would yet be well, since
all that was needed was a practical, business-like give-andtake by each side .
"It being necessary that one side give up vital ground,
an Egyptian retreat could only be compelled, not sought. Nevertheless, the i mage explicitely rejected this method and exalted
what was for all practical purposes a thoroughly noncoercive one.
"Finally, because of the importance to them of forcing Nasser
to retreat, at the very least, the British and French lost all
confidence that satisfactory results would come from the kind of
negotiation implied by the Dullesian ground rule of no force ......
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Although the

u. s .

had no intention to press hostile forces to

the Russ ian boundary , Dulles estimated there wa s a fairly good
chance "of getting Polish and Hungarian Governments NOT ruled
automatically by Moscow."

62

Later, in this , and in his

December 6 , 1956, backgrounder

Dulles argued incorrectly that

the events in Poland and Hungary indicated that the break-up of
the soviet empire was under way.
164.)

(see belows pp . 157 and 163-

It is difficult to see how Dulles could seriously believe

that the Russians , whose empire, according to him , was crumbling,
could pose a real threat to the British-French venture in Egypt.
There also seems to be a double-standard with which Dulles
regarded Anglo-French use of force, and Soviet use of force.
Dulles seemed less concerned with soviet use of force which
would expose the unhappy unio~ between Moscow and its satellites.
The British and French, on the other hand, had committed the
grave error of attempting to gain by force what Dulles believed
they could have settled by negotiation.
Dulles argued, despite indications the British, French,
and Egyptians were close to agreement on the canal, and that a
solution could be reached "by a few days of talk at Geneva •• •
suddenly , the possibilities of a settlement dissolved.
was a blackout of intercourse between the parties. ''

There

There were

later reports of the Israeli build-up, and Pentagon reports of
the sixty Mystere jets .

Dulles continued1

Last week, becoming deeply concerned, we instructed our
Ambassadors in London and Paris to press for information
of British-French intentions. We were unable to break
62rbid ., Harkness, p . 1 .

157

through British-French silence . What information we could
get was misleading . From the Israelis, we heard only
vague language . our conclusion is1 The Israeli mobilization did not occur without the knowledge of the British
and French.
The Israeli attack began Monday . We informed the British
and French that we planned to go to the UN on Tuesday.
The British refused to j o in in our anti-aggression
resolution but asked , since we were determined to act, to
arrange that the Security Council NOT consider our motion
until Wednesday.
In this conversation, neither the British nor French even
mentioned an ultimatum (which came on Tuesday). We have
three objections to such diplomacys (1) Not informing us
of their plan . (2) Asking us to hold-off UN action until
Wednesday, obviously so British-French forces could be in
the canal zone when our resolution was considered. (3) The
ultimatum was unfair. It would have permitted the Israelis
to stay v ithin 10 miles of the canal, but the Egyptians
would have had to stop any defensive fighting. In other
words, it was an ultimatum drawn so the Egyptians could
not possibly comply.
Commenting that he was "philosophizing , ., Dulles observed
that the Ang lo-French intervention was a tragedy since it
occurred at the very time Russian imperialism not only appeared
to be crumbling, "but the Russians are unmasked as imperialists
who will use tanks to shoot down subjugated people."

In the

question and answer session which followed, Dulles elaborated
on this point by noting that because of the Franco-British
military action, the opportunity was lost to the West to use
t he Hungarian invasion against Communism.

Any

estern attempt

t o denounce Soviet Imperialism in Central Europe would be met
with derisive cries of Western Imperialism in the Middle East.
Continuing in a philosophical vein, Dulles indicated that
the United States, as a consequence of the British-French action,
might have more freedom to act in the international arena.
Dulles reasoned: "For many years, we have been in the awkWard
position of trying to ride two horses--our Western Allies with
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their colonial policy, and the nationalism of southeastern
Asia.

For the first time, we stand apart from British-French

imperialism ...
Returning to the different views held by the Americans and
the British and French over the ease of conquest, Dulles
indicated his doubts that the British and French would be able
to easily "reestablish their prestige" in the Middle East
despite their belief that the Arabs had "no stomach for fighting."
Dulles saw the Anglo-French action as a "desperate gamble,"
explaining, ''The drain on both countries will be terrific.
63
.
.
,
d on•t see how t h eir
economies can survive."

I

In the following

question and answer session, Dulles raised the issue of the
impact on Western Europe of the canal and pipelines being
closed more than 30 days, indicating probable cut-backs of
Western European industrial production.

Some countries could

buy Western Hemisphere oil because their currencies were strong
enough, the British and French currencies were not.
While Dulles had grave doubts of the outcome of the AngloFrench action, he did not see it as fatal to the Atlantic
alliance.

Furthermore, should the British and French reestab-

lish their influence in North Africa, the United States would
"deal on that basis. If they fail, we'll find some other
64
.
b asis."
Dulles felt that the basic ties between the United
States and Western Europe were such that he did not anticipate
permanent disruption, regardless of the outcome of the Anglo63 Ibid., p. 3.

64Ibid., P• 4.
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French action. 65

The implication of these rather revealing

remarks, however, was that Dulles really had no fundamental
objection to the Britis h and French reasserting their authority
in Egypt.

The moral tone of official statements masked a more

flexible, a more pragmatic attitude toward the problem which
Dulles held privately.

It also indicated a lack of the dedica-

tion to principle which the
tained.

u. s .

Government officially main-

It represented a practical, pragmatic approach to the

world situation, and a readiness to attempt to accommodate

u. s.

policy to politi cal realities.
Although Dulles regarded the Anglo-French intervention in

Egypt as a "desperate gamble," he did not fear for the United
States position.

••The British-French attack can be a disaster

for them and not for us.

With the Russians diverted in Eastern

Europe, there is less chance now Moscow will attack Western
Europe.

The Reds now have unreliable lines of communications

through the so-called satellites.

Now, there is what amounts

to a buffer line between the Russians and our forces in Europe ... 66
Indicating that the British had told the United States on
Monday--the day before--that it was defunct, Dulles observed,
"There is nothing left of the Tri-partite agreement of 1950."
Furthermore , he saw ''no possibility" of American military
involvement in the Middle East.

Nor did he envision applying

65General Mss. ( misc.
.
) , Princeton
.
.
.
Univ.
Li. b rary, W.iggins,
James Russell, 1903, "Notes on Conversations Between James

Russell Wiggins and John Foster Dulles ••• ," Dulles File,
Oct. 30, 1956, pp. 19-20.
66 General Mss., Princeton, Harkness, "Memorandum and

Notes ••• ," Oct. 31, 1956, P• 3.

160

sanctions to the British and French .

Earli er , he had indicated

that the United States was " di s posed t o suspend economic aid to
Israel until the Israelis pull back. "
" ( T)he Israelis," in the

u.

S

At this point , he noted,

view, "were used as decoys as an

e xcus e for the reoccupation of the canal .
a payoff promised--dismemberi ng Jordan.

We suspect there ' s
But this is wholly

specul ation . .. 67
Dulles reinforced his argument tha t a rmed f orce was
unnecessary in the Suez dispute, but that the British and French
went ahead anyway .

"The policies of Nasser were self-defeating.

We e stimated that Nasser could last no longer than six months
to a year .

The British said they could not wait; that they

had to get him by Christmas .

The sense of urgency was due, no

doubt , to the political weakness of both the Eden and Mollet
gove rnments. 068
67!...L•
b ' d I pp, 3 - 4 •
6 8.!.....!_.
b ' d , p • 4•

'
'
See also: General Mss ., Princet
on, Wi ggins
,
"Notes on Conversation between J. R. W. and J. F. D., '' Oct. 30 ,
1956 , PP • 12-13 and 16-17. Wiggins indic a ted that Dulles
reasoned that within a year Nasser would h ave been discredited .
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Morocco were all against him. Dulles
added s "I am not advocating Nasser--a wild eyed nationalist,
but prefer to try to defeat him by other methods ••• (T)o attempt
it in a few months is a great miscalculation . " Later, Dulles
admitted that the u . s . would be better off with Nasser out of
the way . In response to the question why the u . s . had not
proceeded with a firmer policy against Nasser, Dulles asked,
"What would you suggest?" He indicated that the u. s . had
stopped the Aswan High Dam project, and all relief except that
under PL 480. The u . s. had stopped direct trade with Egypt ,
and had initiated economic pressures whi ch , in Dul les • opinion ,
would have eliminated Nasser in a year . Dulles claimed that
the basic difference between the united States and the British
and Fr ench was that the u. s . had a policy that would take time;
the Br itish and French said they had to move quickly . Dulles
c oncluded: "I cannot think of any economic pressure we could
h ave brought that we did not bring . "
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In response to other questions--Harkness recorded only
the answers--Dulles made an interesting series of replies,
There was more than a coincidence of timing. The Russians
were busy in Eastern Europe. There was the assumption
that we would be unable, politically, to take action
against Israel in the last week of an election campaign.
The situation must have made it attractive to work out the
current attangements of an Israeli attack, and a BritishFrench ultimatum.

•

•

The Russians still can do all kinds of mischief in the
Middle East. They can send in volunteers, arms and
technicians, and keep things stirred up •
•
•
•
••• The President said we'll do what we think is right
regardless of how it effects the election. This is a
direct quote by the President: 0 If they don't want me,
let them get somebody else."
•
•
•
The President had made his views known to the British
and French more forcefully than any one at this table
realizes,69
Dulles was very frank, open and direct in this backgrounder of October 30, 1956.

Not only did he indicate the

American interpretation of events and probable

u. s.

actions,

but he also gave rather revealing American assessments of AngloFrench and Israeli motivations.

But, it must be recognized,

that Dulles took considerable risk.

Had any of the newsmen

present directly quoted him, Dulles• comments would have sparked
considerable diplomatic controversy.

They could readily have

been interpreted by the British and French as giving them the
go-ahead in their Suez venture.

Nasser would have had confir-

mation of his suspicions of Dulles, and Arab anti-Americanism
could have been thereby inflamed by the Egyptian leader.

While

it is true that Dulles could have denied authorship of these
69 rbid., Harkness , pp. 4-5.
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remarks, it bears remembering that his earlier attempts to
correct his October 2 press c onference blunder were scarcely
successful .

Unfortunately, such denials seldom have the same

impact as the original statement which caused them.
The third backgrounder during the period of the Suez crisis
was held on December 6, 1956 .

Analysis of the outline of Dulles•

thoughts indicates tha t, in his opening statement, he intended
to defend the American position which was "guided by principle

rather than by attachment to or animosity toward any one c ountry.'
The Uni ted States held to its position despite opposition from
within and from her friends abroad.

Dulles continueds

••• The guiding principle has been tha t the United Nations
Charter, repeated in the First Article of the NATO and
our collective security treaties, that the parties will
settle any international disputes in which they may be
involved by peaceful means and will refrain in their
i nternational relations from the threat or use of f orce
in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations .
Had the United States not stood for this principle, the very
collapse of the United Nations might have been involved, and
justification would have been given "to the charge of the soviet
Union and of some neutralists like Nehru that our collective
.
.
.
70
security arrangements are in fact a cover for aggression."
Once again, the official text of the backgrounder is not
available.

The researcher must rely on the notes of a newsman,

James Russell Wiggins of the Washington Post , to find out what
was said at the background briefing of December 6, 1956.
70John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings, ,,of J. F. D.,
B. 1 . Addresses, speeches (bd), 3 July 1956-31 Dec. 1956,
outline of Thoughts For Background Press Conference , December 6,
1956, P• 1.
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Wiggins• notes indicate that Dulles modified and expanded his
opening statement.

Wiggins recorded that Dulles said the

f ollowing concerning the

u. s .

position on the Suez crisis1

We face , I think , a very difficult situation--as
difficult as any we have faced. This action by the
British and French and to a less extent by the Israeli
raised the issue of whether we were ready to stand by
our principles--in the Charter in Article One--or whether
we stand by our friends . We decided to try to stand by
our principles even though we knew it would cut across
lines of friendship and alliance . We made that decision-the President and !--because we feel that anything other
than that would destroy the United Nations and would
justify the allegations of the Communist world that our
alliances were all for offensive purposes. It was a more
difficult decision than Korea. It is easier to go against
your enemies than it is to go against your friends. I
believe that all the efforts toward establishing a world
order , since World War I and II, would have been lost and
might have ended in World War III if we had accepted the
d trine that nations are entitled to use force except to
defend themselves . If the rule is to be that each nation
can judge for itself when it has sufficient provocation
to use force we are going to have • •• finally a world war
or general war . 71
Dulle s • opening statement then paralleled the outline of his
thoughts until it reached the point where he claimed i ncorrectly
that t he break-up of the Soviet empire was under way , as seen
in the events in Poland and Hungary .

Dulle s' predictions of

i mminent collapse of the soviet empire were premature .

His

longing for the disintegration of International Communism
di s t orted his perception.

Far from bei ng an all-destructive

quake , the disturbances in Poland and Hungary were mere earth
tremors which the Soviet system h andily survived .

Nevertheless,

Dulles• purblind vision of Soviet collapse led him at this
71 General Mss. Collection, Princeton Univ. Library , Wiggins,
Jame s Russell, 1903, "Notes on Conversations Between James
Russell Wiggins and John Foster Dulles • • • , " December 7, 1956,
Dulles-file , Seminar, 8 pages , PP • 1-2 .
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juncture in his remarks to argue unconvincingly that the western
world must continue to abide by principle until the Communist
world has collapsed, and the double-standard of international
morality--with the Communist world flaunting the United Nations
while the Western world complied--would no longer exist. 72
In the question and answer period which followed, Dulles
repeated his belief that the canal issue could have been solved,
but the British and French were '*more concerned with teaching
Nasser a lesson ... 73

Dulles did not acknowledge the possibility

that far more important to the British and French than a peaceful
settlement was a solution which would enhance their politicostrategic position.
The backgrounder of December 6, 1956, brought out little
new about the Suez crisis.

Furthermore, one doubts the

sincerity of the United States adherence to principle--that
nations are to use force only in self-defense--particularly
when one remembers

u. s.

scarcely two years later.

military intervention in Lebanon
One wonders if this were not largely

a dodge to justify a position arrived at on the basis of a cold,
hard weighing of facts, figures, and interests.

The United

States correctly perceived the difficulties the British and
French would have both in the Middle East and in the arena of
world opinion.

The Eisenhower Administration charted America's

course accordingly and probably used the question of principle
to justify the policy it intended to pursue all along.
72 Ibid., PP• 2-5.
73~•• P• 7.
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In t he fourth Suez crisis backgrounder, December 14, 1956,
held bef re his departure from Paris, Dulles indicated that no
attempt had been made in the NATO discussions to deal with the
Arab-Israel problem.

"It was felt that it was better to

discuss that in the United Nations." 74
Concerning the clearing of the Suez Canal, Dulles indicated
that he thought the canal should be cleared as fast as possible,
and that the Anglo-French assurances for withdrawal should be
regarded as adequate in order that the French and British
salvage equipment be used to clear the canal, an action which
General Wheeler had ruled out--without consulting Dulles-until after the withdrawal of the last British and French
soldiers.

That equipment should be put to use in clearing

the southern part of the canal as soon as the downed bridge
blocking the way could be removed. 75
Dinner Parties and Exclusive Interviews
In addition to background briefings, the Administration,
in its relations with the press, had two other informal means of
communications 1. dinner or cocktail parties for small groups
held in the home of one of the newsmen 76 ; and 2. one-on-one
discussions between a representative of the Administration and
74John Foster Dulles Papers, I . Wri tings ••• of J. F . D.,
L. 1. News Conferences, 1954-1956. In folder of Press conferences, 1956. Transcript of secretary Dulles• Background
Briefing of American Correspondents at 1815 GMT December 14
Before Departure From Paris, p. 6.
75 Ibid., PP• 6-7.

76Dulles Pro ject, Interview with Hightower, p. 34.
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a member of the press.
hower seldom did.

Dulles used both of these means; Eisen-

Eisenhower usually let Hagerty handle

meetings of that sorts
Ike's relations with reporters were, as President's
go, rather formal. We never saw him alone in private ••••
He didn't believe in givin~ anyone an exclusive. He stuck
rigorously with that position •••• Only occasionally were we
called into his office for an announcement by him •••• so
our relations with him were mostly based on the news
conference •••• 77
Dulles, on the other hand, did give exclusive interviews.
In one such interview given on July 2, 1957, to James Russell
Wiggins of the Washington Post, Dulles answered Wiggins• two
part observation that the two most common criticisms of the

u. s.

in Europe weres 1. that the French and the British were

not sufficiently informed how much the

u. s.

opposed the use of

fo rce in the Suez dispute1 and 2. that the Aswan Dam offer "was
c ancelled rudely and in a way that was certain to provoke
retaliation."

Wiggins recorded Dulles• response as follows:

As to the first charge the Secretary said that the
French might have something there. That he had set forth
all the evils that would ensue but that he admitted to
such scant hope of talking the French out of military
action so suited to their purpose in Algiers that he had
not made this a ~articular objective, relying on the ability
to keep the British from going along with them and feeling
that the French would not launch a military adventure
alone. This worked up till the point that Eden went to
Paris and when the French got the British alone they
talked them into it. As to the British, they knew very
well our views, both through what he had told Eden,
Macmillan and Lloyd and through what the President had
told Eden •••
• •• it was not an unexpected or precipitate action. Had
been forecast by our attitude. Agreed on with British.
was not rude or peremptory that in fact he had shown the
Ambassador of Egypt a draft of the Statement he intended
to release and had suggested to him that if anything in
77Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 34.
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the language was particularly objectionable that he would
change it and there was no request to do so. Also, he had
had telephoned to the British Embassy a draft of statement
with request that if foreign office had objections they
should let him know and he did not hear from them. Also,
he recalled that British had applauded his withdrawal of
the dam offer at the time and only later blamed us for
manner it was done •• ,.78
In this exchange we learn about the method Dulles employed in
his efforts to avoid the use of force in the Middle East--pressuring the British while hoping they would restrain the French.
This might have given the French justification, Dulles acknowledged, for feeling that they did not have ample advance notice
of American attitudes of opposition to the use of force in the
Middle East.

The British, however, in Dulles• view, had no

such excuse.
The second factor of interest was Dulles• claim that he
offered Hussein the opportunity to suggest changes in the
release "if anything in the language was particularly objectionable."

Acco·r ding to Dull~s, Hussein · did not , take advantage

of his offer to change objectionable language in the State
Department release.

One wonders why.

Perhaps, the whole

release was objectionable to the Egyptian Ambassador.

Perhaps,

he did not wish, in any way, to appear party to the release.
78 General Mss. Col 1 ection,
.
.
.
.
.
Princeton
Univ.
Li. b rary, Wiggins,

James Russell, 1903, "Notes on Conversations Between James
Russell Wiggins and John Foster Dulles ••• , .. TUesday, July 2,
1957. pp. 3-4.
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Administration Efforts to Influence the Press
So far we have analyzed the various ways in which the
Eise nhower Administration dealt with the press .

We have found

that a g r eat deal of prior preparation went into all f ormal
pres s conferences , the daily conferences of the Presidential
Press Secretary and of the State Department News Division Chief,
as well as the regular press conferences of the President and
of the secretary of State.

Through this process of prepa-

ration, the policies and information the Government wanted to
release was rehearsed , while other policies and information
which t he Government did not want the public t o know was deleted
and suppressed .
I n addition both the President and the Secretary of State ,
and the ir respective press secret aries , reserved the right to
censor transcripts of their press conferences .

On occasion

they e xercised this right .
Thus , although the Administration did not , and, ·.in a
representative democrac y during peace-time , could no t control
the way in which the press used the information rele ased , it
could and did control the the nature and amount of information
available to the press as carefully as it could .

On this level ,

therefore , it exercised indirect influence over the press.
These were not the only means available to the Administration .

The other means were much more direct .

In the event

the President or his Press Secretary fe l t television coverage
of news gave a wrong emphasis to Adminis tration policies ,
Hagerty would usua lly discuss the matter with the reporter
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involved, rather than go to the heads of the television networks.

Hagerty could only remember two occ sions when he went

to see the heads of the networks .

He did so on the Japanese

question, and on something that happened at Geneva. 79
After the Presidential party returned from Geneva, Hagerty
saw the heads of the networks in connection with as signing
American nationals to cover the President abroad.

Hagerty

recalled that he saids
"Look , I •m not telling you who to assign, but I think
you're making a great mistake. There are many times on a
trip when we want to say something to you people. We' re
not going to do i t unless we have American nationals . "
And Hagerty observed:
••• from that day on , there 's been no trouble, and every
President that•s traveled, including Eisenhower later,
has always had American personnel, American nationals.
If they pick up a crew overseas they make sure it's
American national s, as the crew that's covering the
President.SO
As Presidential Press Secretary, james

c.

Hagerty, in

addition to dealing with representatives of broadcast journalism, had to cope with representatives of the more traditional forms of journalism--the newspapers and newsmagazines
of the nation.

On this level, Hagerty had to deal with

reporters, columnists and editorialists.
On occasion, reporters would write things which President
Eisenhower felt were inaccurate.

He would call them t o Hagerty•s

79Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty , Vol. I,
p. 172

SOibid., pp. 174-175.
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attention.

Hagerty would contact the reporter--as a general

policy he would not call the reporter's boss--and point out
where he thought the reporter was wrong.

Occasionally, the

reporter would attempt to show Hagerty where he was wrong. 81
Concerning treatment of columnists who were likely to be
hostile to the Eisenhower Administration, and how he got the
President•s message to them, Hagerty indicated that sometimes
the Administration would invite some of them in for private
di nners or background briefings and discuss matters with them •
•• • You try to straighten them out on the facts. You don't
try to change their opinion because they're entitled to
their opinion, but they also have an obligation, if they're
making their opinions, to at least have their opinions
based on the facts rather than what they think are the facts.
It's a constant operation in Washington under any administration. I myself used to go to dinners with groups of
them, at their homes or at clubs or something, to discuss
a given topic. The President always knew when I was going .
Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't.82
The Administration was also concerned that editorialists
base their opinions on the facts.

The Administration recog-

n ized that the President could not enjoy 100 per cent editorial
support across the entire United States.

Nevertheless, the

President did become annoyed when editorials were based upon
what he regarded as a total lack of information, which was often
t he case with editorials on foreign affairs.

When this happened,

Hagerty would call the editorial section of the paper.

He would

then tell either the editorial page editor or the editorial
writer, if he were available, that the editorial in question
Slibid., Vol . III, PP• 450-451.
82 rbid., p, 454.
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was based on wrong facts , and what the correct facts were.
Hagerty estimated that this tactic was successful 50 per cent
of the time .

"Not that they would correct their editorial,

but they wouldn ' t repeat the same mistake in the next one." 83
When Hagerty briefed the press on the facts, he obviously
d i d not tell all he knew, particularly in matters dealing with
f oreign affairs where vital security considerations were
involved. In theseinstances, the press had to go on what it
could learn from American and foreign sources.

In the case of

the latter, national security considerations influenced the
inf ormation released by foreign governments .

In all such cases,

the propaganda content of released information had to be
reck oned with.
The

u. s.

Government not only seeks to inform, it also

seeks to win support, both at home and abroad , for its policies .
The information released is carefully chosen and doctored to
serve these varied needs.

Hagerty •s efforts, therefore , must

be considered not only as attempts to dispel error, but also
as steps to win recognition and support for Administration
policies, as efforts to influence the press.
The White House sought to give as much advance notice as
possib l e to the news media in order that they would know to
assign their experts to cover the story.

According to Hagerty,

"it resulted in much more comprehensive coverage, in much better
,
. . " 84
written
s t ories

The Department of State used similar

techniques to those of the White House.
83 rbid ., pp. 455-456.
841bid., pp. 473-474 .
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Suez Crisis Impact on Eisenhower Administration Press Relations
The Suez crisis strained the press relations of the Eisenhower Administration .

As the primary spokesman for American

f oreign policy, Secretary Dulles came under particularly strong
a ttack .

In early 1957, Dulles • press image was very poor.

In an attempt to account for Dulles• poor public and press
relations in early 1957 , Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary
of St a t e for Public Affairs during the second term of the
Ei senhower Administration, cited several factors, 1. that Dulles
got off to a poor start during the Joe McCarthy period; 2

that

the working press, being more inclined toward a liberal tradition ,85 was not with him ideologically since Dulles was more
in the Conservative camp; and 3. that United States foreign
policy during the Suez crisis was unpopular.

Berding observed,

85Rivers, Opinionmakers, op . cit., pp. 174-178 . Rivers
indicated that there are more than three times as many Democrats
as Re publicans among the Washington newspaper correspondents,
four times as many among the wire-service and radio-television
correspondents, and nearly twice as many among the magazine
cor respondents . The press corps is predominantly liberal. But
the ownership and political commi tment of much of the press is
Republican . Until 1964, newspapers endorsed Republican Presidential candidates by a ratio of about 3½ to 1 . Nevertheless,
Rivers found that strong political partisanship had been fading
from t he 1930 1 s to the early 1960 1 s . The percentage. of independent or neutral dailies had grown from 5 . 8% in 1932 to 31%
in 1960 . "The figure was 59 . 5 per cent in i964 , but one wonders
whether that was because some publishers were fearful of both
cand i dates (Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater)." Likewise,
Washi ngton corres pondents, when surveyed in the middle 1960's,
indicated a great er independence than in the 1930 ' s when they
were surveyed by Leo Rosten. Compared to the 1930 ' s when 60% of
the corresponden ts surveyed indicated that , although their orders
we r e to be objective , they knew how thei r bosses wanted stories
played , less than 10% felt that way in the middle 1960 ' s . In
the 1930 ' s, 55% h ad had stories "played down , cut or killed for
•policy' reasons , " in the 1960 ' s, only 7% had .
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Now, in 1956, of course, occurred the Suez crisis , and
he {Dulles) adopted wha t I think was the only possible
policy for the United Sta t e s at t h a t time--uphold ing the
Uni ted Nations despite the f act tha t t wo of our c l osest
all ies , Britain and Fr ance, we re defyi ng the United Nations.
But ! think that cost h i m a lot in public opinion in the
United States- -those particularly who were very pro- British
and very pro-French . And t o many newspaper men , it seemed
almost as if he were aligning the United S tates with the
Soviet Union . It so happened that the Sov iet Union and the
United States were voting the same way in the United Nations
on that issue , but what they forgot was ••• that he was
t aking just as strong a stand agai nst the • • s oviet Union's
t h reats (to?)- Brit ain and France • ••• He was , likewise ,
adopting a very strong attitude toward the Soviet Union
with regard to Hungary ••••
But that was October, November , into December of 1956 ,
and when those opening mont hs of 1957 came along •• • he
himself said that his public relations were at a very low
e bb ••••
Another factor which accounted for Dulles • poor public rel ations
was Zionist and Jewish opposition to

u. s .

Suez pol i cy .

This

was so not only at the height of the crisis , but also in
following months , even when Berding joined the State Departme nt .
In order to improve his press relations , Dulles offered
the position of Assistant Secretary of State f or Public Affairs
initially to Ambassador Philip Kingsland Crowe, who turned the
offer down because of poor health following a heart attack. 87
Dulles then appointed Andrew H. Berding in February, 1957 .
Following

enate confirmation in March , 1957 , Berding took over

as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs , replacing
earl

w.

Mccardle .

According to Berding, Dulles offered him

the job because "he wanted to make a change , that his public
relations were at low ebb , and he felt t hat a considerable
86oulles Pro ject, Interview with Barding, PP • 10- 12 .
87nulles Project, Princeton , Interview with Ambassador
Philip Kingsland Crowe , 4 October 1965 , P • 6 .

86
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improvement was necessary . "

Dulles felt that Bertling could do

the job. 88
To aid Berding in the campaign t o improve his image, Dulles,
later in 1957, crea ted the position of Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Ambassador Crowe, who served as special
liaison to the press.

Crowe was sworn in on Nove~er 4, 1957.

In the course of his service, Crowe was at times assisted
by the former Assistant secretary of State for Public Affairs.
Crowe noted that Mccardle never held it against Dulles that he
had been replaced.

He continued to be helpful after he left

the State Department.

Mccardle, who Crowe admitted had a good

sense of the newsworthy, often steered Crowe to newsmen whom he
had discovered were not sympathetic to Dulles or his policies. 89
While he had served as Dulles• press secretary, Mccardle
was known for certain talents.

Livingston T. Merchant , former

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, recalled
that Carl Mccardle had the almost uncanny ability to pick out
a sentence from the 13th page of a speech and to determine that
it was going to appea,r in the headlines.

Mccardle• s choice

usually surprised Dulles who "had not realized that that was
what would c atch the professional journalist's eye and make the
8,8Dulles Project, Interview with Berding , PP• 6-7 .
89Du1les Additional Papers , Princeton Univ . Library, Crowe,
Philip K., 1908, "Recollections of John Foster Dulles,"
pp. 59-60. Mccardle seemed to prefer to remember that his
tenure of nearly 5 years was a record for longevity in that
post up to that time . Seea Eisenhower Project , Interview with
Mccardle, p . 7.
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headline , make the first paragraph • ., 9 o
Neve r theless , Merchant d i d not believe that Dulles ever
cons i dered Ca rl Mccardle a substantive adviser , although Dulles
was fond o f him.

Dulles did believe that Mccardle should be

present at meetings and know wh at was going on in order t o
complete l y discharge his duties as Assistant Secret ary of State
for Public Affairs , and thereby be of greatest value to Dulles.
Merchant noted that McCardle ' s successor , Andrew Berding, was
used i n his field of competence; Dulles respected him, but their
.
.
. .
91
relati onship was not as intimate .
When he assumed his duties in late 1957 , Ambassador Crm-1e • s
own job consisted of having l unch "with publis hers and editors
in this country and in England and on t he Continent--the guys
that wouldn ' t come to Andy ' s (Berding •s) press conferences."
When he felt a particular newspaper was not being f a ir , Crowe
would t ravel to see the publishers or the j ournalists involved .
He was the only one in the State Department doing this sort of
thing.

In fulfillment of his work, he "saw all the leading

publishers in the Uni ted States and most of the ones in Europe . " 9 2
After 1957, Crowe indicated, his "main job was to see the
leading editors and publishers in this country and abroad to
explai n to them on a person-to-person basis what Mr . Dulles
polici e s were, get their reaction, report back those reactions
to the Secretary, attempt to c reate a more favorable atmosphere
90oulles Pro ject, Princeton , Interview with Livingston T.
Me r chant , 13 March 1965-17 April 1965 , p . 3 .
91 rbid . , pp. 8-10 .
92Dulles Project, Interview with Crowe , PP • 7-8 .
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for him and for his writings and for his ideas." 93

In connec-

tion with his duties, Crowe saw such figures as James Reston,
and Tom Hamilton, both of the New York Times, and in England
he saw Beaverbrook and Kemsley.

He talked to the press in Den-

ver, Colorado, and San Francisco, and to the Hearst chain. 94
When in Britain, Crowe saw all of the publishers that were of
any importance, and a great many of the individual columnists,
some of whom felt that the

u. s.

really let the British down

terribly over Suez. 95
In addition, Crowe•s job entailed the following, 1. to
explain

u. s.

policy {On Suez-- 0 if Mr. Dulles had not done what

he did do to stop England, France and Israel from taking over
Egypt, the UN would have gone down the drain.•• 96 ); 2. to help
restore relations between the

u. s.

and her principal allies,

Britain and France; and 3. to reach those people who Dulles
could not reach through Berding's office, but whose opinions
were, all the same, important to Dulles.
Besides talking with publishers and editors, Crowe would
bring in to see Dulles columnists who might, by going through
Berding•s office, have only gotten to see Dulles once in a great
while.

First, Crowe and Berding would talk things over, and

clear it with each other.
93 Ibid., p. 11.
94 Ibid., P• a.
95 rbid., p. 18.
96 rbid., P• 35.

Then Crowe would arrange for these
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columnists a personal interview with Dulles.

"We found this

was quite an effective way occasionally--if the guy wasn't too
prejudiced against us--in getting our point over." 97
As we have seen, Dulles was concerned over European
coverage of the

u. s.

role in the Suez crisis.

As might be

expected, President Eisenhower was also concerned, particularly
over British press coverage.

Eisenhower and Dulles were not

content merely to leave improving their press relations to the
ministrations of Ambassador Crowe.

Evidence of this is clearly

seen in Dulles' notes on the Bermuda Conference of March 20-24,
1957.

On the first day of the Conference, the question of press

coverage of the Suez crisis, and the relative policies pursued
by the respective governments during the crisis and subsequently,
was raised in the dinner conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club.
President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Prime Minister
Macmillan, and Foreign Secretary Lloyd were all participants.
The Continuation of Dulles• Memorandum on the dinner conversation records the following:
Press Treatment. President Eisenhower developed at some
length the harm that was done by the press of our countries
treating the other as a scapegoat. He felt that we had
tried to avoid that very much in the US and there had been
very little effort to present the us case as against that
of the UK and France. On the other hand it seemed that
the British and French press were continuing to abuse the
US and US personalities and this was bad for good relations.
He thought we should try to keep these matters under
control as far as possible.
97 Ibi'd., pp. 9 - 10 •
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(Subsequently, I mentioned privately to Mr. Macmillan
that I thought it would be worth his while to check upon
the British press on the last few days which according
to our reports had made particularly vicious and
coordinated attack on President Eisenhower personally.) 98
It would have been difficult indeed for Eisenhower and
Dulles to ignore press criticism, particularly of Dulles.

Not

only did press dissatisfaction with the Secretary of State
appear in print, Eisenhower was also confronted with it directly
in his regular press conference during Congressional deliberation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957.

John Scali,

Associated Press, asked Eisenhower if, in the light of the rather
sharp attack from some Democrats who contended that Dulles•
Suez policy had been disastrous to America's allies, Britain and
France, the Pre sident still considered Dulles "the greatest
Secretary of State of our time?"
believe Dulles

And, secondly, did Eisenhower

actions in any way contributed to America's

international diffi culties?

Eisenhower replied:

Let me answer your second question first. Secretary
Dulles, to the best of my knowledge and belief--and I keep,
I assure you, very close touch--has never taken any action
whic I have not in advance approved. I insist again that
these
tters are not taken spasmodically, impulsively.
Thy are not policies developed off of top-of-the-head
thinking. They t ake weeks and weeks, and when they come
out and are appli , they have my approval from top to
bottom.
Eisenhower then recalled the long Dulles• family association
with the office of Secretary of State, how Dulles, at the tender
98John Foster Dulles Papers, IX. Conference Dossiers;
Special Subjects, 1957-June, 1958, Bermuda Conference, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan--March 20-24, 1957,
continuation of Memorandum of Dinner Conversation at the
Mid-Ocean Club.
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age of 6 years old, crune to regard the office as the greatest
position in the world, and how Dulles, through the years, had
studied and acquired a wisdom and experience and knowledge that,
Eisenhower believed, was possessed by no other living human
being.

Eisenhower concluded:

Now, all of these critics, I notice this: they don't
bring out any particular project. They just talk about
great blundering and lack of leadership. I have seen •••
no constructive proposals for what should have been done
with the benefit of hindsight. On the contrary, we just
hear these generalized attacks, which I assure you are
easy to make. But I have no reason whatsoever for changing
my opinion of Secretary Dulles, as I expressed so often
to you people.99
Publicly, Eisenhower defended his Secretary of state.

Privateiy,

he must have realized that Dulles was bearing the brunt of the
criticism over Suez for many policies and decisions which were
essentially Eisenhower's own.
99 .,The President's News Conference of January 30, 1957, 0
Public Papers, 1957, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

CHAPTER III
THE ATI'ITUDES OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND
THE AMERICAN PRESS TOWARD EACH OTHER
In a representative democracy such as the United States,
the press serves many functions.

The primary duty of the press

is to disseminate accurate news irrespective of its content.
The press thus fulfills an educational role.

In addition, the

press serves as a watchdog of the public interest by holding
public figures, their statements, policy proposals, and policies
up to public scrutiny.

Furthermore, a responsible press assumes

the task of investigating fraud, scandal, and malfeasance in
office.

Regularly it suggests alternative policy proposals

and comments critically on programs and policies with a view
to their correction and/or improvement.

By calling popular

attention to the burning issues of the day, the press frequently
acts as a catalyst for civic action which often precipitates
governmental response.

Consequently, in American representative

democracy, nearly all levels of government must operate in the
environment of a vigilant press. 1
The ease and effectiveness with which the press can perform

1clifton Daniel, ••Responsibility of the Reporter and Editor,"
in Lyons, Reporting the News, op. cit., PP• 116-121; and Joseph
Pulitzer, Jr ., "The Press Lives by Disclosures," also in Lyons,
pp. 351-355.
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its duties depends heavily on the attitudes and the accessibility of the administration in power.

Theoretically at

least, the more open and accessible the administration, the
easier and more effective the press finds the performance of
its job.

The more closed and inaccessible the administration,

the harder it is for the press to function.

Conversely,

attitudes of the press toward the administration could in large
measure determine the attitudes and accessibility of the administration to the press , and, thereby, influence the ability
of the press to do its job.

The purpose of this chapter is to

probe this r e lationship during the Eisenhower Era in general
and with respect to the Suez crisis in particular
The Administration and the Press
Analysis of Administration attitudes toward the press must
take into acco

t the inclination of the news media to concen-

trate on contr

-rsy, on crisis, on the bizarre, on the sensa-

tional

while playing down the ordinary, the humdrum, the

everyday phenomena of national and individual existence.

The

Eisenhower Adminis tration was keenly aware of the proneness
of th

pr ss to overemphasize problems while failing to give

as much attention to positive progress.

Eisenhower once

remarked to Hagerty, "(C)ontroversy makes the news, and ••• steady
progress gets overlook

1

•

1

The press conference, the major contact poin t between the
President and the press, offered Eisenhower a forum to discuss
2Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. I,
P• 172 .
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and explain his ideas and policies, and an arena to sample
American public opinion.

Hagerty observeds

••• I don•t know of any President that did not look upon
the Presidential press conf e rences as a two way street. He
uses it, of course, to express his beliefs and philosophies,
his actions of government, but by taking the cross section
of questions you get at any given press conference, you
h ave a pretty good idea of what is concerning the American
people, on any given week •••• 3
Whi le Presidential press conferences served positive ends, Eisenhowe r, as might be expected, was not always satisfied with them.
Murray Snyder, Assistant Presidential Press Secretary, pointed
out s ome of the reasons for the President's dissatis faction
wi th certain aspects of the Presidential press conference.
Snyder indicated1
••• (H)is (Eisenhower's) attitude (toward press conferences)
varied with the season. At times they were amusing to
him ••• , and sometimes he felt that the best newsmen didn't
ask the questions. They'd either sit back, or not come
t o him. I mean. Walter Lippmann never came to a press
c onference, nor did he ask questions, which was a shame.
But many good ones, like Scotty (James) Reston and bureau
chiefs of his type, did •••• (H)e (Eisenhower) was well
avare of the value of it, t o the country and to the newsmen. He did not fear the press conference in any way •••• 4
During the Eisenhower Era, there were approximately 2,500
news men and women in Washington, D.
the Pr esident to know all of them.

c.

It was impossible for

However, Eisenhower did

become acquainted with, and come to like. the basic corps of
Whi te House regulars, reporters assigned by the wire services,
the networks, and the major American newspapers to cover the
Wh ite House every day.

Hagerty indicated that over the years

3 rbid., Vol. III, P• 448.

4:eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, p. 29.
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a feeling of mutual trust and respect developed between Eisenhower and the White House pres s c or ps , 5
But it cannot be said that Eisenhowe r was an avid reader
of the press

In his May 11, 1960, press conference, Eisenhower

admitted that he normally read the Sunday papers only.

Regarding

his newspaper reading habits and his reaction to unfriendly
news paper cartoons and columns, Eisenhower explained:
Well , I don't Jmow whether you can call it a habit
for the simple reason it takes a lot of time i f I was
going to keep track of all you people say. I take, ••
what I call the important sections of the Sunday papers
that review world events, go over t he things, and t hose
are the things I study caref ully. The kind of things
you talk of, cartoons and unfriendly quips, I just
c an't be bothered with.6
·
Eisenhower's response caused a minor c ontroversy.

He did not

mean to imply that he never read the daily papers.
not read them i n any grea t depth.

But he did

Snyder indicated that Eisen-

hower always had on the table behind his desk. the old New York
Heral d-Tribune , and in the .house he had the Wa shington papers,
the ~

and t h e ~ . and the New York Times,

"He wasn't

sensitive to what the newspapers said about · him or about what
he was doing.

He read them like a businessman.

He

didn't

devour them, he 'd skim them.u 7
Although Snyder indicated that Eisenhower was not sensitive
to what was said about him or his policies, we have seen in
5Eisenhower Pro ject, I nterview with Hagerty, Vol. III,
pp . 450-451.

6ouoted by Pollard, ,.Eisenhower and the Press ••• ,~ p. 182.
7Eisenhower Pro ject, Interview with Snyder, p. 39.
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Chapter II that on occasion he did take strong exception to
what was written and he had James Hagerty contact the writer of
the arti cle , column or editorial to present him with the "facts."
He was aware of domestic press comment; he was also aware of
f or e ign press comment, as indicated in the dinner discussion
wi th Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign secretary Lloyd
duri ng the Bermuda Conference in March, 1957.

Never theless, as

demonstrated by his stand on withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Egypt, and his willingness to support

u.

N. "pressure"

against Israel, the President did not permit adverse comment
and cri t icism in the press to deter him from pursui ng unpopular
polici e s when he believed he was right.
dent Ei senhower trul.y was not

In this sense, Presi-

"sensitive to what the newspapers

said about him or about what he was doi ng."
Just the same, the Eisenhower Administration was interested
in cultivating good relations with the press .

Members of the

Administration recognized the essential need to deal forthrightly
with t he representatives of the press in thei r daily contacts
with them.

Hagerty noteda

If you're anyone in government, includi ng the President, you can have fine relations with them (newsmen), if
ypu don't try to kid them, if you don' t try to lie to them,
i f you tell them the truth. And if you can't answer their
questions, just say you can't answer their questions.
Actually in a working relationship with a press secretary,
even with the President, some of the questions they ask
they know aren•t going t o be answered, in advance of their
asking , but they•ve got to try. That's part of their
j ob too.a
8Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. III,
p. 451.
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With reasonable members of t he press, members of the Eisenhower White House staff felt i t was possible to forge good
press relations.

Neverthele ss , there were some newsmen and

women in Washington with whom the Administration had difficulties.
Hagerty believed that frequently these people had been favorites
of the previous administra tion, whose sources of news were cut
off when the Republican Eisenhower Administration took office.
Hagerty pa id little attention to them. 9
The Secretary of State, too, regarded press conferences
as a valuable avenue of communication with the public.
the need to keep the public informed of

whether he was at home or abroad.

u. s.

He s aw

foreign policy

Invariably, following a

conference of foreign ministers, and before returning to the
United States, Dullss would agree to hold a backgrounder for
American correspondents concerning the conference «so that he
could sum up his impressions of the conference and try to resolve
any doubts they might have or fill ,in some gaps of information."
Rarely did Dulles hold a backgrounder "at the beginning of or
duri ng the conference, since he did not want to give any impression of conducting his part of the conference in or through
public media ••,
Dulles regarded the formal press conferences as an opportunity to communicat e his thinking informally both to the public
and to foreign governments.
9 tbid. , p. 453.

Berding recalled Dulles saying:
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There are some things I can say in answer to questions
at a press conference which it would be difficult or impossible to declare in a formal statement or note. The latter
c ould f ollow the press confe rence ans wer if necessary, but
perhaps it would not be necessary once our thinking had
been revealed. It's very useful to have a system whereby
I c an speak on some issues where ordinary diplomatic
etiquette would require that I remain silent. Sometimes
I have constructive ideas Im glad to get across in
answer to a question.IO
·
As an example of Dulles• use of this technique to state American
thinking while avoiding committing it to a formal communication,
Berding cited the September 30, 1958, press conference of the
Secretary of State which Dulles employed to indicate to Chiang
Kai - shek the

u. s.

position that Nationalist China should reduce

the size of its garrison on the island of Quemoy.

This enabled

Chiang to take that step while appearing to do so of his own
voliti on.
The formal press conference also gave Dulles the chance
to go beyond a simple answer to a question, and to try to
expound his philosophy.

He .felt that this made the press confer-

ence more valuable and more useful both to the press and to
himself.
Dulles also valued the fact that the New York Times carried
the corrected text of his press conference verbatim.

"That

way virtually every embassy in Washington, most chanceries overseas and many influential individuals will read word for word
exactly what I said ... 11
10Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy. op
11 Ibid •• PP• 146-147.

cit., PP• 145-146.
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Du.lles did not formulate his answers word for word in
advance usually.

He sought to "have the substance in mind--

not the words but a fairly accurate idea of how to answer ...

And

Dulles objected to someone asking a question based on an old
quotation.

He regarded this as a poor tactic which served no

useful purpose.

"It only tries to show a contradiction, to

trap me on verbal differences, to show there's no continuity of
policy. "

But Dulles recognized that 90 per cent of the questions

asked him were

0

intelligent, designed to elicit facts."

These

questions were asked by serious people who sought to gain information either for their own edification or for its newsworthiness.
During his press conferences, Dulles was the picture of
poise and confidence.

He carried himself well and spoke with

an air of authority which some found disconcerting.

He seemed

at ease, but Berding revealed that the press conference was a
strain to him, despite his great experience in public appearances.
He quoted Dulles as having saids
Some people have been kind to say I seem to handle a
press conference with ease. Actually I'm almost scared to
death. My knees knock together when I go downstairs for
the conference.
Yes, I've been doing press conferences almost all my
mature life. But when you have to speak e.x,temporaneously,
and when every word must be chosen to avoid untoward
consequences all around the world, you can't but be nervous.
You can't be so self-confident that rou don't worry about
making serious mistakes. I don't think, in fact, I've made
many. But you have to think of so many things awfully fast-what will be the impression in New Delhi, or Bonn, or Tokyo.
or somewhere else, in addition to the press here--and at
the same time give a spontaneous answer. It's difficult.12
12L_b.1.'
d. , P• 148. •
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During a crisis , Dulles would back Berding in insisting
tha t he hold his regularly scheduled pres.s c onference, over the
oppos ition of area experts who would argue for its cancellation,
fearing a slip-up which might aggravate the crisis situation.
But Dulles did not have to answe r questions dealing with the
crisis.

He could s imply say. "No comment," and avoid controversy.

Besides , there would be other mat t ers about which the press
would have questions, and about which the public wanted to know
and s hould be informed if the Administrati on were to obtai n
support for its policies,

"(I)f the conference were cancelled

or postponed, the press•s conjecturing that this was because
of t he crisis would make the crisis even more serious than it
was. "

Thus, Dulles would go ahead with the press conference as

schedul ed; he seldom made any mistakes which would justify the
fears of State Department Assistant Secretaries for specific
geographic areas. 13
Even though Dulles gave considerable attention t o his
relat i ons with the press, he did not enjoy great favor with
much of the press throughout most of his tenure as secretary
of sta te.

He was severely criticised for much of bis six years

i n t hat office.

Once President Eisenhower observed to Berding

that "the sharpest criticism of Mr. Dulles came f r om politicians
and the press, rather than from top-level statesmen and profess i ona l diplomats."

In the course of his duties as Assistant

s ecret a ry of State for Public Affairs, and after careful study
of public criticism--in which statesmen and diplomats are
13ilig., pp . 150-151.
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unl.ikely to engage--and of private conversations between
statesmen and diplomats, Berding came to share Eisenhower's _
point of view. 14 The Secretary of State was subjected to severe
criticism, yet Berding reporteda
His many years in public life had hardened him to
written and oral assault, although on one or two occasions
I found he was touched to the raw by something said
against him. But to the degree that Dulles evinced any
preoccupation, it seemed to me to be based more on attacks
against his policies than on attacks against him personally.
In any event, no amouat of adverse criticism woeld deflect
him from a given policy, if he felt that policy to be in
the nation's interest.
••I pay very little attention to adverse criticism.
Criticism makes you mad. I can't afford to get mad. The
criticism is probably well-intentioned, but it's made by
people who don 't know as much about the problems as I do.
I'm confident that if they knew as much about a situation
as I do they wouldn't make the criticism. Despite criticism
I'm encouraged to go ahead by the confidence of President
Eisenhower who himself is no amateur in this business. He
had many years of experience abroad before, during, and
after the war. If he thinks I'm the best fellow for the
job, that's encouraging.
"It's highly difficult for a s ecretary of state to
avoid criticism. It's hard indeed for a secretary o f
state to be popular."15
Nevertheless, Dulles was concerned about press criticism, for
he recognized the role the press plays in the formation of
public opinion.

Dulles was quite interested in public opinion,

which he sought to keep favorable to Administration policies.
William B. Macomber, Jr., former Special Assistant to the
secretary of State for Congressional Relations, reported that
Dullesc
14Ibid., PP• 99-100.
15 tbid., PP• 98-99.
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••• worked very hard on explaining to the public why he was
for,some~ing. He wasn't trying to get a hig~ majority
behind hl.ln, but he alwars thought that no policy--no matter
how good it was intrinsically--was going to work if over
fifty per cent of the country was opposed to it.
So, he worked always very hard to explain his policies
in a way that would prevent a build-up of opposition to the
point where they would be overcome and shot down.
Dulles, therefore, sought to educate American public opinion and
to explain his policies in order to retain a favorable majority
of public support for American foreign policy.

Dulles also

watched public opinion polls to determine the rise or decline
in popularity of specific policies and actions.

Macomber

indicated that Dulles paid attention to the polls in the
following manners

••• He did not pay too much attention to this business of
his own popularity. But he did if he thought that the us
polls were indicating that public concern and opposition
was building up against some policy or action he thought
was awfully important. Then, you can be sure, he would .
look at those polls, and he would chart out some kind of
campaign to pursuade people that what he was doing was
11
right. So he used them as warning signs and very definitely.
A month after coming to the State Department, Berding
discon inued the public opinion polls conducted by the Department, with Dulles• approval, in favor of a new rnethod--"checking
editorials and artic

$

in one hundred daily newspapers, the

columnists, radio

TV commentators, letters to editors,

publications and statements of national non-governmental organizations, speeches in the Congress and throughout the country,
and the like."

Dulles was quite satisfied with this new arrange-

ment; he took the public opinion analyses prepared by Berding•s
staff home to read. 17
16Dulles Project, Interview with Macomber, pp. 37-38.
17Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
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While Dulles sought the support of public opinion for
Administration foreign policies , he refused to let public
opinion dictate policy.

On various occasions, he observed to

Berding1
I give great importance to public opinion but I
can•t abdicate to such opinion the leadership I feel I
must exercise. My responsibility, under the President,
is to choose and carry out foreign policies most likeiy
to contribute to the security and advancement of the
American people. I often have to make decisions before
the state of public opinion can be ascertained, and
often such decisions have to be based on circumstances
so complicated that it•s next to impossible for the
majority of our people to understand them. In other
words, you can•t make foreign policy on the basis of
public opinion polls.18
Although Dulles refused to abdicate responsibility for making
foreign policy to public opinion, he believed it was the
Administration's duty to attempt to gain majority support,
since other nations were more inclined to pay attention to the
Administration ' s proposals or objections if they knew that a
"compelling majority" of Americans supported the Administration. 19
The Administration as Seen bz the Press
An analysis of press attitudes toward Administration
spokesmen must t ke into consideration the suspicion with
which newsmen
political men.

en

rally receive the public utterances of

Political officials are often considered by

members of the press as calculating, crafty men who frequently
seek to manipUl.ate the press to achieve their ends • .It is felt
that they regularly use the press to expound their thinking
18~

•• p. 139.

191bid., PP• 141-142.
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and to gain support for their policies and actions.

Public

men are thus seen by newsmen as either self-seeking or guarded
when they appear before the press. 20
While newsmen often regard public men and their statements
with a degree of skepticism, this does not mean to imply that
newsmen expect constantly to be deceived or misled by political
spokesmen.

Nor does it prohibit newsmen from making valid and

object ive judgements about individual Administration figures
or about the Administration as a whole.
In · reviewing the oral history interviews of journalists
in both the Eisenhower Project and the Dulles Project, one is
struck by the marked differences with which newsmen often tended
to r egard the President, the Presidential Press Secretary, and
the secretary of State.

Generally speaking, President Eisenhower

and Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty were held in rather
high e steem, while Secretary of State Dulles frequently received
rather harsh treatment.
It was generally conceded by the journalists interviewed
that President Eisenhower had rather good relations with the
press .

With the exception of a few extremely partisan corre-

sponde nts, Eisenhower was well liked by most of the Washington
press corps. 21

Some found the Presidential press conferences

20sees Dull es Project, Princeton, Interview with James
Rest on, 23 June 1965 , pp. 32-33; and Eisenhower Pro ject, Intervi ew with Hightower , PP• 31-32.
21Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press ••• ," pp. 184 and 186.
Pol l a r d founds "The correspondents, on the whole , respected
t he outgoing President , relations between him and them , in the
ma i n , had been cooperative and cordial a lthough never intimate."
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"congenial and productive. 1122
While newsmen usually regarded Eisenhower amicably, he did
have his critics.

some journalists felt he was a weak President.

Kenneth Crawford, manager, of Newsweek's Washington bureau from
1955 to 1961, believed that Eisenhower did not handle the press
very well.

Crawford observeds

Now, of Ike himself, I wouldn't say that he was very
good at it (handling the press). The press saw him only
at press conferences •••• He was not very good in his press
conferences. His syntax was fuzzy. Instead of answering
questions head on, he had a way of circurnlocuting whatever
he was doing, so that he was jeered at, to a certain extent,
by the press. He was called "Bubblehead" by some of the
people because he seemed to bumble in his press
conferences.23
Concerning Eisenhower s ••scrambled rhetoric" in a press conference, Edward Folliard, Washington Post

commented, ''(W)e under-

stood him 'very well when we were sitting there at a press conference.

We never had any doubt as to what he meant. 11

It was only

afterwards, when looking at the transcript, that questions arose
. nhower's meaning.
.
24
as to Eise
Members of Eisenhower 's Presidential Press Secretariat
realized that occasionally the President "fuzzed up" a reply
so that it was not quite clear.

Following the press conference,

newsmen would approach the Presidential Press Secretary or the
Assistant Press Secretary for clarification.

Staff members of

22Eise
' nhower Pro1ect,
'
'
. h Roscoe
Col umb'ia, Interview
wit
Drummond, 1967, pp. 21-22.
23Eisen
.
h ower Pro1ect,
.
.
. h Kenneth
Columb'ia, Interview
wit
Crawford, 1968, p. 12 .
24Eisenhower Project, Columbia, Interview with Edward
Folliard, 1967, p. 8.
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the Presidential Press secretariat recognized that their explanations did not carry the same weight as the President's words .
Once the President had made a remark

it was on the record and

could n t easily be erasea. 25
James Hagerty held the office of Presidential Press secretary
longer than any of his predecessors.
confidence.

He enjoyed Eisenhower ' s

Consequently, he functioned not only as the Presi-

dent's spokesman, but he also participated in policy-making
decisions , particularly during Eisenhower 's second term.

He

also served as an "advance man" for Eisenhower on trips
abroad. 26
Hagerty was regarded by the press as extremely competent.
He was considered well informed, capable . 27

Kenneth Crawford

remarked that he thought that "Hagerty manipulated the press
much more skillfully than anyone had done it ea~lier. or has
25According to a reliable, former member of Presidential
Press Secretary Hagerty•s staff .
26 Pollard. "Eisenhower and the Press ••• •• pp. 185-186.
27 Ibid. Pollard quoted James Marlow, Associated Press news
analys t , to the effect that Hagerty • s success stemmed from two
things which many public relations men never learn "He paid
attention to details and informed hi~self on problems he had
to handle."
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were not to make comments to the press unless directed to do
so by the President.

In this way, it was hoped to avoid possible

contr adictions of what the President or a Cabinet member planned
to s ay.

Only occasionally were requests for interviews with

members of the White House staff granted. 32
The press was expected to put their questions through the
Press Secretary and to receive their answers from him.

Of course,

they also questioned the President in his press conferences.
Snyde r recalled that once newsmen realize d how the Administration· operated, they did not often approach Hagerty for private
talks or interviews.

Snyder indicateds

•• • This was a Jim Hagerty principle ••• that exclusive stories
on major matters of general national interes t were not
good • • •• (I)nformation which was to be made public belonged
to the public domain, belonged to ever yone, and there was
no advantage to anyone, • •• to the country , to the President's personal press relations, or to Jim Hagerty to
divulge to an individua l or to several some special information that everyone wanted, when it was to be made public.
And we'd go to great extremes to see that, where possible,
t hese matters didn't leak in advance. So my r e collecti on
i s that this was accepted. It was what most of the newsmen wanted, a fair shake, rather than to see a special •••
gro~p or clique of favored newsmen getting special
t reatrnent.33
Concerning this system of channelling news through Press
secretary Hagerty, William H. Lawr ence, New York Times White
House correspondent, observed that, with rare exception, newsmen
could not get a story of substance from Hagerty.
tration was "good with the hand-out.

The Adminis-

But you couldn' t get much

backgroWld on why the President had decided this, that or the
32Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, pp. 16-17.

-

33Ibid. , PP• 19-20.
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other, or on anything he was about to decide."

Lawrence felt

that if one were to review newspaper accounts of the period,
one would f ind them "vague and perhaps misleading."

Like any

administration, Lawrence believed, the Eisenhower Administration
handled good news better than bad. 34
As a result of the White House news managing procedure,
some Wh£te House correspondents never even met some of Eisenhower• s chief assistants.

Presidential assistants who were

asked for an interview usually replied, "See Hagerty."
reported,

Rivers

"One correspondent who arranged an interview with a

Presidential spe.echwriter without going through the press
secretary was so elated that he telephoned his editor to say,
'I broke around behind Hagerty!'

The important news was not

the substance of the interview but the fact that he got one. 035
In contrast to President Eisenhower and Presidential Press
Secretary Hagerty who enjoyed favorable press relations, for
much of his six years as Secretary of State , Dulles did not,
although he gave a great deal of consideration to his dealings
with the press.

Some newsmen objected to what they regarded

as Dulles' excessive monl.is11., his tendency to expound his foreign
policy on principle.
efforts.

It was felt that he was insincere in these

For example, Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News Diplo-

matic Correspondent, was told by Dulles at a backgrounder during
the Suez crisis that the big powers by showing "moral restraint"
and by going to the United Nations to seek a resolution to Suez
3 4Eisenhower Project. Interview with Lawrence, pp. 11-12.
35Rivers.
•
• •
k ers, op. ci• t ., p. 156 •
Opinionma
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would actually strengthen Britain and France more in the long
run than the Anglo-French resort to f orce.

Lisagor indicated,

Now, this is the moralistic judgement of Dulles, and
I never thought he meant it for one minute. Because later
in the case of Lebanon, we went in to Lebanon for the
wrong reason. We made a monumental miscalculation about
what happened in Iraq, but we went in there for the wrong
reasons and the results were quite salutary.36
Other newsmen singled out Dulles• legalism in handling
foreign affairs which they felt stemmed from his Wall Street
legal background.

Commenting on this Dulles trait, Arthur Krock,

formerly of the New York Times, observed that, perhaps, Dulles
did in fact imply to Eden intentions about Suez which he did not
keeps
••• Anthony Eden's book ••• pretty well demonstrated that
Foster implied intentions about Suez that he certainly
did not keep. And I think that he may have himself felt
that he had gone too far; that he had justified the
British feeling--which practically closed relations
between Washington and London for months before Suez-that he probably deserved this feeling, this reaction,
by Eden. And if you'll read Eden's book, all that is
set forth, which Foster never undertook to answer,
because I think he was culpable to that extent.
It may have been his legal training, where, as you
know, if you write a brief for the Supreme court, you•ve
rested your case upon seven different points, only four
of which you think have got any chance at all of being
considered valid. But you put them in because you•ve
put in everything you can in the hope that if one is
knocked down, the other will survive. And I believe •••
this legal training of his ••• perhaps may be the answer.
The United States Government was his client, the President was his client, and the American people were his
clients. And so he made the best case he could and in
so doing, I think he often stretched a little bit what
he was prepared to do.37
36Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Peter Lisagor,
3 Feb. 1965, PP• 30-31.
37ou11es Project, Princeton, Interview with Arthur Krock,
20 Feb. 1965, PP• 30-31.
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Dulles was also regarded by some members of the press as a
man who could be very devious when the occasion demanded.

Sympto-

matic of t he distrust with which newsmen often regarded Dulles
are Peter Lisagor •s words about t hings in the Dulles• period
which newsmen did not likes "We always felt there was something
slick about it, there was someth ing c oony about it ••• It was
too sha r ply angled .

We sometimes felt we weren t getting a

straight account because of a purpose thats to be served." 38
Du.lles• handling of talks with Eden during the Suez crisis ,
and h i s formula for a Suez canal Users' Associat i on have been
cited as examples of his deviousness.

The belief in his alleged

deviousness might in part account for the widespread credence
Eden •s argument that Dulles misled the Brit i s h during the Suez
cris i s received from members of the American pr ess.

Columnist

Stewart Alsop argued that Dulles• formula for a Canal users•
Association appeared to the Bri tish as a device to keep them
quiet, and that Dulles had no i ntention to support t he Brit ish
position on Suez .

"(T)he British then took grea t ple asure, I

am s ure, in being devious on their turn, and in closing off all
information to Washington, which was an act of extreme stupidity.
Never t heless, this act of extreme stupidity was stimulated in
turn by Dulles • method of dealing with the British. 039
Additional opposition to Dulles apparently can be attributed to the ideological gap between Dulles and the "working
38Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p . 32.
39Dulles Project , Princeton, Interview with Stewart Alsop,
4 Feb. 1966 , PP• 22-23.
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press."

The working press tended to be ideologically liberal

while Dulles was ideologically conservative.

A meeting of the

minds was therefore difficult.
Nevertheless, members of the press recognized that Dulles
was very accessible.

He held weekly press conferences--for him

not to hold them was considered irregu1ar--and numerous backgrounder.s.

"He was available for small d i nners, f or private

conversation, for talks in his office, for meetings at somebody's
house, that sort of thing.•• 40

Lisagor commented, "Dulles was

never standoffish with the press • ., 41
By contrast, Eisenhower was less accessible to the press
than his Secretary of State.

Eisenhower held far fewer press

con ferences than his predecessors, Harry Truman and Franklin
Roosevelt.

Several factors accounted for this.

First, his

three i11nesses restricted direct contact with the press for
extended periods.

His numerous trips abroad interrupted his

normal news conferences.

And, if, in a recent fireside telecast,

or in some other manner, Eisenhower felt he had said what he
wanted to say, he held no news conference.

"(T)he Presidential

news conference depended largely upon his whim or judgement." 42
Eisenhower held news conferences only a little more than
half as often as Truman and not quite a third as often as
Roosevelt.

(Sees Table IV, Appendix D.)

40Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, pp. 31-32.
41 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 24.

42 Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press ••• ," p. 181.
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Cha lmers Roberts , Washington Post newsman, theorized that
Eis e nhowe r let Dulles compensate for his own infrequent press
conferences .

Consequently, Dulles was much more available to

the press than the President, on both the public and private
l e vels . 43
Also , by way of contrast, many newsmen regarded Dulles as
highl y effective in his handling of backgrounders and formal
press c onferences; the President was not.
•
'
44
very " frank" in his
backgrounders.

Dulles was considered

Reston observeds

••• First of all, he could say what was on his mind. And
he'd put a subject and a predicate and an object together
and then he stopped . He wasn' t like his boss over in the
White House. He spoke in sentences, and he knew how to
turn the delicate corners so that he put the proper
qualifications, like a good lawyer, into any positive
s tatement he would make. He was awfully good at that.45
Hightower felt that Dulles both liked and trusted reporters.
"(H)e recognized and appreciated the function of the press as a
channel of communication between individual advocates or national
leaders and people, working both ways.

He understood this, so

he used it." 46 While Dulles, it was generally conceded by newsmen,
understood the function of the press, it was held by some that
Eisenhower did not appreciate it.

Harkness indicated&

43Eisenhower Project, Interview with Roberts, p. 2.
4 4:ou11es Project, Interview with Reston, PP• 21-22; and
Dulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Harkness, pp. 11-12
and PP • 58-59 .
45I bid. , Reston, PP• 25-26.
46Eisenhower Project , Interview with Hightower, pp. 31-32.
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••• This is an interesting relationship in this town
(Washington, D. c.)--relations between government officials
and news media--the role of reporters in this town. A lot
of our peqple don't understand it •..• Always his (Eisenhower ' s) phrase was, .. Well, I know you fellows have to
make a living . .. That was his idea. If you bugged him-"Well, it's all right. You've got to make a living," He
never did realize the role of the press in this town ...... 47
Reporters often felt that Dulles used the press to get his
point across , to inform the people of his thinking, and to win
support for his actions, in a sense attempting to manipulate
the press in order to achieve his ends. 48

So strong was this

impression that reporters often felt that Dulles was not
addressing them directly, and they would wonder aloud among
themselves to whom he was directing his remarks

Lisagor noted1

••• Dulles was rarely speaking ta us as reporters asking
questions. In fact, we used to meet after his press
conferences to decide to whom he was addressing his
answers and for what purposes . He spoke to the Russians,
to the Communists generally, he spoke to all European
allies, he spoke to friends , neu.tr.a ls and so on. · He
always answered things with the thought in mind that some
American purpose might be served, some message might be
conveyed that he wanted to convey, that he couldn't
convey in a diplomatic atmosphere, and he'd do it through
the press. We always felt that he was using the press as
a vehicle for the promotion of his policies •••• 49
That these were indeed considerations was borne out in Dulles
remarks to Berding, cited above.

Dulles used the press confer-

ences to communicate with the American people and other peoples.
47Dull~Sf P-roject, IntefView with Mr. and M~s. Harkness,
pp. 67-68.
48Eise
' nhower ProJec,
' t
'
' h tower, pp. 31 - 32 •
Interview
wi. th Hig

49 oulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, P e 91 and Eisenhower Project, Interview with ~oberts, pp. 4-5. Concerning
Dulles• background sessions , Roberts observed that Dulles
"always was trying to put over his point of view ••• And it
became something of a game, for the reporter to be sure he
wasn't just buying a pig in a poke and becoming just a transmission belt for the administration."
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He was very much aware of the potential impact his words would
have on

u. s. foreign relations, and of the need to weigh his

words very carefully with a view to their impact.

For this

reason, he considered giving extemporaneous answers to questions
asked in a formal press conference "difficult."
At least one journalist, Walter Kerr, of the Washington
bureau of the New York Herald-Tribune from 1954-1956, felt that,
even though Dulles did not mind giving press conferences, it was
not the way he preferred to work.

Kerr believed that Dulles

would rather deal with a few newsmen whom he liked to see on a
fairly frequent basis.

"He preferred to see someone he knew--

a reporter or a correspondent he knew--at his home on a Sunday
morning and sit there and just talk f or two hours.

He preferred

that to the press conferences. ,,SO
Despite his accessibility to the press, his solicitude f or
the press and his capable handling of the press, Dulles• relations with the press were hardly ideal.

John Hightower has

perhaps best summarized Dulles• relations with the press in
the following wordsc
••• (T)hey were very odd. He liked newsmen. He never took
offense or ••• wasted time complaining about things that were
written, that involved him. He understood the communications function of the press perfectly. He probably
collected more press critics than most Secretaries of
state. Part of it may have been simply the natural process
of accumulating deficits for a public figure in this
country •••• 51
50nu11es Project, Princeton, Int erview with Walter Kerr,
25 June 1964, p. 19.
51 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 30.
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Andrew Berding•s and Philip Crowe•s task of aiding Dulles
to improve his press image was not an easy one, for Dulles
seldom agreed with their suggestions for toning down the
language of his speeches, statements, and the like.

Crowe

estimated that Dulles had a highly developed sense of public
relations and the great importance of communicating his ideas
to the public.

Nevertheless, Crowe observeds

••• I don't think that he was an expert at it. He thought
it was important, but there were times, I know, that both
Andy (Berding) and I felt he could have expressed something differently and gotten a better reception. He often
felt that, if he did this, his point wouldn't be as strong.
But I was constantly asking him to tone down controversial
things so he'd get a better press--without much success.
Berding, Phleger, Crowe and a few others read all Dulles• speeches
carefully, and suggested changes to improve their reception by
the press.

Crowe noted, "If I saw something that I thought the

hostile part of the press would jump on, I'd bring it to his
attention.

Occasionally I was able to get him to tone it down

a little, but not often." 52

Dulles preferred to get his point

across clearly and strongly, even though it meant risking
unfavorable press reaction.
And there were times when he made mistakes when speaking
to the press.

Hagerty recalled that when Dulles did get into

trouble with the press "it was when he deserted the diplomatic
language, when he shouldn't have •••• Then, he'd act like a school
boy.

He'd come over with a sort of sheepish look on his face to

the White House and say to the President--or stick his head
52oulles Project, Interview with Crowe, pp. 12-13.
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into my office--and say, 'Did I cause you too much trouble
yesterday?

I

guess I shouldn't have said it just that way,

should 1?" 53
Crowe indicated that Dulles worried in particular about
the New York Times.

Crowe took J ames Reston to see Dulles five

or six times, because Dulles, although personally fond of Reston,
was annoyed at some of Reston•s "pronouncements ...

Crowe also

went to New York to speak to various members of the New York
Times on different occas ions.
were not very close.

Dulles• relations with the Times

Crowe observeds

••• The New York Times ••• is normally a Democratic paper.
Scotty (Reston) and he respected each other. Some of the
other Times peop1e occasionally would go to see him, but
not very often. I know the publisher of the New York Times.
I went up to see him twice about Mr. Dulles• policies.
I
addressed the editors of the New York Times at a private
luncheon upstairs on several occasions. I thought they
were mildly critical most of the time.54
Walter Lippmann was also regarded as very critical.

Crowe

arranged to take Lippmann to see Dulles for the first time that
he had been to see him "in, literally, years."

Crowe mentioned

that he had a very difficult time convincing Dulles to see
Lippmann because Lippmann was so hostile.

Crowe estimated,

"I felt that after this time that I did bring Walter to see

him that he was a little more mellow in his column--for a few
weeks anyway.

I thought it had served some purpose ... 55

In addition to the New York Times and Walter Lippmann,

Crowe regarded the New York Post and the st. Louis -Post-Dispatch
53Dulles Project, Interview with Hagerty, P• 25.

54Dulles Project, Interview with Crowe, pp. 13-14.
55 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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as critical of Dulles. 56
However, not every publication was opposed to Dulles•
policies.

Friendly to Dulles were the New York Herald-Tribune

and the Harry Luce Time-Life publications. Concerning the
Herald-Tribune, Crowe remarked&
••• we had a very good relation with the Herald Tribune
because it's not only a Republican paper, but was extremely
interested in what we were doing. They would call me up
often on the telephone and ask what our position was on
certain things, and I 'd always give it to them. And
occasionally there would be a very nice editorial reflecting
almost exactly what I'q told them, which ther agreed with
or they wouldn ' t have put it in. But the Tribune was on
our side.
Crowe regarded the Luce publications as one hundred per
cent behind the Administration.

He remarked, "I didn't waste

any time on Harry Luce and his people, because they were on our
side.

My job was to take care of the people that weren•t.•• 57
Murray Snyder indicated that Eisenhower showed no

partiality toward particular journalists, but that Eisenhower
did like some of the White House regulars.

Snyder mentioned

Marvin Arrowsmith of the Associated Press, Merriman Smith of
the United Press, Roscoe Drummond of the New York HeraldTribune and Cy Sulzberger of the New York Times. These men and
others like them appealed to Eisenhower because he regarded
them as honest and scrupulously objective.

Nevertheless,

Eisenhower was not personally close to any of them.

"He knew

many ••• editors and publishers personally, and saw them all, of
course, as does any President.
57 rbi'd., pp. 15 - 16 •

No, he had no clique of special
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friends, and I think the reason is, he didn't come up through
the normal political channels." 58
Edwa r d Folliard , Washington Post, confirmed some of Snyder's
observations.

He indicated that in addition to himself, Merriman

Smith, Marvin Arrowsmith, and Pat Morin continued to see Eisenhower a t Gettysberg after his retirement.

Eisenhower had

maint ained friendly relations with a number of newspapermen. 59
Walter Kerr thought that, while he was assigned to Washington,
the Secretary of State saw five or six newsmen regularly,
inc luding James Reston, Art Sylvester, Roscoe Drummond, on
occas i on, John Hightower, and himself. 60
James Reston acknowledged that he liked Dulles, and was
close t o him.

Reston offered a very i nteresting and perceptive

hypothesis to ex.plain Dulles• concern about the New York Time s
parti c ularly, and his accessibility to Times peoples
58Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, p. 40.
59Eisenhower Project, Interview with Folliard, p. 20.
60Dulles Project, Interview with Kerr, ~P• 19-20 .
Concernin~ the Dulles-Reston relationship, Rivers commented:
••In the Eisenhower Era, Reston swayed secr etary of State John
Fost e r Dulles; some ..S.tate Department func t ionaries grew to
assume that Reston •s writings were...State policy. His impact .
became so pronounced that Eisenhower himself . once exploded,
' Who does Scotty Reston think he is, telling me how to run the
country! ' " Rivers a lso noted that Reston is careful to maintain h is independence from Government officials. For example,
Rivers recalled that, on another occasion, Reston wrote in 1958
concerni ng Dulless "'If General Eisenhower had had a theatre
commander in the war who lost as much influence among his men
and got into as much trouble as Secretary Dulles has in the
past f i ve years , he would have fired him.'" Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit. , pp. 72-74.
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•• (Y)ou always have to understand the special position of
the Times. And the special position of the Times really
is two-fold. First of all, it's the one paper that goes
into every Embassy in Washington. It is well known to a
secretary or state that, if the Times, first of all, gets
things wrong, that's going to cause him an awful lot of
trouble, because then every Ambassador whose country is
involved in whatever that bit of information is is on top
of his department, saying, "You're saying one thing and
the Times is saying another."
There is also the great illusion in the diplomatic
world that the New York Times is like the Times of London-that, somehow, it's an official or semi-official agency of
the American government-- which, of course, is not true.
Never has been true. But that illusion persists. Therefore, Foster Dulles was well enough aware of the diplomatic
world in Washington--the habits of the diplomatic corps
here--to know that it was easier to see that we were well
informed in advance, than to try to deal with the consequences of inaccuracy in the Times after the event. Therefore, he was very available to us.61
Among Dulles• press friends, Lisagor placed Roscoe Drummond,
Marguerite Higgins, and almost anybody from the New York HeraldTri bune. He recalled that Dulles was long acquainted with HeraldTr ibune people. As Republicans, they contributed money to
Republican campaigns, and, Lisagor surmised, to Dulles• unsucces s ful Senatorial campaign in 1949.

Lisagor also mentioned

J ames Reston of the New York Times, Chalmers Roberts of the
Washi ngton Post, Ernest Lindley of Newsweek, John (Jack) Beal
(who wrote a biography of Dulles) and Jim Shepley, both of

Time-Life. The famous .. brinkmanship" article in Life magazine
resulted from an interview Dulles gave Shepley and Bea1. 62
It becomes clear from studying Crowe•s remarks and those
of newsmen that Dulles had a special regard for the New York
Herald-Tribune, and that members of its staff had easy access
t o him.

Therefore, it does not come as a great surprise that

61 Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, P• 16.
62Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, pp. 27-29.
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during the Suez crisis, following the Anglo-French-Israeli
invasion of Egypt , that Ogden Reid, former editor of the Tribune,
was approached by both British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd
and Israe l i Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir.

Apparently they

were interested in having eithe r the Herald-Tribune or Ogden
Re i d "clarify their concern i n the public mind, perhaps on the
editorial page, and that I (Reid) would have some opportunity
to discuss their views with the secretary."

At that time, the

Administration had taken the position that to meet with the
British, French or Israeli Foreign Ministers would appear to
the world as if the United Sta tes sanctioned aggression.
Consequently, Dulles was refusing to meet with the British and
Israeli Foreign Ministers.

They, therefore, went to see Ogden

Reid, who later commented, "I think Selwyn Lloyd went back without
seeing secretary Dull.es on that particular occas ion." 63
Reid indicated .that, following Lloyd's visit, the HeraldTribune did write an editorial "with reference to some of
Selwyn Lloyd ' s concerns and the importance of the

us

rebuilding their relationship as early as possible.

and UK
It was

written partly to be in the European edition, prior to a very
key debate in the House of commons." 64
Selwyn Lloyd ' s and Golda Meir's actions indicate that the
foreign diplomatic community recognized the special position of
the New York Herald-Tribune during the Eisenhower Administration,
63Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Ogden Reid,
9 May 1967, PP• 11-12.

64rbid., pp. 12-13.
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and that Britain and Israel sought to exploit it to open
alternate avenues of communication with the

u. s. Government

when normal channels were disrupted following the Anglo-FrenchIsraeli invasion of Egypt .

As a consequence, the Herald-Tribune

became temporarily a part of the foreign policy nexus with which
Secretary of State Dulles had to deal.
How The Press Viewed Eisenhower's Relations With Dulles
It was a fairly commonly held opinion among newsmen that
President Eisenhower delegated too much power and authority to
Dulles.

While it was generally conceded that Eisenhower had

a good grasp of foreign policy, it was felt that he gave
secretary of State Dulles too much leeway. 65

There was the

feeling that Eisenhower, in the early days of the Administration ,
was unsure of Dulles, and that he tested him before gradually
coming to place more and more trust in him.

But when Eisenhower

fully realized the man he had in Dulles, . "a dedicated, hardworking, 24-hour-a-day man, ••• he just sort of abdicated.,• 66
So heavily did Eisenhower come to rely on Dulles, in this
view, that when Dulles was hospitalized at the height of the
Suez crisis, some newsmen felt that, for the first time, Eisenhower realized how dependent he had become upon Dulles--he now
had to deal with foreign policy decisions himself, and to bear
full responsibility for them.

"(H)e had never, up to that point,

really come face to face personally with a foreign problem." 67
65Eisenhower Project, Interview with Folliard, p. 38.
66Dulles Project, Interview with Lis agor, PP• 36-37.
67oulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs . Harkness,
p. 40.
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One consequence of this overdependence upon Dulles,
according to Lisagor, was that Eisenhower never fully appreciated the adverse impact that Dulles could have on people like
Prime Minister Eden and French Foreign Minister Pineau, that
Dulles was "driving (them) ••• out of their minds."

Thus it was,

in Lisagor•s opinion, "that Eis enhower was truly astonished
that the British and French closed us out--kept us in the dark
about Suez, not knowing that it was a response and a reaction
agains t Dulles, what Dulles would probably do to undermine
their game or what they planned to do." 68
In the general view, Dulles was "the informing mind" on the
conduct of

u. s .

·
·
.
h'1story,
foreign
po 1 icy
. 69 In mod ern American

he "probably had the freest hand" of any Secretary of State· in
recent decades . 70
over

u. s.

Dulles was discreet in his handling of power

foreign affairs, "but he never left anybody in any

doubt that if he determined what it was that was to be done
(with possibly the one exception of the defense of Dien Bien

Phu), then President Eisenhower would probably go along with
him."

Reston concluded that Dulles .. was quite justified in

his confidence in that." 71
Lisagor seconded this interpretation and theorized about
the way Dulles did its
68 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, pp. 36-37.
69Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, P• 18.
70Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor , P• 37.
71 Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, p. 18.
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••• Dulles never did anything, I don't believe, that needed
presidential sanction or approval that he didn't get it.
I thi nk what Dulles did was to shape the alternatives in
such a way that Eisenhower's choices almost inevitably
came out the way Dulles would want them to which is something you can do quite eas ily with a man like Eisenhower
whose interest i n the real ••• nuts and bolts of the
operation was limited.72
The fact that newsmen considered Dulles primarily respons i ble f or

u. s.

foreign policy seems to account for the fact

that he drew far more severe criticism from the press than did
Pres ident Eisenhower.

Yet, Dulles never displayed publicly

any s ign of his displeasure with criticism. 73

Berding noted

that Ei senhower was ultimately responsible for American foreign
relations, but that this did not deter opponents of any phase
of American foreign policy from holding Dulles personally
. 74
responsi"b le for it.

Berding recalleds

I sometimes gathered the impression that the Secretary
s eemed deliberately to attract criticism to himself so as
t o deflect it from President Eisenhower. He willingly
r eceived personally the venom of the bitter attacks
following the Suez debacle and during the sharply contest ed
effort to pass the Joint Resolution on the Middle East
t hrough Congress in 1957. I know of no instance when be
side-stepped criticism which would then fall upon the
President. He was something of a lightening rod drawing
the bolts from the heavens into the ground before they
c ould strike the White House.
Fa r from being discouraged by oral and written criticism,
72oulles Pro ject, Interview with Lisagor, p. 36.
73Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with James Russell
Wiggins , 9 Aug . 1965 , P• 15.
74Be r d.ing, -Du'11es on Dip
' l omacy. • .op._ cit.,
'
p. 99 •
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Dulles regarded it positively as having its advantages in that
it aroused public interest and discussion from which might
.develop public understanding . and support for his policies.
Thus, he was "stimulated" by criticism to work harder on
behalf of his policies. 75
Members of the pres s got the impression that channels of
communication within the Department of State, during the tenure
of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, did not flow
smoothly from the top down.

Numerous State Department career

personnel "jammed" Dulles• press conferences.

Lisagor surmised

that they attended in order to learn what Dulles was thinking.
He attributed this to the fact that Dulles tended to regard

u. s.

foreign policy as his . exclusive domain, and did not consult

regularly with, nor rely heavily for advise or comment on, State
l s . 76
,
Depar tme n t pro f essiona
Dulles• first press secretary, Carl

w.

Mccardle, interpreted

the phenomenon of. crowded Dulles• . press conferences quite differently.

Recalling that, because he believed in the people's right

to know, he had recommended that Dulles hold weekly press conferences, and that Dulles be very complete in his explanations of

u. s.

foreign policy, Mccardle remarkeds
There was a sign that the country was waiting for that
kind of thing; where previously there'd been only a small
gathering of correspondents at the Secretary of State's
press conferences, I (Mccardle) had to ask the secretary
that all State Department officials, personnel, stay away
from his press conferences, because correspondents were
having to stand around the walls. There were not enough
seats for them.77
75 Ibid., P• 100.
76ou11es Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 37.
77Eisenhower Project, Interview with Mccardle, p. 5.
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Congressional Use of the Press in the Floor Debate over Suez
Throughout most of the Suez crisis Congress was not in
session due to the fall elections in 1956.

Recessing in August,

1956, Congress did not reconvene until January, 1957.

Through-

out the crisis President Eisenhower maintained contact with
Congressional leaders of both Houses of Congress and of both
parties, summoning them to Washington at the height of the
campaign on one occasion.
Because of the elections and the Congressional recess,
Congressional comment on Administration policies was min
during the final months of 1956.

1

Following the elections and

the return of Congress, there was animated comment from the
Hill .

In addresses from the floor, Senators and Representatives

voiced their support or opposition to Administration policies.
Particularly hot issues were the questions of United Nations
sanctions against Israel and of guaranties to Israel that would
insure maintenance of the peace and prevent an Arab return to
guerrilla activities and secure open transit of the Straits of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
To buttress their arguments from the floor, members of
Congress would often request that articles and/or editorials
from the nation's leading papers--most frequently from the
New York Times--be recorded in the Congressional Record as
part of their remarks,

Usually the newspaper articles reflected

the views of the speaker,

For example, Senator Knowland,

California Republican, used four supportive articles in his
speech against the imposition of sanctions on Israel.

Senator

Knowland regarded this whole matter as illustrative of the fact
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that there was a "double-standard of international morality
growing like a cancer at the United Nations."

Senator Knowland

pointed out that: 1. the Soviet Union defied the United Nations
in Central Europe; and 2. India failed to respect

u. N.

resolutions on Kashmir which India unilaterally incorporated
into the Indian state--that same India which had at times taken
a high moral position in the United Nations.

In support of his

citing of the Indian contradiction, Knowland requested that four
articles be recorded in the Record as a part of his remarks.
The titles of the articles give a good hint of their character:
1. "The Pakistan Riots," New York Times, Jan. 28, 1957;

2. "Kashmir for the Kashmiris," N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1957;
3. "India's Contempt," Washington Star, Jan. 28, 1957; and

4. "Festering Kashmir," Washington Post and Times Herald,

January 21, 1957,
Senator Knowland, who opposed the Administration's readiness to impose sanctions on Israel and the movement in the
United Nations to do so, concluded his remarks by claiming:
"(I)f we are to have sanctions at the United Nations, they
should apply to all nations which defy the resolutions and
mandates of that organization.

Otherwise the moral foundation

of the United Nations is destroyed and a doctrine of •might
makes right' condoned,

This issue of principle cannot be

brushed aside or avoided. 078
78 "The Double Standard of International Morality at the

United Nations , 0 Sen. Wm. F. Knowland, Congressional Record,
Feb, 7, 1957, PP• 1654-1655,
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· on February 11, 1957, Senator Jacob Javits, New York
Republican, joined with six other Senators (Beal, Maryland;
Douglas , Illinois; Humphrey, Minnesota; Neuberg, Oregon;
Sparkman, Alabama; and Ives, New York) to offer Senate
Resolution 77, stating it to be the sense of the Senates
That our Government should support effective action
both in and outside of the United Nations, which will
guarantee that there will not·• be a resumption of border
raids and blockade of vital international waterways and
other activities which might erupt into new hostilities
in the Middle East; and that, pending an effective
guaran~ that there will not be a restoration of the
conditions out of which the hostilities in the Sinai
Peninsula came about, our delegation at the United Nations
urges measures to assure that the United Nations Emergency
Force take up positions to separate the forces of Israel
and Egypt and to prevent repossession of bases for the
operation of guerrilla bands, and the interdiction of
international shipping, including Israel's through the
Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of qaba.
Senator Javits concluded his address by requesting that two
editorials be printed at this point in his remarks in the
Record. They were:
1. "Israel, Egypt and the
2.

0

u.

N.,U N. Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1957;

Suez Calls for Action, 0 N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1957.

senator Javits had begun his remarks by quoting the last
sentence of the editorial, "Israel, Egypt and the

u.

N.," which

ran, "The friendship of the Arab States, if that is what we are
looking for, is not worthwhile if it has to be bought by
. . t'ice." 79
f
subter-uges
and J.nJus

Illinois Senator Douglas, in his argument on behalf of the
effective guarantees sought in Senate Resolution 77, argued that
79 "The Middle East Question," Mr. Javits, in ibid.,
Feb. 11, 1957, pp. 1839-1840.
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"the only real guaranty we can have in such matters is a
permanent occupation by a United Nations police force," and a
"public pledge

0

by Colonel Nasser in advance of Israeli with-

draual that Egypt would keep the peace.

Senator Douglas then

requested that three articles and one letter to the editor in
support of his position be included in the Record :
1. "One standard for All in

u.

N.," Philadelphia ·Inquirer,

Feb, 11, 1957;
2. "Israel's Defiance: Cause and Effect," Washington Post,

Feb • 11 , 195 7;
3,

0

Israel's Position," Lynchburg (Va,) News , Feb. 11, 1957;

4. Frank Altschul,

v.

P ., Council on Foreign Relations,

Letter to Editor of N. Y. Times --Israel's Stand on Gaza-Question Raised Whether

u. N. Votes Represent Public Opinion,

New York Times, February 11, 1957.
Douglas also included an article opposed to his position,
written by Marguerite Higgins , known to be sympathetic to the
Eisenhower Administration and privy to Administration thinking.
The article was: "After King Saud, the Deluge?," New Yorlc
Herald-Tribune, no date given, probably February 11, 1957. O
The White House was not insensitive to the expressed
sentiments of opposition of members of both parties in
Congress.

On February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower met with

leaders of both parties from both Houses of Congress to discuss
the question of

u.

N. sanctions against Israel.

President

BO.,The Middle East Situation ," Sen. Douglas, in ibid.,
Feb. 11, 1957, pp. 1843-1 847 .

219
Eisenhower failed to win the support of Congressional leaders
for sanctions, so, that evening, he took the matter to the
nation in a nationwide radio and television address.

Unable to

indicate that he had the support of Congressional leaders, the
President, after mentioning the morning meeting with the leaders
of both parties from the Senate and the House of Representatives,
took refuge in stock phraseology, "We had a very useful exchange
of views.

It was the general feeling of that meeting that I

should lay the situation before the American people ... 81
As in the case of opposition from the press, the Administration withstood adverse Congressional criticism and stuck
with its foreign policies.

It went over the head of Congress,

taking the matter directly to the American people in a play
for support.
The Impact of the Press on the Formulation of
United States Foreign Policy
united States foreign policy during Dulles• tenure as
Secretary of State was arrived at in a variety of ways.

Foreign

policy decisions were made in consultation with the Cabinet and
with the National Security Council and through daily discussions
between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles following
consultations with their respective staffs.
When the President and the Secretary of State considered
policy, they were not impervious to the probable impact upon
public opinion and upon the press.

Yet, both refused to surrender

81 "Question of the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From
Egyptian Territory," State Dept. Bul., March 11, 1957, p. 387.

220

to the pressures of either public opinion or the press when
making foreign policy decisions .

While aware of both, they

were nevertheless able to withstand adverse criticism from both
quarte r s when confronted with a crucial foreign affairs matter.
Thus , despite considerable unfavorable public opinion, and much
criticis m from the American press during the Suez crisis, Eisenhower and Dulles adhered to policies which they deemed proper.
One is struck with the small degree of influence the
Amer i can press seems to have had over foreign policy decisions
during the Eisenhower-Dulles years, and during the Suez crisis
in particular .

The prevalent attitude among members of the

Admini stration to the press seems to have been one of studied
respect.

The Administration recognized that members of the

press were entitled to their opinions.

But often their

oppos ing opinions were not taken too seriously because the
Administration felt that, since it had far greater access to
informa tion than the press, it therefore knew best what to do.
However, the Administration recognized the value of the press
in i n forming and making public opinion.

Consequently, the

Administration sought to use the press as an avenue of communication with the American people and other peoples.

While it

could not guarantee that the press would always agree with its
polic i es , the Administration did not shy away from the press •..
Becaus e it could not impose agreement with its policies upon
the press , the Administration lived with press criticism.
The refore , the Administration's reaction to James Reston•s
front page byline article in the New York Times during the 1956
campaign , after the outbreak of war in the Middle East, which
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charged that the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy
was bankrupt, should not be surprising.

Hagerty remarked,

••• I'm not saying that Scotty Res ton was part of the
Democratic strategy, but this was part of their campaign
to discredit everything in the administration. They
really didn't have any issues of importance, and not
having issues of importance, you have to do the best you
can with the issues you decide to go with. Actually, in
'56, as I recall it, our foreign policy was pretty good.
our position in Europe vis-a-vis NATO, our position in
SEATO, the stand that Mr. Eisenhower made in Suez,
certainly were all in much better shape than they are
now and have been for some time. I'm sure that Scotty
believed what he was writing. I don't think you can
plant a political story with a man like Scotty Reston.
We had different points of view. And that's a bout all
there is to that.82
One is struck by the conviction with which most Administration spokesmen stood by American foreign policy during the
Suez crisis.

It is hard to doubt tha t they really believed

they were doing the right thing although their reasoning is
not always convincing.

They chanced losing a comfortable

majority of American public support.

And they were willing

to risk defeat in the election.
It is difficult to overlook the dichotomy between the
version of responsibility for

u. s.

foreign policy decisions

held by the press and that held by members of the Eisenhower
Administration.

Members of the press tended to charge Dulles

with ultimate responsibility, while Administration insiders

insisted upon Eisenhower's ultimate responsibility.

Members

of the Administration repeatedly stressed the close consultation and cooperation between Eisenhower and Dulles to indicate
82Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. III,
pp. 409-410.

222
the President's key role in major foreign policy decisions.
They emphasized that Eisenhower did ~ot merely rubber-stamp
Dulles• recommendations.

Newsmen often argued the reverse.

CHAPTER IV
THE REACTION OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS TO THE SUEZ CRISIS
Preliminary Observations
An attempt will now be made to discern how successful
Eisenhower Administration press policies were in influencing
American newspaper coverage of
crisis.

u. s.

policy during the Suez

This study will concentrate in depth on three major

American newspapers--the Christian Science Monitor, the New
York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. It will consider the
degree to which these great newspapers supported American
foreign policy, or opposed it, during the crisis.

The degree

of divergence from support of Administration policies may be
taken as an inverse measure of the strength of Administration
influence over newspaper coverage.

Parallelism of newspaper

positions and Government policies could indicate great support
for Administration efforts, and/or the success of Administration
attempts to influence

wspaper coverage of events.

In order to limit the size of the sample to manageable
proportions, and in order to cover every day of the publication
week without giving undue bias to any particular day of publication, I have deemed it necessary to limit selection by
following a rotating sample using a different day each week,
in recurring cycles .
223
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Each cycle starts with the Friday, July 20, 1956, issue,
which appeared the day after the withdrawal of the American
offer t o help finance the Aswan High Dam project.

It continues

through the first full week in March , 1957.
Special attention was paid to editorials--they were checked
dai ly--for they reflect the official views of the newspaper,
the pol i cies which it supports and/or advocates .

In the

editor i als are represented the clearest statements of organization support for, or opposition to, Administration policies.
Editorials are consequently one of the better barometers for
measuring the relationship between the Administration and
American newspapers.
In order to determine whether the Times, Monit or, and
Journal were representative of the editoria l opinion of l a rge
American newspapers during the Suez crisis, a study was made
of the editor ials of four major Mid-Western and Far-Western
newspapers--t he Chicago Daily News, the Chicago Sun-Times, t he
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Los .Ange l es Times.

Similari ties

and/or differences of editorial comment will be appropriately
noted in the footnotes.
Withdrawal of the American Offer
The American decision to withdraw fr om the Aswan High Dam
came as a surprise to the American press.
reaction was generally cautious.

Initial newspaper

The American action was

regar ded as a ma j or policy decision which indicated that
Washi ngton, after reexamination of policy, had settled on a
" t ougher line" in relations with the "neutralist regime" of
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President Nasser. 1

The step was also described as a "major

shift in American policy and attitude toward Cairo."

It

constituted a calculated risk which could result in Egypt's
turning to the Soviet Union for economic aid for the High Dam,
and the subsequent falling of Egypt into the soviet camp,
thereby, greatly complicating and increasing the United States
Middle East troubles. 2
The cancellation of the American offer was regarded as
striking a blow at Egypt's Nasser, who was ••hit" by the American
decision, and, thus, placed in the "most perilous and exposed
pos ition" he had been in since the ouster of King Farouk. 3
The Times reported that "United States officials said the
dec i sion had been taken in full anticipation of angry antiUnited States and anti-British reactions in Egypt and throughout
the Arab countries where Egyptian influence is high ... 4

No

mention was made of the possibility of nationalization of the
s ue.z Canal.
The

u. s.

action was seen as calculated to "deflate" Nasser,

causing him to lose prestige, and to place Moscow "on the spot,"
f orcing the soviets to either help Nasser, or to "incur the
1oana Adams Schmidt, "U.S. Annuls Offer of FUhd to Build
High Dam,., New York Times (Hereafters NYT), July 20, 1956, p. 1.
2Neal Stanford, "Moscow Placed on Spot," Christian Science
Monitor (Hereafters CSM), July 20, 1956, p. 1; "A Calculated
Ris k on the Aswan Dam, .. Editorial, Los Angeles Times (Hereafters
LAT), July 21, 1956, part I II, p. 4.
3Harry B, Ellis, "Nasser Hit," CSM, ibid., P• 1.
4nana Adams Schmidt, "U,
loc. cit.

s. Annuls Offer of Fund, .. NYT,
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Egyptian dictator's wrath by refusal ...

American officials,

including John Foster Dulles, it was reported, did not believe
that Moscow could help, or would help, with the very expensive
project. 5
The press repeated the official reasons for Washington's
refusal, including Egypt's failure to secure the agreement of
other riparian states, and its alleged inability to pay for the
project.

The American papers reported, however, that the r .al

reasons for the cancellation of the American offer werea
1. Anger over Nasser's dealings with the Communist bloc,
as represented in the Czech arms deal;
2. Zionist opposition;
3. Growing Congressional opposition, as represented in the
Senate Appropriations Committee's "instructions" to Secretary
Dulles not to commit funds to the Aswan High Dam without first
consulting the committee; and
4. Distaste for Egyptian efforts to reduce Western influence in the Third World. 6
The Christian Science Monitor, on July 21, 1956, asked,
.. But is the kick necessary?"

While expressing general support

for the American decision to stop "bidding for the privilege
of helping to finance the proposed Aswan Dam," the Monitor
inquired,
5Neal Stanford, "Moscow Placed on Spot," CSM, loc. cit.
6composite of views expressed by: Dana Adams Schmidt,
u. s. Annuls Offer of Fund," NYT, loc. cit.; Neal Stanford,
"Moscow Placed on Spot," loc. cit.; and "What's News--World
wide," Wall Street Journal (Hereafters WSJ), July 20, 1956,
0

p. 1.
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• • • need the turnabout have been advertised so bluntly and
s o c rushingly as has been done? The effect is virtually
to challenge the Egyptians t o wel c ome i nto the Middle East
Soviet-bloc aid and influence which both Egypt and the
West might find very damagi ng t here . To be sure, a
waiting game might have only repeated t he pattern of
the Czech arms de al. Or c ould di plomacy have been more
diplomatic here?7
The Monitor missed the point entirely.

The withdrawal of

the American offer was calculated to be as insulting as possible
i n order to bring about Nasser's fall.

This was the opinion of

Eugene Black, former President of the World Bank. (see aboves
pp. 59-60.)

Kennett Love, who a r rived at the same c onclusion,

wrote, "(T)he manner of his (Dulles•) renege on the High Dam
bor e all the earmarks of a design to shake Nasser's position." 8
He i kal reported that Nasser himself regarded the American withdrawa l statement as designed to bring down his regime. (see above s
pp. 16-18.)
70 But Is the Kick Necessary?," Editorial, CSM, July 21,
1956, P • 18.

8Love , Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., pp. 326-32 7 .
Hoopes (The Devil and J. F. D,, op. cit., p. 344.) offered
another explanation for the reneges " • • • Dulles, bent upon
pursuing his own highly abstract brand of global anti-communism,
was only incidentally interested in bringing Nasser down. His
principal aim was to expose what he regar ded as the pretensions
of Soviet economic aid programs. Demonstration that these
consisted of unfillable promises would break t he momentum of
the Soviet drive for •competitive coexistence'; that it would
also humiliate regimes in small countries that had staked their
own futures on those soviet promises would be a salutary, but
quite secondary, result ...... Hoopes explanation seems too
esote r ic . The doc uments currently available tend to support
the view that Dulles hoped to precipitate Nasser's fall. (sees
Chapters I and II.)
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When it became clear that the Soviet Union did not then
intend to finance the Aswan High Dam project, the initial
cautious reaction gave way t o more outspokenly favorable
response.

American editorialists argued that the soviets, as

predicted, were unwilling to offer funds to Egypt, at that time,
and that they were unable to do so due to their own poor
' cond't'
economic
i ion. 9
Nasser was described as in great difficulty.

It was

stated that his position had deteriorated and that Egyptian
hopes had been dashed.

The Egyptian people could "blame it

only on the overweening ambitions and adventurist policies of
President Nasser , who has tried to play off the West against
the East in the name of national 'independence' and 'positive
neutralism' and has landed between the two chairs ... 10
Because the American press believed Cairo had carefully
cultivated the impression that the Soviet Union was ready to
finance the High Dam if the West did not, the press felt that
Washington 's move initially .,looked like a daring gamble, and
perhaps it was."

With the Soviet denial that they were

considering financing the venture, the Nasser regime was
••disclosed as having run a stupendous bluff--and fallen off it.,.
Events further proved that Egypt could not have both a guns
and a butter policy because

0

the economic strength of that

country is such that it probably can have a monumental developg"The Bear Who Cried Wolf," Editorial, WSJ. July 24, 1956,
p. 10; and 0 The Aswan Dam Project,•• Editorial, NYT, July 23,
1956, P• 22 .
lOibid., "The Aswan Dam Project.••
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ment project like the Aswan Dam or it can have a military
machine geared for stirring adventure--but not both." 11 such
arguments flew in the face of World Bank findings.

Despite

Egypt's conclusion of a second arms deal, the Bank felt Egypt
could shoulder the economic burden. 12

On a related charge,

the alleged mortgaging of Egypt's cotton crop to purchase
Soviet arms, Heikal wrote that Egypt was "not exporting too
much cotton to Russia.

Nasser insisted that we keep a balance

of export, with a third going to the Communist bloc, a third
to the non-aligned bloc, and a third to the Western world ... 13
Dulles• action was also seen by the American papers as
giving "notice to 'Neutrals'" that the United States would no
longer permit millions of dollars to be dra ined from the
Treasury by their playing East off against West.
would now have to help Egypt or remain silent.

u. s.

The Russians
Judging from

the remarks of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov, indications
were that the Russians would not help Egypt.

This, it was argued,

should prove quite enlightening to those other neutral nations
which sought to play both sides for money.

Despite the risk

that Egypt might receive some Russian

ney, the Journal saw

a ••tremendous gain" in Dulles• policy.

"Notice has been served

ll.,Aswan1 A Bluff Is Called," Editorial, CSM, July 26, 1956,
p. 18; "Calling Their Bluff," Editorial, Chicago sun-Times (Hereafters CST), July 24, 1956, p. 19; and "Bluff on the Nile," Editorial, Chicago Dai ly News (Hereafters CON), July 23, 1956, p. 12.

rn•

12 Finer, Dulles over Suez, op. cit., pp. 49-50; Love,
The TWice-Fouqbt War , op. cit., pp. 316-317; and Hoopes, The
Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 343.
13Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
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that the

u. s. will control its own foreign aid program and

not let its decisions be made by fear or blackma ii . .. 14
Although these prominent papers displayed concern over the
consequences of the dramatic shift in American policy toward
Egypt evident in the withdrawal of the offer t o finance the
Aswan High Dam project, there was little harsh critic ism of
the s tep in the week prior to the Egyptian nationalizati on of
the Suez Canai . 15
The First London Conference
on July 26, 1956, President Nasser of Egypt announced
nationalization of the Suez Canal and Egyptian intentions to
use c anal revenues to finance the Aswan High Dam project.

The

reaction of American newspapers was predict ably very opposed
to t he Egyptian move.

The act of na tionalization was labled

a " seizure , " a "grab," an "act of officia l thievary" and a
14"Notice to 'Neutrals,'" Editorial, WSJ, July 23, 1956, P• 8.
lS For an exception,
'
'
'
see s "Daring
Gamb le or Foo1'is h Risk,"
Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (He rea fters SLPD), July 22,
1956, P• 2D . The Post-Dispatch indicated that it would have
preferred u. N. multilateral aid for Aswan , and an invitation
to Russia to participate . Russia would have been put on the
spot, yet if it took part it would have no chance to use aid
for Russ ian national purposes.
Even if Dulles • gamble were to work, and Russia and Egypt
were taught a lesson, the Aswan High Dam 0 which h as become a
great symbol for all underdeveloped countries, will not have
been built . Meanwhile the whole of Asia and the Middle East
will have been given a striking demonstration that American
aid promises are unreliable . Meanwhile a strong suspicion will
have been created that we demand political conformity as the
price of aid . How would t hese consequences balance off against
the others?"

231
"

.
16
·piece o f criminality."
o

I

o

It was argued that President Nasser, backed into a tight
economic corner by the withdrawal of the Western offer to
finance the High Dam project, retaliated against the West's
denial of aid by nationalizing the Cana1. 17

Heikal indicated

that there certainly was an element of revenge-taking in
Nasser's nationalization of the Canal.

Nasser's insulting

language was "deliberately calculated .. as a reply to the
i nsulting manner in which Dulles withdrew the American offer. 18
The American press regarded the Egyptian nationalization of the
Canal as a threat to the free movement of international trade,
for it was feared that the Egyptians would use the Canal in
pursuit of their own national, political, and economic goals,
and that they did not have the technical capacity to run the
Canal by themselves.

The press did not reflect the Adminis-

tration's privately-held belief that the Egyptians could manage
the Cana1. 19

These American newspapers worried that, if Nasser

were "'allowed to get away with his steal," other Arab States
might be emboldened sufficiently to attempt nationalization
16 "British Stunned At Suez Seizure," NYT, July 27, 1956,
p. 2 ; Henry s. Hayward, "Eden Veils Counteraction on Suez Grab,"
CSM, July 27, 1956, P• 6; .. Beyond the Suez," Editorial, WSJ,
J uly 30, 1956, p. 6; and "Nasser's Seizure of Suez, 0 Editorial,
CST, July 28, 1956, P• 15.
17 rbid., "Beyond the Suez,.; and Egypt National.izes Suez
Canal Company; Will Use Revenues to Build Aswan Dam," NYT,
J ul.y 27 , 1956, p. 1; Harry B. Ellis, "Suez Canal. Seized by
Nasser of Egypt," CSM, July 27, 1956, p. 1; and "The Suez Canal
se i zures Egypt's Little Dictator Threatens All Europe," Editorial,
CDN, July 30, 1956, P• 12.
0

18He1'kal, Cairo
.
Documents, op. ci. t ., p. 93 •

19Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
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("confiscation") of foreign oil company properties. 20
The British and French we re depicted as "stunned•• and
taken by surprise by Nasser's action. 21 Initially, in Britain,
there was unified opposition to the Egyptian move .

.. Laborites

joined with Conservatives in demanding that Egypt be forbidden,
by force if necessary, from carrying out the move." 22

A little

over two weeks later, however, American papers began to report
growing Labor Party opposition to the use of force to settle
the Suez matter.

The Christian Science Monitor welcomed the

Labor Party's "Wholesome reservation .. to its initial endorsement
of the Conservative position, and its demands that British military measures be ••purely precautionary," and that Suez be taken
to the United Nations before resort was made to force.

The

Monitor connnented furthers
Under the circumstances of the moment it was natural
to apprehend that nationalization of the canal by Egypt
was a prelude to exclusion or pena lizing of British and
other Western shipping. But that has not followed.
So long as Egypt allows British and French ships to
use the canal, there is no ground for c omplain t under the
international Convention of 1888 and no cause for war.23
Initially, American papers questioned the ability of the
Egyptian Government to compensate canal stockholde rs, to run, to
maintain , and to improve the canal, and to direct canal revenues
to the High Dam project in view of expected international
20 •aeyond the Suez," WSJ, l oc , , ~it • . .

21 "British Stunned at Suez Seizure," NYT, loc. cit.
22 ,.suez Canal Seized By Nasser of Egypt," CSM, loc . cit.
23 ,,second Thoughts on Force," Editorial, CSM, Aug. 15,
1956, P • 16.
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repercussions. 24

Nasser's statistics were disputed.

The

$100 million Egypt hoped to receive after nationalization

represented an "overstatement" not of the net but the gross
receipts.

After meeting operating expenses , it was argued,

.,..,
.
$3 million
·
·
~gypt would b e for t una t e t o realize
clear, 25 or

approximately what it was getting before nationalization.

For

Nasser to obtain the $100 million-a-year to build the High Dam,
he would be required to double the canal tolls.

"If ••• he

should attempt to double the canal tolls, he would immediately
.
. ' h'ing re t urns.'' 26
face the question
of d'iminis

Less than two weeks later, reporting for the New York Times,
Harold Callender wrote : "It is now pointed out in both Paris and
London that the sterling balances Egypt still owns as a result
of credits on Britain during World War II are more than enough
to pay the shareholders even at the former market values--to
say nothing of the much smaller gold values at which t..~e stock
is being retired by the company itself."

Callender reported

that Egyptian sterling balances totaled $308 ,000 ,000, considerably more than the market value of the Suez Canal Company's
stock then being calculated at $233 ,000,000 prior to nationalization.

The British Government owned $81 ,000,000 worth of the

company' s s tocJ-s:. 27
240 suez Canal Seized By Nasser of Egypt ," CSM , lo , cit.
2511 wi11 a Canal Build a Dam," Editorial, CSM, July 28,
1956, p . 18.

26"Conference on Suez ,., Editorial , NYT , July 30 , 1956, p . 20.
2r/.

Harold Callender, "Egypt Held Able to Pay Off Canal,"
NYT , Aug. 12, 1956, p. 2.
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Britain, France and the United States convened the
Tripartite London Conference to consider steps to regain
international control of the canal.

To accomplish this and

to ensure transit rights of international shipping, the Wall
Street Journal advocated that the United States work with the
British and French on "economic measures designed to force
Nasser to retreat or to make the consequences of his outlawry
.
as painful
as possi'ble." 28
Secretary Dulles

August 3, 1956, radio and television

address to the nation to announce the first London Conference,
which the Three Powers had agreed to convene, was variously
interpreted by American newspapers.

The Times claimed that

the United States was following a policy of moderation in the
Suez crisis, and that Dulles was opposed to violent action to
settle this issue, a factor which would give little comfort to
the "hotheads on both sides of the controversy."

Mr. Dulles

would rely on mutual consultation and the principles of the
United Nations Charter to arriv2 at a settlement. 29

The

Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times both interpreted Dulles• remarks to mean that the United States was
opposed to the canal being left in Egyptian hands alone.

While

the Times interpreted Dulles• words to virtually exclude the
28 "Beyond the Suez," WSJ, loc. cit.; and "Too Late for
Protests," Editorial, SLPD, July 30, 1956, p. 56. The PostDisiatch commenteds "Military action to counter Egypt•snat onalization of Suez is out of the question ••• But economic
sanctions and ••• constructive but forceful diplomacy are in order."
29 0 011
· For Nasser's Lamps," Ed'1tor1al,
'
NYT, Aug . 4 , 1 9 5 6,

p. 14; "Report on Suez," Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 5, 1956, p. 2C;
and "Dulles Against War,•• Editorial, CDN, Aug. 6, 1956, p. 8.
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use of force in the future, Neal Stanford, reporting for the
Monitor, wrote that "in various ways Mr. Dulles implied that
fo rce could not be ruled out."

Stanford buttressed his argument

with references to Dulles' remarks.

Stanford pointed out that

Dulles had said that if Nasser got away with seizure of the
canal, it would "encourage a breakdown of the international
fabric.H

Dulles • observations that the

u. s.

had given no

commitments •of any kind" in the event of failure of the conference, led Stanford to note, "It {the

u. s.)

has neither promised

to use force, nor has it said it would not use force."

Referring

to Dulles • airport statement, Stanford wrote1 "It may be significant that ••• Mr. Dulles did not say •we will not meet violence
with violence,' but said •we do not want to meet violence with
vi olence .• ..

While the

u. s.,

according to Stanford, did not

rule out the use of force, Mr. Dulles and Pre sident Eisenhower
appea r ed to be counting on the "moral force" of world opinion
•
h negotiating
.
.
to b ring
Nasser tote
ta b le. 30

The Three Power decision to call the first London Conference
to s eek a peaceful solution to the Suez crisis was welcomed by
the American press .

The United States was regarded as chiefly

responsible for the turn away from war.

"(I)t is no small

3 0Neal Stanford, "Dulles Airs Position As Egypt Hits West,"

10c, c i t. Sees Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 103. On
Dulles • phrase "we do not want to meet violence with violence,"
Finer commented, " ••• He {Dulles) still did not exclude the
possibility that violence would be used , and that the u. s. A.,
on the terms stated , would be by its word obliged to support
it , but he hoped it would be ave rted by a conference-made solution, Egypt was still, in the context of his statement, open
to an attack, and Dulles may well have deliberately worded his
stateme nt to kee p this possibility open, so that Nasser would
be s obered and made pliable by its coercive anticipatory effect."
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tribute to Mr . Dulles

statesmanship that he has directed the

justifi ed wrath of Britain and France into a search for peaceful
sol u tions."

The Journal regarde d the

u. s .

effort to secure a

peaceful settlement as "one mor e application of a cardinal principle of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy, •• a
belief that firmness coupled with diplomatic flexibil i ty can
bo t h end and avoi.d wars." 31
TWenty-four nations were invited to the first London Conference; twenty-two agreed to attend; Egypt and Greece refused,
Prior to announcement of the Egyptian decision not to attend,
Osgood Caruthers, New York Times, reported that Nasser was
cons idering going to London to press his demand for a broader
confere nce . 32 Heikal later commented that Nasser considered
attending the conference until he received a dispatch from the
Egyptian Embassy in London, informing him of Eden's remarks
duri ng a television appearances "Colonel Nasser is the enemy,
we have no quarrel with the Egyptian people . "

This, coupled

with reports "about Eden's health, temper, and unpredictability , "
supposedly determined Nasser not to go to the conference. 33
A number of Asian countries were invited to the conference.
The American papers expected that they would support the Egyptian
31"In the Right Order, 0 Editorial, WSJ, Aug, 7, 1956, p. 10.
s ee alsos "Toward a Conference on Suez," Editorial, CSM, Aug. 4,
1956; "Oil For Nasser ' s Lamps,•• NYT, loc. cit.; and ••Nearer the
Suez Showdown , " Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 10, 1956, P• 2c.
32osgood Caruthers, "Nasser Reported Weighing Decision to
Go to London , " NYT, Aug. 12, 1956 , p. 1.
33Heikal , Cairo Documents, op. cit., p. 100,
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position and use their influence for a negotiated settlement. 34
It was, therefore, welcome news when not all these nations did
Support the Egyptian position.

The Wall Street Journal, in a

front page italicized insert, noted, "Among the countries
backing the West were five members of the Arab-African-Asian
bloc--Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, and Japan." 35
Dulles• journey to London on August 14, 1956, to attend the
London Conference was described as "one of the most important
missions of his career: namely to try again for a just and peaceful settlement of the Suez Canal problem." 36
Earlier, on August 4, the Christian Science Monitor had
expres sed doubts about how much the London Conference could
accomplish.

Would Egypt attend?

Would Russia attend?

Whether

Cairo would attend or not, "(i)t is a fair guess ••• that the
Nasser regime will oppose vehemently the internationalizing o f
what it had just purported to nationalize."

This should not

be permitted to happen since half the oil supply of Western
Europe passed through the Canal.

A good case could be made for

Eden's declaration that Britain would not accept any arrangement which would leave the Suez Canal in the unrestricted
. 1 na t'ional power. 37
contro 1 o f a singe

The Times argued that Egypt could not be relied upon,
35 ,.What•s News--World Wide,'' iSJ, Aug. 22, 1956, p. 1.
36 "Dulles Returns to London," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 14,
1956, p. 24.
37"Toward a Conference on Suez," Editorial, CSM, Aug. 4,
1956, p. 18 . The Daily News commented that the probability of
a unanimous, peaceful agreement was not bright. "Dulles Against
war," CDN, loc. cit.
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despite President Nasser's promises to maintain freedom of
shipping through the Canal.

Past experience had shown that

Egypt could not be trusted--Israeli shipping was blocked from
the Canal and Nasser had broken the terms of the Suez canal
concession.

Fears were voiced that transit of the Canal would

depend upon the will of the Egyptian Government.
untried nation.

Egypt was an

There were doubts about its ability to run the

Canal .. with the requisite efficiency and stability."

And there

were doubts about Egypt 's capability of defending the canal "on
its own ••• if the need arose ... 38
News of unanimity among the British, French, and Americans
on the question of international control was greeted warmly by
the Christian Science Monitor.
. d 39
t h e conference was praise.

Secretary Dulles• conduct at

The New York Times argued that it was in the best interests
of the world that control of the Suez Canal be internationalized,
and that Egypt should accept this.

Adequate measures would be

taken to safeguard Egyptian interests , and to guarantee equitable
payment to Egypt for its part in running and maintaining the
Cana1. 40
The adoption of the Western proposal by 18 of the 22 nations
38 u•Nationalization• In Suez, .. Editorial, NYT, Aug. 17,
1956, p. 18.

39Henry

s. Hayward, "D-Hour Toll at Suez Parley," CSM,
Aug. 21, 1956, p. 1.
4 o"'Nationalization• In Suez ," NYT, loc. cit.
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was considered a good omen.

It was taken to indicate that the

confe rees were willing to "rely upon moral rather than physical
fo rce" for the implementation of the Ei ghteen Power recommendations.

''The effort of the conferees continues to be to persuade

rather than to coerce the Egyptian President .

As a result, there

is evidence of widespread feeling that the immediate danger of
war in the Middle East has diminished." 41

Prospects for

achieving a negotiated settlement were increased.

"Thanks to

the restraining influence of Secretary Dulles, the trend toward
war was already diminishing even before the conference began,
but the meeting itself served to emphasize the increasing
remoteness of the danger . " 42

The optimism of the American pr ess

was not tempered by recognition that Dulles• refusal to lead
the negotiating mission to Cairo might have been an opportunity
lost.

Eden had requested that Dulles lead the mission as the

only man capable of handling the matter .

Perhaps, as Hoopes

s uggested , Dulles felt that "such a course of action would have
meant placing the United States in the role of appa rent spokesman for colonial-imperial interests, and it also carried with i t
a h igh risk of failure."

Thus , Dulles cabled Eisenhower, "I t hink

h ld b ecome 1 ess conspicuous.
'
,. 43
•-= t i' s pre f erable tha t we sou
Even though the Conference could not reach a final soluti on
41 "The Real Clash on Suez,•• Editorial, NYT, Aug. 21, 1956,
p . 28; "Only a Beginning," Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 22, 1956, P• 2B.
42 "Avoiding Explosions," Editorial, WSJ, Aug . 24, 1956, p. 4.
43Hoopes , The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 355; Love,
suez: The TWice- Fought War, op . cit., pp. 411-412; and Finer,
Dulle s over Suez , op. cit., pp . 173-174.
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to the problem due to Egyptian non-attendence, the Wall street
Journal considered it a success for it presented to President
Nasser "a fairly impressive body of world opinion which he can
ignore only at some risk to his own prestige ... 44
There was also support for Dulles• argument during the
conference that the Suez problem should be removed from the
sphere of such concepts as "nationalism," the "East versus the
West," and the like, and placed in the realm of the practical.
The raising of such questions, the New York Times observed, "has
obscured the real problem, and in some cases, was undoubtedly
designed to do just that.

Colonel Nasser is not the only one who

is trying to make political capital out of this thorny question . .. 45
Early optimistic reports that Nasser was ready for serious
negotiations with the Menzies mission proved false. 46 The
failure of the Cairo talks produced calls f or patience.

"Before

the Western nations rush to adopt policies either of appeasement
or belligerence, they might do well to explore the possibilities
of time and patience .

It could be that those are the pressures

most likely to put Nasser in a negotiating mood ... 47

The failure

of the Menzies • mission was not to be used as a justification
for resort to force .

"(S)o long as negotiations can be main-

tained , in Cairo , the

u.

44

N. or anywhere else, there is some hope

.
"Avoiding Explosions," WSJ, loc. cit .

45 "The Real Clash on Suez ," NYT, loc. cit. See alsor
"Getting Away From the Grandiose," Editorial, WSJ , Aug. 30,

1956, P• 6.
46nana Adams Schmidt, "U.

s . Now Thinks Nasser is Ready for
Negotiations , " NYT, Aug. 28, 1956, pp. 1 and 3.
47 "Time and Patience," Editorial , WSJ, Sept. 11, 1956, p. 10.
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of an eventual solution." 48
Failure of the Cairo discussions led to calls for debating
the issue before the United Nations where "some compromise might
eventually be arrived at which would respect Egyptian sovereignty
and at the same time give reassurance to Western Europe. •• 49
There was general support for Dulles• policy of seeking a
nonviolent solution to the Suez problem, although the American
newspapers favored placing the Suez problem before the United
Nations before Dulles was ready to do so.

Dulles was seen as

the cool headed man who had prevailed over British and French hotheads, winning them over to peaceful means and staving off the
immediate danger of war . In these American newspapers there was a
good deal of optimism, at this point, that force could be avoided.
At this time, there was also speculation in the American
newspapers about Nasser's ambitions.

There were charges and

countercharges that he was another Hitler, and there were debates
over his book, Egypt's Liberations The Philosophy of the Revolution.
some saw it as proof that Nasser had expansionist ambitions for
Egypt.

"President Nasser by his own words is dreaming big dreams

for Egypt . .. 50

He was accused of plotting to found an Arab empire

48 "Force Is No Solution," Editorial, NYT, Sept. 9, 1956,
p. lOE. Earlier, the Post-Dispatch had commented that the broad
sympathy for Egypt ' s position evident at the First London Conference might encourage Nasser to reject the majority statement.
"A rejection itself would not be disastrous if Nasser proved
willing to negotiate from there on." .,Now, Egypt's Turn,"
Editorial, SLPD, Aug . 24, 1956, P• 2C.
49 "suez, End of a Phase," Editorial, CSM, Sept. 11, 1956,
P• 18; "Suez to the U. N.?," Editorial, SLPD, Sept. 11, 1956,
p. 2B; and "To Spite Their Faces, Suez Parties Bite Noses,"
Editorial, CON, Sept. 13, 1956, P• 14.
SONeal Stanford, "Colonel Nasser's Book.. in the column,
.. An Int imate Message from Washington," CSM, Aug. 22, 1956, p. 18.
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from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. Nationalization of
the Suez Canal was seen as merely one step in his quest for
empire.

On the other hand, occasionally less harsh assessments

were made of Nasser and his books
Some have read sinister meanings into the youthful
colonel's short book, "Egypt's Liberation." True, he
speaks there of a "role in search of a hero," but he
describes it (overtly, at least) as not a role for a
personal hero but for the Egyptian people. In his writing
is neither the bombast and cynacism of a Mussolini nor
the arrant racism and frenzy of a Hitler.51
On the whole, however, American newspaper comment on President
Nasser was not sympathetic.
SCUA and the second London Conference
Before the conclusion of the Menzies mission to Cairo, and
in anticipation of its probable failure, Dulles sought an alternative plan.

While vacationing at Duck Island, he conceived

the idea of a users• association.

He persuaded the reluctant

British and French to consent to support the concept.

As agreed

by the Three Powers, Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested the
immediate establishment of the users• association in an address
to Parliament on September 12, 1956.
Hoopes argued that Dulles• conception "possessed a trans.
parently gro t esque, unreal qua 1 ity
... 52 Finer noted that Dulles
refused to face the fact that SCUA was "inefficacious unless he
was ready to enforce the passage of the Association's ships
51 "Nasser: Mussolini or Ataturk?," Editorial, CSM, Sept. 5,
1956, p. 20.

52Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit. , p. 359.
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through the Canal." 53

And Love believed that Dulles designed

the scheme to prevent Britain and France from taking Suez to the

u.

N., and to preclude their using the anticipated pilot shortage

as a pretext to retake the Suez Canal.

Love claimed that "Dulles

devised ••• SCUA ••• as a temporary answer to both problems, a
stalling device if not a solution ... 54

Robert Murphy, likewise,

was of the opinion that Dulles sought to use SCUA to stall, to
buy time to allow European tempers to coo1. 55
The reaction of New York Times reporters was reserved and
skeptical .

Kennett Love, in a front page article on the riotous

emergency session of Parliament, observedt "Pending disclosure
of additional details, creation of conflicting authorities over
canal traffic appeared to raise so many difficulties as to be
unworkable.''

Commenting further on the surprise and doubt

expressed both inside and outside Parliament, Love noted:
"Observers of several interested countries and various political
views at first regarded the project as either completely unrealistic or a plan to provoke Egypt into giving provocation for
military intervention," 56
Homer Bigart, in the same issue of the Times, noted that
diplomatic sources ascribed the plan for SCUA to Dulles, and that
53Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
54Love, Sueza The Twice-Fought War, op . cit., p. 425.
55Murphy , Diplomat, op. cit., P• 386.
56 Kennett Love , First of two articles under same 3 column

headline, "West Plans A Suez Agency to Operate Canal Traffic;
Egypt Charges War Move , " NYT, Sept. 13, 1956, pp. 1 and 8 .
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Dulles was irritated with the way Eden presented it in London.
La ter in the article , Bigart observed that "the plan closely
res e mbles the Western pr oposals turned down by President Gamal
Abdel Nasser of Egypt , who is almost certa in to reject the plan
out of hand • ., 57
By contrast, the Wall Street Journal commented that the
legal position on which the plan for SCUA rested was "unassailable , " and that there was "no moral reason" why a ship shoul d be
den i ed passage regardless of whether its pilot was employed by
Egypt or not.

The Journal was quick to not e, however , its

doubts about Egyptian readiness to c ooperate with SCUA. 58
On September 17, the New York Times remarked that the
momentary danger that the British and French would use force to
keep the Canal open had diminished.

The Times then gave cred i t

to Dulles for making the altered circumstances possible.
Characteristically administering a backhanded compliment, the
Times commented,
Secretary Dulles has indeed revealed a flexibility
not always characteristic of our diplomacy under his
guidance . Not only has he discouraged rash movements in
the Eastern Mediterranean , but he has also been willing t o
modify his plan for a Suez Canal "users• association."
All that he was insisting upon as the week began was tha t
c r aft using the canal must have some choice of pilots,
t hus ruling out the possibility of American vessel s coming
under Russian steermanship; and that Egypt must share
57Homer Bigart , Second of two articles under same 3 column
head line , "West Plans A Suez Agency to Operate Canal Traffic,"
ill,g_., PP • 1 and 10 .
58 "By-Passing Nasser," Editorial, WSJ, Sept. 14, 1956, p. 4.
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complete control of canal traffic, thus ruling out
political use of the geographical accident that the canal
passes through Egyptian ter ritory . 59
But American journalistic misgivings about SCUA increased and
mul t iplied as it became evident that initial

u. s. willingness

to strongly back the Association financially were tempered by
revelations that Export-Import Bank funds would not be readily
available to cover the extra cost of rerouting Middle Eastern
oil tankers around the Cape.

The New York Times observed on

September 19, 19561
••• The idea (SCUA), which seemed clear cut at its inception,
has since been clouded by backing and filling on the part
of the United States and by objections from some of the
smaller and poorer countries.
The proposal only appeared feasible if the United
States were in a position to finance it in a big way.
Secretary Dulles now seems to be saying that we cannot
do so ••••

The impression one gets--and it is an unfortunate one-is that the Western powers are groping blindly in a sort of
hit-or-miss fashion for a solution while Egypt is nothing if
not consistent. The present London conference has no more
important task than to dispel or annul this impression. The
issues involved are clear enough and Colonel Nasser should
not be allowed to succeed in his designs.60
Despite skepticism about the feasibility of the users•
Association, these American newspapers nevertheless saw positive
value in the scheme.

It was argued that the Association could

serve as an agency for exerting economic pressures on Egypt.

In

the event of Egyptian refusal to cooperate with SCUA; ships
could be sent around the Cape, thereby, boycotting the Canal and
59 .. A Suez 'Lift'?," Editorial, NYT, Sept. 17, 1956, p. 26.
The Times clearly was unaware of Eden's sentiments that "the
American conception of the association was now evolving so fast
that it would end as an agency for collecting dues for Nasser."
Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., P• 127.
60 ,,The Suez Drama, 0 Editorial, NYT, Sept. 19, 1956, p. 36.
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damaging the Egyptian economy.

SCUA would at least provide

alternative direction for redeployment of tankers and for supply
of oil to Western Europe.

Reporting on

u. s.

willingness to

provide funds to Europe if the Canal were closed--the

u. s

was

said to be ready to lend $500 million to defray costs of sending
ships around Africa 61 --these American newspapers observed that
boycotting the Canal, though expensive, was better than war and
better than tolerating Nasser's "highhandedness. 062

Envisioning

a "Water lift" comparable to the Berlin air lift, financed by
the

u. s.

half-billion dollars, the Wall Street Journal

commented, .. if it succeeds, it will be far less costly than
shooting guns." 63

The Christian Science Monitor saw SCUA as

a "declaration of economic war" which set the stage for months,
or even a few years, of economic attrition against Egypt. 64
In the opinion of the American newspapers, every peaceful
610 what•s News--world Wide," WSJ, Sept. 17, 1956, p. 1.
62 "The Economics of Suez," Editorial, NYT, Sept. 16, 1956,
p. 12E; "The Suez Crisis, Canal Users• Disagreement Threatens
Western Unity," CDN, Sept. 9, 1956, P• 18; and "Cash Instead
of War In Suez, .. Editorial, CST, Sept. 18, 1956, p. 25.
63 "0il for the Troubled Waters, 0 Editorial, WSJ, Sept. 18,
1956, p. 10. The Post-Dispatch lamented that SCUA seemed "a

provocative measure, badly timed and ill considered. For what
the plan appears to do is to impose on Egypt a species of international control which the West has been unable to obtain by
negotiation." It appeared to the Post-Dispatch to be an effort
by tenants to impose the terms of rent on the landlord. "No
Place for Peace," Editorial, SLPD, Sept. 14, 1956, p. 2C. see
also, .,Alternative to Force,•• Editorial, SLPD, Sept. 19, 1956,
p. 2E.
64 .. The Suez •users• Association," Editorial, CSM, Sept. 14,

1956, P• 18,
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means had to be used to find a solution, but the Canal should
not remain exclusively in Egyptian hands.

For Nasser's "seizure

of the canal was carefully planned and the American refusal to
finance the Aswan Dam simply provided him with an excuse to act."
After all, his dreams of empi re and his penchant for creating
mischief for the West were well known.
Hitler, appeasement is no answer.

"With Nasser, as with

On the other hand an armed

conflict must be avoided if humanly possible."

It was therefore

regarded as extremely important that the West demonstrate its
willingness ••to try every peaceful recourse. 065
The outcome of the conference was greeted optimistically.
The New York Times was gratified that a majority of the eighteen
nations were expected to accept Dulles• plan for a users•
association.

"This means that the effort to retain and guarantee

the internationalization of the Suez Canal is not to collapse,
as it seemed in danger of doing in recent days."
be thanked for this result.

Dulles was to

"The Secretary of State has had to

face much harsh criticism in the last year or two, but both at
the London donference in August and this week Mr. Dulles has been
at his best.

It is not only that he proved to be an eloquent and

skillful pleader for a difficult course.

What is truly heartening

is that he has had a strong policy and has followed it through
consistently and courageously ... 55 American newspaper accounts did
55 .. The Suez Drama, .. Editorial, NYT, Sept. 19, 1956, p. 36;
•Just, Yet Peaceful,' Suez Solution," Editorial, LAT, Sept. 15,
1956, part III, p. 4; and "We May Not Have to Pay For This,"
Editorial, LAT, Sept. 18, 1956, part III, p. 4.
0

66 .. Progress In London,*' Editorial, NYT, Sept. 21, 1956,
p. 24. see alsos Henry s. Hayward, "Suez Enters New Phase,''
CSM, Sept. 22, 1956, P• 1.
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not reflect the diplomats• skepticism and pessimism about SCUA.
Aldrich reported that the Ambassadors in London of the countries
participating in SCUA were instructed to complete the organization, but he doubted ,.if any one of them believed that it
. h any th'ing." 67
cou ld accomplis
Before the United Nations Security Council
American newspaper reception of the news that Britain and
France intended to take the Suez matter before the United Nations
Security Council was mixed.

The Christian Science Monitor

observed that the controversy was being taken to the forum where
it belonged.

While recognizing that this did not guarantee a

settlement, the Monitor felt that this course created "maximum
opportunity for a right adjustment of the problem without
resort to war. 068
William Henry Chamberlin, Wall Street Journal columnist,
regarded the step as a "futile gesture," and "a dubious idea."
He argued that since the big disputes of the post-war era had
been solved by nation-states there was little likelihood that
reference of the Suez problem to the

u.

N. would lead to any

positive or constructive solution of the Suez dispute,

In all

likelihood, final settlement of the Suez controversy ,.,will be
determined by which side. ; .-holds the stronger cards, political
and economic, and plays them more skillfully," not by the

u.

N. 69

67Aldrich, "The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History,•• loc. cit.
68 usuez to the u. N.," Editorial, CSM, Sept. 23, 1956, P• 16;
and "AS the u. N. Gets Suez," Editorial, SLPD, Sept. 28, 1956,
P• 2B.
69william Henry Chamberlin, "Futile Gesture," WSJ, Sept. 21,
1956, P• 8.
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Taking a position midway between that of the Monitor and
Chamberlin, the New York Times expressed the opinion that there
was no reason to be particularly optimistic about United Nations
discussion of the problem.

After all,there was the question of

the Soviet veto in the Security Council of any constructive
proposal.

"It is in the Communist interest to foment and to

prolong instability in the Near and Middle East, and any solution designed to restore a rule of order and to promote peace
would naturally be opposed."

Nevertheless, ' the West did right

to take the case before the international body.

United Nations

discussions might "shed light on the broad issues involved and
can make it even more clear that there is such a thing as international morality and that it should prevail." 70
The beginning of talks in the Security Council were seen
by the Times as offering "an opportunity ••• to reach a just
solution." 71

Attempts to seek a settlement of the crisis by

negotiation were regarded by the Monitor as the United Nations
biggest test since Korea. 72
The New York Times continued to consider Egyptian policy as
central to a solution.

"The hope of achieving anything solid

will lie with a change of heart on the part of President Nasser.
If he is ready and willing to negotiate, something can be
70 .. suez and the
P• 26.
710 suez and the
P• 32.

.,

u.

N

u.

N

., Editorial, NY'l', Sept. 24, 1956,

. , ,.

Editorial, NYT, Sept. 26, 1956,

7211 'rl'l.e Council Tackles Suez," Editorial, CSM, Oct. 8,
1956, p. 16.
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accomplished and violence will be avoided." 73
not the whole reality of the situation .

This was, in fact,

Britain and France had

gone to the United Nations to eliminate the last diplomatic
hurdle in the path of military action against Egypt.

There is

no indication that Eden and Mollet had the slightest interest in
serious negotiations resulting from

u.

N. discussions.

They

were interested in unseating Nasser, and in retaking the Suez
Canai. 74

Thus, the policy of America's Anglo-French allies was

also central to a settlement, not merely Egyptian policy, as the
Times suggested.

When the Security Council unanimously passed

the Six Principles clearing the way for c ontinued discussion, the
prospect of more months of protracted, sterile negotiations was
more than Eden and Mollet could bear.
had come to act . 75

They decided the time

All of this, of course, was unknown to the Times, which
continued to advocate that the United States support Britain
and France on the basic issue of the internationalization of
the Cana1. 76

This question of Anglo-French-American unity

730 Hope for Suez,•• Editorial, NYT, Sept. 28 , 1956, p . 26;
and "Mr. Dulles Speaks," Editorial , NYT, Oct. 10, 1956, p. 38 .

The Post-Dispatch argued that compromise would have to be on the
basis of not only the London plan but also Egypt's proposal for
an international advisory committee and reaffirmation of the
Constantinople Convention of 1888. A settlement depended upon
the West as well as upon Egypt. "No Gain in a Deadlock,"
Editorial, SLPD, Oct . 6 , 1956 , p. 4A.
7~utting, No End of a Lesson, op. cit. , pp . 72- 79; Love,
suezr The TWice-Fought War, op , cit., pp. 446-447; and Thomas,
suez Affair, op. cit. , pp . 101-102.
75Be11, Long War , op. cit., P• 296.
76 .,suez and the

u. N. ," NYT, Sept. 24, 1956, loc. cit .
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became a controversial issue with these American papers after
Dulles' October 2nd news conference blunder.
141.)

(see aboves pp. 135-

Reacting negatively to Dulles' faux pas, the Times

commented that Dulles had succeeded, "most unwittingly," in
confusing the Suez canal issue.

The Times found it surprising

that a statesman of Dulles• experience could say anything that
he did not mean in a major press conference.

"Unfortunately

corrections never have the weight of an original statement.

0

Dulles, the Times argued, had puzzled and dismayed America's
allies by seeming to link Suez with colonialism . . .He could not
have meant to do so, because his policies on the canal prove
that he never thought of it in terms of colonialism.
it was a piece of clumsiness.••

Evidently

The Times hoped that President

Eisenhower, in his press conference, would straighten out the
confusion caused by Dulles• error.

The Suez Canal problem was

"confused enough at best without having the confusion worse
confounded by thoughtless remarks from the American Sedretary
of State.

. nee d e d now is
. some clarity."
.
77
What is

Regarding the start of Security Council debate, which Dulles
had indicated would be "most momentous," the Times quipped that
this would be so "if the user powers stand united and firm on the
77 .,confusion Over Suez," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 4, 1956,
p. 32. Finer has questioned Dulles claim that his statement
was made in error . Finer theorized that Dulles deliberately
made his remarks to cover the imminent collapse of his Suez
policies, and in order to predetermine the conduct of the u. N.
discussions, scheduled to begin three days later in New York.
Noting the careful preparations Dulles put into this press
conference, and the possibility that Mccardle had planted
questions, Finer, like the New York Times, wondered that a
seasoned statesman like Dulles could say something he did not
mean to say in a scheduled press conference. Finer, Dulles Over
~ , o p . c i t . , pp. 288-295.
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concept of international control of the Suez canal." 78
The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, argued that
t oo much was being made of Dulles• blunder and the disunity
between the allies which it implied .

The Journal recognized

t h at differences of opinion need not totally disarrange the
We stern alliance.

"The future unity of the West is not damaged

by the fact that Britain and France disagree with the
over Suez.

u. s.

It might be injured if , in the name of present unity ,

the differences were bludgeoned into silence. 1179

A week later,

the Journal reacted calmly to reports of British displeasure
wi th Dulles • remarks, and their expressed fears that he had
sold Britain down the river.

The Journal did not see British

criticism as a breach in the Western alliance.

It claimed that

the difference in American and British opinions about how to
handle Suez--the British believing in the nec essity to teach
Nasser a lesson, even if that meant war, and the American
re f usal to become embroiled in a Middle Eastern war--caused
and explained British criticism of Dulles.

"We suppose our

allies would be happier if events did not cause occasional tiffs
such as the British accusation that Mr. Dulles is not looking
to t heir interests .
we think.

But there is one satisfaction in all this,

The criticism makes it very obvious whose interests

Mr. Dulles is l ooking to . 1180
79 ,.A Matter of Differences , " Editorial , WSJ, Oct . 4, 1956,
p. s. The Jour nal obviously was totally ignorant of the true
impact o f Dulles • blunder on Eden who concluded that Dulles •
remar k , "however unintentionally , was likely to make Nasser
beli eve that if he held fast , the United Stat es would fall apart
from France and Britain over the seizure of the canal." Eden,
s ue z Crisis , op. cit ., p. 135 .
SO,,Mr . Dulles and the British," Editorial, WSJ, Oct. 11,
1956, P • 14 .
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The question of differences between the allies served as
a vehicle for the Christian Science Monitor to reintroduce its
concern over Soviet entry into the Middle East.

on October 1,

1956, the Monitor had argued that the soviet foothold in the
Mediterranean gave rise to the need for American statecraft to
undertake earnestly to explore the question, "How is the position
of the West with reference to the Middle East to be improved? 081
Later , on October 18, the Monitor saw the differences between
the united States and her allies, Britain and France, stemming
from their readiness to accept, or not accept, the use of force to
solve the Suez problem, and from their respective interpretations
of the relationship between Nasser and the Soviet Union.

The u.

argued that the West must deal with Nasser; the British and the
French, that Nasser was but a tool of Soviet aims in the Middle
Eas t.

This British interpretation, in the view of the Monitor,

led Eden to warn Khrushchev of British determination to defend
their Middle East "life lines" with force, if need be.

"Mr.

Dulles • rejection of the possible use of force in the Suez has
tended to nullify this British warning to Moscow.

America's

chief allies meanwhile have been trying to preserve the effectiveness of that warning.

They may have done this with too

little regard for the effect of their policy statements on
colonial and neutral peoples.

But they are keeping an eye on

a ma i n source of the threat to Middle Eastern stability ... 82
81 "Russia in the Mideast, .. Editorial, CSM, Oct. 1, 1956,
p. 18 .

82 uA Reason for ' Force• in Suez," Editorial, CSM, Oct. 18,
195 6 , P• 24.

s.
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Lindesay Parrott, in a front page article in the Sunday
New York Times, October 7, 1956 , reported that the

u.

N. was

looking for a basis for negotiations between Egypt and the
We st on the Suez Canal.

Parrott also noteds

Hope that quiet talks might be successful is one of
the reasons that the United States agreed quickly to a
series of closed-door meetings among the members of the
Security Council. One basis for this standpoint is a
feeling that if the United Nations proves unable to settle
the question, it must revise its opinion of itself as a
power of arbitration.83
Parrott •s explanation closely paralleled Dulles• interpretation
of

u. s.

expectations at his October 5, 1956, background news

briefing .

(see aboves pp. 150-153.)

Parrott•s report omitted

mention of the fact that the Administration feared the Britis h
and French were setting the stage for eventual military intervention at Suez, and that Dulles had actively lobbied for private
negotiations . 84

Rather , his story tended to reflect what the

Admi n istration wanted the American public to know.

u. s.

support for private meetings at the United Nations

led the Times to comments "There is nothing wrong in these behind
the scenes contacts •••• confidentia1 · negotiations and private
explorations are indispensible.

Indeed, they are a basic advan-

tage of the United Nations system ...

But the Times feared that

ser ious public debate would be "sacrificed or diminished" if
pr ivate discussions were to serve merely as rehearsal for the
public discussions .

"That sort of practice cannot educate the

83Lindesay Parrott, "U. s. Seeks Basis to Discuss Suez
With Egypt," NYT, Oct. 7, 1956 , P• 1.
84childers, Road to Suez , op. cit., p. 223; and Robertson,
crisis, op. cit., p. 128 .
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world audience in the realities of international life.

It could

destroy the sense of wide participation which is absolutely
necessary to the

u.

N.'s success ... 85

Two days later, the Times, s e emingly contradicting its
earlie r observations on the value of open

u.

N. discussions,

greeted the decision to terminate "the so-called 'discussion'"
and the beginning of some sort of negotiation.

"This need not

be c arried on in formal and secret meetings of the Security

Council.

The United States Government is presumably willing t o

listen informally to any honest proposals from the Egyptian
Government and, if they are practicable, to support them with
Britain and France ...

Since nothin~ much was to be gained fr om

further oratory, the Times argued it was time for those i n te rested in a peaceful settlement .. to sit down and reason togethe r . " 86
The Christian Science Monitor commented that "only in private c an
statesmen have the latitude to work out accommodations." 87
Private discussions between the British, French and Egyptians, chaired by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, res ulted
in the Security Council's adoption of the six Principles, and
in agreement for continuation of private discussions at Geneva
in late October, 1956.

The American press welcomed the passage

of the Six Principles.

The New York Times said they reflected

85 ,,u. N.: Forum and Mediator," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 7,
1956, P• lOE.
86 .. A Troubling of the Waters,,. Editorial, NYT, Oct. 9,
1956, p. 34.
87"The Council Tackles Suez," Editorial, CSM, Oct. 8,
1956, p. 16.
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"a long step forward since the troublesome days of ••• July and
August. 088

The Christian Science Monitor noted that they "map

an area of agreement from which or within which negotiation
can proceed. 089

And the Wall Street Journal felt that at least

the three foreign ministers had accomplished "that much" in
bringing the six Principles into being.

This might result

eventually in an agreement which, when it would come, would
not be because of any particular speech in the United Nations
but because the agreement would be "~o the interests of all the
disputants.

And a Russian veto will not stop it." 90

To these papers, the six Principles, despite the Soviet
veto of the proposal for their implementation, signaled a new
phase in the Suez Canal dispute.

"The danger of drastic measures

in the Suez Canal situation has diminished. 0

The stage was seen

as set inevitably for further negotiations.

The third principle--

that the Canal should be ••insulated from the politics of any
country--was seen as the principle "with the teeth in it ... 91
It was felt that it might actually represent "a considerable
'
concession
on t h e part ofth e Egyp t'1.ans." 92

Despite the prin-

ciples• acknowledged vagueness and generality, these American
newspapers expressed optimism that a peaceful settlement could
88 nsuezs A New Phase,•• Editorial, NYT, Oct. 14, 1956, P• lOE.
89 .,six Principles and a Veto, .. Editorial, CSM, Oct. 16,
1956, p. 18.

9 o.,Suez and the Veto," Editorial, WSJ, Oct. 16, 1956, p. 14;
and "Progress at Suez," Editorial, CDN, Oct. 16, 1956, p. 14.

91 nsuezt A New Phase," NYT, l.oc . cit.
9211 suez and the veto , " WSJ, loc. cit .

257

•
be achieved , that the principles could be implemented,

"(T)he

implementation of the principles should be no impossible task
fo r world diplomacy, even recogni zing all the irritating factors
which enter the Suez problem , " 93

For this, credit should be

give n to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and to Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles. 94
While it was recognized that force was not yet entirely
ruled out , it was noted that the tension had diminished and it
appeared that the gradual approach toward a negoti ated settlemen t continued .

It was assumed that a peaceful solution would

take a long time and much patience, "so the sooner negotiations
ge t going the better • • •• If the three powers (Britain, France,
and the United States) stand fast they should get a settlement
95
in the long run . "
Reports from overseas r eporters concentrated on the
domes tic problems of the British and French Governments in
gai n i ng support for their policies, of Labor opposition to the
Conservative stance, and their dissatisfaction with the torpid
pace of negotiations, and on growing Franco-British dissatisfac t ion with Secretary of State Dulles, 96
93 "Six
· Pr1.ncip
• . l es and a Ve t o , " CSM, 1 oc. c1..
't
94 .. suez,

A

New Phase , " NYT, loc. cit.

9511 suez Negotiations, .. Editorial , NYT, Oct. 18, 1956, p. 32.
Heikal (Cairo Documents, op. cit., p. 105) reported tha t, with
pa ssage of the Six Princi ples , "President Nasser estimated that
the danger of invasion had dropped to 10 per cent . He virtually
rul ed it out . "
96 Drew Middleton , .. British to Debate Suez Issue Anew , " NYT,
Oct. 23, 1956 , P• 8; and "What ' s News--World Wide , " WSJ, Oct. 18,
19 56, p. 1 .
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Eden's mid-October visit to Paris was described as an
attempt to work out a common French-British policy towards
Egypt and the Middle East.

It was reported that the British and

French talked about keeping Suez from becoming mired in one
conference after another.

They discussed further negotiations

with Egypt, which they concluded were pointless unless Egypt
made meaningful suggestions for implementing the Six Principles.
They also considered ways of converting SCUA into an efficient
weapon, and they attempted to work out a coordinated policy on
the Iraq-Jordan-Israel problem.

It is likely that at this meeting

Eden gave final agreement to the invasion of Egypt and the secret
alliance with Israei. 97

Yet, no mention of this was made in the

article, or even hinted,

On the contrary, the French were cited

as feeling that "the tension in the Middle East had eased, 098
Apparently, these American newspapers were unaware of
Administration doubts and fears of war in the Middle East, and
of the split in the Western alliance.

So convinced do these

papers seem to have been that the Suez controversy was on the
road to a negotiated settlement that it largely dropped from
discussion the last week or so before the Israeli invasion of
Sinai.

Attention was concentrated on the troubles in Eastern

Europe.
Nor did American papers surmise the depth of the gap between
American Suez policy and Anglo-French Suez policy of which BritishFrench attacks on Dulles were symptomatic,

It is therefore little

wonder that the outbreak of war in Egypt surprised them so.
97Bar Zahar, suezs Ultra-Secret, op. cit., pp. 149-158.
98Joan Thiriet, "Joint Plan on Egypt Spurred," CSM, Oct. 17,
1956, p. 4.
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Invasion, The General Assembly, And UNEF
When Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956, it was not
yet apparent to American newspapers whether this was merely
another retaliatory raid, or the beginning of another Middle
East wa.

The Wall Street Journal wrote, "It is still not very

clear whether the invasion will resolve into a war or a relatively
.
minor
clas h •" 99 Perceptively, the New York Times observeds "The
purpose of this action and the precise intentions of the Israeli
Government must still be revealed.

But on the face of it this

appears to be more than a retaliatory raid of the kind that has
been always followed by withdrawal."lOO
Israel's action ("invasion••) was seen as a threat of new
war stalking through the Middle East, a war "the end of which
no man could forsee."

The Israeli invasion of Egypt was

generally unexpected by these American newspapers.

Nor were

they aware of the rupture in the Western Big Three alliance
which the earlier Anglo-French decision to go before the United
Nations represented to Washington.

Apparently only after the

Anglo-French entry into the war did these American newspapers
become fully aware of the breakdown in communications between
London and Paris, and Washington.

For on October 30, 1956, the

New York Times still saw the Middle Eastern situation as "of
immediate concern to the United States as well as to Britain
and France because they are pledged to maintain the peace in the
99 "Israel, .. Editorial, WSJ, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 12.
lOO"Israel and Egypt," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 30, 1956, p. 36.
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Middle East • .,lOl

It is clear that they did not anticipate the

Ang l o-French ultimatum and the ir r e nunciation of the Tripartite
declaration of 1950 .
While it cannot be said that these American newspapers
approved• of Israel ' s action, it must be recognized that they
were sympathetic to Israel .

Recalling the rivalry between Egypt

and Israel , Egyptian threats to Israel ' s existence, the Czech
arms deal , and the increase in border incidents, while not
regarding them as sufficient justification for war, these
American newspapers noted their provocative character .

The

Wal l Street Journal remarked, "A charitable explanation is that
insecurity has made the Israeli react out of proportion to the
.

provocation. ••

102

The British-French intention to occupy the Suez Canal Zone
and their veto of the American United Nations resolution on
October 30 , 1956, were broadcast with one inch banner headlines
across the entire front page of the October 31 issue of the
New York Times , along with news of the Egyptian rejection of
the Anglo-French ultimatums
BRITAIN AND FRANCE MOVE TO OCCUPY SUEZ;
REBUFF EISENHOWER, VETO HIS PLAN IN U. N.;
EGYPT REJECTS LONDON-PARIS ULTIMATUM
The British-French invasion of Egypt was referred to by
American newspapers as .,intervention . "

Their action was not

lOlibid. , and "Israel , " WSJ, loc . cit.; and "New Grave
c r isis: Israel ' s Acti on Risks A Middle Eastern War, .. Editorial,
CDN , Oct . 30 , 1956 , P • 16 .
102 Ibid ., "Israel . "

NYT, Oct:---n, 1956 , P• 32 .

See alsoa "Crisis in the Middle East,"

261

regarded as based on any legal grounds.

Therefore, it was felt,

they would seek to justify their actions by arguing that they
were taken in order to stabilize the Middle East.

The British-

French ultimatum and their military action caused fears that
" the crisis within the Western alliance overshadowed even the
grave events in the Middle East." 103

The rift in the Western

a lliance was clearly out in the open.
Closely related to American newspaper reaction to the
Anglo-French-Israeli invasion was its assessment of a proper
United Nations response.

The American papers expressed shock

at the Israeli "invasion" of Egypt, and the British-French "intervention," which came "at a moment when most of the world thought
itself at peace and rejoiced in the victories of freedom in
Eastern Europe."

The Times considered it little wonder that the

Ge neral Assembly reacted so harshly to their actions. 104
There was some support for the

u. s.

Security Council

r esolution and opposition to the Anglo-French veto.

"(I)t

seems to us that the United States resolution in the security
Council asking for withdrawal of Israeli forces was in order.
For the same reason we cannot see how British and French
annoyance with Egypt could justify their vetoes." 105

However,

103 "Resort to Power," Editorial, CSM, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 18;
and James Reston, "President in Plea," NYT, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 15.

104 "The Assembly Steps In," Editorial, NYT, Nov. 2, 1956,
P• 26.

lOS"Resort to Power,° CSM, loc. cit.; "What Was Israel's
Roles France and Britain Risk Everything on Suez Move," Editorial,
CDN, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 18; and ,.The Risk of War," Editorial, CST,
Nov. 1, 1956, p. 47.
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there was not universal support for the

c.

u. s.

resolution.

Joseph

Harsch wrote in his front page Christian Science Monitor

column on November 2, 1956, thats
The only objective of the resolution was to obtain an
immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt. There
was no provision in it for a settlement which would have
protected Egypt and Israel equally
Under these circumstances the resolution was bound to be opposed by Britain
and France, and be supported by the Soviet Union.
The United States resolution quite as much as the
ultimatum shook the old alliance because had there been no
resolution and had the United States supported the ultimatum, then, in all reasonable probability, Western forces
would have established a buffer zone between Egypt and
Israel which would have protected both and guaranteed the
international character of the canal without bloodshed.
Harsch continued his argument by observing that it was easy to
say that the resort to force violated United Nations principles
and represented aggression, but what if Egypt's Nasser were in
fact the "shrewd empire builder" that the British and French
believed him to be, "then their actions, however difficult to
defend in the context, could be interpreted to constitute not
aggression but foresight and resolution in stopping a real
aggression in time."

In support of his argument, Harsch

concluded with the observation that ''President Eisenhower was
careful to avoid the charge of aggression against his country's
two oldest and ·closest allies.

He expressed an opinion that

they were 'in error,' but he twinned that with the statement
that they were acting within their •manifest right.,., 106
One is struck by the amount of newspaper support for the
Anglo-French position, and the willingness to accept their
106Joseph c. Harsch, "The 'Other Side' of the Suez Case," in
the columns "State of the Nations," CSM, Nov. 2, 1956, p. 1.

,.
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reasoning, often at face value.

In addition to Harsch•s column,

one can cite the New York Times editorial, "Crisis in the Middle
East," of Wednesday, October 31, 1956.

According to that

editorial:
Fortunately, for the present at least, all the powers
are moving in the direction of stopping the conflict before
it broadens into something even more serious, though not
all are moving along the same route. Thus, following
hurried consultations between Prime Minister Eden and
Premier Mollet, Britain and France issued a twelve-hour
ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to halt all warlike
action by land, sea and air and to withdraw their forces
at least ten miles from the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they
asked Egypt to agree to joint British and French occupation
of key positions along the canal on a purely temporary
basis in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee
free passage through the canal •••• 107
British-French motives were not questioned.
not probed.

Their argument was

The fact Egyptian forces would have had to withdraw

across Sinai and to leave the East bank of the Canal to take up
position on the west bank in order to comply with the ultimatum
was not mentioned.
James Reston correctly reported that no attempt was made in
official quarters to conceal American vexation at "the sudden-and what is felt here to be provocative--action of the British
and French Governments."

American disappointment and concern

became "acute" when Britain and France vetoed the
tion in the United Nations.

u. s.

resolu-

American displeasure was so great,

Reston noted, that American officials "lent some credence to
1070 crisis in the Middle East," NYT, loc. cit. The Times
clearly did not know the reality of the situation. The AngloFrench ultimatum had actually been predrafted at Sevres, France,
in October when the representatives of Britain, France, and
Israel signed the "Treaty of sevres," which set the terms of
Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. Hoopes , The Devil and J. F. D.,
op. cit., p. 371.
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,•

reports that the Israeli Government not only had informed the
French and British in advance of the plan to invade Egypt, but
that the Israeli officials were encouraged to believe that they
would have the support of France, and perhaps even of Britain,
if they did move."

Reston quoted

u. s.

official.a as giving two

pieces of evidence to support this positions 1. the coolness of
British and French military liaison officers in Jerusalem to
American officials, starting Saturday, October 27; and 2. Israel's
original communique which candidly stated that their objective
was the Suez Canal.
high

u. s.

Reston also indicated that at least one

official, the previous Saturday, intimated that he

knew an Israeli attack was coming and that the French would
welcome it.

Therefore, Reston concluded, the Anglo-French

ultimatum did not come as a complete surprise to United States
officials. 108

u. s.

displeasure with Israel was reported by Dana Adams

Schmidt, who wrote that Israeli explanations did not dispel the
feeling among American officials "that the Israelis not only
had flouted the earne st entreaties of President Ei enhower but
had rewarded United States generosity and understanding by
embarking on an irresponsible adventure ...

They recalled that

it was the United States that persuaded France and Canada to
supply Israel with the arms "she was now using against Egypt. 11109

108Reston, "President in PJ.ea," NYT, loc. cit. Reston•s
estimate that the Anglo-French ultimatum did not come as a
complete surprise to u. s. officials was correct. Aldrich
indicated years later that the American Ambassador to France
sent Dulles advance information on the ultimatum. (see above:
pp. 98-100.}
109oana Adams Schmidt, "U. s.-Israel Ties Badly Strained,"
NYT, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 5,
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President Eisenhower's radio and television address to the
nation on October 31, 1956, and his decision to avoid

u. s.

involvement in the war and to rely on the United Nations to
secure the peace, drew front page headlines which accompanied
war news headlines.

In banner headlines across the entire front

page, the New York Times proclaimed on November 1, 1956:
EISENHOWER PLEDGES NO U. s. INVOLVEMENT;
BR!T!SH BOMBERS RAID AIRFIELDS IN EGYPT;
U. N. ASSEMBLY CALLED INTO SPECIAL SESSION

And the Christian Science Monitor, in front page headlines spread
across six of eight colwnns, announceds
WORLD UNREST STIRRED BY ATTACK ON EGYPT;
PRESIDENT PINS U. S, HOPE FOR PEACE TO U. N.
Generally, there was support for Eisenhower's decision to
stay out of the Middle East war, to seek to confine it and to
end it, and to rely on the United Nations to reinstate the peace.
Editorial comment on the speech varied, but it was usually
favorable.

The Wall Street Journal, on November 1, commented

that it was the duty of all governments to look after the interests
of their people, even though they "may sometimes decide wrongly"
about what their interests are.

In the case of the United States,

"{o)ur purpose in the Middle East from the first has been to
keep the peace by peaceable means.

That should remain our purpose.

But our own national interests dictate that our participation in
the Middle Eastern affairs should be confined to that role only.
"That role will be difficult enough at best,,.,.,llO
1100 our Role in the Middle East, .. Editorial, WSJ, Nov. 1,
1956, p. 8; and "Middle East Crisiss British and French Make
Blunder in starting War," Editorial, CDN, Nov. 1, 1956.
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That the

u. s.

role in the Middle East was, from the first, to

keep the peace by peaceful means i s, as we have seen , subject
to considerable debate.

During their first meeting to discuss

the Suez dispute , Eden got the impression that Dulles was not
totally opposed to the ultimate use of f o rce, should all peaceful
avenues fail .

Hoopes observed that Dulles "insisted on sustaining

a t ortured ambiguity .

He thought the seizure was legal, but he

frowned upon it as bad international practice and so would not
give it full countenance .

A vague insistence that •justice •

must be done tended to mislead pent-up Tories into thinking that
a d i fference over the means required to dispose of the problem
.
.
was a relatively
minor
matter . .. 111 A simil ar ambiguity
characterized Dulles• early public statements on the dispute.
(see above: PP • 69-74.)
The next day , the Journal expressed gra titude for President
Eisenhower ' s decision to keep the

u. s.

out of war.

It hoped

t h at the nation would not overlook the fact that Eisenhower
res ted his decision on "two principles which are most revolution a ry for our times" s 1. •• that the United States will not
enter wars just to try to patch up the world"; and 2. "that
henceforth the United States will choose its course by its own
l ights even if it means Wal.king alone . "

The Journal regarded

this as a positive return to the pre-World War I policy of
avoiding entangling alliances. 112

The Journal failed to note

lll Hoopes, Te
h Devil
' and J . F. D. , op . ci' t . , p. 349 •

112 .. The President ' s Speech , " Editorial, WSJ, Nov. 2 , 1956 ,
P• 6.
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that it is impossible to return to the ways of a different era.
Prior to World War I, the United States could rest secure under
the umbrella of British naval supremacy.
existed.

In 1956, no such shield

The United States itself had to shoulder world-wide

responsibility.

It could not, however, bear the burden alone.

It required the support of, and mutual cooperation with, allied
nations around the globe.

During the Suez crisis, Anglo-French-

American mutual cooperation was tragically lacking.

As a result,

the Suez imbroglio culminated in a tragic debacle for the nations
of the West.
The New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor also
endorsed Eisenhower's decision to keep the

u. s.

out of the war.

The Times welcomed the new American policy of non-involvement in
the hostilities, and it supported Eisenhower's assertion of the
American right to dissent "because we regard the use of force
as contrary to the principles of the United Nations and as
neither a wise nor proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes." 113

The Monitor found "particularly appealing"

Eisenhower's declaration that that "instrument of injustice--war"
is no solution for the injustices of peace, and that "there can
be no peace without law. 0114

1130 war in the Middle East," Editorial, NYT, Nov. 1, 1956,
p. 38; and "The President Reports, .. Editorial, SLPD, Nov. 1, 1956,
P• 2B.
1140 Political Effects of Crisis, .. Editorial, CSM, Nov. 1,
1956, p. 22; and "A Calm Voice Ami the Clamor, .. Editorial, LAT,
Nov. 1, 1956, part III, p. 4. The Los Angeles Times noted that
Eisenhower had observed that all nations involved had suffered
injustices, but that uanother instrument of injustice--war--•• was
not the remedy. The L.A. Times made no mention of Eisenhower's
argument that "there can be no peace without law." Sees Emmet
John Hughes, The Ordeal Of Power (New York: Atheneum, 1963),
P• 219. Hughes, Eisenhower's campaign speech writer, indicated
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Despite

u. s.

differences with Britain, France and Israel

over Suez, these American newspaper s agreed with Eisenhower on
the need to maintain friendly relations with these nations and
t o repair the rift in the Western alliance.

0

To maintain these

friendships and alliances is and remains the supreme goal of
our foreign policy. 0115
The .,one major point of agreement" between

u. s.

Secretary

of State Dulles and British delegate Sir Pearson Dixon as they
addressed the United Nations General Assembly on November 1,
that there should be a permanent Israeli-Arab peace treaty to
replace the Armistice Agreements, was taken by Mary Hornaday,
Christian Science Monitor, to indicate that "the present
diplomatic rift • •• may be ended in a joint effort for an over-all
peace settlement in the Middle East ... 116

So anxious were some

f o r a return to the accustomed Western unity that they apparently
t hat on Wednesday, October 31, 1956, he spent one hour with the
President to review a draft of a "possible" speech to be delivered
November 1 in Philadelphia. Hughes wrotes "He (Eisenhower)
generally approves--especially line of argument appealing to 'law
i n world community as condemning aggression •no matter who the
attacker, no matter who the victim.• ('We cannot subscribe to
one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for
those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can
be only one law--or there shall be no peace.•) With not much
e n thusiasm, for I know it oversimplifies far too much, I had
written out this approach to the crisis last night, for the sad
reason that no other reasonable a~proach occurred to me, to
validate u. s. position without vilifying our allies •••• " Only
the Christian science Monitor commented favorably editorially on
this concept. Apparently the other papers studied were not
c onvinced that this was a "reasonable approach ••• to validate u. s.
position"; this may be indicated by their lack of comment on the
concept as used in the President's October 31 nationwide radio
and television address.
115 "war in the Middle East," NYT, loc. cit.
116Mary Hornaday, 0 Over-All Mideast Pact Sought in
CSM, Nov. 2, 1956, p . 1.
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were grasping at straws for signs of its restoration.
Little wonder then that indications that the split between
the United States and Great Britain was narrowing were both
anxiously anticipated and eagerly welcomed.

Henry

s.

Hayward,

reporting for the Christian Science Monitor, cited British and

u. s.

support for a United Nations Emergency Force and the

serious British reception of the

u.

N. majority vote in favor

of a cease-fire as indications that "(t)he sharp rift between
Britain and the United States shows signs of narrowing for the
first time since the Anglo-French involvement in the Israeli.
.
117
Egyptian conflict."
The New York Times credited Bulganin's note to Britain
and France with reuniting the Western allies and concluded:
••It is now time to get down to fundamentals.

We and the British

and the French are the bulwarks of the free world.
stand without each other.

We cannot

We cannot afford to quarrel or to do

things that arouse the criticism or mistrust of each other.
must work together in and out of the United Nations.

We

The

irmnediate past cannot be written off •••• However, as a source of
division, this past can and must be written off. 0118
Initial newspaper reaction to the United Nations Emergency
Force was mixed.

It tended to parallel the general attitudes of

the separate newspapers to the United Nations.

Throughout this

period of the Suez crisis, the Christian Science Monitor leaned
117Henry s. Hayward, "British-u.
CSM, Nov. 6, 1956, p. 6.

s. Rift Seen Narrower,••

118 "The Reunited Front," Editorial, NYT, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 18.
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strongly in favor of the United Nations.
was less favorable, but not opposed.

The New York Times

And the Wall Street Journal

was quite opposed to the United Nations, questioning greatly its
ability to accomplish anything.
. .
t rad itional
power po lit'ics. 119

It placed greater trust in

The Christian Science Monitor expressed the hope that the
United Nations Emergency Force would make the United Nations
"a plainly impartial and sufficiently strong force" to be "an
.
.
"120 The Times argued that the establisheffective
policeman.
ment of such a force "would be only a temporary remedy and a
preliminary to more enduring measures."

It advocated that the

United Nations find solutions which would not only allow the
Governments concerned to save face, but would also create
conditions that would preclude a future repetition of the
disastrous events.

The Times concluded that such solutions could

be found only "in a permanent and guaranteed peace settlement
between Israel and the Arab states and a new regime for the Suez
Canal, putting that essential waterway under international
control." 121

Likewise, the Christian Science Monitor believed

that the United Nations must not merely permit the restoration of
a "troubled status quo _in the Middle East.

The

u.

N.'s duty is
to advance lasting solutions toward a durable peace there.•• 1 2 2

119The Western papers strongly supported the swift dispatch
of UNEF to the Middle East and the complete withdrawal of AngloFrench-Israeli forces. See: "Let the u. N. Move In," Editorial,
SLPD, Nov. 8, 1956 , p. 2E; "Pouring Peace on Troubled Oil,"
Edi torial, LAT, Nov. 9, 1956, part III, p. 4; and "A Police Force
In The Middle East ," Editorial, CST, Nov. 11, 1956, P• 53,
120 .. u. N. Moves on TWO Fronts," Editorial, CSM, Nov. 5,
1956, p. 16.
121 "After the

u.

N. Vote," Editorial, NYT, Nov. 3, 1956, p. 22.

122 0 Mi'deasts An Uneasy Cease-Fire,
.
.
.. Ed i torial,
CSM, Nov. 7 ,
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Post-Invasion--Anglo-French Pullout
Following Anglo-French acceptance of the United Nations
cease-fire resolution, American newspapers busied themselves for
weeks with evaluations of the outcome of the brief Middle Eastern
war.

The British-French operation was seen by American news-

papers as falling very short of achieving its objectives.

Far

from eliminating Nasser, the abortive invasion strengthened his
position.
Canal open.

The British and French had failed to keep the Suez
All but one of the pipelines were cut.

Nasser

r emained in power and Egyptian morale had not cracked.

Nasser's

popularity was not "discredited" by the British-French assault;
t his alone was interpreted to be

11

a measure of the erroneous

calculations made by the British and French Governments when
they decided to launch their attack. 11123
It was frequently accepted by the American press that the
real reasons for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt were other
t han their proclaimed aim of separating the belligerents, Egypt
and Israel.

It was surmised that Britain and France were inter-

ested in eliminating Nasser from power, in checking soviet
incursions into the Middle East, and in retaking control of the
Suez Canal in order to ensure that the Canal always remained
open.

Instead, they failed to achieve their objectives.

William Henry Chamberlin, Wall Street Journal columnist, wrote
1956, p. 26. The Post-Dispatch argued there should first be a
cease-fire, troop withdrawals, and formation of au. N. police
force to patrol the area and keep the peace. "Then basic solutions can be undertaken." "From the Danube to the Suez,"
Editorial, SLPD, Nov. 5, 1956, P• 2B.
123Geoffrey Godsell, "Nasser to Cooperate with UN-cautiously," CSM, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 12.
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that the Soviets had won a "psychological victory" and were
well on their way toward establ ishing themselves as protectors
o f the oil rich Arab world .

Because Britain and France gave

t he impression of retreating before soviet threats when they
accepted the United Nations cease-fire resolution so soon after
r eceiving the Soviet ultimatum, Chamberlin claimed "they created
a si t uation much more difficult and ominous than the one which
existed before they struck." 124
The New York Times noted that the results hardly justified
the great risks and the high cost of their joint venture.

Not

only had the Anglo-French action failed to achieve its objectives, but it had also given rise to a series of undesirable
side effects .
On balance • •• it seems clear that much more has been
lost than gained . It will take long to live down the
initial blow to the United Nations , the shock to the
conscience of the Western world , the renewed conviction
of the Arab-Asian world that imperialism and colonialism
are still alive and the equally strong Arab conviction
that the Western powers were in league with Israel.
We now stand with the Middle East in a state of
extreme tension, with the Russian position strengthened,
the Western position (including that of the United States)
weakened , Nasser as great or greater a menace than ever
and the United Nations flouted, though with a partial
comeback. A new era begins in the Middle East , one
frought with dangers and difficulties . The Western
ranks must be closed again--and quickly •••• 125
12511 suez Balance Sheet , " Editorial, NYT, Nov . 9, 1956 , p. 28 .
See : Johns. Knight , "The Editor 's Notebooks u. s. Alone Keeps
Faith in World Hope for eace s Not a Difficult Decision," CDN.
Nov . 3 , 1956, p . 14 .
night argued the British and French were
"scuttling'" the u. N. TWO days later , the Daily News claimed
t h at it would be fortunate if the Communist world did not follow
the Anglo-French precedent in many parts of the world . By their
abortive invasion , the British and French had licensed such
ac tion. See: "Fruits of the Blunder, British-French Stupidity
I nvited Red Aggress i on , " Editorial, CDN, Nov . 5 , 1956 , p . 10 .
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In a perceptive article, Hanson

w.

Baldwin, New York Times,

argued that the Anglo-French operation was poorly planned, and
the immediate military objective--seizure of the Canal--was
lost sight of.

Retaking the Canal with as little danger as

possible became "fuzzed up" with overthrowing Nasser by psychological warfare and bombing.

This was further complicated when

Eden added the professed objective of separating Israeli and
Egyptian forces.

"The careful and indispensible weighing of

political, economic, psychological and military factors was
lacking in the Egyptian operation •••• As a result the British
and French, and the West in general, are suffering the consequences."

Baldwin also noted parenthetically that London and

Paris seemed to weigh so lightly economic factors.

"They

apparently forgot that the Arabs could hurt Britain and France
economically more than Britain and France could hurt the Arabs.
The Arab economy can revert to dates and camels; Western
Europe cannot ... 126
Closely related to the evaluation of the outcome of AngloFrench participation in the war was American newspaper review of
.American foreign policies and their relationship to the war.
John Allan May, reporting for the Christian Science Monitor on
British hopes for joint Anglo-American agreement on a reasonable
settlement of the issue of control of the Suez Canal, commenteds
"Lack of previous agreement between Britain and the United States
126Hanson w. Baldwin, "A Confused Invasion, 0 NYT, Dec. 10,
1956, p. 4. Hoopes reached quite similat! conclusions about
Eden's losing sight of the "central political requirement •••
for a swift military fait accompli." Hoopes, The Devil and
J. F. D., op. cit., p. 372.
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about aims in the area, while it did not cause the Anglo-French
ultimatum, did make it possible."

Furthermore, the dangers of

new Western divisions would remain as long as the .. vacuum in
understanding still exists. 11127

But the Wall Street Journal

argued that American foreign policy, as long as it remained
dedicated to a peaceful settlement, not to force, could neither
cause the Middle East war alone, nor could it have prevented
it alone. 128

And the New York Times observed that the Eisen-

howe r decision to recognize other nations• "manifest right" to
defend their national interest while maintaining the United
States right to dissent during the Suez War, although it may
have caused differences with our allies, "has averted the
complete alienation of the free East from the West."

The Times

claimed that the British Government was now seen moving along
lines toward a settlement which approximated those pursued by
the United States.

This was taken as a good sign for renewed

Western unity in NATO and for settlement of the Middle Eastern
, , 129
crisis.
American newspapers were at this time also concerned with
evaluating the role of the United Nations in ending the war
over Suez and in finding a permanent settlement.

The level of

expectations depended largely on the individual newspaper's
127John Allan May, "Allied vacuum Seen on Control of Suez
Area," CSM, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 12.
lZS,,Policies and the Middle East," Editorial, WSJ, Nov. 19,
1956, p. 14.
1290 The U. S. And Its Allies,•• Editorial, NYT, Nov. 29,
1956, p. 34; and "Peace Seems Near in Middle East," Editorial,
LAT, Dec. 5, 1956, part III, P• 3.
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predisposition toward the United Nations.
expected very little of the United Nations.

The Wall street Journal
In fact, on Novem-

ber 21, 1956, the Journal acknowledged that the United Nations
had been considerably more effective in restoring peace in the
Middle East than had been expected.

Nevertheless, the Journal

felt that despite gratifying initial success in Egypt, the

u.

N.'s

real test as an international peace-keeper under difficult
circumstances was just beginning.

The article noted further

that "the apparent effectiveness of the

u.

N. police force could

be only an illusion, or that it might evaporate in a matter of
hours" in a burst of machinegun fire. 130
The Christian Science Monitor was more positive.

For the

United Nations it envisioned limited goals: 1. withdrawal of
foreign troops from Suez; 2. securing a "decent" settlement of
the Canal dispute in the interest of canal users; and 3. protection of international shipping rights. 131
130 ,.u. N. Appraisal," WSJ, Nov. 21, 1956, pp. 1 and 16.
For an earlier, guarded reaction to UNEF, see: "United Nations•
Big Experiment," Editorial, LAT, Nov. 14, 1956, part III, p. 4,
The L.A. Times observed that the u. N. was undertaking a
momentous experiment. In Korea, the police action was commanded
by the Security Council. But UNEF was the creation of the
General Assembly. "How workable can be a police action run by
the Assembly where votes of small nations could presumably
commit the larger nations to take great risks and make great
sacrifices, remains to be seen," see also, "The Alternatives-Major War: World Powers Face Fact That u. N, Must Succeed,"
Editorial, CDN, Nov. 13, 1956, p. 20.
1310An Egyptian 'Veto'?," Editorial, CSM, Dec. 26, 1956,
p. 16.
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The New York Times saw the duty of the United Nations to
be much broader--to seek a permanent settlement of the great
issues in the Middle East--for this was the tacit understanding
upon which the Anglo-French withdrawals were ordered.

The Times

remarked a
Certainly the United Nations police force ••• must
remain in the area until the settlement has been achieved,
irrespective of Egypt's contrary claim. Moreover, despite
Egypt's wishes, the clearing of the Suez Canal must begin
at once with all available technical means and without
waiting for the completion of withdrawals. Egypt must
give binding understanding to negotiate for a new regime
for the Suez Canal which will "insulate 0 it from President
Nasser's provocative policies. Finally, Egypt must
recognize the existence of Israel, end the blockade against
it, maintained in defiance of the United Nations, and
consent to real peace negotiations on a mutually acceptable basis.132
Failure of the British-French invasion of Egypt resulted in
the near complete demise of Anglo-French power and prestige in
the Middle East, and gave rise to fears of a power vacuum in the
area which might be filled by the Russians.

The New York Times

claimed that it had pointed out three or four years prior to
Suez that the collapse of British and French power in the region
would result in a power vacuum which would be filled either by
the United States or by the Soviet Union.

"We have not filled
.
133
it; the Russians are moving in, and time is not on our side."

The movement of Russia into the Middle East was later seen by
the Times as "one of the great movements of history and a highly
dangerous one for our country.••

Soviet charges of "imperialism

132 ,.withdrawal From Egypt," Editorial, NYT, Dec. 4, 1956,
p. 38.

1330American Policy on Egypt,•• Editorial, NYT, Nov. 13,
1956, p. 36.

0
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and "colonialism,. were leveled against the United States for
warning that any threat to the territory or the independence
of Baghdad Pact nations would be viewed nwith the utmost gravity,"
and for expressions of

u. s.

shipments" of Soviet arms .

concern to Syria over "substantial
Replying to those charges, the

Times connnentedr "If there was any valid charge against the
Americans in these days it has been one of weakness, of taking
the easy line that the United Nations would do it all.•'

The

United States should serve notice on the Soviet Union that it
would not permit Soviet domination of the Middle East nor the
elimination of Israel, "the one sure and permanent pro-Western
nation in the Middle East ... 134
Geoffrey Godsell, Christian Science Monitor, stressed that
the United states must act "independently" of Britain and France
who had discredited themselves over Suez.

The United States

must decisively take the initiative if the nations of the West
were to "salvage" anything from the ••wreckage" of the Western
position in the area.

If the united States did not act resolutely

to fill the Middle Eastern power vacuum , "Soviet influence will
not so much thrust itself as be sucked into the Middle East on a
scale which will make its recent successes in the area seem
. .
. i cant." 135
1.ns1.gn1.f
While recognizing the existence of a Middle Eastern power
vacuum which might be filled by Nasser or Russia, the Wall Street
1340 The Russian Moves ,

0

Editorial, NYT, Dec. 1, 1956, p. 20.

135Geoffrey Godsell, "U. s, Held West Hope in Mideast,"
CSM, Nov. 27, 1956, p. 7.
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Journal cautioned against excessive pessimism and reminded its
readers, .,Something of value has already come out of it.

This

country has acquired a freedom of action in world affairs it
has not had in a generation.

This is not of value to us alone;

it has given reassurances to many uneasy peoples that the choice
for the world does not lie in the extremes of being bossed by
the Communists or by a Western bloc resting on the power of the
United States." 136
Once Anglo-French withdrawal was in prospect, American
newspapers turned their attention to securing the clearing of
the Suez Canal as quickly as possible.

The United Nations should

be able to use British-French salvage experts and equipment

already at the scene.

Clearance of the Canal should not depend

on the withdrawal of foreign troops. 137

Egypt should not be

permitted to exercise a veto over the Suez Canal clearance
operation nor to blackmail the world with its insistence that
Israel withdraw before Canal clearance operations can begin.
Should Nasser continue to maintain this position, the General
Assembly must face its collective responsibility and the United
States its duty by leading the United Nations in organizing
appropriate action to meet Nasser's challenge. 138
These American newspapers reported on debates in Britain
136 "Salvage from the Suez," Editorial, WSJ, Dec. 21, 1956,
p. 18.

1370c1earing the Canal," Editorial, CSM, Dec. 21, 1956,
p. 18; and "Issues in the Middle East, .. Editorial, NYT, Nov. 28,
1956, p. 34.
1380 Impasse at Suez,n Editorial, NYT, Dec. 26, 1956, p. 26.
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over charges of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion, but they did
not endorse the charges.

They reported Conservative denials

and the fact that Labor opposition "remained unconvinced." 139
Editorially, these three great American newspapers took no
position on the issue of collusion. 140

Dulles raised the issue

in his October 30, 1956, background news briefing.

(see aboves

pp. 156-160.)
Post-Anglo-French Pullout--Israeli Pullout
The new year, 1957, ushered in a series of events which
stemmed directly from the abortive Anglo-French-Israeli invasion
of Egypt.

The first of these was the resignation of Prime

Minister Anthony Eden.

American newspapers refused to accept

the official British explanation that Eden was resigning for
health reasons.

The failure of his Suez policy was generally

seen as a "major reason" and the "immediate cause of his
departure. 0

It was deemed "ironic and sad" that his resignation

should have resulted from a question of foreign policy since
139Peter Lyne, "Eden Denies Charge of Suez Collusion," CSM,

Dec. 21, 1956, p. 15; "Observers in the Middle East Are Puzzled
by Moves in Egypt,•• NYT, Nov. 24, 1956, p. 8; and "Commons Cheers
Eden on Return," NYT, Dec. 18, 1956, p. 3.
140Western papers were not as h esitant
·
'
a bout commenting
early on Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. On October 31, 1956,
the Daily News observeds "The speed with which the two nations
(Britain and France) acted, and their refusal to heed United
states pressures toward keeping the peace, suggests that this
was not only the opportunity they had been waiting for, but
that they also created the opportunity." Seea 0 What Was Israel's
Role: Britain and France Risk Everything on Suez Move," CDN,
10c. cit. See also: "The Risk of War," CST, loc. cit.; and
••What's This War Really About?," Editorial, LAT, Oct. 31, 1956,
part III, p. 4.
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he had established his political reputation in the field of
.
.
141
f oreign
affairs.

The appointment of Harold Macmillan as Eden 's successor
wa s welcomed by these American newspapers.

Reestablishing a

good working relationship between Britain and t he uni ted States
would be g reatly aided by the personal friendship of Eisenhower
and Macmillan which dated from World Wa r II and the North Africa
campaign.

Since he had backed the Suez venture, Macmillan's

appointment was seen as a signal of British " adherence to Eden
Cabinet policies."

His inaugural address , in which he declared,

" I believe history will justify what we did," was interpreted
as indicating that Macmillan agreed with Eden's Suez policy,
. retention
'
as was h is
of 1 arge 1 y t h e same Cab'inet. 142

These three major American newspapers displayed relative
unanimity on the questions of Israeli withdrawal and sanctions. 143
1410 What•s News --World Wide ,., WSJ, Jan . 10, 1957 , p. 1;
"Eden Resigns ," Editorial , NYT, Jan. 10, 1957, p. 28; "A Brave

Leader Steps Down," Editorial, CSM, Jan . 10, 1957, p. 20; "Suez
Boomerang: Eden's Departur e Sings swan Song of Empire ," Editorial,
CDN, Jan. 10, 1957 , p. 8; and "Harold Macmillan, New British
Premier," Editorial, LAT , Jan . 11 , 1957, part III, p . 4 .
1420New Hand at Bri t ish Helm , " Editorial, CSM, Jan . 12, 1957 ,
p. 18; "Macmillan at the Helm, " Editorial , NYT, Jan . 11, 1957,
p. 22; "What ' s News-- World Wide , " WSJ, Jan . 18, 1957, p. l; "The
Macmillan Cabinet," Editorial , CSM, Jan. 15, 1957, p. 16; and

''Britain• s New Leader: Macmil lan• s Formula I Wo rk Harder , Spend
Less," Editorial , CDN , Jan . 11, 1957.
143Most of the American
.
.
newspapers stud'ie d oppose d sanctions.

Only the L . A. Times raised the possibility that Eisenhower 's
February 21 , 1957 , suggestion of u. N. "pressure" against Israel
might have been an attempt to remove Arab suspicions of u. s .
intentions, and to show that u. s. policy in the Middle East was
not centered on Israel. It hoped that Eisenhower's speech would
make possible private negotiations with Middle Eastern countries-which would be far more satisfying than "the goldfish bowl debates"
of the United Nations--and make easier a permanent Middle Eastern
sett lement. "The President on I srael," Editorial, LAT, Feb . 22,
1957, part III, P • 4.
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All three believed that Israel had legitimate grounds to seek
guarantees against a return to the status q u o ~ before withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran.

The

Monitor suggested that the U. N. should administer these areas
until a general Palestine peace treaty c ould be drawn. 144

The

Times advocated that mutual guarantees to Israel and Egypt should
be negotiated and agreed upon first, so they could be announced
"simultaneously" with the Israeli withdrawa1. 145
On the matter of sanctions, the Journal and the Monitor
ques tioned the wisdom of directing them against Israel while
not directing them against Egypt , since the latter had provoked
the former .

Echoing the arguments of Congressional opponents

of sanctions, the Journal claimed that considering their use
against Israel implied one code for the weak, another for the
strong .

If sanctions were to be applied to Israel, why not to

. as well forte
h Hungarian
.
,
.
146
Russia
invasion.
144"U . N. Role in
' Gaza an d Aqa b a , " Ed'J. tor ial,
'
CSM, Jan. 25 ,
1957, p . 20 J and "Justice Both Ways ,•• Editorial , SLPD, Jan. 18,
1957, P• 2C.
145 "Warning on Sanctions ," Editorial , NYT, Feb. 12, 1957,
p. 26 .
146 "Explosive Sanctions," Editorial , WSJ , Feb . 21, 1957,
P• 12. See alsos "A Ray of Hope," Editorial, SLPD , Feb. 22 ,
1957, ~ • 2C. The Post-Disbotch remarked that u. s . policy should

bear with equal weight on
th Israel and Egypt . "Let the grave
issue of sanctions be postponed as long as possible . " Johns .
Knight raised another point s "(T)he use of economic sanctions
agains t a nation largely of our own creation and nourished with
American assistance would be incredibly unrealistic and selfdefeating . " Knight suggested there was more to be said for
senator Knowland ' s recommendation of u. N. adoption of moral
sanctions condemning noncompliance with u. N. resolutions. sees
John s . Knight, "The Editor ' s Notebooks Deal Giving Gaza to
Israel Might Bring Lasting Peace; It Would Be Asking for More
Trouble , " CDN, Feb , 23, 1957, p . 12,
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James Reston found that the vague public threats of sanctions
had made the Middle Eastern situation look much worse than it
really was.

Administration opponents had a bogus issue with

which to make headlines.

Reston argued that the United States

Government had "no intention of going to such extremes in the
fo reseeable future ...

According to him, Dulles had taken the

lead in efforts to break the deadlock by proposing that the
United States should attempt to establish the principle of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran.

Had Israel withdrawn

and made common cause with the United States , the weight of
public opinion would have been transferred to Egypt.

0

Unfor-

tunately, this move by Mr. Dulles was not made quietly but
publicly , and this turned what promised to be a hopeful diplomatic move into an angry propaganda battle. 0

Nevertheless, it

was felt that eventually Israel would withdraw and the Dulles
plan would be tried.

This would involve some risk for Israel ,

but the risk had been exaggerated.

"For there is nothing in the

record to suggest that the Israelis cannot handle the Egyptians
in a test of strength, and if they had to go back to Aqaba and
Gaza to regain their rights, they would be doing so with the
support, rather than the opposition of the United States and
, ,
147
wor ld opinion."
Reston•s prediction of Israeli victory in a
future test of strength proved accurate in 1967 .
the six Day War handily.

Israel won

But, the United States did not actively

support Israel, although the

u. s.

did not oppose it.

Israel

went it alone.
147James Reston, ,.The Sanctions Threat," NYT, Feb. 20, 1957,
p. 8.
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The Times "deplored the one-sidedness 0 with which both the
United Nations and the united States had treated the whole Middle
, . 148
E as t ern crisis
.
The Times noted that both the United States
and the United Nations had largely ignored Egyptian provocations
and Nasser's arrogant defiance of both the u. N. and international law.

Only in recent days had the U.

s.

and the

u.

N.

taken account of them and promised Israel some of the assurances
it sought.

All such moves and promises, however, had been

premised on Israel's prior and unconditional withdrawal, and, to
a great extent, on Egyptian consent .

"Since Egypt has publicly

withheld such consent, it would be in a position to restore the
status quo ante that gave rise to the recent hostilities ...

Thus,

it was understandable that Israel saw the assurances offered as
inadequate.

Nevertheless, the Times believed that it would be

wise for Israel to withdraw its forces from the last strong
points, and, thereby, put itself

0

on the side of the angels"

and place the burden of world opinion on Egypt. 149
148Apparently the Administration was more concerned with
u. s. interests in the Middle East than with ensuring equitable
guarantees to Israel. Bell, Hoopes and Love maintained that
the Administration yielded reluctantly to Third World pressures
applied at the United Nations. Dulles and Eisenhower were
motivated by a desire to show the Arabs that u. s. Middle East
policy was not dictated by American Jewish interests. They
also feared Communist gains in the area, as a result of Soviet
advocacy of complete Israeli withdrawal, and Soviet support
for u. N. sanctions against Israel to bring it about. Thus, in
order to retain American influence in the region, the u. s.
Administration felt compelled to advocate sanctions. See: Bell,
Long War, op. cit., pp. 351-353; Love , Suezs The Twice-Fought
War, op. cit., pp. 665-666; and Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. o.,
oi;>:- cit. , pp. 390-391.
149 "IsraeJ. and the U. N., .. Editorial, NYT, Feb. 22, 1957,
p. 20. see al.so: 0 short of Sanctions," Editorial, SLPD, Feb. 21,
1957, P• 2E.
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Israel's decision to withdraw from the Gaza strip and the
Straits of Tiran was greeted as "excellent news.••

Prime Minister

David Ben-Gurion was said t o have acted with praiseworthy
statesmanship and courage . 150
Summary Remarks
Before the Israeli invasion of Sinai, these American newspapers tended to give rather strong support for Eisenhower
Administration Suez policies.

Dulles' tactics to secure a

negotiated settlement seemed to be working.

Consequently there

was high newspaper praise for the Secretary of State, and great
support for his Suez foreign policy.

Newspaper positions and

American foreign policy showed conspicuous parallelism.

Further-

more, the various positions of these three great American newspapers were quite similar .
Following the brief war and the acceptance of a United
Nations supervised cease-fire, the degree of divergence of
opinion increased noticeably both between the various newspapers,
and between the newspapers and the Administration.

Criticism of

Adminis tration policies by these American newspapers became
more pronounced and more outspoken, with the New York Times
the most critical.

Both the New York Times and the Christian

science Monitor, for example, supported a quick return to
western unity while the Eisenhower Administration preferred to
make progress slowly in that direction.

On the other hand, the

1500 settlement1 First Phase?," Editorial , CSM, March 2,
1957, p. 20; "Israel Keeps a Promise," Editorial , NYT, March 5,
1957, p. 30; and "Israel Takes High Road of Duty," Editorial,
CDN, March 5, 1957, p. 16.
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Wa1·1 Street Journal advocated a position of continued

u. s.

f o reign policy independence, and the avoidance of entangling
alliances--this seemed to echo Dulles• October 30, 1956, background news briefing.

(see aboves pp. 157-158.)

Newspaper discontent with

u. s.

i n intensity after January 1, 1957.

Suez foreign policy grew
In addition to opposition

t o sanctions, these American newspapers expressed concern on a
variety of matters related to Suez developments.

For example,

the resignation of Prime Minister Eden sparked some very sharp
c omment.

c.

L. Sulzberger of the New York Times noted the

s ignificance of his resignation to the Anglo-American coalition.
"Neither Government can afford indefinitely--as did Washington-to ignore the other's vital interests.

Nor can either--as did

London--violate the other's trust, regardless of excuse ...
Unless the United States and Britain learned these basic rules,
Eden ' s would not be "the last political reputation to be
s acr i' f'ice d • •• 151
Throughout the crisis, the Christian Science Monitor had
not hesitated to remind its readers that Washington might somehow be partially responsible for Suez.

Thus, following Eden's

resignation, the Monitor advised that the United States should
help Eden 's successor to work out solutions to common problems
arising from Suez ,

The Moni tor reasoned thusa

151
c. L. Sulzberger , "Eden's Unhappy Political Epitaph,"
in his columns "Foreign Affairs," NYT, Jan. 14, 1957, p. 22.
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It will be wholesome for Americans to recognize ••• that
shortcomings of their own government in the formulation of
a foreign policy for the Middle East have contributed to
the situation which led the French and British to feel that
only desperate measures could suffice against Soviet penetration. Had Washington listened to Sir Anthony early last
year and made a declaration comparable to the one now before
Congress (the Eisenhower Doctrine), Britain might not now
be losing the guiding hand of its most experienced
diplomatist.152
However, not all was criticism.

President Eisenhower was

praised for the courage he displayed by taking an unpopular
stand in favor of ••pressure" against Israel.

And support was

readily given to the Administration's argument that aggression
should not be rewarded. 153
In general, these newspapers tended to react to policy,
rather than to precipitate it, during the Suez crisis.

They

were in the position of reporting rather than initiating.

And,

as we have seen, their reports were regularly inaccurate.

It

may be that such inaccuracies are fostered by the Administration
to conceal what it actually knows for diplomatic reasons, or to
protect itself from sharp and/or damaging domestic criticism.
or they could reflect so-called "trial balloons,., unofficial
statements issued by American or foreign governmental officials-often in background news briefings--to sample reaction both at
home and abroad to proposed government policies and/or actions.
When such reports later prove false it could indicate that the
1520A Brave Leader Steps Down,,. CSM, loc. cit.
153 .. No Reward for Aggression," Editorial, CSM, Feb. 21,
1957, p. 26; and Arthur Krock, "A Speech That Can Only Be
Graded by Effects," in the column, In the Nation, .. NYT,
Feb. 22, 1957, p. 20.
0
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authorities responsible for them have altered their decisions
in light of unfavorable response to their "trial bal.loons ... 154
Such false accounts could also reflect the attempts of individuals or departments to influence Administration policies by
stimulating public interest and support for some favored policy
or project.

Failure of these attempts could be indicated by

later invalidation of inaccurate or false reports.

Thus, the

accuracy of newspapers depends heavily upon the accuracy of
their sources.

Accuracy of sources in turn depends upon the

interests to be served through the release or the withholding
of correct information by government officials.
The New York Times gave the most coverage to the Suez
crisis; the Wall Street Journal gave the least.

A liberal news-

paper, the Times was occasionally strongly critical of Administration policies, especially on the question of sanctions.

The

observation of former Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State, Ambassador Philip Kingsland Crowe, that the Times was
"mildly critical most of the time" of Eisenhower Administration
policies was borne out in this analysis.

Overall, the Christian

Science Monitor tended to be somewhat less critical of Administration Suez policy than the New York Times , The Wall Street
Journal was usually pro-Administration during the Suez crisis.
Review of the editorial . policies of the four Western papers
indicated that the three Eastern papers were generally repre154Rivers
,
·
b ackground information
'
'
'
remarke d s usince
is
never
attributed to the spokesman, Eisenhower's assistants ••• use(d)
backgrounders as launching pads for trial balloons. If Congressional or public reaction to a policy announced during a backgrounder was unfavorable, the balloon was hauled down and a new
policy formulated." Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 144145.
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sentative during the Suez crisis.

Many of the issues raised

by the Eastern papers were also commented upon by the Western
papers .

However, there wer e a number of discernible differences.

The Western papers tended to be more isolationist, more concerned
with domestic politics.

u. s.

They were less anxious to see an expanded

role internationally, and they were more favorably inclined

to the united Nations Emergency Force.

Also, they were less

hesitant about taking up Dulles• charge of Anglo-French-Israeli
collusion.
Three of the four Western papers studied were as opposed
to u. N. sanctions against Israel as the Eastern papers.

The

only paper which did no t oppose sanctions categorically was
the Republican Los Angeles Times.
The Christian Science Monitor most closely approximated the
st. Louis Post-Dispatch.

The New York Times also approached the

Post-Dispatch in policy .
The Wall Street Journal was quite similar in approach to
the Los Angeles Times.

It was, however, more reserved on the

probable success of UNEF.

The Journal was categorically opposed

t o sanctions, the L.A. Times was not.

Of the seven major

American papers studied, the Los Angeles Times most nearly
approached total support for

u. s.

Suez foreign policy, and

for the Eisenhower Administration.
The Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Sun-Times, both
Knight publications, usually took the same editorial position.
Of the newspapers studied, they were the most independent
editorially , agreeing, at times, with sentiments expressed by
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the ' liberal papers, the Times, Monitor, and Post-Dispatch, and,
at times, with the more conservative L.A. Times, and Journal.
In general, the Eisenhower Administration's policy of
seeking a peaceful solution to the Suez dispute was popular
with the major daily American newspapers studied.
decisions to avoid

u. s .

The

military involvement in the hostilities,

to seek a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli
forces drew praise.

With respect to Israeli withdrawal,

questions were raised about the method of bringing it about-possible

u.

N. sanctions--not the goal.

Vo L.
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CHAPTER V
THE REACTION OF AMERICAN NEWSMAGAZINES, OPINION JOURNALS,
AND SCHOLARLY JOURNALS TO THE SUEZ CRISIS
Preliminary Observations
The objective of this chapter is to discern the nature of
support for Eisenhower Administration foreign policies during
the Suez crisis in selected major American periodicals.

The

periodicals studied are of three types1 newsmagazines, opinion
journals , and scholarly journals.

To determine the kind of

support for Administration policies, an analysis will be made
of the manner in which these periodicals reported and evaluated
the crisis.

A high index of support for Administration

policies could indicate the success of Administration efforts
to influence coverage of the crisis, or it could merely reflect
a favorable predisposition of a particular periodical to
Administration efforts.

Conversely, adverse criticism of

American Suez policies could indicate failure of the Administration to convincingly present its policies, or it could
mirror a given periodicals prior ideological position of
opposition.

An attempt will be made to determine which factor--

ideological predisposition or Administration influence-accounted for the nature of periodical coverage during the Suez
crisis.

This analysis will further test the Administration's

belief that it had an unfavorable press during the crisis.
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General Remarks on American Newsmagazines
From the standpoint of circulation, the three largest
weekly American newsmagazines are Newsweek, Time, and

u. s.

News

and World Report. There is an eight-day gap between the day
these newsmagazines send news to press and the date on their
cover.

Furthermore, there is a five-day gap between the day

they appear on the newsstands and the date on their cover. 1
Because weekly newsmagazines appear later after the fact
than the newspapers, they possess certain theoretical advantages;
the time lag between the occurence of newsworthy events and the
date of publication offers newsmagazines the opportunity to
select important and accurate news with greater objectivity.
Their newseditors are able to review the news events over a
longer time span during which the accuracy or inaccuracy of
reports may become more evident.

Unfortunately, newsmagazines

often do not avail themselves of this opportunity to transmit
more accurate news.
The American weekly newsmagazine tends to concentrate on
descriptive summaries of news trends.

Selected facts, dates

and figures are often woven together to illustrate the news
trends which the newsmagazine is seeking to trace.

Consequently,

there is far less new news in newsmagazines than in daily
newspapers generally.

Furthermore, reporting in newsmaga zines

tends to be highly interpretive.

Newsmagazine reports are

1Ben H. Bagdikian, "Those Uncanny Predictions1 Newsweek:
The Magazine of New Significance," The New Republic, Vol. 140,
Feb. 16, 1959, P• 11.
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often short, pithy accounts, well spiked with descriptive
adjectives and value-laden key words which serve as indicators
of either the journalists personal bias or the newsmagazine•s
editorial policy.

Therefore, newsmagazine reports of political

events are frequently far from objective, cold analysis of news.
This is not to deny that many newsmagazine correspondents are
competent men, highly respected in their profession.

On

numerous occasions, they uncover newer, better, and more
important news than the daily newspapers.

But, in the mechanics

of the daily operations of newsmagazines, the editors ignore
the standard practices of conventional news reporting which
require telling the reader the source of the news--except in
the case of background information, in which case the reputation
of the reporter serves as a guide to the authenticity of the
news.

Unencumbered by observance of, such conventions, the news-

magazine editor can publish more readable news.

••But the lack

of restraint in the newsmagazines often permits the news to
look more titillating and more authoritative than the facts
warrant, giving the reader little hint as to when the news stops
and the editorial titillating begins, or when the facts end
and the editorial dogma takes over." 2
In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyze the
coverage of the Suez crisis by four major American newsmagazines:
Business Week, Newsweek, Time, and

u. s.

News and World Report.

Study of these four newsmagazines indicates that elements
common to all were often obscured by the editorial line of the
2 rbid., pp. 11-12.
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individual newsmagazine.

Also, more or less distinct policies

emerged to coincide with various phases of the crisis.
Business Week was primarily concerned with the financial
side of the crisis.

Consequently, weeks passed in which little,

if any, mention was made of the crisis.

A conservative,

business magazine, it was usually pro-Administration.
Newsweek stood out as the maverick among American newsmagazines;

It evidenced no clear-cut or readily detectable

ideological line.

Commentaries were at times pro-Administration,

at times strongly anti-Administration, which further indicated
no clearly definable Newsweek line. 3
Time was very pro-Administration.

Its articles, with rare

exception, parrotted the official view of the Republican Eisenhower Administration. 4

Editorial comment within articles often

panned editorial critics of the Administration's policies.

For

example, Time answered those who warned of a possible Russian
assumption of responsibility to help Egypt build the High Dam
f ollowing the Western pull-out by indicating that there was
"strong doubt" that the Russian Communists could afford to
build the dam, and that, in fact, by week's end Foreign Minister
Shepilov had stated that Russia did not then intend to finance
the Aswan High Dam. 5
3 tbid., PP• 10-11.

4Ben H. Bagdikian, "Time: The weekly Newsmagazinea 'There
Will Be No Editorial Page;.;,-The New Republic, Vol. 140,
Feb. 23, 1959, p. 13.

5 "The Dramatic Gambit," Time, July 30, 1956, P• 7.
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During the Suez crisis,

u. s,

News and W,grld Repgrt

was generally pro-Administration, adhering to the policies of
its editor, David Lawrence.

u. s.

News quoted extensively,

most frequently from sources with whom editor Lawrence apparently
sympathized . 6

For example, it regularly reproduced transcripts

of the news conferences and public addresses of the President
and the Secretary of State .

At one point, it carried what appears

to be a complete, paraphrased text of Dulles• October 30 background news briefing. 7

Often during the crisis, u. s

News

quoted the remarks of Prime Minister Eden and other British
Conservatives .

When, however, an individual whose position

did not meet with Lawrence's approval was quoted, his remarks
were preceded by a carefully biased introduction.

This was the

u. s. News reproduced Nasser•s remarks during
u. s. News also featured question-and-answer

case the one time
the crisis. 8

articles dealing with various aspects of the crisis.

The answers

were very slanted, and, in general, reflected the editor's views.
In this chapter the term American newsmagazines will be
6Ben H. Bagdikian, 0 The Newsmagaziness I--u. s. News and
World Report,., The New Republic, Vol. 140, Feb. 2, 1959,
pp. 13-14. Bagdikian commented: ''(T)wo distinct lines appear in
u. s . News and World Report: (1) Accurate reprints of interviews
and public statements, plus first-hand reports by the magazine•s
own correspondents, many of them unbiased reporting; (2) A selection process of the reprints and interviews which heavily weights
them in quantity, number and presentation on the side of
Lawrence's personal convictions, and an embellishment of the
first-hand reports which carry out the editor's themes in headlines, introductions and other presentations even when these
embellishments are contrary to the reports themselves."

70 This Is u. s. Policy In A Troubled World,'* u. s. News and
World Report (Hereafters u. s. News), Nov. 9, 1956, PP• 43-45.
8sees "Defiance In Egypt: Nasser, New Dictator, Rattles His

Sabre,"

u. s.

News , Aug. 17, 1956, pp. 74-77.
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used frequently.

Specifically it refers to the four news-

magazines of our study.
Withdrawal of the American Offer
Washington's decision to withdraw the American offer to
help finance the Aswan High Darn project received generally favorable response from these American newsmagazines.

Significantly,

few new themes were introduced, rather newsmagazine accounts
largely echoed in shortened form the reports of the American
newspapers studied in Chapter IV.
The decision to rescind the

u. s.

offer of aid to Egypt

was seen as serving "notice on neutrals'' that it would no longer
be profitable to play East against West to secure economic aid.
Underdeveloped countries :.could no· longer count·. on· blind East-West
competition for their favor.

In the future, the United States

would weigh each project and decide its merits without regard to
.

• .

fear of Soviet competition.

9

Newsweek noted that Dulles• patience had been exhausted when
he told Ambassador Hussein "curtly" that the
.
.
d rawing
its
o f fer. 10

u. s.

was with-

Dulles• move was generally applauded.

Time was most effusive when it evaluated Dulles' performance
in these terms1 "On the broad chessboard of international
diplomacy, the

u. s.

moved decisively last week in a gambit that

9 "International Outlook," Business Week, July 28, 1956,
pp. 101-102; "Notice to 'Neutrals,'" Newsweek, July 30, 1956,
p. 20; "The Dramatic Gambit," Time, loc. cit.; David Lawrence,
"The Honeymoon Is Over," u. s. News, July 27, 1956, P• 128.
1 Oibid. , "Notice to •Neutrals. '"
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took the breath of professionals for its daring and won the
assent of kibitzers for its instinctive rightness.•• 11
In the newsmagazines, there was little of the early newspaper caution over the conse quences of the

u. s. action.

Generally it was assumed that the Russians would not step i nto
the gap left by the American withdrawal from the project.

It

was believed that t he Russians already were preoccupied in t heir
Eastern European satellit es, tha t they would hesitate to shoul der
additional responsibilities in Egypt.

In David Lawrence's

opinion, Washington policy-makers had "wisely decided to call
the Soviet bluff."

Thus , they forced the Soviets to expose them-

selves, and, thereby , gave neutralists paus e to think. 12

Time,

noting that by week's end Shepilov had indicated that the Soviet
union had no intention of financing the Aswan High Dam, obse r ved:
0

It was highly possible t hat Chessmaster Dulles h ad his opponents

. c h eck • " 13
in

Business Week editoria lized t hat this was the onl y

way for the united States to deal with Egyptian blackma il and t o

.
.
.
. .
put an end to the "impossible
state of affairs"
arising
therefrom. l •

The reasons given for the u.

s. pullou t were basic ally the

same as those listed by the daily newspapers.

In addition to

the official reasons, mention was made ofs
11 "The Dramatic Gambit," Time, loc. c it.
12navid Lawrence , "The Honeymoon Is Over," loc. c i t. s e e

also: "The Trend: The Only Way to Deal With Blackmail," Busi ness
Week, July 28, 1956, p . 140; and "Notice to 'Neutra ls , "' ~ ~ . loc. cit.
13 "The Dramatic Gambit,•• Time, l oc. cit. For Dulles•
reaction to this Time magazinearticle, see above: p. 61.
14"The Trends The Only Way to Deal With Blackmail,'1 Business

~ , loc. cit.
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1. The Czech arms deal and growing Egyptian indebt edness
to the Soviet bloc;
2, Nasser's efforts to weaken the Western positi on in the

Middle East and North Africa;
3. Egyptian blackmail--playing Washington off against

Moscow to obtain the best possible terms for financial aid to
the Aswan High Dam project; and
' . t s. lS
4 • Te
h opposi. t'ion o f Sou thern Sena t ors and of Zionis
Of the four newsmagazines studied, Newsweek alone indicated
some caution about the

u. s.

action stemming from f actors other
..

than fear of possible greater soviet commitment to, and involvement in, Egypt, which Russian agreement to finance the Aswan
High Dam at that time would have represented.
about a "lessening of

u. s.

Newsweek worried

prestige for having backed off on

a promise" which it saw as one of the calculated risks involved
.
h e American
.
d ecision.
. .
16
int

The First London Conference
Nasser's nationalization ("seizure") of the Canal was
r egarded by the newsmagazines as the desperate move of a
d ictator whose "grandiose dreams " were crumbling, and whose
pr e stige was "slipping fast. 017

Nationalizat ion of the Suez

Canal was also seen as Nasser's taking revenge for the Western
15 Ibid.; "The Dramatic Gambit," Time, loc. cit.; and "Worldgram,., U:--S. News, July 27, 1956, P• SS:16"Notice to 'Neutrals,"' Newsweek, loc. cit.
17oone Dictator Who's In Trouble: Seizing Canal Isn't CureAll for Nasser, u. s, News, Aug. 3, 1956, p. 61; and "'Strong
Man• and the storm over Suez," Newsweek, Aug. 6, 1956, p. 38.
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withdrawal from the Aswan High Dam project. 18

Business Week

saw the Egyptian nationalization as proof that Nasser, like so
many dictators before him, was ••being pushed into foreign
adventure by his failures at home. 0

But Egypt must not be

allowed to get away with its nationalization of the Canal, for,
if it did, other Middle Eastern Governments might be encouraged
to nationalize the foreign mmed oil companies next. 19
Adopting a line of argument which it was to repeat often

u. s.

in the next two months,

News and World Report described

Nasser as a man who was growing increasingly isolated from his
Arab neighbors and his neutralist friends, and about to become
. h h'is own countrymen. 20
more and more unpopular wit

Lawrence, editor of

u. s.

David

News, mused on the damage Nasser's

action had done to Egypt's future in the name of nationalism.
Lawrence noteds
suicide .

0

'(N)ationalism• can become a form of national

It can affect adversely the lives of millions of men

and women who, though themselves innocent of wrong, must resort
perhaps to bloodshed to get rid of their dictatorship government.021

u. s.

Following Lawrence's editorial line, within a month

News saw the "big question ••• how long Nasser himself will

last."

Egyptians were reported having second thoughts on Nasser.

180 Nasser•s Revenge, •• Time, Aug. 6, 1956, p. 19.
190 Nasser Takes A Big Jump," Business Week , Aug. 4, 1956,
p. 56.

200 one Dictator Who's In Trouble ••• ,"

21 David Lawrence,
Aug. 17, 1956, P• 136.

0

u. s.

News, loc. cit.

The Promises Men Live By,"

u. s.

News,
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While recognizing that Nasser was squeezing the West at Suez,
now the West was also seen by the Egyptians as squeezing Egypt. 22
As a resul.t of Western economic pressure,

u. s.

News proclaimed,

"Ousting of Nasser is expected to be a matter of months, not
years." 23
The Red specter was seen lurking in the Middle East.

It

was regarded increasingly threatening to the West as a result
of Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Business Week

chargeds "The shadow of Russia hangs over vital Western link
now that Egypt has seized the Suez Canal." 24

Frequent Egyptian

consultations with the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo at the time of
the first London conference were interpreted by Western dipllomats,
according to Newsweek, to indicate that "it was becoming painfully clear that Russia, not Egypt, was calling the moves."

This

factor did not augur well for the negotiation of a compromise
solution to the Suez dispute. 25
Referring to Dulles• nationwide radio and television address
of August 3, 1956, Time took note of the
moderation.

u. s.

position of

"In one of the unusual gambles in diplomatic history,

the President and the Secretary of State proposed to confront
Egypt•s President Nasser with the pressures of moral law."
220 Nasser Now In Deep Trouble, War Risk Closer--No Profits-Future Uncertain," u. s. News, Sept. 21, 1956, p. 56.
23 ,.worldgram, 0

u. s.

News, Sept 21, 1956, pp. 87-88.

240 Nasser Takes A Big Jump, 0 Business Week, loc. cit.

250 Peace With Islam: In The Balance," Newsweek, Aug. 20,
1956, p. 40.
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Dulies' moderation.was seen by Time as having blunted the AngloFrench demands for forceful retaliation against Egypt.

The

United States thereby had assumed the leadership in the crisis.
"Should the force of law bring an effective settlement in the
Middle East , the favorable repercussions would be of sweeping
significance.

But a failure--or any effort to let Nasser go

his way unrepentant--would be a tremendous blow to the Eisenhower-Dulles policy and to

u. s.

prestige everywhere. 026

Time

and again Time was to echo the Administration's position that
settlement of the Suez dispute should be made in conformance
with justice and international law.
As Newsweek saw it, central to a peaceful solution of the
problem was the willingness of all to compromise.

The resolution

of the first London Conference was seen as a compromise for it
was not the "ultimatum.. the British and French had first demanded,
nor did it accept unrestricted Egyptian control over the Suez
Cana1. 27

Following the failure of the Menzies mission to Cairo,

Newsweek feared thats "Compromise seemed possible only on Gamal
Abdel Nasser's terms."

This resulted in Eden's greatest chal-

.
, h 28
1 enge since
Munic.

The United States was seen as continuing to strive for
compromise following the failure of the Menzies mission, even
26 urnvoking Moral Force ," Time, Aug. 13, 1956, P• 7.

27 "If There's 'Reasonableness• About Suez ••• , .. Newsweek,
Sept. 3, 1956, P• 34.
280 0n the Thames, Payoff--On the Nile, Wavering Allies?,"
Newsweek, Sept. 17, 1956, p. 48.
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at the risk of some Anglo-French animosity, by proposing the
Suez Canal Users• Association.

Nasser was depicted as exerting

every effort to keep the Canal open and to continue negotiations
in order not to provide Britain and France with an excuse to
use force.

Newsweek's John Madigan was reported to have cabled

from Cairo that Western diplomats there were convinced that with
proper economic inducements , Nasser might be convinced to agree
to a compromise,

"The imponderable, they admit, is how far Sir

Anthony Eden will--or can- -back down ... 29

Newsweek alone of the

four major newsmagazines suggested that a solution to the Suez
dispute might depend on anything other than for Egypt to give in.
While it cannot be a rgued that Newsweek was anxious to see Egypt
"get away with" its nationalization of the Cana1, 30 it alone
suggested that others besides Nasser might also be ultimately
responsible for the conclusion of a peaceful settlement .
The efforts of the Western nations attending the first
London Conference were interpreted by Business Week and Time as
offering Nasser an opportunity to conclude a peaceful settlement.
As a result of the first London Conference, Time argued, Nasser
had a chance to own the Suez Canal Company (after appropriate
compensation), and the world had a chance for guaranteed freedom
of transit through the Canal,
and the onus of refusal his • ., 31

"The opportunity was Nasser's,
Business Week predicted that

29 .,suez Moods Nasser Waits, Eden Chooses," Newsweek,

Sept. 17, 1956, P• 50.
300 Where we Fit In," Newsweek, Aug. 13, 1956, P• 43.
310 The Principles of 1888," Time, Aug. 27, 1956, p. 21.
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the ' cairo meeting between Nasser and the Menzies committee
would not be more than ••a negotiation about negotiating."

But

it should indicate whether Nasser was moving in the direction
of a settlement that the West could accept ... 32

Ultimate

responsibility for a settlement was neatly shifted to Egyptian
shoulders since the West was depicted as making every constructive effort to achieve a peaceful solution.

The onus for

possible future failure of negotiations was seen as transferred
to Egypt as a result of the first London Conference.
The picture of Nasser drawn by these four American newsmagazines was far from complimentary.

Nasser was depicted as

"a restless, unstable man intoxicated wi th vast ambitions ... 33
Nasser allegedly dreamed of empire, a great Arab empire extending
from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, and in control of
the area's vast oil riches.

Nasser's attempts to reduce Western

influence in the area were all seen as part of his plot to build
an Arab empire.

As proof, these newsmagazines cited Nasser's

Egypt 's Liberation, The Philosophy of the Revolution. And they
intimated that Nasser saw himself as the "hero" mentioned in
. b ook. 34
h 1.s

32 "International Outlook," Business Week , Sept. 1, 1956,
p. 111; and "International outlook," Business Week, Sept. 8,
1956, P• 163.
33 "Role in search of a Hero, The Three Circles of Nasser's
Ambition," Time, Aug . 27, 1956, p. 22.
34"Special International Report, Nasser 's Real Objective:
Arab Riches in Oil," Newsweek, Aug. 13, 1956, PP• 44-49; "The
Counterpuncher," Time, Aug. 27, 1956, PP• 21-28; and "One
Dictator Who's InTrOuble ••• ," u, s. News, loc. cit. Nasser
wrote that Egypt 's role was dictated by its geographic position.
Egypt was at the center of three circles, an Arab circle, an
African circle, and an Islamic circle. Referring to the first
circle , he wrote: "For some reason it seems to me that within
the Arab circle there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search
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Britain and France were described as determined to use
force to regain control of the Canal, but, due to the efforts
of the United States, they were dissuaded from doing so, at leas t
until after the first London Conference.

"The

u. s.

was willing

to join its Allies in a solid front against Nasser, but it was
anxious at the same time to avoid any ill-considered step that
'ht 1 ead t o s h oo t 'ing .tt 35
nu.g

The

u. s.

was seen as advocating

a moderate stand which had "blunted the demands of the British
.
t quic
. k re t al1.at1.on
.
.
.
and F rench f or d irec,
against
Egypt ... 36 The
American role was represented as designed to contribute to the
pressure for calm, and to cautiously pursue a policy leading to
some form of international control of the Suez canai. 37
of a hero •••• (I)t seems to me that this role, exhausted by its
wanderings , has at last settled down ••• near the borders of our
country and is beckoning t o us to move, to take up its lines, to
put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it."
It was, ostensively, a collective role, for all of Egypt , to be
the hero of the Arab circle. Nasser added that the role was not
one of leadership, but one of interaction, "to spark the tremendous power latent in the area." He dreamt of unified Arab opposition to the common enemy--Western imperialism. Nasser felt
there were three main source s of Arab strength: 1. "a communit y
of neighboring peoples linked by all the material and moral ties
possible"; 2. the Arab land itself and its position on the map;
and 3. "oil--a sinew of material civilization without which all
its members would cease to function." Nasser discussed the
significance of Arab oil--its great reserves and its economical
production. He concluded: "So we (Arabs) are strong ••• when we
remain silent and measure the extent of our ability to act; when
we really understand the strength resulting from the ties binding
us together, making our land a single region from which no part
can withdraw , and of which no part ••• can be defended without
defense of the whole." Thus, Nasser dreamt of Arab unity--which
is difficult to equate with quest for empire. He dreamt of Arab
progress, and of Arab employment of the elements of Arab strength
to achieve freedom from western imperialism. Gamal Abdul Nasser,
Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Wash., D. c.s
Public Affairs Press, 1956) , pp. 81-114.
35 ,"strong Man• and the storm' over Suez," Newsweek , loc. cit.
36 "Invoking Moral Force, '1 Time , loc. cit.
37"Will There Be War over Suez and Oil?: Odds Against It-West Needs Arabs, Arabs Need West, .. u. s. News, Aug. 17, 1956,
p.

so.
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' since Britain, France and the United States had agreed to
convene the first London Conference, the odds were .. better than
even" that there would be no shooting until after its conclusion,
unless Nasser were to decide to close the Canal.

The greatest

danger to Egypt now was seen to be from Russian Communism, not
from a Wes tern resort to force. 38
American newsmagazines acclaimed the resolution of the
first London Conference as a reasonable starting point for
negotiations.

A long, tense period of diplomatic maneuvering

was envisioned before a final settlement could be reached. 39
Dulles was praised for the way he had handled the conference.
The newsmagazines noted how Dulles had won acclaim from European
diplomats.

Time commenteds .. He (Dulles) had set an unfailingly

conciliatory tone, in contrast to the original hot anger of the
French and British, and tirelessly revising his internationalcontrol plan to meet the reservations of the new Asian nations,
built up the wide backing that would make it harder for Nasser
to refuse the heart of the proposal--to insulate the Suez Canal
'
40
.
from any na t ion's
poll.' t 1cs."

Newsweek found positive results

in the fact that the Western alliance had survived dangerous
stress intact, and that Dulles had won the support of three AfroAsian nations--Pakistan, Iran, and Ethiopia--for the conference
3811 International Outlook,
Business Week, Aug. 4, 1956,
p. 107; "International Outlook," Business Wee k, Aug. 18, 1956,
pp . 161-162; ,.The Middle East on Edges War of Nerves,,. Newsweek,
Aug. 13 , 1956, pp. 43-44; ''Report on Suez," Time, Aug. 20, 1956,
p. 13; and "Will There Be War Over Suez and Oil? ••• ," u. s. News,
loc. cit.
0

39 "International outlook," Business Week, Sept. 1, 1956,
p. 111.
400 Putting the Question ," Time, Sept. 3, 1956, P• 19.
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proposal.

,.Even dissenting India, Indonesia, and Ceylon ••• spoke

warmly of the West's •conciliatory
urged Nasser to negotiate."

attitude, and privately

It was up to Nasser and his Soviet

mentors to decide whether to negotiate on the basis of the
conference proposa1. 41
The failure of the Menzies mission sparked questions about
how Britain and France would react to Nasser's rejection of the
London proposal.

Economic sanctions were widely anticipated.

At the same time, Nasser was reported under great pressure from
many quarters to reach a negotiated settleme nt. 42
The Second London Conference, SCUA, and the United
Nations Security Council Debates
The failure of the Menzies mission challenged the Wes t to
respond.

The Western answer took the form of the Suez Canal

Users• Association, brainchild of secretary of State Dulles.
Reaction of the newsmagazines to the scheme varied.
~

Business

saw the proposal as indication that the United States had

moved into the Suez crisis "in a big way--taken over, in fact,
the leadership of the Wes tern cause in the conflict. "

Thus, as

it had done so many times before in the post-World War II period,
the United States stepped into a power vacuum in order to resist
Russian advances.

The Suez Canal Users• Association served

several vital functions.

While threatening to boycott Suez, it

41 "If There's 'Reasonableness• About Suez ••• ,,, Newsweek,

loc. cit.
42 ,•At Suez: A Showdown Has Come," Business Week, Sept. 15,
1956, pp. 23-24; "On the Thames, Payoff--On the Nile, Wavering
Allies?, " Newsweek, loc. cit.; "Suez Mood: Nasser Waits, Eden
Chooses," Newsweek, loc. cit.; and 0 Worldgram," u. s. News,
Sept. 21, 1956, loc. cit.

306

presented, at the same time, an opportunity for a renewal of
negotiations with Nasser.

"It offered the West an alternative

to war, on the one hand, or a backdown, on the other." 43
Newsweek argued that Dulles had conceived the plan ••not so
much as a means of achieving international control over Suez but
to give the West a common instrument with which to counter Nasser
short of war."
Scheme to work. 0

Newsweek commented furthe rs "No one expects the
It saw SCUA as an instrument whereby the Western

nations could pursue "other steps" following the expected Egyptian
refusal of passage to SCUA piloted ships.

The interpretation

made of "other steps" by the United States was detouring Suez.
''Britain and France, however, still talk of force." 44
Time noted that the United States, Britain and France, who
had seemed to be moving in divergent directions, united and
confronted Nasser "with the chance to back down from his Westflouting seizure of the Suez Canal or the risk of exposing his
45
impoverished nation to an economic squeeze."
Early in this phase of the Suez dispute, a telling difference
of approach emerges between the way Newsweek and Time covered the
crisis in the latter half of September, 1956, on into October, 1956,
prior to the outbreak of war in the Middle East .

It will be

recalled that during this period optimistic reports dominated the
American newspapers of our study, and that from the middle of
October to the outbreak of war Suez ceased to be a matter of
pressing concern to them.

so too, coverage of the crisis in

43 .. u. s. Tal<:es the Helm on Suez," Business Week, Sept. 22,
1956. see alsos "The Safety Catch," Time, Sept. 17, 1956, P• 23.
44"At swords ' Point,•• Newsweek, Sept. 24, 1956, p. 44.
450 The Crisis Turns , 0 Time, Sept. 24, 1956, P• 21.
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Business week and u.

s.

News and World Report was diminished.

Newsweek and Time continued regular, though briefer, coverage.
During this period, Newsweek tended to stress the forces of
disunity among the Western allies--the United States, Britain,
and France ,

While recognizing Dulles• efforts to maintain Big

Three unity, Newsweek stressed the continuing threat that the
alliance was on the verge of coming apart.

Britain and France

were repeatedly induced by Dulles to agree reluctantly to work
together with the

u. s.

in his continually changing schemes,

Thus,

Newsweek contended that Britain and France were persuaded by
Dulles to accept a "watered-down .. SCUA "'which came close to what
Nasser has been demanding all along."

While u.

s.

officials

optimistically predicted Egyptian willingness to compromise,
Newsweek pointed out that Britain and France blamed Secretary
Dulles for making Nasser's position even harder to crack.
Three unity was "under renewed strain. 046

Big

Concerning debates

before the United Nations security Council, Newsweek commented,
"The West 's problem was not so much how to force Egypt into line,
but how to heal the rift in its own ranks," 47

Reporting on the

appointment of Eyvind Bartels as Administrator for the Suez
Canal users• Association, Newsweek also noted the disunity of
the Western Powers on Suez .

The u .

s.

wanted to work with

Nasser t o keep the Canal open and to pay him a fair share of
the canal dues collected by SCUA. Britain, however, wished to
withhold the dues and to use SCUA as an economic weapon.
46 ••A Suez compromise? Don't Count It out, .. Newsweek,
Oct . 1, 1956, pp. 38 and 40.
470 Not so united Nations," Newsweek, Oct. 15, 1956, P• 56.
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Newsweek concluded: .. Until the West made up its own mind, no
Suez solution seemed possible ... 48
During this period, rrime, which recognized the threat of
Western disunity, emphasized that it was repeatedly overcome
by Secretary Dulles• efforts.

Dulles• plan for a users•

Association was seen as removing the threat of force from the
Sue z crisis, and as replacing it with a Western strategy of
••massive but peaceful pressure."

The U. S., Britain and France
••came together in a united plan." 49 It reported that the second
London Conference was in great danger of becoming mired in
irresolution until Dulles softened the plan for SCUA.

Then

Dulles struck at the crux of the matter by pointing out
emotionally that if the use o f force was to be ruled out, " nations
must join in seeking solutions that are just, as well as
peaceful ...

The speech was effective, Time concluded:

delegates were impressed."

SCOA was accepted.

0

The

Britain and

France agreed to the proposal--which represented a "climb-down •••
f rom an admittedly unsteady perch."

Time evaluated SCOA thus:

s. c. u. A. remains loose and only mildly binding, but
it provides the canal users with a body that can negotiate
with Nasser, move on to other concerted action should he
block the canal or prove unable to keep it open. It does
this in a manner that avoids, so far, act s that plunge the
Suez crisis into full deadlock, yet leaves the Westerners
free to keep moving, keep trying to make time work for
them instead of for Nasser •••• 50
48 ••Middle Easts Double Trouble," Newsweek, Oct. 29, 1956,
p . 50.

490 The crisis TUrns, 11 Time, loc. cit.
5 o.,The Ba rgainers," Time, Oct. 1, 1956, P• 27.
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Reporting on activities before the United Nations security
Council, Time no ted that the
had not started in step.

u. s.

and its Anglo-French allies

There were differences over the

timing of taking the issue to the United Nations--the
preferring to hold off until SCUA was fully launched.

u.

u.

s. •

And the

s. had cast the deciding vote for the Egyptian counter-

complaint.

"After that , however, diplomats of the three Western

powers got together in efforts to seek one common objective in
the Security Counci l--a resolution that will budge Egypt•s
Nasser back toward internationalization of the control of the
canal." 51
Even Time could not totally overlook the lack of Western
unanimity on the p roper course of action to pursue in the Suez
crisis which was evident in the Security Council debates. 52 But
results of the United Nations debates and the passing of the
six Principles were regarded by Time as the first important
breakthrough in the Suez dispute.

Time regarded Nasser's remarks--

"What does Mr. Dulles mean by 'insulating the canal from politics?'
The canal still runs through Egypt.ff--as casting doubt on the
prospects of the six Principles.

Yet, echoing President Eisen-

hower, it remained optimistic, "The week's events, however,
could be counted a broad step toward conciliation and away from
the recent angry moment when governments were mobilizing fleets
and armies and threatening war over suez." 53
Sl " The Slow-Grin
' d'1.ng Mi'11 s," Time, Oct. 8, 1956 ,

52 ,,suez Session," Time, Oct. 15, 1956, P• 40 .
53 "Road to Suez," Time, Oct. 22, 1956, P• 28.

PP• 29-30.
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Newsweek momentarily softened its concern over Western
disunity, seeing

u. s.

support in the United Nations o f the

British-French implementing resolution as indication that
"Western unity on Suez had been strengthened."

The Russian

veto of the resolution made the Council's unanimous approval of
the six Principles anticlimactic.

Ne:vertheless, Newsweek saw

"hope that a basis had been laid for further negotiations.
President Eisenhower said • ••• it looks like ••• a very great
crisis is behind us.• ,. 54
During the period of proposal of the Suez Canal users'
Association and the Security Council debates, these American
newsmagazines tended to be somewhat optimistic.

u.

s.

News and

World Report observed that the Suez crisis was ••settling down
into a long tug of war. 055

All parties to the crisis were

reported taking a long second look.
Canal open.

Boycotting Suez could cost the West more than it

would cost Nasser.
seemed to

Nasser was keeping the

u. s.

The prospects of getting rid of Nasser, it

News--in a major shift from its earlier line--

was .. another idea that no longer looks feasible.
be hard to do.

It might

And Nasser's successor might just continue

Nasser's ideas."

The only thing left to the West was "a program
56
of slow, mild pressure ••• on Nasser."
54 "The Spoiler Steps In,•• Newsweek, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 51.
55 .. worldgram," u.

s. News, Sept. 28, 1956, P• 81.

560 worldgram, 0 u. s. News, Oct. 5, 1956, pp. 79-80. On the
argument that boycotting Egypt was unlikely to have the desired
results ... see: "Is the Squeeze Working?,,. Newsweek, Oct. 8, 1956,
pp. 32-.:s4.
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Newsweek foresaw the possibility of compromise resulting
in a Suez solution as all sides to the controversy had given
themselves over to sober second thoughts.

Talk of boycotting

the Canal gave way to thoughts of using the Users• Association
to provide the foundation for intervention by the united
Nations, and Nasser was reported listening to pleas for
moderation from India and worried, oil-rich Arab rulers.

"The

realities of economics and world politics in the a tomic age
57
' h t ye t d'1.ctate a compromise"
'
mig

However, Newsweek's optimism

for a compromise solution was overshadowed by its preoccupation
with manifestations of Western disunity.
American reaction to the Anglo-French decision to go before
the United Nations with the Suez dispute evoked differing newsmagazine interpretations.

Newsweek reported that Dulles was

very annoyed when the British and French took the dispute to the
United Nations without prior American agreement.

It indicated

that Dulles ' aim was to involve the Foreign Ministers of both
sides (Britain's Selwyn Lloyd, France's Christian Pineau, and
Egypt's Mahmoud Fawzi, Russia's Dmitri T. Shepilov) in private
meetings at the united Nations "where chances of compromise
were better." 58
Time reported that the united States was surprised at the
timing of the Anglo-French decision to go before the United
Nations,

0

but acquiesced."

Time continued, "Said Dulles: 'This

is an interdependent world and you cannot thrive and prosper if
57 ,,A Suez compromise?1 Don't Count It out," Newsweek,
loc . cit.
58 .,Not so united Nations," Newsweek, loc. cit.
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you deny the principle of interdependence.•
the

Taking the case to

u. N. was another way of airing the West's concern, of

impressing the world with its urgency and of seeking a settlement by means rooted not in the jungle but in law. 059
In the last two weekly editions before the outbreak of war
the newsrnagazines paid little attention to the Suez dispute.
Like the daily newspapers, their attention was attracted to the
events in Eastern Europe.

Expressions of optimism were common.

Only Newsweek made much of the disunity between the United States
and its Anglo-French allies. Yet even NewsweeJ{. did not predict
the consequences of that disunity--war.
Up to this point there were no strong criticisms of
Eisenhower Administration Suez pol i cies by these American
newsmagazines.

Administration efforts to arrive at a peaceful

settlement were a pproved.
Invasion, the General Assembly and UNEF, and the
Anglo-French Withdrawal
The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt was generally
juxtaposed to the Russian invasion of Hungary, by American newsmagazines, in the issues released immediately after the outbreaks
of hostilities.

All issued instant analyses of the significance

of the double eruption of fighting.

Opinion var±ed on the

important consequences of these troublesome occurrences.

All

agreed that they portended highly consequential new developments
and set in motion new forces.

Business Week exclaimed: "(T)here

is no doubt that the whole pattern of the postwar world has been
59 .. Te
h Bargainers,"~,
.
.
1 oc. ci.
.t
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torn to shreds by the violence in Eastern Europe and in the
Middle East and by Eisenhower's reaction to the two events ...
The communist monolith had been completely shattered and the
Western alliances had been shaken so much by the independent
actions of Britain and France that the confidence between
London and Washing~on would not be restored easily. 60
Newsweek proclaimeds
our time.

0

0

The world would not be the same in

It found that Hungary proved that "international

Communism could no longer be fastened on nationalist-minded
nations merely with the devices of political trickery, secret
police, and the ever-present threat of force."
French-Israeli invasion of Egypt showed that

0

The Britishcollective security

among power blocs based on larger common interests no longer
provided a base for common solution of all problems."

The

United Nations, backed solidly by the United States , was "about
the only hope of a peace that could be made to stick." 61
Time found Eisenhower "taking a stand for justice and law
amid the tangle of a baffling and dangerous double crisis" on
election day.

But British-French acceptance of the United

Nations cease-fire signified that things were returning to
normal .

Time concluded: "No nation, the free-world had relearned,

could afford to divert its attention very long or very far from
60 "Tis
h' Weeks A Basics
'
h'i ft in
' u. s. Foreign
'
Re la t'ions,"
Business Week, Nov. 3, 1956 , pp. 34-35.
61 "The Struggle for Durable Peace," Newsweek , Nov . 12,
1956 , p. 29.
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the Soviets, always the threat, always implacable, always there ... 62

u. s.

News and World Report argued that since Communism

could not give people what they want, explosions were likely
to continue convulsing Eastern Europe.

A weakened Soviet

Russia emboldened others to take strong action, as Britain,
France and Israel turned to arms.

u. s.

relations with Britain

and France might be a little strained, "temporarily, but not
.
h e same issue,
'
for long." 63 · Elsewh ere int

u. s.

News found tha t

"alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain no longer amount to
much."

The Warsaw Pact was a "shamblestt and NATO was "on the

skids."

The United Nations had been given another damaging

blow by two charter members, Britain and France.

It failed to

prevent a Middle Eastern war. 64
The Soviet suggestion that the United states join it in
intervention against the British and French invasion of Egypt
was labled "unthinkable" by American officials.

Time noted

that Eisenhower answered Bulganin "in stern and unequivocal
language." 65 Newsweek found that the President had responded
to Bulganin even more bluntly than Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr., who had first declared the Soviet suggestion
unthinkable.

Eisenhower pointed out to Bulganin, in a special

62 "Man of the Hour," Time, Nov. 12, 1956, p. 17; and
"Appalling Events," Time,~ 12, 1956, p. 30. For a similar
view, see: "Out of Hungary, Suez Disasters: A Rebuilt Western
Alliance,'* Business Week, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 157.
63 "Newsgram, ff

u. s.

News, Nov. 19, 1956, pp. 15-16.

64 "Worldgram," in ibid., pp. 65-66.
65 Man of the Hour,"~,
·
't
loc. ci.
0
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White Hous e statement--"made public--as had Bulganis• s note-before the d iplomatic reply was delivered"--that only after
Russia ceased its repression of Hungary and withdrew its troops
would it be proper for the Soviet Union to talk of peace . 66
Elsewhere Newsweek concl uded : "The Kremlin' s incredible cynicism
was wasted on Pres ident Eisenhower" who rejected joint inter67
.
ven t ion.
Failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion to achieve i ts
objective was attributed to certain basic miscalculations.

It

was postulated that the British , French and Israelis believed
the

u. s .

would be preoccupied with its presidential election

campaign and would take no steps against them.
French presumed t he

u. s .

The British and

would neutralize Soviet Russi a. 68

Soviet threats to use rockets against Britain and France,
and s oviet o ffers of

0

volunteers" to aid Egypt sparked debate

in the American newsmagazines , in the month of November, 1956,
over the likelihood of global war.

As we saw in Chapter I , as

a former soldie r, Eisenhower was not greatly impressed by
Russian threats,

He apparently chose to let them add to the

pressures on Britain, France, and Israel to cease-fire and
withdraw.

At that time, the CIA leaked reports of Russian

66 "To Stop the Tide," NewsweeJ~, Nov, 12, 1956, p. 36.

67 "The struggle For Durable Peace ," Newsweek, loc. cit.
68 "Why Britain and France Went to War in Egypt: To Topple
Nasser , control Suez , Save Their Oil," u. s, News , Nov . 9, 1956,
p , 33; "Appalling Events," Time , loc. cit.; "War Russian Sty;es.
10 Days That Spe lled Defeat: After Suez , Nasser Stronger, Britain
and France in Trouble," u. s . News, Nov . 23, 1956, p. 36.
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military activity which had no basis in fact. 69

The Adminis-

tration, in all likelihood, used the fear of war to win
domestic and foreign support for

u. s.

Suez policies.

Its

efforts to exploit war hysteria undoubtedly contributed to
press speculation about the imminence of world war.

Business

~ claimed initially that total war was ••not probable. 70
0

By mid-month, however, it found that "(p)eace literally hung
in the balance" as a consequence of Soviet offers to send
.,volunteers" to Egypt.

The Soviet goal in making this offer

was to force an unconditional withdrawal of British and French
troops and to place the

u.

N. police f orce under Nasser's control,

thereby, eliminating the Western influence from the Middle East.
Business Week concluded: "The real question is whether Moscow
is ready to risk war to achieve this goal--or whether it's
bluffing. 071
Newsweek seemed obsessed with the fear of World War III .
"The world had moved steadily nearer the rim of disaster
a result of Soviet threats, it theorized.
the key. 072

This was hardly the case.

0

as

"The Russians held

Dulles had actually been

69Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 384; and
Love, suez s The '!'Wice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 615.
?O,.out of Hungary, Suez Disasters, A Rebuilt Western
Alliance , 0 Business Week, loc. cit.
7111 rnternational outlook," Business Week , Nov. 17, 1956,
p. 153 .

720 Look East for the Decision," Newsweek, Nov. 19, 1956,

p, 41; and "The Struggle for Durable Peace," Newsweek, Nov. 12,
1956, p. 29. see alsos .. Edge of Conflict," Newsweek , Nov . 19,
1956, pp. 42-43 , for a sensational account of an emergency
Presidential session with top Congressional leaders during which
the following was reported to have taken places
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told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff that the
Russians were in no position to act militarily in the Middle
East, not even through dispatch of

0

volunteers." 73

Heikal

subsequently con~irmed the accuracy of Pentagon estimates.
He told of a meeting between Syrian President Shukri al-Kuwatli

and soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai A. Bulganin, and
Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, in which Kuwatli told the Russians
they must intervene.

Zhukov unfolded a map in front of him

and asked Kuwatli, "'Mr. President , here is the map, look at
it, how can we intervene? 074

since the Russians were unable

to intervene in the Middle East, there was no possibility of
the Anglo-French invasion leading to a total war.

Never-

theless, only in late November, 1956, did Newsweek magazine

"At the cl sely guarded emergency session, President Eisenhower addressed the 23 most important members of congress in
grave, measured tones:
"'Everything is being done to achieve a peacefu1 solution
(in the Middle East). There will either be a peaceful solution,
or a terrible nuclear war
"Few of the legislators summoned to the White House Cabinet
room Friday a week ago had realized the stark dimensions of the
crisis . The President ••• called on Allen Dulles, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to summarize developments
Mr. Eisenhower called •very serious but not alarming.
"Charles Halleck of Indiana, the Republican House floor
leader broke ins ' ! m glad to hear that it isn t as bad as the
picture painted in the newspapers.•
"Soberly, the president replied, ' :I 'm sorry about my choice
of words . The situation is actually more serious than what you
have been reading in the papers. 11
While one ay doubt the accuracy of this account, it erves to
illustrate the emotion Newsweek projected at that period of
time--fear of global war.
73 Finer, Dulles ' over Suez, op. cit, P• 186.
74Heika
. 1 , Cairo
.
't
Document s, op. ci.

pp. 111-112.
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find that the alleged danger of war had receded, although it
had not been removea. 75
Time noted that, by the time widespread fears of world
war began to appear in the headlines, diplomats were beginning
to ·think that they had affairs under control.

Israel had agreed

to withdraw; Britain and France would comply with the United
Nations Emergency Force.
between the

u.

HThe Middle East crisis became a race

N.--trying for peace before the Russians could

intervene--and the Russians, hastening to raise •volunteers•
by the thousands (and in entire army reserve units), perhaps to
move into the Middle East under the guise of peacemakers. 076
Late in November, Time reported Soviet flights over Turkey
to Syria of complete air force units which took up positions
around 3 Syrian airfields.

Time remarked that for a few strained

hours Washington offi cials did not know whether the United States
0

would or would not be in a shooting war with Russian •volunteers'

within the next 48 hours."

President Eisenhower reacted calmly

and instructed Ambassador Bohlen "to mal~e absolutely sure that
the Kremlin did not misunderstand

u. s.

intentions, if the

Russians moved troops into the Middle East the
oppose them with arms ...

u. s.

would

When Russia did nothing, Time concluded:

"From all visible signs it seemed the Russians had understood
wha t the U• S • mean t ••• .,77 As we have seen, the Russians had no
75 "Holding Back War , 0 Newsweek, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 28.
76 "The Threat of War, 0 'l'ime, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 31.
7711 we can Only Act Like Men," Time, Nov. 26, 1956, pp. 17-18;
and "Worldgram ," u. s. News, Nov. 23,1956, pp. 103-104.
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intention of intervening.

The United States apparently felt

constrained to counter Soviet propaganda moves with similar
ploys of its own.

Thus, it responded to Russian threats by

sending Bohlen to the Kremlin and placing

u. s.

forces on the

alert.

u. s.

News and · orld Report argued simply that Sovi et

Russia, held in check by American threats to oppose introduc tion
of .. volunteers" in Egypt, would "stop short of action which c an
bring World War IIr. 078
Newsweek alone of these major American newsmagazines
indicated any interest in the possibility of a Muslim Holy War
(Jihad) against the

est and Israel.

It alone seemed to find

Jihad a real and frightening possibility. With a melodramatic
touch, Newsweek opined: .,And, in the dark and narrow stree t s and
in the bazaars of Eastern cities~ there was a potential that few
dared think about--Jihad or Holy War,

Troops were moving among

the Moslem nations in a way that suggested the worst--now or
later." 79

Newsweek later claimed to see in Nasser's survival

in power indication that "the threat of Holy War was as pressing
as ever." 80
The

u. s.

decision to oppose the Angl.o-French-Israeli

invasion and to work through t he United Nations received suppo rt
from Business Weelt and Time.

They pictured the United States as

7811 After 'Little War• What? Shaky Truce, •• Big Power Clash? •• •

More Russian Meddling,•• u. s. News, Nov. 16, 1956, p. 66; and
"Worldgram," pp. 91-92.
79 .,The Struggle For Durable Peace," Newsweek, loc. cit.
BO"Passage in the Storm, .. Newsweek, Nov. 26, 1956, P• 27.
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gaining world-wide credit for opposing its allies• aggression,
and global recognition for the role it played in ending the
hostilities and in restoring stability to the Middle East.
Thus, the u. s. gained greater prestige among the family of
nations.

American Suez policy was seen as protecting the

totality of Western interests in the ex-colonial world, and of
maintaining working relations with Asia, Africa , and the Middle
East. 81
A bit more florid, perhaps, than some of the other comments
were these remarks of Times
In a sense, the prestige of the u. s. rose as that
of its rivals fell. The myth of the Moscow mass man and
Marxist benevolence lay buried in the rubble of Budapest ••••
The British and French ••• had temporarily lost their
credentials for world statesmanship. But in another sense,
the u. s. had earned the new regard by its own conduct. In
time of crisis and threat of World War III, President Eis enhower had cast u. s. policy in a role to reflect the u. s.• s
basic character--its insistence on justice, its desire
for friendship, and its hatred of aggression and
brutality.82
Although the United States claimed to rely upon the United
Nations to restore order and the rule of law in the Middle East ,

u. s.

News and World Report _argued that it was the United States,

not the United Nations, which forced the Anglo-French withdrawal
from Egypt .

u.

s. News remarked that this proved that the United

Nations could be no ·more effective a force for world peace "than
the two major powers, the united States and Russia, choose to
81 see, "Out of Hungary, Suez Disputes, A Rebuilt Western
Alliance," Business Week, loc. cit.; "This Week : A Basic Shift
in u. s. Foreign Relations ,•• Business Weelc, loc. cit.; "International Outlook, .. Business Week , Dec. 1, 1956, p. 130; "Danger
in the Jungle," Time, Nov. 12, 1956, P• 30; .,We Can Only Act
Like Men ," Time,---ioc. cit.; ,.International Outlook," Business
Week, Dec. 297"'1956 , p. 63.
82 "Acclaim and Misgivings," Time , Dec. 3, 1956, P• 15.
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to make it.

Whenever the interests of these two nations collide,

the one with the advantages on its side can control the success
.
,
83
or failure
o f any u. N. action.u

opposition to

u.

Suez problem, u.

While never expressing direct

S. reliance on the United Nations to solve the

s. News repeatedly expressed misgivings about

the united Nations ability and effectiveness.

Editorially ,

David Lawrence took the position that ••the united Nations in
recent years has become a political bodywhe:r e-" 'log rolling• and
the •expediency

of opportunism rules the day.

has superseded objectivity."

Partisanship

As an example Lawrence cited the

fact that the u. N. had resolved upon the withdrawal of British,
French and Israeli forces and upon the reopening of the Canal
itself ••without providing a means of dealing with the illegality
which was the original cause of the whole tragedy.
"International rights are readily defined.

The historic

principles of rectitude in international behavior are well known.
"The time has come to establish the rule of law ... 84
The United Nations Emergency Force was seen by u.
as lacking

0

real punch ... 85

s.

News

And it feared that UNEF would fall

under Egyptian domination if President Nasser's demands were
complied with. 86

Later in the same issue, u.

s . News observed

83 "Two Sides of the u . N.--Egypt and Hungary, 0 u.
Dec. 21, 1956, p. 35.
84navid Lawrence, "The use of Force ," u.

s. News,

s. News, Nov. 9,

1956.

850 Another Peace Test For u. N.1 Police Force For Egypt
Lacks Real Punch," u. s. News, Nov. 16, 1956, pp. 69-72.

u. s.

860 war Russian style: 10 Days That Spelled Defeat •• •,••

News, loc. cit.
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that "under the restrictions set forth for the (u. N.) force,
its chances of accomplishing anything looked slim to most
87
observers ."
u. s. News 's fears were not without foundation.
On November 19, 1956, Hammarskjold, Nasser and Fawzi approved
a formal understanding that: 1. UNEF's presence in Egypt was
conditional upon Egypt 's consent; 2. Egypt "when exercising its
sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and
functioning of UNEF ••• will be guided, . in good faith, ••• by the
General Assembly Resolution"; and 3. the United Nations "Will
be guided ••• by ••• the aforementioned Resolutions; in particular,

the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the
wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness
to maintain UNEF until its task is completed ... 88
date was set for the completion of UNEF's task.

No target
More importantly,

UNEF was clearly in Egypt at that country's sufferance. 89
87 .,Head of History's Strangest Army,"
1956, p. 40.

u. s.

In

News, Nov. 23,

88 "Report Of The United Nations Secretary-General On Basic
Points For The Presence And Functioning In Egypt Of The United
Nations Emergency Force, November 20, 1956," Committee on Foreign
Relations• A Select Chronologv. op. cit., pp. 140-143.
89when, in 1967, Nasser requested the withdrawal of UNEF,
Secretary-General U Thant acted according to the letter of the
original agreement. He later claimed to be unaware of an
August 5, 1957, Hammarskjold aide-mernoire, subsequently released
for publication by Ernest Gross, a former u. N. legal adviser,
in 1967, after Thant's decision to withdraw UNEF from Egypt. In
the aide memoire, Hammarskjold made it clear that he believed
UNEF had been set up by bilateral agreement between Egypt and
Israel, "The consequence.~ of such a bilateral declaration is that
were either side to act militarily in refusing continued pressure
or deciding on withdrawai ••• an exchange of views would be called
for towards harmonising the position. 0 Quoted by: Walter z.
Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem, The origins of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, 1967 (New York, Macmillan, 1968), PP• 88-89.
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the cour~e of the preliminary discussions, Nasser imposed on
Hammarskjold the condition that canal clearance would not begin
until all non-Egyptian forces were withdrawn.

Hammarskjold

also agreed not to station UNEF in the Canal Zone. 90

Egypt

gave its commitment to explore with the United Nations concret e
aspects of the functioning of UNEF in Egypt .

The provisions

finally agreed to were adopted on the basis of an oral agreement
between Nasser and Hammarskjold . UNEF was empowered to arres t
suspected infiltrators within half a mile of the truce line,
and to open fire on infiltrators in self-defense. 91
While expressing grave doubts about the role the United
Nations could play, David Lawrence did not deny the editor ial
support of his publication to the Eisenhower Administration.
He argued that the strong nations--Great Britain, France,
Russia , and the United States--had agreed unanimously .. to
enforce the resolution of the United Nations in seeking to stop
a local war."

Thereby, the United States was giving s upport "to

a new balance of power in the world."

Lawrence commented,

Whether for any long period of time this can spare the
world the horrors of a big war may be debatable, but t here
can be no doubt of the President's broad objective. It
is to apply the principle expressed in diplomacy as a
umodus vivendi"--a way to get along or to live with
existing problems without a war.
•

•

•

The entire world will hope and pray that the new
balance of power will gain what is most necessary--time.
Time for the Soviet empire to collapse was the sort of time
9 °Finer, Dulles over Suez, _o.P~•;......c_i_'t_., P • 450.
91 Love, Suez: The TWice-Fought war, op. cit., p . 669.
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Lawrence coveted. 92

Lawrence echoed Dulles• October 30 back-

grounder remarks and anticipated his December 6th remarks that
the Soviet empire was crumbling.

Apparently the events in

Central Europe in the fall of 1956 led many Americans to presume
that the collapse of the Soviet Empire was imminent, which, of
course, it was not.

u. s.

News suffered from a special phobia--fear of commu-

nist global expansion and a longing for its destruction.
was evident throughout the Suez crisis.

This

For example, despite

the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli combined operation in
Egypt,

u. s. News professed eo ·.derive satisfaction from the fact

that a "Soviet plot" had been "foiled."

u. s.

What sort of plot?

News interpreted the finding of vast quantities of Soviet

military hardware in Sinai in this way: "Russia had shipped
large quantities of planes, tarucs, armored vehicles, weapons and
other equipment into the Middle East.

The British now explain

that these shipments were to be followed into the Middle East by
Soviet 'volunteers• to operate that equipment.

Egypt's Nasser

then was to become another soviet puppet •
..,Thus, the Egyptian invasion may have choked off this
Soviet plot." 93

u. s.

News was the only American newsmagazine

which supported this British fabrication.

There seemed to be

92Davi'd Lawrence,,, Th
. e New Ba 1 ance o f Power," U• S• News,
Nov. 23, 1956, p. 164.
93 "war Russian Style: 10 Days That Spelled Defeat ••• ,"
u. s. News, loc. cit. See alsos "War Russian Style: Britain
Debates Kremlin's Scheme to Take Over Egypt," u. s . News,
Nov. 23, 1956, pp. 46-48, for Parliamentary remarks of British
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox Boyd, on the
Soviet "plot."
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no factual evidence that such stockpiles existed. 94

Further-

more, the argument overlooked the fact that Russia's arms
deliveries to Egypt had been common knowledge for over a year.
Only Time endorsed Dulles• charges of Anglo-French- Israeli
collusion.

Time found that there was "plenty of evidence to

show that the two attacks were planned in collusion •••• In this
conspiracy, France was the instigator, Britain a belated partner ,
and Israel the willing trigger.
actually happened.

0

This was in essence what

In September, 1956, France, disenchanted

with British hesitation, sought Israeli participation.

Israel

agreed to attack Egypt in a preventive war, providing France
with a pretext to seize the Canal.

On October 16, Britain

agreed to the Franco-Israeli scheme in closed-door discussions
with France. 95

Time theorized correctly that Britain made the

decision to back Israel, at France 's urging, during the
October 16 meeting between Prime Minister Eden, Foreign secretary
Lloyd , and Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau .

"State

Department officials are sure that the British and French
callously deceived or misled them from that date onward."

When

Israel began its mobilization on October 25, Time reported,
American military attaches noticed that their French and British
colleagues no longer talked to them.

When Dulles summoned

British and French diplomats to get their cooperation on an
emergency security Council meeting, "they stalled."

Neither

9 '\ioopes, The Devil and J . F. D., op. cit., p. 405.
95 Bar Zohar , Suez: Ul tra-secret, op. cit., pp. 135-138;
and 149-158; and Beaufre, Suez Expedition, op. cit., PP• 65-74.
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the U.

s.

nor the Commonwealth was notified about the Anglo-

French ultimatum until 15 minutes after Eden announced it.

From

this combination of circumstances Time deduced "collusion ... 96

u. s.

News hinted at the possibility of collusion.

Noting

that in London one heard only denials of the charge of collusion,

u. s .

News commented wryly: .. There is no official evidence of

such collusion available in London or in Paris.

But the Paris

Government seldom has made any move in the Middle East without
consulting Britain, or at least informing Britain. 097
The British and French had acted independently oe the United
States in the Suez invasion, and, consequently, the Western
alliance appeared threatened.

From the beginning, Eisenhower had

stressed his intention to preserve and to repair the alliance.
This was picked up by the newsmagazines and supported.
same time, it was noted that the
.
.
h e d.1.spute. 98
policy
int

u.

At the

s. was following an independent

Dulles' argument that the Anglo-French

invasion camouflaged Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe was also
repeated.

It was seen as a "boon•• to the Kremlin.

"It was a

measure of the betrayal of mankind 's best hopes by Britain and
France that the embarrassed west could not cry shame with one
voice" against the Russian invasion of Hungary. 99 This latter
96 .,.1.ue Conspiracy: How Br1.ta1.n, France an d I srae 1 Go t
Together , .. Time, Nov . 12, 1956, pp. 32-33.
ml,..

•

'

'

970 Why Britain and France Went to War in Egypt, 0
loc. cit.

u.

S. News ,

980 Man In Charge," Time, Nov. 19, 1956 , p . 22; and "International outlook, .. Business Week, Nov. 17, 1956, P• 153.
99 "Danger in the Jungle," Time, loc. cit. see also: "This
Week : A Basic Shift in u. s. Foreign Relations," Business Week,
loc. cit~
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remark recalled Dulles• observation, during his October 30 backgrounder, that because of the Anglo-French military action, the
opportunity was lost to the West to use the Hungarian invasion
against Communism.
Newsweek assessed the outcome of the Anglo-French-Israeli
failure to unseat Nasser negatively.
success, they had gained little.
military defeat.
threats, and

Egypt had suffered ignominious

But extraordinary luck (fortified by Soviet

u. s.

pressure for peace) enabled Nasser to rebound

from the brink of defeat.
in the dispute.

Despite easy military

Newsweek regarded him the real victor

If left to his own devices, Nasser could start

new trouble in the Middle East. 100
Business Week , Time, and

u. s.

News and World Report,

following the outbreak of war in Egypt , remained strong supporters
of

u. s.

Suez policy.

They voiced no criticism.

Only

u. s.

News

cautioned on the inadequacies of the United Nations as a peacekeeping force .
Generally, Newsweek took no discernible stand--pro or con-on

u. s.

Suez policies.

But Newsweek newsanalyst Henry Hazlitt

wrote an extremely scathing criticism of U.
myths.

The

u. s.

s.

foreign policy

got into the Suez crisis because of its post-

World War II foreign policy "mishmash of specious slogans,
fallacious economic ideas, and pseudo-idealistic assumptions
with no counterpart in reality."

Among the pillars of post-war

American foreign policy, according to Hazlitt, werer
lOO"Nasser--'l'he Real victor?: Unsilenced He Can Rekindle
The Arab World, " Newsweek, Dec. 3, 1956, P• 25.
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••• (1) the reiteration that every step we take must be
"short of war"; (2) the program of giving away money and
goods to foreign governments all over the globe almost
regardless of their internal or external policies; and
(3) an announced determination to "act" only through the
united Nations.
Hazlitt found Eisenhower's announcement, that he could not
"conceive of military force being a good solution,"
as was Dulles• that the
through the Canal.

u. s.

0

gratuitous,•'

did not intend to shoot its way

Both remarks "assured Nasser and the Russian

leaders that they could commit any aggression of barbarity
without fear of reprisal."
tive.

Hazlitt's remarks were quite percep-

Heikal has subsequently confirmed the fact that Nasser

was encouraged by such imprudent Administration remarks.
Concerning the Menzies mission, Heikal wrote:
••• It was an abject failure. It was doomed anyway, doomed
by its originator Dulles who, at a press conference in
Washington on Augus t 28, had told the world that "the Suez
Canal is not a primary concern of the Uni ted States." He
thus rendered Menzies powerless and President Eisenhower
added to Menzies• discomfiture at another press conference
on September 4, soon after Menzies had arrived in Cairo.
"We are committed," said Eisenhower , "to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else ." When Nasser heard of
this, he said: 0 That man puzzles me; which side is he on?"
It was obvious that the Americans were backing down.
Eden was beside himself with fury. And Nasser rode high.101
The remarks Heikal cited were not the same ones Haz litt recalled,
although in both cases the implications were fairly similar.
Thus, it is not difficult to imagine the impact the words Hazlitt
referred to must have had on the EgyptiaM. -

In all probability,

they further confirmed Nasser's belief that time was on the side
of the Egyptians , and that by diplomatic means they could forelOlHeikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., PP• 102-103.
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stall an Anglo-French invasion until world opinion would weigh
so heavily upon the British and French that they would recognize
that force was not an appropriate response.
To Hazlitt, the worst
United Nations.

u. s .

sin was making a fetish of the

For Hazlitt believed, as British and French

statesmen saw at long last, ''that to refer crucial problems to
the

u.

N. is to evade responsibility and invite paralysis."

And

he hoped that before irreparable harm had been done "we in
America will stop putting our c onscience and decisions in the
hands of other nations, and stop throwing away American principles and Western civilization by turning every critical
problem over to the hazards of a vote by African, Asian , and
Communist blocs."

Until the united States found a way out o f

the Suez cris is, its economic outlook would "remain obscure." 102
Later in the crisis, Newsweek newsanalyst Ernest K. Lindley
argued that "lack of a comprehensive, consistent American policy
contributed directJ.y to the recent crisis."

But since the

United States had demonstrated through its non-support for
Britain , France , and Israel, that American foreign policies
were controlled neither by Zionism nor by London and Paris,
"We have a better opportunity to exert constructive leadership
in the Near and Middle East than we have ever had before. 0

In

order to take full advantage of the opportunity, Lindley proposed
that the United States initiate a three-phase program offering:
1 . An Eisenhower Marshall Plan of coordinated financial aid
102Henry Hazlitt, "Foreign Policy Myths ," Newsweek, Dec. 17,
1956, p. 92.
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for Middle Eastern countries, comprehensive enough to make it
unnecessary for any Middle Eastern government to turn to the
Soviets for assistance.

The plan would call for a coordinated

five-or-ten year plan of economic development and resettlement
of the Arab refugees;
2. A permanent Suez settlement including the creation of
an international zone (under United Nations control) 20 to 30
miles wide.

This would permit the digging of a second canal

and the laying of pipelines; and
3. A permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Provided the

u.

N. police force remained in the area, the Arab-

Israeli settlement need not be immediate.

u.

N. would guarantee the frontiers.

of the Gaza Strip.

The

u. s.

and the

Israel might retain control

Jordan might federate with Iraq, with some

frontier adjustments in favor of Israel.
Lindley's comprehensive program of economic development
would be contingent upon a Suez settlement and Arab acceptance
of Israel's right to exist. 103

In the context of the Middle

East in 1956, Lindley•s proposal seems unrealistic.
Arab States have gladly accepted millions of

u. s.

While various
dollars, they

have repeatedly opposed cooperarive economic development schemes.
This was the case when the Eisenhower six-point proposal was
made during the Lebanon crisis scarcely two years later.
below: Chapter VI.)

(see

Egypt was highly unlikely to surrender its

control of the Suez canal Zone to the United Nations.

In fact,

Nasser refused to permit UNEF to be stationed in the Canal Zone,
103Ernest K. Lindley, "Washington Tides, The Opportunity
Is Now, 0 Newsweels::, Dec. 24, 1956, P • 22.
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and to accept UNEF administration of the Gaza strip.

Would

he have been likely to surrender the Strip to Israel? Considering
Egyptian opposition to Hashemite Iraq, Nasser probably would
have resisted its federation with Jordan.

Israel would not

have been the only opponent to such action.
Following the first issue in December, newsmagazine
coverage of the Suez dispute diminished until after the first
of the new year.

Attention was given to the progress of the

Anglo-French pullout, to the supply of oil to Europe, and to
clearance of the Canal.

The British withdrawal was seen as
signaling the end of an era. 104 British Prime Minister Eden

was described as a "tired" man who had succumbed to the
,
.
105
pressures of the invasion.
Post-Anglo-French Withdrawal--Israeli Withdrawal
Unlike the American newspapers, the.American newsmagazines
expressed no criticism of

u. s.

Suez policy as a contributing

factor to the retirement of British Prime Minister sir Anthony
Eden--"the victim of failure and illness ... 106

Eden's successor,

Harold Macmillan, was expected to make strenuous efforts to
restore the Anglo-American alliance.

In this, the "half-American"

Prime Minister would be aided by his long-standing friendship
with President Eisenhower, and by Eisenhower's reputed determi104..worldgram,"

u. s.

News, Dec. 14 , 1956, pp. 77-78.

lOS.,Tired Man," Time, Dec. 3, 1956 , P• 26.
1060 rnternational outlook, .. Business Week , Jan. 12, 1957,
p. 137.
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nation "to set the u. s.-British alliance back on the trackS ...107
The fate of Nasser•s Egypt was also of concern to these

newsmagazines.

They wondered hov long Egypt could withstand

Western economic pressure before becoming bankrupt.

The Egyptian

economy was reportedly in great difficulty--"economic ruin is
staring Nasser in the face . "

But they al.so noted that the low

standard of living prevalent in Egypt and the early imposition
of rationing of goods by the Nasser regime made it unlikely
there would be a rapid collapse.

Nasser, paradoxically, was

seen as stronger than ever and, in all likelihood, well able to
withstand domestic plotting and intrigue.
chance that he would be overthrown.

There was little

Greater fears were expressed

that Egypt would become a soviet satellite and Nasser a Russian

puppet as Egypt came to rely more and more on Russtan economic
support to survive. 10~
Of greatest concern to these American newsmagazines was

Israeli refusal to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Straits
of Tiran without guarantees, and the resulting threat of United

Nations sanctions to compel Israeli compliance with
resolutions.

u.

N

Newsweek saw the Israeli decision as placing the

united States and the united Nations "in a precarious spot,"

ro7"An

Old Friend--A New Change?,N Newsweek , Jan . 21 , 1957,
p. 251 "The Chosen Leader," Time , Jan. 21, 1957 , pp . 18-22; and
"After Eden, What •s Next For Britain?," u. s. News , Jan . 18 ,
1957, pp. 39-40.
108"worldgram," u. s, News , Dec . 21 , 1956 , pp . 71-72i "Russia
Is Favorite as Nasser Gets Ready to Choose Sides ,'' Business Week ,
Jan. 26, 1957, pp. 158-166; "Under Pressure , " ~, Jan . 21 ,
1957, pp. 22-23; and "Worldgram,•• u. s . News , Jan. 25 , 1957 ,
pp. 77-78.
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for the Afro-Asians demanded "immediate action° against Israel
and Egypt warned that

u.

N. failure to act might result in an

indefinite shut-down of the Suez canal.

And Israel was digging

in "for a long stay" in the Gaza Strip.

"It would take strong

words and heavy pressure to avert another Egyptian-Israeli
blowup. 010
Time noted that Israeli defiance of the United Nations was
*'fateful not only for Israel and the Middle East, but for the

u. s.,

the

u.

N. and for world peace."

Intransigence fed

intransigence for it was reported that Nasser had been ' 1 deliberate1y delaying"

u.

N. canal clearance operations and would not

allow the canal to be reopened until the last Israeli left
Egypt.

Time concluded& "If there is no early settlement in the

Middle East, the standing of both the

u.

peacemakers, will suffer a severe blow.

S

and the

u.

N., as

Even more serious is the

prospect that the exchange across the Gaza Strip might once
again shift from words to bullets and bombs . •• 1 1 0
Dulles • assurances to Israel that the
Tiran Straits open and pressure the

u.

u. s.

would keep the

N. to post forces along

the Israeli-Egyptian border were seen as a "determined effort"
to end the deadlock.
indication that "(t)he
behind the

u.

Business week interpreted these steps as

u. s.,

in effect , is getting out from

N. on this issue .

It is offering to use its own

lO "Israela Stubborn Nation on the Spot, " Ne'WSweek , Feb . 18 ,
1957 , pp. 39-40.
l lO"Defying the world,"~ , Feb . 18 , 1957 , pp . 21 - 22 .
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power to force a settlement ...
showdown with Egypt. 111

Its efforts could spark a

Time argued that United States diplo-

macy, while working outside the United Nations "as long as it
could hope to be effective," was "not in conflict" with the
United Nations. 112
When Dulles• assurances to Israel did not bring about the
desired results, President Eisenhower decided to make his
nationwide radio and television address calling upon Israel to
withdraw, and hinting at

u. s.

"pressure" if Israel did not.
variously interpreted.

support for United Nations
The President's address was

Business Week saw the address as giving

Israel "a last chance to back down."
effect of sanctions was unclear.

It noted that the practical

Administration backing of

sanctions could shaJ~e Congressional support for the Eisenhower
Doctrine , and failure to "push Israel into line., could dim
American hopes of bringing Nasser to terms on the Suez Canal
and on an Arab-Israel settlement. Thus, the Administration
113 Later int
.
h
,
.
.
face d a real d ilemma.
e same issue,
Business
Week expressed the belief that the President's speech "was meant
to convince all quarters that he means business about (1) getting
Israel to withdraw from Gaza and from the Gulf of Aqaba; and
1110 rnternational Outlook," Business Week, Feb. 16, 1957,
p. 26 .
112 .,The Crowd Looking on," Time, Feb. 25, 1957, P • 26.
113 .,Behind the Middle East Policy Crisis , " Business Week,
Feb. 23, 1957, PP• 30-31.
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(2) enforcing a rule of law against any belligerence in the

area.0114
Newsweek saw the President's address as indication that:
1. •'To all intents and purposes, present

u.

s.-Israeli negoti-

ations on the working level are at an end (though they could be
resumed)"; and 2. "The President has left the Afro-Asian bloc
in the United Nations free t o press for economic sanctions
against Israel." 115

But

u. s.

News and World Report regarded

Eisenhower's address as an effort "to head off new troubles in
the Middle Eas t." 116
According to Newsweek , Israeli refusal to withdraw upset
the Eisenhower Administration's timetable toward achieving a
peaceful settlement for "the troubled and long turbulent Middle
East," which would have been the crowning achievement of Pres ident Eisenhower's international career.
own and

u. s.

President Eisenhower's

prestige were on the line because he had staked

them on h is ability to d islodge Israel .
Arabs would be lost if he failed.
Israel agreed to evacuate Gaza.

Support of moderate

But he kept at it until
Thus, "(b)arring some last-

.

minute hitch, the path to an honorable compromise seemed to
be opening at last.'• 1 17

114,,rnternational Outlook," in ibid., p. 159.
115 "The
1957, p. 33.

u. s.

and Israel: A Break-Off?, .. Newsweek, Feb. 25,

116 ••Ike's Plea to Israel, Ben-Gurion•s Answer: U. s. Stand:
Troops Should Withdraw From Egypt, Israel's Standr Not Without
Guarantees," u. s. News, Mar. 1, 1957, PP• 65-70.
117 .. Peace Hung in the Ba lance," Newsweek, Mar. 4, 1957,
pp . 27-28.
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Both~ and Business Week foresaw deeper

u. s. involve-

ment in the Middle East as a consequence of the Israeli agreement to withdraw following American assurances .

The United

States had emerged from the Suez crisis to play the dominant
role in the Middle East as the U

s.

moved to fill the power

vacuum in the Middle East. 118
Following the Israeli agreement and withdrawal, several of
these American newsmagazines expressed the belief that the
United States would turn its pressure on Egypt to "exact from
Nasser assurances" toward Israel , to settle the future of the
Suez Canal, to bring about a permanent "truce" in the ArabIsraeli conflict , and to start oil flowing to Europe . 11 9
Summary Remarks on Newsmagazines
Three of the four weekly newsmagazines, Business Week ,

s.

Time , and

u.

tration.

Criticism by them of Eisenhower-Dulles Suez policy

News and World Report were clearly pro-Adminis-

was so rare as to be almost non-existent.

Their position was

clearly one of near total support for Administration policies .
Newsweek s ideological position throughout the crisis was
indeterminate.

It was neither strongly pro-Administration , nor

strongly anti-Administration.

It tended to present the facts

of Administration policies with interpretations of t heir
118 ff1srael1 The Watchman of Zi on, " Time , Mar . 11 , 1957 ,
pp. 26-27; and ''Fresh Start in the Middle East, " Business Week,
Mar. 9 , 1957, pp. 23- 24 .
119 • rnternationa l outlook,'' Business Week , Mar . 2, 1957 ,
pp. 133-134; "Pressures , " ~. Ma r . 4 , 1957 , P • 26 ; and
"Worldgram," u. s . News , Mar . 8 , 1957 , PP • 79- 80 .
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significance, without taking any particular stand on them.
The strongest eXpression of criticism of

u. s.

Suez policies

during the entire crisis appeared in Newsweek newsanalyst
Henry Hazlitt's feature, "Business Tides," on December 17,
1956.

Hazlitt attacked

issue.

u. s.

foreign policy myths in that

Normally, however, during the crisis, Hazlitt supported

the notions of the rule of law in the international community
and the sanctity of contracts, both positions with which the
Eisenhower Administration was in genera l agreement. 120
Thus, by and large, the Eisenhower Administration enjoyed
an overwhelmingly favorable press among the weekly American
newsmagazines, in contrast to the daily newspapers, which were
often quite critical of Administration actions .

Consequently,

the Administration had little cause to fear hostile press
reaction from the newsmagazines .
Opinion Journals and the Suez Crisis
Some of the most critical comment on United States foreign
policy during the Suez crisis appeared in American opinion
journals, such as, Commonweal, The Nation, The New Republic , and
The Reporter. The editorial positions of these four journals on

u. s.

Suez policy will be analyzed briefly, for they are repre-

sentative of the adverse criticism to which the Eisenhower
Administration was subjected over its Suez policy.

TWO of these

120see: Henry Hazlitt, 0 Invitation to Seizure," Newsweek,
Aug. 27, 1956, p. 88; and Henry Hazlitt, "For the Rule of Law,••
Newsweek, Dec. 10, 1956 , p. 96.
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opinion journals--The Nation and The New Republic--were highly
critical of Secretary of State Dulles.

our analysis will

concentrate on editorials which appeared in the four journals
at the time of the crisis.

While articles on the crisis

appeared occasionally in these journals, they were few in
number, and they generally conformed to the editorial position
of the journal in which they were printed.
Editorial comment on the crisis appeared irregularly in
the four journals.

Weeks , and in one case months, passed

without mention of crisis-related events.

our analysis will

probe these opinion journals' re f lections on

u. s.

Suez policy.

Some of them offered novel, and, it must be said, not too
realistic--in the context of the times--suggestions for alternative foreign policies.

Each of the four journals advocated

independent editorial policies; there were, however, some
points of convergence, which will be noted appropriately.

Of

the four journals to be studied, three are weekly publications-Commonweal, The Nation, and The New Republic--and one--The
Reporter--is a biweekly publication.

The term opinion journals

will be used frequently in this chapter to refer specifically
to these four journals.
commonweal saw in the withdrawal of the western offer to
help finance the High Dam and the subsequent Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, an illustration of the

0

perils 0
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inherent in "changing policy in mid-flight.••

While recognizing

that Nasser was not an easy man for the West to deal with,
Commonweal could see nothing to be gained through the imposition
of economic sanctions on Egypt and it regarded as "folly"
expectations to dislodge Nasser by force of arms.

It feared

the possibility of Egypt turning to the Russians for aid

u. s.

The

should have stayed with its original offer of financial

assistance "regardless of Soviet blandishments and Nasser
threats."

And it expressed for the first time its concern over

a decline in

u. s.

prestige and power in the Middle East,

"(W)e now have the satisfaction of 'knowing that by backing out
on Aswan we have alienated large segments of the Arab world ... 121
In its August 28 issue, Commonweal expressed the
belief that it was not in the United States interest to participate in any British objective of "cutting Nasser down to size"
for the means which Britain had discussed "either threaten our
interests in the Middle East or contain the seeds of the third
world war."

Therefore, the United States "cannot lend present

support" to this objective of British foreign policy. 122
In its September 28 edition, commonweal voiced concern
that American support for the Anglo-French-policy of concerted
economic pressure on Egypt was "shortsightedn for, far from
achieving a return to international control of the canal , this
policy would merely solidify anti-western sentiments in much
l ?l .,Embattled Suez," c mmonweal , Vo. LXIV , No . 19 , Aug . 10 ,
1956, pp. 455-456.
122 ffThe Suez crisis," commonweal , Vol. LXIV, No. 21 ,
Aug. 24, 1956, p. 506.
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of the Arab world and would alienate most of the uncommitted
nations.

"Moreover, such a policy simply opens wide the door

to Russian dominance in the Middle East." 123 While it is
questionable that the entire area would have come under Soviet
dominance in such an eventuality, it is probable that Egypt
would have been pushed further in that direction.

The effec-

tiveness of such tactics in compelling Egyptian acquiescence
to Western demands is open to question, for Egypt was then,
even more than now, a predominantly agricultural society, not
greatly affected by the international market.

Commonweal did

not sufficiently analyze the options available to the West in
the Suez dispute.

Essentially, they were three in number:

1. economic sanctions--of doubtful utility; 2. force; and
3. protracted negotiations.

To compel Egyptian compliance

with Western wishes, only the first two had any chance to
succeed.

Protracted negotiations were unlikely to result in a

settlement satisfactory to Britain and France since the longer
negotiations lasted, the more likely Nasser was to win his case
by default.

Because there was little chance economic sanctions

would be effective, force, the only option remaining to them,
had great appeal to Anglo-French leaders.

Their error was not

to follow through once they had initiated military action.
Commonweal saw the United States as at least partially
responsible for the situation in the Middle East and for the
outbreak of war.

It charged that the United states had followed

a "policy of no-policy" which helped prepare the ground for the
123,,suez Boycott,., commonweal:, Vol. LXIV, No. 26, Sept. 28,

1956, pp. 624-625.
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crisis, and which accounted for a decline in American power and '
prestige in the area.

It accused the Eisenhower Administration

of a failure "to design a policy which would be cl.ear to
ourselves, to our allies and to the nations of the Middle East ... 124
Unclear
because

u. s . foreign
the u. s. had

policy resulted in war over the Suez Canal
managed to frustrate and to alienate all

parties to the conflict.

There was little for Americans to d o

but "to wax indignant and condemn those actions which we had
helped to bring about."
failure of

u. s.

It was now impossible to hide the

foreign policy.

The only thing left for the

United States to do was to learn a lesson from these events.
"In a shifting world the nation must have a firm yet flexible
foreign policy ... 125
flexible"

u. s .

While pointing out the need for a "firm yet

f oreign policy, Commonweal did not indicate how

this was to be brought about.
Later, on the question of Israeli withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran, Commonweal indicated that
the united States had taken a too rigid stand on withdrawal and
was later forced to back down and to concede the need for some
sort of guarantees to Israel against fedayeen raids and blockade.
Reported

u. s.

willingness to support a proposal to use the u. N.

police force in Egypt to protect Israel was seen as sure to
encounter Arab-Asian opposition within the

u. N.

The

u. s.

anti-Israel stand, after all , had just won Arab-Asian favor,
124"Crisis in the Middle East," Commonweal, Vol. LXV, No. 6,
Nov. 9, 1956 , p . 142.
125.,Failure of Policy," commonweal, Vol. LXV, No. 7, Nov. 16,
1956 , pp. 165-166.
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which the

u. s.

should want to keep.

"One can only trust that

this whirlwind turn of events has taught those shaping our
foreign policy that all-or-nothing decisions are usually hard
to live with • ., 126
Fearful that the wholehearted imposition of sanctions could
set off a new outbreak of the clearly superior Israeli armed
forces, Commonweal suggested three policy alternatives which the
Administration might pursue, any one of which seemed to it to
offer .,greater possibilities than the present White House formul a " •
1. The American Navy could assume responsibility for keeping

the Gulf of Aqaba open to shipping bound for Israel;
2. The

u.

S. could support some "largely pious 0

u.

N.

resolution regardless of Arab displeasure; and
3. The

u.

u. s.

could encourage establishment of a series of

N.-policed buffer zones to effectively separate the Middle

Eastern combatants. 127
The

u. s.

supporting a

0

was reluctant to incur Arab displeasure by
largely pious"

u.

N. resolution as a means of

avoiding the complexities of the situation.
crisis, the

u. s.

During the Suez

sought to minimize Arab and Third World

suspicions about the purity of American motives.

Commonweal's

suggestions that the American Navy should guarantee Gulf of
Aqaba shipping open passage to Israel, and/or that the
should encourage the establishment of

u.

u. s.

N.-policed buffer zones

1260 Egyptian Dilemma,., Commonweal, Vol. LXV, No. 18, Feb. 1,
1957, p. 454.
127 "Gaza-Aqaba," commonweal, Vol. LXV, No . 23, Mar. 8, 1957,

pp. 580-581.
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to effectively separate Middle Eastern combatants, had little
merit.

The former implied a greater degree of

u. s.

involvement

in the Middle East, and a willingness, if necessary, to use
force to enforce such guarantees.

The difficulty with the latter

was that it would have required an even greater degree of

u. s,

support for the United Nations, and a further renunciation of
U,

s.

independence of action.

Both courses of action would

have, in all likelihood, met with Arab opposition, for the general
thrust of Arab foreign policy was to reduce to a minimum foreign
involvement in Middle Eastern affairs.

Both steps would have

required that the Eisenhower Administration court Arab displeasure.

But Washington sought to curry Arab favor, and deemed

prestige on the rise in the Middle East.

u. s.

However, by the summer

of 1957, as Finer observed: "The vaunted rise in American prestige in the Middle East, expected by Dulles and State Department
officials as a reward for the Administration's enmity towards
the allies• attack on Suez, was dissipated (if it had ever
existed)."

In June, 1957, Nasser attributed the Anglo-French

cease-fire to several causes: the allies had not won a quick
victory, the Egyptians were prepared to continue fighting, the
Egyp ian army still existed, although in retreat, and world
opinion was adverse to allied action. Nasser reduced credit to
.
,
. nhower. 128
Russia,
and omitted
thanks to Dulles and Eise
Having ignored the crisis editorially since Jul y, in
October, prior to the outbreak of war, The Nation predi c t ed
that Eden had discovered that gunboa t diplomacy was "obsolete"
128 Finer, Dulles over Suez , op . cit ., P • 501 .
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for "(n)either domestic opinion nor world opinion will sanction
'gunboat• tactics in situations where the danger of provoking
a general war is implicit."

It found that economic sanctions

were also obsolete in a bi-polar world in which a rival power
bloc existed, and from which the boycotted nation could obtain,
noften at a premium, the supplies and materials it needs to
survive."

Sanctions could only be effective if backed by all

major powers, East and West, through the United Nations. 129
Because the Department of State had granted permission to
a number of

u. s.

ship pilots to leave for Egypt to work as

Suez Canal pilots, The Nation concluded that the users' association was

0

not a policy but another of Mr. Dulles' nifty

improvisations--this one designed to forestall any decision
•
on Suez until
after Nove rober 6 , " 130
Like Commonweal, The Nation considered the United States
at least partially responsible for the Suez crisis.

The Nation

held Dulles principally to blame for the crisis, for it was
he who had kept the West from inducing Nasser to negotiate,
As a result of

u.

N. negotiations, and the mediation of Secretary-

General Hammarskjold, Britain and France were moving

0

in a

positive direction" with the agreement to the six Principles.
"To do this, they had to remove a lot of deadwood, mostly of
1290 Gunboats Are Obsolete," The Nation, Vol. 183, No . 14,
Oct, 6, 1956, P• 277.
i 3 o,,The Improvisation of Mr. Dulles," The Nation, Vol, 183,
No. 14, Oct. 6, 1956, P• 277.
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American origin."

A Russian veto killed the proposals of the

first London Conference,
tant. part."

0

in which Mr. Dulles played an impor-

And the Suez Canal Users• Association, "which

Dulles dreamed up," and which now was largely a ,.dead duck,"
was subject of new Washington efforts to give it "some semblance
of life in modified form.,.

'rhe Nation quipped: "Britain and

France, in short, are for a time on their own and they will
probably do much better that way.u 131
The outbreak of war in Egypt gave rise to optimism on the
part of The Nation, which foresaw the deterioration of the Cold
War power blocs that had been a major hindrance to United Nations
effectiveness.

Their disintegration might make possible greater '

cooperation between the

u. s. s.

transform the United Nations.••

R. and the

u. s.

"which could

The Nation was all in favor of

the United States utilizing the United Nations as a major channe l
for directing

u. s.

foreign policy.

It saw

u. s.-u. s. s.

R.

alignment in the United Nations on the Suez question and on the

u. s.

resolution as a good omen, for, after a decade of by-

passing the World Body and of weakening it by mutual defense
pacts, "we now find ourselves f reshly appraising it as the
soundest possible structure within which to adjust great-andsmall power relationships and t o seek solutions for world
problems."

The great powers might resolve their differences

through the

u.

N. by channeling their power safely through it.

And Israeli military action might force the great powers to
press for a lasting Middle Eastern peace between Arabs and
l 3 l"Big Ditch at U. N.," The Nation, Vol. 183, No. 17,

Oct. 27, 1956, p. 337.
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Israelis.

''Time is clearly on the side of peace if this brush-

fire war can be stamped out quickly.••

Technology was rapidly

altering the significance of the Suez Canal .

The Nation

predicted that within a year super-tankers and British nuclear
power stations would place the Suez issue in a different
perspective.

Furthermore, the lessons of the previous six

months would teach Third World leaders that there were easier
ways to secure funds for huge development projects "than to
stage tantrums."

The Nation, abandoning all touch with the

reality of power politics, prophesied:
In the manner of the Egyptian legend, a phoenix is
being consumed in the flames of the Sinai pyre. The
phoenix that is dying is a symbol of a world that is
dying, a world of power politics, military alliances,
gun-boat diplomacy, curt ultimatums, irresponsible
aggressions, a world of national states dedicated to
the mutually destructive position that war is the
prime instrument of national policy. A new phoenix
will arise from these ashes.132
The words of the oracle were trampled in the dust as the United
States and Great Britain jointly practiced gunboat diplomacy
scarcely two years later in Lebanon and Jordan .
The Administration, according to The Nation , had acted
wisely in taking the Suez and Hungarian crises to the united
Nations .

Eisenhower made no blustering statements and he

avoided taking the issue from the
a Big Power conference.

u.

N., ' "where it belongs," to

The Suez crisis liberated the

from too close association with Anglo-French policies.

u. s.
The

132 .. The Phoenix Pyre," The Nation, Vol. 183, No. 19,
Nov. 10, 1956, pp. 377-379.
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u. s.

won prestige in colonial areas by its support for the

United Nations Charter and its refusal to back its allies•
military action.

While

u. s.

policy might have earned some

Third World dividends, the impact was temporary, at best.
Third World leaders were not so easily weaned from their
suspicions of the Super Powers.

As noted, by the summer of

1957, any increase of American prestige in the Arab countries,
which might have occurred as a result of
was dissipated.

u. s.

(see above: pp. 342-343.)

Nation incorrectly assessed the temporary

Suez policy,

Furthermore, The

u. s .

expedient of

independence from its allies and dependence upon the United
Nations as a significant development portending long-range
consequences.

Thus, The Nation rejoiced,

The Administration's policy in dealing with both
crises holds promise of strengthening the u. N. At long
last American policy-makers see that since this country
must, because of its position, keep a number of different
forces in some kind of balance at all times--support for
Israel, good relations with Western Europe and the British
Commonwealth, long-range good relations with the Arab
world, avoidance of a direct clash with the soviet Union,
etc.--American power can be applied most wisely and
effectively through the u. N. Hence , there is a good
chance that the world organization will become the major
pivot of American policy •••• 133
In reality, there was little chance of such an eventuality.
Nevertheless , .The Nation persisted in insisting that
only through the United Nations could the United States hope
133 "The United Nations, Pivot of American Power," The
Nation , Vol. 183, No. 21, Nov. 24, 1956, P• 441 .
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to avoid direct entanglement in the "ruinous" decisions of
Britain and France, jeopardy to Israeli security, or alienation
of the Asian-African bloc.

Not that the u. N. should be the

sole reliance of the Eisenhower Administration, but that "(i)f
American power is to be used to back any mandate, that mandate
must be

u.

N.-sanctioned ... 134

In choosing to support the united States on the question
of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Tiran, in the view o f ~
Nation, President Eisenhower was looking to safeguard the longterm interests of Israel as well as the united States by
strengthening the United Nations.

But he was not helped in

this regard by Secretary Dulles who prematurely talked of
sanctions and the proposal to test the right of "innocent
passage" in the GUlf of Aqaba.

"Nor was his (Eisenhower's)

burden ·lightened by reason of the fact that Mr. DUlles is now
distrusted in the Senate, by the leaders of both parties, to
almost the same degree that he is distrusted at the u. N. and
.
t
,
1 35
in mos capitals."
The Nation intimated that while Mr, Dulles might be "one
of those unhappy creatures who was born with his foot in his
mouth," he was now too old to change.

He

was depicted as

having a talent for creating enmity, distrust and irritation
on both sides of Congress as well as abroad .

Eisenhower s

"continued insensitivity to the maladroitness of his Secretary
1 340 The use of American Power," The Nation , Vol. 183,
No. 22, Dec. 1, 1956, p. 469.
i 35 .,The American Interest,•• The Nation , Vol . 184 , No. 9,
Mar. 2, 1957, p. 177.
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of State" had placed Eisenhower himself uon the spot ."

The

President's continued loyalty to Dulles, according to The
Nation, ·v as unacceptable, whether it was based on understanding

or misunderstanding of what his righthand man was doing. 136
Thus, The Nation, which was extremely critical of
Suez policy before the outbreak of war, supported u.

u. s.

s. reliance

upon the United Nations and President Eisenhower 's efforts to
arrange an Israeli withdrawal.

Throughout the crisis, it

remained hypercritical of Secretary Dulles and his efforts.
The Reporter also held the United States accountable for
its alleged part in causing the Middle East war.

It found:

"The Administration's diplomacy drove Britain and France to
such a point that, for their own salvation, they felt compelled
to do a thing that was slightly against the still hazy principles
of the united Nations, and more than slightly risky. 0

While

Britain, France and Israel had to be brought to account for
their actions, the u.

s. would have been wise to recognize in

the u. N. General Assembly that the three nations had been
guilty "of a sort of international misdemeanor, not a major
crime."

Furthermore, the Administration should have urged

immediately that

11

something radical .. be done to solve the Middle

Eastern "mess."

The Reporter continued: "As this magazine has

suggested, the only way to reach any real result is to have the
whole region neutralized , and to negotiate that neutralization
136 "Who's to Blame for Mr. Dulles?," The Nation, Vol. 184,
No. 6, Feb . 9, 1957, P• 109.
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with Soviet Russia." 137

This suggestion had been made b y ~

Reporter several weeks before the outbreak of war, and had been
repeated, with some regularity, throughout the Suez crisis. 138
Editor Ascoli, originator of the suggestion, failed to indicate
how the neutralization of the Middle East could be achieved at
the height of Cold War tensions.
air of unreality.

Thus, his idea had about it an

In this latest editorial, Ascoli charged that

the Eisenhower Administration was reluctant to recognize the
Russians ' role in the area and to negotiate with them--"that
would be appeasement."

To avoid appeasement, The Administration

was said to be f ol lowing the Russian lead, and to be acting as
a "Russian satellite . "

.!\.scoli noted that the Administration

did this "for high principle .

There is nothing it will not do

for principle--including being unmerciful to the allies on
whose strength we depend . ,, 139
Following the announcement of Israeli agreement to withdraw from the Gaza St rip and the Strai ts of Tiran, The Reporter
handed out accolades to the principal participants--to Premier
Ben-Gurion ("for wise moderation at the final moment"); to
Secretary-General Hammarskjold ("because of whose stewardship
the

u.

N. has not been wrecked by too many burdens that have

been imposed on it"); to Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister
137Max Ascoli, "The Lazy Giant, Editorial, The Reporter,
Vol. 15, No. 10 , Dec . 13, 1956 , p . 8.
0

138 see 1 Max Ascoli, "A Neutralized Middle East'?,•• Editorial,
The Reporter, Vol. 15, No . 4, Sept . 20, 1956, p. 10; and "Time
for a Breakthrough ," The Reporter , Vol . 15, No. 5, Oct. 4,
1956, p. 4.
139 Max Ascoli, "The Lazy Giant," loc. cit.
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Pineau ("(a)s proven friends of Israel, they helped convince
Ben-Gurion that he could trust the word of our Administration");
and to Secretary Dulles ("for once ••• not the victim of his own
guile'').

In retrospect, The Repgrter saw the greatest hazard

of the Gaza-Aqaba impasse "that it erupted constantly from the
tables of negotiation into the diplomacy of the front page"
where there was always the danger that men would be lead "into
taking up public positions front which there later may be no
retreat."

Fortunately the principais realized before long that

appeals to the "world sounding board" were not achieving the
desired results and they determined to return to the "art of
diplomacy." 1 ~·o
From the first, The New Republic argued that a negotiated
settlement was indicated and that it could best be found in the
"middle ground" between the Anglo-French position and the
Egyptian position.

Since Egypt was not in attendance, the

first London Conference could not settle the issue.

Therefore,

a second conference such as that suggested by the soviet Union
and by Egyptian President Nasser might be needed "to lower the
.
.
. .
tensions,
and b ring
worl d opinion
to b ear." 14 1

In its debate on

u. s.

Suez policy, The New Republic

indicated that the West had shown no willingness to consider
giving up anything in order to reach a compromise with Egypt
140 ••A Job Well Done," The Reporter , Vol . 16, No . 6,
Mar. 21, 1957, p. 2.
141 .. solution for suez ," The New Republic, Vol . 135, No. 6,
Aug. 6, 1956, p . 3; and "Middle Ground on Suez," The New
Republic , Vol. 135, No. a, Aug. 20, 1956, pp. 4-5.
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over Suez.

At this point, it made the novel suggestion that

the United States submit the Panama Canal to discussion by its
users.

The New Republic asked1 "If Mr. DUl.les still has hopes

that Nasser might agree to some kind of international control
over the navigation rights in the Suez canal, would he not be
wise to propose voluntarily a similar arrangement for the
Panama Canal, and to do it now when such an offer would impose
'
? 142
maximum
pressure on the Egypt 'ians"
In a later issue, The New Republic indicated the unlikelihood that boycotting the canal would accrue to the Nest's
benefit.

It claimed that "Mr. Dulles should move far beyond his

present position.
sufficient."

His policy of sufficient unto the day is not

It then repeated its argument that the scope of

discussions should be broadened to include talks about the
future of the Panama Canal.

Thus to solve a complex inter-

national issue, The New Republic suggested that the issue could
be cleared up by making the discussions more complex.

Compounding

matters still further, The New Republic continued1
••• Along with this Mr. Dulles would be wise to suggest that
present discussions be broadened to include reconsideration
of methods for financing the high dam at Aswan, a project
that could dramatize our desire to improve the daily lives
of Egyptians and their neighbors. And finally, is it not
time for the u. s. to suggest the possibility of some
co-operative method for exploiting the oil resources of
the Middle East, so that the natutal wealth ••• could be
diverted from ••• a few pashas to the liberation of the
people ••• from economic degradation?
It must also be noted that The New Republic which offered
142 0Mr . Dulles and suez , 11 The New Republic , Vol. 135 ,
No. 12, Sept. 17, 1956 , p. a.
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such expansive suggestions for policy alternatives was ironically, of the four opinion journals studied, the most critical
of Secretary of State Dulles.

Earlier in the same editorial, The

New Republic observed caustically that, following his "clumsy"
withdrawal of the American offer to help build the High Dam.
Dulles' "talent for fancy footwork" had never been better demonstrated than during the Suez crisis.
is everywhere.

"He is here, he is there, he

When Colonel Nasser complains that he does not

•really know what the Americans are after,• Dulles may take it as
a compliment.

For the Secretary has meant to keep all sides off-

balance; he is playing for time."

While The New Republic was

willing to aclmowledge Dulles• flexibility, it was not ready to
credit him with vision, for. in its view, Western leadership was
characterized by its "too limited response, 'being compelled to
concede ••• when concessions can no longer save the day.•n 143
Predictably, The New Republic was not satisfied with

u. s.

reliance upon the United Nations, and suggested that American
initiative in the Middle East would be necessary after the ceasefire and military withdrawal, if a permanent settlement for the
area were to be reached.

Were the United States to have seriously

sought to further a permanent settlement, there is nothing in
the record to indicate that such efforts would have been successful.

Nasser, having survived the Suez fiasco, was not in any

mood for compromise.

Without his cooperation. there was little

chance to reach a Middle Eastern solution.
143 ••John Foster Pimpernel," The New Republic, Vol. 135,
No. 13, Sept. 24, 1956, P• 4.
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Realistically, The New Republic envisioned only two
strategic alternatives open to the United states, 1. to work
with the

u. s. s. R. to neutralize the Middle East; or 2. to

align itself with one or more Arab countries to counterbalance
Russian penetration and the political maneuvering of President
Nasser . 144

Other proposals for

tive were made later.
that the

u.

u. s. assumption of the initia-

For. example, The New Republic suggested

S. might support guarantees to Israel of her right

of innocent passage through the Tiran Straits, and of security-"both ways••--of the Israeli-Egyptian border • 145
When Israel agreed to withdraw, The New Republic acknowledged Secretary-General Hammarskjold's role in concluding the
successful negotiations.

Dulles was blamed for nearly over-

turning Hammarskjold's plan when, following a "skeptical

0

Israeli response to his February 11 assurances, "Mr . Dulles,
angered, threatened to support immediate sanctions.

Only domestic

political opposition and the appeals of our European allies saved
us from a decision which would have made a settlement all but
impossible ...

The New Republic closed the editorial with the

fervent hope that Dulles would keep his thoughts to himself, and
would not claim a great diplomatic victory for himself and the
Administration before the television cameras.

"In the weeks

ahead, harmony will be best achieved if Mr. Dulles plays a
l 44 .. The U.S. and Egypt ," The New Republic, Vol.. 135,
No. 21, Nov . 19, 1956, pp. 4-5. see al.so: Eisenhower's
Request," The New Republic, Vol. 136, No. 1, Jan. 7, ~957,
pp. 4-5; and "Mr. Lodge's Initiative," The New Republic,
Vol . 136, No . 4, Jan. 28, 1957, P• 6.
145 "sinai Guarantees,;' The New Republic, Vol. 136, No. 7,
Feb. 18, 1957, p. 5.
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pianissimo accompaniment to Mr. Hammarskjo1a. 0146
Considering its obviously negative opinion of Mr. Dulles,
it is little wonder that earlier The New Republic had suggested
that it might be time for Mr . Dulles to retire.

It argued that

Dulles was "guilty of gross neglect" since his chief executive
remained ignorant of the planned Anglo-French attack against
Egypt .

Dulles was "disliked

0

by our .. estranged" European allies,

"distrusted" by Asian and Middle Eastern leaders.

The New

Republic concluded by· askings
Is the man in whom our NATO associates have little
if any confidence the man whom we can trust to restore
confidence? ••• The Pr esident has not yet made use of his
traditional privilege of reshuffling his Cabinet. Would
it not be wise for him to begin by replacing his secretary
of State?l47
Dulles bore the burden of criticism during and after the
Suez crisis, frequently for policies and decisions which were
not his own, but Eisenhower's.

For example, it was Eisenhower

who decided: 1. to seek a peaceful settlement to the Suez dispute;
2. to react h arshly to the Anglo-French attack; 3. to press for
cease-fire and withdrawal; and 4. to pressure the allies through
economic means.

While the decision to withdraw from the Aswan

High Dam project was primarily Dulles', most subsequent, major
Suez decisions were Eisenhower's.

While Eisenhower claimed

never to have doubted the wisdom of cancellation, he later entertained thoughts that the way it was handled ••might have been
1460 The 123 Days ," The New RepubJ.ic, Vol. 136, No . 10,
Mar. 11, 1957, pp. 4-5 .
147 "Time to Retire," The New Republic, Vol. 135, No . 24,
Dec . 10, 1956, p. 4.
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undiplomatic,'' and so indicated to Dulles.

In a letter dated

September 15, 1956, Dulles respondeds 1. telephone conversations,
of which the

u. s.

had intelligence, indicated "that the Egyp-

tian Government knew that when they came, as they did, to get a
definitive reply it would be negative"; and 2. if he had not
acted as he did, "the Congress would certainly have imposed it
on us, almost unanimously .,l 4 Ba
Since Eisenhower knew that Dulles was absorbing the brunt of
the criticism, whether deserved or not, he must have been reluctant to bow to public pressure for Dulles• replacement.

As we

have seen, Eisenhower was accutely aware of European criticism
of

u. s.

Suez policy.

Nevertheless, the President retained

Dulles, in whom he had great faith, although he undoubtedly
realized that the close association of the Secretary of State, in
the public mind, with

u. s.

Suez policy would make his post-Suez

assignment of restoring European confidence more difficult.
It bears remembering that comments like these were made by
journals committed to the American system of democratic capitalism,
not by socialist publications, such as Monthly Review, which
interpreted

u. s.

policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the

Suez dispute as geared to .. propping up ••• an outworn system•• and
as intended to reap big profits from the export of Latin American
148aEisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 33. Hoopes noted
that a year later Dulles replied to a similar inquiry from the
President with a wholly new defensive argument. On October 30,
1957, Dulles wrote Eisenhowers "President Nasser has since said
that he planned for nearly two years to seize the Suez Canal.
Company, but was waiting for a good occasion. He knew that if he
pressed for a decision from us when be did the result would be
negative because the congressional action {the report of the Senate
Appropriations committee) had been announced. Neve:thele~s he
pressed for a definitive answer, and I suspect he did so in order
to create the occasion for which he was looking." Hoopes, The
Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 343.
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oil to Europe in the event of a canal closing. 148b

Far from it,

the opinion journals studied were part of the Amer.ican mainstream.

Commonweal was more moderate in its criticism.

The

Reporter and The Nation were more critical, and The New Republic
was the most critical.

All detected partial

bility for the Suez crisis.

u. s.

responsi-

All doubted the effectiveness of

economic sanctions against Egypt and of boycotting the Suez
Canal.

All opposed sanctions against Israel.
Scholarly Journals and the Suez Crisis

A sampling of scholarly journals published during the Suez
crisis revealed that, excepting law journals, the crisis was
little treated by them.

The journals sampled were:

American Journal of International Law
American Political Science Review
Current History
Foreign Affairs
Harvard Law Review
Journal of Politics
Middle East Journal
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Western Political Quarterly
The American Political Science Review and the Journal of
Politics carried no material on the crisis.
Current History carried a few crisis related documents in
November and December, 1956.

Under the heading, "World Docu-

148b"What Every American Should Know About the Suez Crisis,.,
Monthly Review , Vol. 8, Oct., 1956, pp. 181-191.
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ments," in its November issue, Current History featureda
1. "Suez Canal Users

Association.. --texts of the declara-

tion of the establishment of a Suez Canal Users

Association,

and of a statement issued by the second London Conference on
the Suez crisis; and
2. "The Text of the Constantinople Convention of 1888

Free Navigation of the Sue2 canal." 149
In the December issue, under the heading, "Statements on
the Middle East," Current History reproduced the following
documents,
1. "Israeli Statement on the Invasion of Egypt"--text of
the October 29 statement of the Israeli Foreign Ministry on
the invasion of Egypt;
2. "French Statement on Egyptian aid to Algeria"--text of

French representative Bernard Cornut-Gentille s statement
presented to the

u N. Security Council on October 29; and

3. "British-French Resolution on the Suez canal users•
Association"--text of the French and British joint resolution
on the Suez as presented to the Security Council on October

s. 1

Foreign Affairs carried an article by Belgian Foreign
Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, "The West In Disarray."

To Spaak,

the Suez crisis indicated that the "insufficiency" of the
United Nations as then constituted had never before stood out
so clearly.

Spaak called for modifications of the Charter to

149current History, Vol. 31, No. 183 , Nov., 1956 . pp. 305-308.
lSOCurrent History,
•
l 31 , No. 184 , Dec., 1956 • pp. 363 - 365 •
Vo.
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eliminate the caricature masquerading as

u.

N

justice which

rewarded those nations bold enough to accomplish the most
reprehensible act Hbut which very cleverly stops short, not of
violence, but of open war."
Secondly, the Atlantic Alliance had failed during the Suez
crisis.

The Western alliance must be reconstituted.

"The

principal partners need only to have a little more trust in
one another, to be more deeply aware of their fundamental
unity."

And the West must respond to the global challenge of

Communism which threatens the very survival of Western
civilization.
And thirdly, Western Europeans might consider unity more
favorably in light of the recent crisis.

There were already

indications of a growing thrust toward European unity evident
in the then upcoming agreements on the Common Market and on
Euratom, the European project for the peaceful development of
atomic energy. 151
The Middle East Journal, in its Winter, 1957, issue
carried a section, "Developments of the Quarter , " under which
it featured comments and chronology which ran to 28 pages .

The

chronology was preceded by comments in which it was observed
that not since the 1947-48 Arab-Israeli war had the United
Nations played sucn a prominent role in the many difficulti es
of the Middle East.

The Journal theorized ,

151Paul-Henri Spaak, "The West In Disarray , " Foreign
Affairs , Vol . 35, No . 2 , Jan ., 1957 , PP • 184-90.
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••• With much more unanimity than then (1947-48), the
N. has taken a stand, not so far to solve the questions,
but to restore a deteriorated situation to the status quo

u.

~- ..

The same events which have made an early settlement
more necessary than ever have also rendered the prospects
of that settlement more unlikely. These events have
tended to coalesce the Palestine and Suez questions •••
into one, and thus to make both less susceptible of
rational examination. They will certainly not be solved
in any grand, over-all coup, but at least the necessary
disentangling process has begun. 152

In the same issue, under the title, •'Documents,., the Middle

East Journal featureds "U. N. General Assembly Resolutions on
the Recent Hostilities in Egypt." 153
In the Spring, 1957, issue the Middle East Journal, in

its "Documents•• section, carried the followingr
1. "UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) Resolution of

2 February 1957"J and
2. "Israeli Foreign Minister s Address of March 1, 1957. ,, 154

The Western Political Quarterly ran an article by Khosrow
Mostofi, "The Suez Disputes A Case Study of a Treaty," which
analyzed the development of the Constantinople Convention of
1888 historically and attempted to assay the impact of the

Suez crisis on it.

The article concluded that following the

Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and their subsequent
withdrawal, the Constantinople convention was no longer relevant.
"(T)here is today no principle of international law governing
152 Middle East Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1, Winter , 1957,
pp. 63-91.
153Ibid., pp. 92-94.
154Middle East Journal , Vol. XI , No. 2 , Spring , 1957,
pp. 191-198.
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the Suez canal except that which assigns it to the_exclusive
soveriegnty of Egypt.

Under these circumstances the appropriate

course is to negotiate a new multilateral treaty for international use of the canal, rather than to rest upon the icy
155
.
Convention."
.
corpse of the Constantinople
The remainder of the indexed articles appeared in law
journals late in the crisis or in the month of April, 1957,
the month after Israeli withdrawal.

They were concerned

primarily with the legality of Egyptian nationalization of the
canal, the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, and the
question of compensation of stockholders.
Opinion varied on the Egyptian right to nationalize the
Suez Canal.

Thomas T. F , Huang, writing in the American Journal

of International Law, argued that the contention that the
concession agreements of the Suez Canal Company form an integral
part of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 , because they
were referred to both in the preamble and in the text, was not
supported by the travaux preparatot tes respecting the 1888
Convention .
However , Huang proceded, it is arguable that the December 1 ,
1873 , Decl aration of the Ottoman Porte established per se the
.,objective international status" of the Suez Maritime Canal
Company and thus formed sufficient basis for the appl ication of
public international law.

''Consequently the company was no

longer within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of Egypt , and
1551<hosrow Mostofi , "The Suez Dispute , A Case Study of a
Treaty," The Western Political Quarte rly , Vol. X, No . 1 ,
Mar. , 1957, P • 37 .
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its nationalization was a violation of public international
law."1 56
on the other hand typical arguments used at that time to
support the claim that the Egyptian nationalization was illegal
were struck down by Harvard Law students in a Harvard Law
Review article, "Notesa Nationalization of the Suez canal
company.••

The students fotmd that Egypt• s apparent desire to

use canal profits to finance construction of the Aswan High
Dam project, "which is intended to benefit the entire popu-

lation," did "not render the nationalization illegal."

They

anal was "unique within. Egyptian

also argued that since the

territory'' nationalization did not di'scrimi:nate against foreigners
and was therefore not illegal.

In addition, they found that the

special international status of the company, or of the canal,
did not invalidate Egyptian jurisdiction to cancel a concession
since this argument did not distinguish between cancellation of
the concession and nationalization of the company.

Further,

"there is clearly no rule in international law that such
utilities cannot be operated directly by states but must be in
the hands of private groups."
.

Both the Kiel and Panama Canals

have always been under national control.

1 57

On the question of adequate compensation, the students
found that most authorities agree that a state which nation156Thomas T. F. Huang , "Some International and Legal
Aspects of the Suez canal Question," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, Ap., 1957, P• 307.
1570Notess Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company,"
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 70, Jan. , 1957, PP • 484-486.
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alizes the property of foreigners is required to make "adequate,
effective, and prompt" compensation.

The students then reviewed

Egyptian offers .o f compensation, 1. to pay the price of the
stock on the Paris exchange on the day before Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, and 2
price for the preceding five years.

to pay the average exchange
The students indicateds

••• both (offers) assume Egypt•s right to the assets of the
company held abroad and would be withdrawn if that right
were not recognized . Egypt 's claim to these assets is
unlikely to be upheld by the courts of those nations in
which most of the assets are located unless their governments have indicated recognition of the extraterritorial
effect of the nationalization. Such recognition will
probably not be granted unless an arrangement for compensation is concluded by treaty or international agreement,
and under such an arrangement the problem of adequacy
would no longer exist.

Following this line of reasoning, the students suggested that,
should a case arise before any national policy is decided, the
court should ''dismiss the cause as involving a •political
question .' "

For any final disposition of Canal Company assets

"might hamper the Department of State in future negotiation and
would be, in effect, a determination of our foreign policy i n
· l area.u 158
a cri· t ica

An additional matter of concern to American legal journals
was the question of the legality of the Anglo-French-Israeli
invasion of Egypt.

Quincy Wright, in an article in the American

Journal of International Law, argued that unless their actions
satisfied one of three possible defenses, they were guilty of
illegal aggression.

The three defenses were: 1. action taken

in pursuance of a united Nations decision or recommendation;
1

bid., pp. 486-489.
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2. action taken by necessity of individual or collective defense;
and 3. action taken by consent or request of the invaded state.
Wright found that Israel was not justified in its invasion of
Egypt despite fedayeen raids . and Egyptian blockade of the Suez
canal and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping .

The

fedayeen raids did not constitute sufficient threat to the
"territory, official agencies , or perhaps the lives of the
citizens of the state . "

Concerning the stoppage of Israeli

shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba , Wright argued
that these "(a)lleged violations of other rights involve a
dispute justifying presentation of claims or protest , but not
military intervention. "
Regarding the case of Britain and France, Wright found
that none of the several justifications for Anglo-French acts
withstood analysis , and the one that might have, if Israeli
invasion of Egypt had been found justifiable , i . e, r "collective
self-defense" of Israel , the British and French had taken pains
to avoid its use .

" They denied any co-operation or col l usion

between themselves and Israel. 0
The clai m that the measures taken were justifiable because
they stopped soviet penetration and Egyptian aggressiveness ,
Wright found to be in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and
the united Nations Charter both of which £orb de the use of
force to settle a dispute.

Concerning the Anglo-French insist-

ence that t hey acted to separate the belligerents , Wright asked
pointedly why the2r vetoed the u . N. cease-fire order .

0

Great

as the hazards to British welfare may have been in the nationalization of the canal , these hazards were more distant and
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speculative than those which international law deems a justification for military acts of self-defense."

The same could be

said for French interest in preventing Egyptian propaganda
from inciting Algerian nationalism.

Thus, the Anglo-French

invas ion of Egypt could not be justified legally, "and probably
not politically ... 1159
Generally the law journals took no deliberately favorable
or unfavorable position on the matters involved in the Suez
dispute.

They seemed to seek to preserve their objectivity

and to base their conclusions on solid legal pre · ent.
It cannot be said that scholarly journals posed any threat
to the Administrations Suez policies during the crisis.
them, the crisis went largely unmentioned .

In

The reaction of the

scholarly community to the Suez crisis rolled in months and
years later as more facts became known and articles were
published after the fact .
Some Summary Remarks
Indirect efforts of the Eisenhower Administration to
influence the American press during the Suez crisis appear
evident in the surprise with which t.l-ie outbreak of war was
greeted.

The press had been led by optimistic Administration

statements to report that a negotiated settlement was in
prospect .

The Administration withheld information about

Anglo-French-Israeli mobilization for war, not so much to
deceive the American people apparently , but in the hope of
9 ouincy Wright , "Intervention , 1956 , " American Journal

of International Law , Vol. 51, Ap. , 1957 , PP • 267- 274 .

366

dissuading the British at the eleventh hour.
At this point, it is difficult to see where Administration
efforts had any significant direct impact on press--newspaper
and periodical--interpretation of events during the Suez crisis.
It appears that support for, or opposition to, Administration
policies reflected, in large measure, the ideological predisposition of a given publication or journalist.

Liberal publi-

cations and journalists often seemed to oppose the policies of
the conservative Eisenhower Administration on principle.

Conserv-

ative publications and journalists tended to support the Administration on principle.
down on the question of

This simple dichotomy, however, broke

u. s.

reliance on the United Nations to

settle the Suez dispute--liberal publications often supporting
the Administration; conservative publications often questioning
the probable effectiveness of

u.

N. efforts--and on the question

of sanctions against Israel--the Administration drew criticism
from all sides on this issue.
But it must be recalled that stepped-up Administration
efforts to directly influence the American press came only
after the Suez crisis.

(see aboves pp. 172-180,)

To find the

degree of success of those efforts, it would help to examine
press coverage of

u. s.

foreign policies during a later Middle

Eastern crisis, the Lebanon crisis of 1958,

If, at that later

date, from traditional centers of opposition, criticism of
Administration foreign policies is muted, one might detect the
effectiveness of Eisenhower Administration efforts to win a
more favorable American press.
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Concerning the impact of the American press on United
States foreign policy for the Middle East, there is one area
in which the press might have played a role.

American press

pressure, as a reflection of popular sentiment, called for a
review of united States foreign policy, particularly u.
policy toward the Middle East.

s.

This pressure may have been a

factor in the Administration decision to propose the Eisenhower
Doctrine in early 1957.
gation.

This matter deserves further investi-

CHAPTER VI
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON DURING THE LEBANESE
CRISIS OF 1958
Preliminary Remarks
The Lebanon crisis will be considered to extend from
early May, 1958, when violent dis turbances shook the tiny
Middle Eastern country, following the assassination of the
leftist editor of the daily al-Talegraph, Nassib al-Matni,
on the night of May 7, until October 25, 1958, when the
last contingent of

u. s.

troops was withdrawn.

of this chapter is to analyze

u. s.

and to compare and contrast it with

The purpose

policy during the crisis,

u. s.

Suez policy, in order

to determine whether there had been any significant alterations
in Eisenhower Administration thinking on the Middle East, and
on the question of direct intervention by Western nations in
that area.

Changes in allied attitudes and differences in

the level of allied cooperation in the two crises will also
be noted, as will differences in the amount and character of

inter-allied communication.
some Causes of the Lebanon crisis
Late in 1956, the Eisenhower Administration began to
realize that its policy of dissociating the

u. s.

and France had caused unforeseen consequences.
368

from Britain

Soviet Russia
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was making unprecedented gains in prestige in the Arab world. 1
Having miraculously survived Suez, Nasser was rapidly becoming
the undisputed hero of radical Arab nationalism, which sought
untrammelled national independence and broad social change.
Eisenhower and Dulles were aware that the abortive AngloFrench venture had effectively swept Britain and France f rom
the area, and had sharply increased Arab hostility to the West.
The American leaders feared that the Soviets would attempt to
fill t he power vacuum left in the wake of the collapse of AngloFrench influence.
fill the void.

They decided that the United States must

Without consulting the nations of the Middle

East, the European allies, or the United Nations, they sought
to secure advance Congressional approval for a policy to deter
Communist penetration of the Middle East. 2
On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower delivered a
special message to a joint session of Congress.

In his address,

Eisenhower requested a joint Congressional resolution granting
three major provisions for American assistance of Middle
Eastern nations,
1. Authorization to cooperate with and assist Middle
Eastern nations in the development of economic strength dedicated
to the maintenance of their national independence;
2. Authorization to undertake programs of military assistance and cooperation with Middle Eastern nations desiring such
aid; and
1Richard Goold-Adams, The Time Of Powers A Reappraisal of
John Foster Dulles (Londona Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), P• 249.
2Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., PP• 405-406.
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3. Authorization •tto-· in~lude the employment of the armed
forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations,
requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any
nation controlled by International Communism. ,. 3
Following heated Congressional debate, legislative support
for the Eisenhower Doctrine was given in the Middle East Resolution (Public Law 85-7)--later popularly referred to as the Eisenhower Doctrine--approved on March 9, 1957.

The key provisions

of the joint Congressional resoultion were:
••• That the President be and hereby is authorized to
cooperate with and assist anr nation or grou~ of nations
in the general area of the Middle East desiring such
assistance in the development of economic strength
dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.
sec . 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the
general area of the Middle East, militarr assistance
programs with any nation or group of nations of that
area desiring such assistance. Fu~ther1n9re 1 the United
States regards as vital to the national interest and
world
ace the reservation of the inde endence and
inte rit o
e na ions o
e Mi
e East. Ita ics
a e.
o
sen, J.
e resi en
e ermines the
necess ity thereof, the United States is prepared to
use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such
nations requesting assistance a~ainst armed aggression
from any country controlled by international communism.
3"The Eisenhower. Doctrines·. ·Special Message to the Congress
an the Situation in the Middle East, January 5, 1957," Committee
on Foreign Relations, A seiect Cbronoloqy, op. cit., p. 148.
The Eisenhower Doctrine did not become firm ~olicy--and was not
even mentioned by Eisenhower himself--until it had first been
tested as a trial bal loon in a background dinner. It had been
signaled earlier in a James Reston exclusive story on December 28, 1956, after Dulles grudgingly affirmed a Reston hunch.
The story upset Dulles• timetable for leaking the doctrine. So
he invited a small group of correspondents to his home. There,
Dulles outlined the doctrine. No source could be mentioned by
the newsmen. Since reaction to the doctrine was favorable, it
took on firmer proportions. While Dulles was leaking the
doctrine, Eisenhower was playing golf in Augusta, Georgia; the
President had not yet spoken a word on the subject publicly.
Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
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Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with
the treatr obligations of the united states and with
the Constitution of the United States.4
When Congress authorized what President Eisenhower requested,
it included an unrequested bonus--the underlined sentence--

which was to play a crucial role in the Administration's
policy justification during the Lebanon c risis in 1958.
The Eisenhower Doctrine, as embodied in the Middle East
Resolution, was designed to fill the Middle Eastern power
vacuum, and to counter Soviet penetration into the area. As
such, it was tailored to serve American foreign policy
objectives.

It was a unilater al declaration issued over the

heads of the people upon whose cooperation it depended for
success.

The Arabs objected to the Eisenhower Doctrine for

several reasons.

First, the Arabs, who f avored a policy o.f

positive neutralism, believed that to accept the Doctrine,
now that there was no signif icant Western presence in the
Middle East , would be to concede the

u. s.

right to employ

armed forces in the region to prevent its falling to the
Soviets •. The Arabs would involve ·. themselves in military
entanglements on the side of the

u. s.

against the Soviet

Union, and, thereby, destroy Arab neutrality in the Cold War.
Second, the Doctrine attempted to _bypass the. United Nations.
The Arabs believed that the United States, which had recently
4 "Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the
Middle East," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXVI, No. 926, Mar. 25,
1957, p. 481. H.J. Res, 117 was passed on January 30, 1957,
by the House of Representatives by a vote of 355 to 61; H.J.
Res . 117, as amended, was passed on March 5, 1957, by the
Senate by a vote of 72 to 9; and the House accepted the Senate
version on March 7, 1957, by a vote of 350 to 60.
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worked through the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire in
Egypt, now sought to circumvent the
called for

u. s.

u.

N. through a plan which

military intervention without consultation

with the United Nations.

Third, the Doctrine failed to condemn

armed aggression from all sources; it merely singled out soviet
aggression.
then.

There were no Russian troops in the Middle East

But Israel had only recently invaded the Sinai, and -was~,

in fact, in military control of much of the Peninsula when
Eisenhower addressed the Congress on January 5, 1957.

The Arabs

were, consequently, more concerned with possible future Israeli
aggression than with Soviet aggression.

Since the Eisenhower

Doctrine failed to mention the Arab-Israeli dispute, many Arab
leaders felt that the u. S. was "casting a protective mantle''
over Israe1 . 5

For these reasons, the Eisenhower Doctrine was

coldly received by the Arabs.
Only Lebanon, of all the Arab States, subscribed to the
Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957.

Lebanon's action was

very unpopular both at home and in neighboring Arab countries.
Cairo and Damascus radio aired highly volatile propaganda
broadcasts against the Chamoun Administration for its adherence
to the Doctrine.

Inside Lebanon, Opposition leaders considered

the Administration's action repudiation of the National Pact
of 1943, which provided for neutrality in international relations
and cooperation, but not union, with sister Arab States.
Chamoun•s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was seen by the
Opposition as violating the neutrality provision of the
National Pact.
5Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, op. cit., PP• 115-117.
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It was rumored that President Chamoun intended to seek a
second term, which would have required a constitutional amendment--for a long time, Chamoun did not deny the rumors.

And

charges of unfair parliamentary elections, in which several
prominent Opposition leaders were defeated, increased tensions
in Lebanon.

The overwhelming victory at the polls by Chamoun

supporters was viewed by the Opposition as paving the way for
Chamoun•s reelection for a second six-year term following
passage of the necessary constitutional amendment.

Passage of

the amendment, which would require a parliamentary majority of
two-thirds, was considered a foregone conclusion, given the
large majority of Chamoun supporters recently elected.
On the night of May 7, 1958, Nassib al-Matni, leftist
editor of the daily al-Talegraph and a critic of Chamoun, was
assassinated on the streets of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon.
His killers were never found, but the Opposition blamed his
death on the Chamoun Administration.

Al-Matni•s death triggered

riots and strikes, and the Opposition voiced demands for
'
d'iate resigna
'
t'ion. 6
Ch amoun • s imme

6on the history of the Lebanese crisis, see: George M.
Haddad , Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle Easts The
.A rab States, Vol. 2 (New Yorks Robert Speller and sons, 1971),
Chap . V; Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diploma9y (New York: Oceana Publications, 1962), Chap. VI and VII,
te1.la M. T. Meo , Lebanons Improbable Nation (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1965), Chap. 6-8; Desmond Stewart,
Turmoil in Beirut (London: Allan Wingate, 1958); Fahim I.
Qubain , Crisis In Lebanon (Washington, D. C.s Middle East
Institute, 1961); and Andrew Tully, CIAs The Inside Story
(New York: William Morrow, 1962), Chap. 6.
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u. s.

Pre-Intervention Policy Towards Lebanon

President Chamoun inquired of the British, French and
American Ambassadors what their Governments• actions would be
if he were to request their assistance. 7

Britain and America

agreed to cooperate in responding to the Lebanese situation,
a point emphasized by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in his
memoirs, but scarcely mentioned by Eisenhower in . his memoirs. 8
Macmillan rejoiced in the . fact -that the Americans had "learned
a lot" since Suez.

Quoting from his diary, Macmillan indicated

that, following a long discussion on May 13, 1958, the British
Cabinet agreed to join with the United States in saying to
President Chamoun that, if he decided to ask for military assistance to "preserve the independence" of Lebanon, the AngloAmerican allies would give it. 9

According to this early agree-

ment, Britain was to provide the smaller force, and the combined
operation--.. probably airborne"--would be coordinated so that
the allied forces would "come in together."

When, however,

President Chamoun did call for Western intervention, the
Americans decided to

0

go it alone," and requested that British

'
.
forces b e h el d in
reserve for possi'ble use in
Jord an. 10

Anglo-

American cooperation throughout the contemporaneous Lebanese
7chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, op. cit., pp. 414-415.
8Harold Macmillan, Riding the storm, 1956-1959 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 506-507; and Eisenhower, Waging
Peace, op. cit., pp. 266-269.
9 rbid., Macmillan, P• 506.
lOibid., pp. 511-514; and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit.,
p. 273-:---i{oopes indicated that the American decision "was taken
unilaterally and without contemplation of British participation ••••
Immediately after the decision was taken, on July 14, he (Eisen-
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and Jordanian crises of 1958 was in sharp contrast to the lack
of mutual cooperation during the Suez crisis, scarcely two years
before.
General Andrew J . Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to President
Eisenhower, later recalled that,when the question of intervening
in Lebanon was considered, the association of France with the
operation was discussed.

But, since France had been the manda-

tory power in both Lebanon and Syria prior to World War II, it
was the judgement of the State Department and

u. s.

Intelligence

that the association of France with the intervention would

maJt:e

it totally unacceptable to the Lebanese, and to the Syrians, in
particular, and the entire Middle East, in general.

Conse-

quently, the operation was set up as a joint Anglo-American
venture, and France was not invited to participate in it. 11
In his memoirs, Eisenhower indicated that on May 13, he
met with Dulles and others to discuss Chamoun's request, and
that Dulles noted the grave possible consequences of United
States intervention in Lebanon.

The pipeline across Syria

might be cut, the Suez Canal blocked, and the Iraqi and
Jordanian Governments restrained from cooperating by popular
resentment to the American action.
must also be considered.

The possible Soviet reaction

Eisenhower wrote,

"This point did not

hower) telephoned to inform Macmillan, who said in jest, 'You
are doing a Suez on me .' The President laughed." Hoopes,
The Devil and J. F . D., op, cit., p. 435.
11 Eisenhower Project, Columbia, Interview with Andrew J.
Goodpaster , 1967, p. 94.
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worry me excessively; I believed the Soviets would not take action
if the United States movement were decisive and strong, particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in
the operations ... 12
Following discussions with his advisors, Eisenhower informed
Chamoun that the United States would respond favorably under
certain conditions.

First, the Administration would not send

American troops to Lebanon to achieve an additional term for
the Lebanese President.

Second, the Lebanese request should

have the concurrence of some other Arab state.
sion of

u. s .

Third, the mis-

troops sent to Lebanon would be twofolds protec-

tion of American lives and property, and assistance to the legal
government of Lebanon. 13
Public statements by Administration figures during May,
June, and early July, 1958, laid the groundwork for justification of possible future American intervention in Lebanon. 14
In his news conference of May 20, Secretary of State Dulles
indicated the line of reasoning
during the crisis.

u. s.

policy was to take

In response to a question whether be would

clear up the confusion over the applicability of the Eisenhower
Doctrine to the Lebanon case, Dulles commented that, by the
Eisenhower Doctrine, he assumed the newsman meant the March 9,

12.
.
Peace, op. cit., p. 266.
Eisenh ower, Waging
13 rbid., P• 267.
1'\ioopes commented: 0 Despite the dearth of evidence that
Lebanese independence was threatened by a Middle East country
'under the control of International Communism,• Dulles and the
President quickly construed their authority under the Eisenhower
Doctrine as broad enough to provide emergency assistance if
Beirut should appeal for help. Dulles announced this finding
on May 20; but preparatory actions had been taken three days
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1957, Middle East Resolution adopted by Congress.

Dulles

indicated there were several provisions to that resolution.
It authorized the united States to assist Middle Eastern nations
economically and militarily.

It said that the independence and

integrity of the nations of the area are "vital to world peace
and the national interest of the United States.

0

And it author-

ized the President to send forces to resist, upon request, an
attack upon a Middle Eastern nation by a country under the
control of international communism.

Dulles continued:

Now we do not consider under the present state of
affairs that there is likely to be an attack, an armed
attack, from a country which we would consider under the
control of international communism. That doesn't mean,
however, that there is nothing that can be done. There is
the provision of the Middle East resolution which says that
the independence of these countries is vital to peace and
the national interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace
and vital interests are endangered from any quarter.
Among the types of possible action the United States might take
Dulles mentioned the right to assist in the protection of
American life and property at the request or with the consent
of a foreign government.

There was also the program of mili-

tary assistance, whereby the United States provided many countries, including Lebanon, military equipment and training in
its use.

However, Dulles averred, the United States was not

looking for a pretext to introduce American troops into Lebanon.
0

We hope and believe that that will not be called for, and the

situation, to date, does not suggest that it would be called for.••
before: accelerated deliveries of military equipment to Lebanon
were ordered, the marine contingent with the Sixth Fleet was
doubled, and a number of transport air craft were dispatched from
the united states to Germany, ostensibly to stand by for the
evacuation of Americans from Beirut." Hoopes, The Devil and
J. F. D., op. cit., p. 433.
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Later in the press conference, the following exchange
took place over Dulles• interpretation of the Middle East
resolutions
Mr. secretary. I would like to clear up one point on
this Middle East doctrine ••• You said that there is a
provision in the resolution which states that the independence of the countries of the Middle East is vital
to ••• the peace and security of the united States.
A. Yes. That's the so-called Mansfield amendment.
Q. Yes. Then you said that that surely is a mandate
to do something if we think that the peace and security
of those countries is threatened from any quarter. Does
this represent a broadening by interpretation of the
possibility of ac tion to be taken under that resolution?
The reason I ask is that I think most of us had always
believed that the authority of the resolution applied
almost exclusively to actions against international
communism.
A. You recall that, as the resolution was sent up to
the Congress by the President, there was not in the
resolution the particular sentence to which I refer;
that was introduced by the Congress itself. And I assume
that the introduction of that resolution had a meaning
and had a significance. You cannot, as a matter of
legislative history, assume that when you put a new
sentence into a resolution, it is utterly meaningless.
We assume that the Congress does not do things that
are utterly meaningless.15
Q.

Dulles• interpretation of the Middle East Resolution
caused some heated Congressional comment.

Senator Mike Mansfield,

Montana Democrat, took exception to Dulles• reference to the socalled Mansfield amendment, indicating that what Dulles referred
to as the Mansfield amendment was, in fact, a modified version
of an amendment--originally submitted by Mansfield, but rejected
in committee--reintroduced by Minnesota Democrat, sena tor Hubert
H. Humphrey.

senator Mansfield maintained that the Mansfield-

Humphrey amendment had only one objective--"the clarification
150 secretary Dulles• News Conference of May 20, State
Dept. Bul,, Vol. XXXVIII, No, 989, June 9, 1958, PP• 945-946.
0
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of the constitutional question of the division of powers as
between the President and the Congress," an issue which the
Eisenhower resolution had "obscured."
Senator Mansfield suggested that it was time for the
United States to propose in the United Nations "the extension
of the United Nations Emergency Force to the borders of any
country in the Middle East which is concerned with aggression
from a neighbor and which asks for that safeguard.•• 16
Oregon Democratic Senator Wayne Morse associated himself
with the remarks of Senator Mansfield .

Morse indicated that,

if Dulles acted upon his interpretation, "the secretary of
State would be overstepping the constitutional prerogatives
of the executive branch of the Government." 17

Congressional

protests against the extremely broad interpretation of the
Eisenhower Doctrine were ignored by the Administration. 1 '8
Thus, in his news conference of May 29, the President
reaffirmed the Secretary of State's position in response to a
question from James Reston, New York Times, inquiring whether
the President now had a different interpretation of the Middle

East resolution from what it was originally.

Eisenhower r eplied1

I don't think it is different from what we finally
felt it was after the thing was passed •••• (T)he re was
an amendment passed that we had a very long study about
16 "The Mansfield Amendment and the Middle East Resolution,"
Congress ional Record, Vol. 104, Part 7, May 22, 1958, PP• 9286
and 9289.

17 rbid., pp. 9289-9290.
18
Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., P• 433.
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around here. We felt that as long as it was a friendly
government, one with which we have associations like
military assistance and so on, there were probably certain
actions that we might be able to take that were beyond just
a mere overt aggression from a communist controlled state.19
When reading the statement in question in its original context
in the Middle East Resolution (see above: pp. 370-371.), it is
difficult to escape the impression that the Eisenhower Administration interpreted it out of context.

Apparently the Adminis-

tration took the liberty of utilizing this statement to justify
actions which it intended to take with or without this rather
convenient amendment.

Around this, it built much of the official

justification for American intervention in Lebanon.
In his news conference of June 17, 1958, Secretary Dulles
indicated that the United States continued to watch the situation in Lebanon with concern.
the

u. s.

In response to a question about

attitude to a larger United Nations force in the

Middle East, Dulles indicateds

0

The United States would be

disposed to support.,.any action along those lines which commended itself to the Secretary-General."

would be both diplomatic and "physical" for any
action.

u. s. support
such u. N.

That such

That if called upon by the United Nations, the United

States would respond.

Asked if that implied that the only

possibility of an American military action in Lebanon would be
in response to a United Nations call, Dulles replied: "No, there
are other possible contingencies."

He did not elaborate on this

19 "The President's News conference of May 28 , 1956,"
Public Papers, 1958, op. cit., P• 438.
200 secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 17, 0 State

Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No . 993, July 7, 1958, PP• 8 and 10.
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remark.

But , the world was put on notice that the United States

would intervene militarily in Lebanon, under certain unspecified
conditions, to save the pro-Western Chamoun regime.
Dulles• words signaled a significant departure from
during the Suez crisis.

Furthermore,

u. s.

policy

The Administration would not feel bound

to consult the United Nations before taking action in the Middle
East.
This remark caused immediate response from Congressional
critics of the Administration's foreign policy
field admired Dulles•
with his statement.

11

Senator Mans-

candor and honesty," although he disagreed

Mansfield expressed his hope that the United

States would exhaust all possible peaceful alternatives before
acting "unilaterally" to preserve Lebanon's independence.

Among

the possibilities for action which Mansfield mentioned were:
1. a special meeting of the United Nations to consider an embargo
against countries (unspecified) carrying on aggressive activities
against the Republic of Lebanon; 2. diplomatic sanctions against
those same countries; and 3. the expansion of the United Nations
Force to the borders of Lebanon. 21
senator Sparkman, Alabama Democrat, took the opportunity
to press the Administration to encourage its

u. N. representa-

tives "to take aggressive leadership in favor of establishing
such a United Nations peace-maintaining force .••

Both senator

Mansfield and Senator Sparkman agreed that such a force would
cost a fraction compared with the cost of a single day of
actual war, and, senator Mansfield was quick to add, with the
21 "The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East,•• Congressional Record--Senate, Vol. 104, Part 9, June 17, 1958, p. 11452.
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possible shedding of American blood. 22
Republican Senator Dirksen strode to the Administration's
defense by observing that it could not be said that either
President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles were

insensible" of

the fact that the United Nations Charter provided for an
international police force.

But because it involved the

cooperation of other countries, establishing such a force was
a

0

delicate matter indeed."

Therefore, Dirksen stated that

he would rather see the matter remain in the hands of the
Administration which had daily working knowledge of the whole
foreign field than to see it become "the product of so many
minds of men" in the Senate who were not so informed. 23
On May 22, 1958 , Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of
the United Nations Security Council to consider the situation
arising from alleged United Arab Republic intervention in the
internal affairs of Lebanon.

The Security Council met on

May 27 to consider the Lebanese complaint but agreed to adjourn
for one week in order to permit the Arab League to consider the
issue.

The Arab League, however, was unable to agree on a

resolution.

The Security Council was reconvened.

On June 11,

au. N. security Council resolution established the United
22 rbid., pp. 11452-11453. For additional Congressional
statements in support of a United Nations police force, sees
"The Crisis In Lebanon , " Mr . Cooper , Congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 104, Part 9 , June 26, 1958 , p. 12291; and 0 The
Situation In Lebanon," Mr. Humphrey , Congressional Record-senate , Vol . 104, Part 9 , pp. 12304-12308 .
23 "The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East ," op. cit.,
p. 11455.
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Nations Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL) to determine
the extent of external intervention in Lebanon.

The Group

commenced its activities in Lebanon on June 13, 1958.
Senator Manstield greeted the Security Council resolution
and American support for it as "a step in the right direction."
Mansfield argued that it was an important "initiative for
stability" in the highly volatile Middle Eastern situation.
And he repeated his proposal for the extension of the united
Nations Emergency Force to any Middle Eastern country which
felt itself threatened with aggression from a neighbor 24
In his July 1, 1958, press conference

Secretary Dulles

revealed that he did not think that it would be practical for
the United Nations to seal the borders of Lebanon if so requested
by the Lebanese Government nor did he believe that it would be
required.

He opined that the very presence of UNOGIL would

have a practical effect in stopping movements across the border.
Dulles gave further indication of how the Administration
regarded possible American armed intervention in Lebanon in
response to the following question
Q. }!r . Secretary, keeping in mind the role we played in
discouraging ••• the invasion of Suez, is it realistic to
think that we would participate in any kind of military
intervention in Lebanon except under the most extreme
circumstances.
A. I don't think that there is any analogy whatsoever
between the situation in Lebanon , where the lawful
Government is calling for assistance, and the Suez case,
24 0 The crisis In tebanon," Mr. Mansfield, Congressional

Record--Senate, Vol. 104, Part 8, June 13, 1958, p. 11069.
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where the armed intervention was against the will of the
Government concerned. There is no parallel whatever
between the two cases. We do believe that the presence
in Lebanon of foreign troops, however justifiable--and
it is thoroughly justifiable from a legal and international-law standpoint--is not as good a solution as
for the Lebanese to find a solution themselves. It
would be ••• a sort of measure of last resort.25
Throughout the crisis, the Administration was careful to repeat
its position that the American intervention in Lebanon was
different from the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in
1956 because the United States was acting upon the request of

the duly constituted Government of Lebanon.

Therefore, the

united States maintained, it was not guilty of aggression. 26
Upon his return from a diplomatic and fact-finding mission
to the Middle East on behalf of UNOGIL, Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjold stated, at a news conference on July 3, 1958, that
there was no evidence of "mass infiltration" of men and arms
into Lebanon. 27

On July 4, release of the UNOGIL preliminary

25 ,,secretary Dulles' News Conference of July 1," State
Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 995, July 21, 1958, p. 106.
26Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 271. Eisenhower
wrote: "The present (Lebanese) case, from a legal viewpoint,
was far different from that of the British-French attack on
Egypt. our intervention would be a response to a proper request
from a legally constituted government and in accordance with
the principles stated in the Middle East Doctrine. But, Foster
warned, many people would not get the distinction and some
domestic opposition could be anticipated ...
Concerning the Administration's position, Goold-Adams noteds
.. Dulles and Eisenhower were proposing direct intervention in the
Middle East, to a degree which appeared to deny much that D~lles
had said in public during the previous few months. In ~eality
this was not quite the case, since the essence of the Eisenhower
Doctrine was that intervention should take place only at the
invitation of a government on the spot." Goold-Adams, Time of
Power, op. cit., p. 249.
27Liti.desay Parrott,
NYT, July 4, 1958, P• 1.

."U~

N. ·Lacks Proof of Beirut Charge,"
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report indicated that there was "little doubt .. that the
majority" of rebels was composed of Lebanese. 28

0

vast

The Lebanese

Government was not pleased with the Hammarskjold and UNOGIL
findings.

In his memoirs, Chamoun wrote:

••• Le groupe d'observation vint au Liban avec a sa tete,
un delegue peruvien. Son
arrivee avait ete precedee de
✓
celle du secretaire general
Dag HammarskJold. De mes
conversations avec l'un et l'autre, je recueilles l'impression qu'ils prevenus contre le Liban et que rien d'utile
ne serait accompli par leur mission •••• sous le pretexte
que presque toute les frontieres etaient controlees_ par
les rebelles et que ceci constituait un obstacle insurmontable a l'accomplissement de leur tache, ils passerent
un grande parti de leur temps sur les plages et dans les
receptions mondaines. Leurs rapports (presque negatifs)
ulterieurs furent
peine plus etoffes. Ils n•avaient
pourtant qu' bien regarder pour voir. ,i.-Les <<volontaires>>
egyptiens, syriens et palestiniens etaient au Liban par
centaines, par millieurs. De meme, il ne leur arriva
jamais de se demander qui avait fourni
l'armee rebelle
ses armes et ses munitions, qui s•etait charge, des mois
durant, de leurs depenses, et de leur entretien •••• 29
""

•

,

'

•

a

'

/

•

A

,

a

a

Although the Eisenhower Administration made no official
280 Excerpts From Report of u. N. Observers on Conflict in
Lebanon," NYT, July 5, 1958, p. 1.
29 ..... Teo
h
b servation
'
'
d in
. Le. b anon wi. th a
Group arrive

Peruvian delegate at its head. Its arrival was preceded by
that of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. From my conversations with the former and the latter, I received the impression that they were prejudiced against Lebanon and that nothing
useful would be achieved by their mission •••• under the pretext
that nearly all the frontiers were controlled by the rebels
and that that constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the
accomplishment of their task, they spent a great part of their
ttme on the beach and at social gatherings. Their later reports
(always negative) could scarcely have been more substantial.
Yet, they only had to look to see. The Egyptian, Syrian and
Palestinian •volunteers• were in Lebanon by the hundreds, by
the thousands. However , it never occurred to them (UNOGIL) to
inquire who furnished the rebel army its arm~ and munitions,
who took charge, during those months, of their expenses, and
of their maintenance •••• " Chamoun, Crise au Mayen Orient,
op. cit., pp. 416-417.
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statement on the preliminary UNOGIL report, privately

u. s.

officials regarded it as inconclusive and misleading.

They

gave the following reasonss 1. the Observers had only been
functioning in Lebanon for a short while; 2. the rebels excluded
the Observation Group from much of the Syrian-Lebanese border;
3. the Observers engaged in little night-time observation, if

any; and 4. radio agitation--which Washington considered the
most effective type of u. A. R. interference--was beyond the
scope of the u. N. inquiry.

tJNOGIL headquarters in Beirut

contradicted the last point with a press release stating that
the u. N. Observers were listening to Middle Eastern radio
broadcasts. 30
Nevertheless, the Administration was reluctant to intervene
in Lebanon because of possibly grave i nternational consequences.
Since Lebanon had internationalized the conflict by taking its
complaint to the United Nations, the united States hoped to
give the u. N. time to settle the crisis.

"(B)y the end of

June, the United states was assuming a wait and see policy,
staying the hand of Camille Chamoun, discouraging him f or the
time being from requesting United States troops,u 31
u. N. efforts in Lebanon were making progress.

In early

July, 1958, it seemed to the Administration that the Lebanese
would find their own solution, and that Western military involvernent would not be necessary. 32

Pre-intervention statements by

30Miller,
,
· ld , op. ci' t ., P• 172 •
Dag Hammarsk 10
31 Meo, Lebanons Improbable Nation, op. cit., P• 197.
32Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 269.

387
Administration spokesmen reveal an interesting picture of the
Eisenhower Administration's official view of the Lebanese crisis.
It was regarded as primarily a domestic dispute, with some
infiltration of supplies and men from the Syrian sector of the
United Arab Republic.

Extremist, nationalist elements inside

and outside Lebanon were held to be aided and abetted by violent
propaganda broadcasts from Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus.

The

aim of the dissident opponents of the Lebanese Administration
was to overthrow the pro-western Chamoun regime.

Communists,

while not responsible for the disorders , were seen as exploiting
them.

The Soviet Union, through inflammatory Arabic language

broadcasts, was said t o be exacerbating the situation in Lebanon.
The hand of Soviet influence was detected in United Arab Republic
propaganda against the Chamoun Administration. 33
In his June 17, 1958, press conference, Secretary of State
Dulles acknowledged the fact that, at that time, the disturbances
assumed, in part, the character of a civil disturbance.

Never-

theless, Dulles argued that the Lebanese situation was covered
by the 1949 United Nations resolution on "indirect aggress ion,"
which denounced the fomenting of civil strife from without. 34
33 "Review of Recent Anti-American Demonstrations, Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy," State Dept. Bul.,
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 989, June 9, 1958, p . 959.
34nsecretary Dulles• Ne ws Conference of June 17,"
loc. cit.
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The American Intervention In Lebanon
The violent overthrow of the pro-Western Iraqi government
by the forces of Brigadier General Abdul Karim al-Kassem on
July 14, 1958, caught the West by surprise.

The American

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had only one vaguely worded
prewarning from some of the men captured when King Hussein put
down an army rebellion against his Jordanian Government.

This

piece of intelligence was passed to the Iraqi Government, which
did nothing with it. 35
President Eisenhower was "shocked .. by the news, which
awakened American fears for the worst and led to the decision
that steps be taken to restore order and stability in the
Middle East.

Eisenhower wrote, "This somber turn of events

could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a
complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East.
Overnight our objective changed from quieting a troubled situation to facing up to a crisis of formidable proportions.
Lebanon again came into our conscious concern because of the
internal conflicts in that country and the pressures exerted by
Syria." 36 The decision was made to send in the Marines.
35Andrew Tully, CIAs The Inside Story, op. cit., p. 76.
36Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 269. Qubain listed
the following objectives for the dispatch of u. s. troops to
Lebanon: "(1} to serve notice on the Soviet Union that the United
States is willing to go to war to defend the Middle East if this
became necessary; (2) to •call the Russian bluff'; and (3) to
demonstrate to the Arabs conclusively that the soviet Union would
not go to war to defend them, and that its threats were intended
only to win it friends among them. To be sure, in view of the
Soviet threats, this involved a great risk, but in army jargon,
it was a •calculated risk,' for both the Pentagon and the State
Department were reasonably certain that Soviet threats were what
they proved to be--threats for propaganda purposes." Qubain,
crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 129.
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The American decision to intervene in Lebanon was made
in haste.

Although the question of what an American show of

force in the Middle East should be had been pondered beforehand, when the climax came in Lebanon, a quick decision was
.
. .
,
37
made to intervene
militarily.

.
Presi'dent Eisenhower
was

personally responsible for the decision--he had apparently
made up his mind even before meeting with his advisors. 38
The united States would have to move into the Middle East
"to stop the trend toward chaos."

An additional factor in

Eisenhower's concern was the large number of American citizens
living in Lebanon whose lives might be endangerea. 39
Joseph J. Sisco, former Director of the Office of united
Nations Political Affairs, indicated that, at the time of the
Lebanon crisis, the general feeltng in the Office was that
sufficient consideration had not been given to how the American
action could be defended politically.

The Office prevailed

upon Dulles "to make a simultaneous move in the u. N. at the
very time we were scheduled to land our Marines . 1140
37nulles Project, Interview with Murphy, p. 49.
38Dulles Project, Interview with Karl G. Harr, Jr., 14 Jan.
1966, p. 53; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 269-270; and
Dulles Project, Interview with Hagerty, p. 25. Hagerty recalled
that Eisenhower told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General White, at 5116 in the afternoon of July 14, to send in
the Marines. Hagerty reminisced: "I had to sit pn that all night
and not make a statement until nine o clock in the morning when
we knew the troops had hit the beaches and we knew what was happening. It was one of the longest nights that I've spent."
39 Ibid., Eisenhower, P • 270.
40nulles Project, Interview with Joseph J. Sisco, 12 Aug.
1966, pp. 13-14.
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The Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15 , 1958, at
3:00 p . m. local time (9 00 a . m New York time) .

A Presidential

press release, timed to coincide with the landing , was read by
Press secretary James Hagerty
Chamoun•s request for

u. s.

41

The statement noted President

forces to help mainta in security

in Lebanon , and it emphasized that Chamoun •s appeal was made
with the concurrence of all members of the Lebanese cabinet .
The key elements of the statement were contained in the
following paragraphs,
In response to this appeal from the government of
Lebanon , the United States has dispat ched a contingent of
United States f orces to Lebanon to protect American lives
and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese
government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity .
These forces have not been sent as any act of war
They
will demonstra te the concern of the United . States for the
independence and integrity of Lebanon , which we deem vital
to the national interest and world peace . Our concern
will also be shown by economic assistance . We shall ct
in accordance with these legitimate concerns .
The United States , this morning , will report its
action to an emergency meeting of the United Nations
Security council . As the United Nations charter recognizes , there is an inherent right of collective selfdefense . In conformity with the spirit of the charter, the
United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the
Security Council of the United Nations , making clear that
these measur swill be terminated as soon as the security
CQuncil has itself taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.42
Without ever referring specifically to Article 51 , 43

the

Administration detached a phrase from it to validate Ameri can
intervention in Lebanon, and to claim the
conformity with the spirit of the

u.

u. s.

action was in

N. Charter .

Article 51 reads s

41 Eisenhower , W,aging Peace , op . cit ., p . 274.
42 "United States Dispatches Troops t o Lebanon , Statement by
President Eisenhower (White House press re l ease dated July 15) , "
Stat e Dept . Bul . , Vol . XXXIX , No . 997 , Aug . 4 , 1958 , P• 181 .
43Miller , Dag Hammarskjold , op . cit ., P • 182 .
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the united
Nations, until the Secuity Council has talten the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.44
Thus, the inherent right of collective self-defense applied
only in the case of armed attack against au. N. member.

There

was no such armed attack against Lebanon. 45
In his message to Congress that same day, Eisenhower
repeated the arguments of his morning press release.

He added

that the events in Lebanon represented ttindirect aggression from
without" which endangered the independence and integrity of
Lebanon.

(Article 51 makes no mention of "indirect aggression.")

The United Arab Republic was responsible for the troubles in
Lebanon, for it encouraged the revolt there through inflammatory
radio broadcas ts, through shipments of

0

sizable amounts" of

arms, a.munition, and money, and through the infiltration of
personnel.

Eisenhower argued further that events in Iraq

44••ch arter of t h e Unite
' d Nations,"
'
.
d.ix A , Maurice
'
Appen
Waters, The United Nations, International Or anization And
Administrati on New Yorks Macmillan, 1967, p. 564.
45wright commented: .. The United States can justify its
intervention in Lebanon on the ground of 'collective selfdefense• onl y if the Lebanon was the victim of •armed.attack'
and if the de jure government, which re9uested.such aid, was
not so pressed by internal revolt that it was incapable of
representing the state. Neither of these conditions seems to
have existed." Qunicy wright, "United States Intervention In
The Lebanon," Editorial Comment , American J ournal of International Law, Vol. LVIII, January, 1959, PP• 112-125.
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demonstrated that Lebanon could not combat the

0

ruthlessness of

aggressive purpose," which these events represented, "without
further evidence of support from other friendly nations."

There-

fore, the United States sent in the Marines, and would augment
them "as required."

United States forces would be withdrawn

as rapidly as circumstances would permit.

To facilitate the

early withdrawal of American forces, Eisenhower encouraged the
United Nations to take "further effective steps designed to
safeguard Lebanese independence ... 46

The evening of July 15,

1958, the President delivered a nationwide radio-television

statement to the American people in which he repeated these
arguments on behalf of u.

s.

armed intervention in Lebanon. 47

Following the landing of the first wave of

u. s.

Marines

in Lebanon, the Eisenhower Administration pursued a two-pronged
diplomatic offensive--open debate in the United Nations, and
negotiations on-the-scene in Lebanon, directed by Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy.
At the emergency session of the United Nations Security
Council, the morning of July 15, 1958, Ambassador Lodge presented
the American position to the United Nations.
repeated Eisenhower's main points.
item when he expressed the u.

s.

Generally, Lodge

He did, however, add a new

hope that the u. N. Observation

Group would continue to pursue its work "in the most effective
46 .,united States Dispatches Troops to Londons Message to
the Congress, .. State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 997, Aug. 4,
1958, pp. 182-183.
4711 united stated Dispatches Troops to Lebanon, Radio-TV

Statement (White House press release dated July 15)," in
ibid., pp. 183-186.
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and energetic way possible," and he indicated that the

u. s.

forces had been instructed ttto cooperate with it (UNOGIL) and
to establish liaison immediately upon arriva1 • ., 48

The Observa-

tion Group announced in Beirut that it would establish no
liaison with

u. s.

forces except when "strictly required" to

fulfill its Security Council mandate. 49

UNOGIL, thus, refused

to take action which might be construed to legitimize

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon.
Clearly, the

u. s.

did not accept

u.

N. Secretary-General

Dag Hammarskjold's statement that there was no foundation for a
judgement of massive infiltration of men and arms into Lebanon .
Nor did it accept the UNOGIL preliminary report that there was
••little doubt" that the vast majority of rebels were Lebanese.
(see above: pp. 384-385.)

As a matter of fact, the American

United Nations Representative, Ambassador Lodge , actually argued
that since the revolt in Iraq the infiltration of arms and personnel into Lebanon had become "much more alarming.,,so
The American position was made more difficult when Lodge's
argument was challenged by the
July 16.

u.

N. Secretary-General on

Hammarskjold announced to the Security Council that

lJNOGIL had cabled a report that it had, as of July 15, access to
all parts of the Lebanese frontier.

It was purely coincidental

that these results were achieved by the Observation Group on
48 "The Lebanese complaint
·
· the Securi· t y c ounci· 1 I Sta tement
in
of July 15 (U. S./U. N. press release 2956)," in ibid., P• 187.
49 Thomas J. Hamilton, "Legality Queried, Authority For
Action Doubted--Observers to Shun Marines," NYT, July 17, 1958,

pp. 1 and 8.
5 o,,The Lebanese complaint in the Security Council: Statement
of July 15,u loc. cit.
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the same day the Security Council renewed debate and the
landed units in Lebanon.
previous efforts.

u. s.

UNOGIL's success was a resul t of its

Hammarskjold concluded that ••the Observation

Group is fully equipped to play the part envisioned for it in
the total United Nations effort, with the general purpose of
insuring against infiltration and smuggling of arms.

0

The

Secretary-General hoped that "no later developments," i.

§t•

the

American intervention, would cause a setback for UNOGIL, and
that it would retain its key position . 51
On July 17, in response to Hammarskjold's remarks, Lodge
noted that only the day before did the Secretary-General tell
the Security Council that the Observation Group had "finally"
reached agreement with rebel forces granting it access to all
of Lebanon's frontiers .

Lodge continueds "That agreement was

only reached on the day ••• that our forces landed.

And with

great respect I submit that our efforts may have already been
helpful to the work of the United Nations"

With this argument,

Lodge sought to justify the need for American intervention.
Then, he claimed that since UNOGIL now had access to all Lebanon's
frontiers, it was in a much better position than it had ever been
to go ahead with its activities.

Lodge concluded his remarks by

stating, rather unconvincingly, that if the United Nations could
not deal with indirect aggression, the

u.

N. would break up.

"This could surely be the rock on which this organization could
510 Excerpts From statements Before u. N. Security Council
on the Lebanese Issue, 0 NYT , July 17, 1958, P• 8.
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founder ... 52

Thus, American spoJ.cesmen repudiated

u.

N. findings

and insisted upon maintaining charges of "indirect aggression."
On July 16, 1958, Ambassador Lodge introduced the American
draft resolution in an attempt to encourage the United Nations
to take over from American forces responsibility for maintaining
peace and stability in Lebanon through an expanded united
Nations Observation Group.

In the major provisions of the u. s.

draft resolution, the Administration suggested that the security
Counci l : 1. Invite the Observation Group in Lebanon to continue
development of its activities based upon the June 11, 1958,
Security Council resolution; 2. Request the Secretaty-General
to make necessary arrangements, including the contribution and
use of military contingents, to protect Lebanese territorial
integrity and independence and to guard against infiltration
of personnel or s upplies; 3. Call upon all Governments concerned
to co-operate in implementation of the suggested resolution;
4. Call for the immediate cessation of illegal infiltration and
of inflammatory media attacks upon the Government of Lebanon;
and 5. Request the
.
Secur1' ty Council

0

u.

N. secretary-General to report to the

. t e." 53
as appropria

The threat of a Russian veto did not deter the United States
in its efforts ,

On July 16, Ambassador Lodge expressed the

United States hope that the United Nations Observation Group
5211 The Lebanese Complaint in the Security Councils First
Statement of J uly 17 (U, s./U. N. press release 2963)," State
Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 997, Aug. 4 , 1958, pp. 194-196.
530 Text of u. s. Draft Resolution (U. N. doc. S/4050/
Rev. 1)," State Dept Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No . 997, Aug. 4, 1958,
p. 198.
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would not be suspended, as had been suggested by the Swedish
representative to the United Nations. 54

On July 17, 1958,

Lodge indicated, in the security Council, for the first time,
that the American forces in Lebanon would not remain if their
withdrawal were requested by the lawfully constituted Lebanese
Government. 55

Not surprisingly, the American draft resolution

was vetoed by the Soviet Union on July 18.
(U.

s. s.

The vote was 9 to 1

R.), with 1 abstention (Sweden).

On July 18, Ambassador Lodge was the first speaker after
the final vote on the American draft resolution.

since the

soviet Union had mentioned, on July 17, the possibility of
calling for an emergency session of the

u.

N. General Assembly,

under provision of the "uniting for Peace" resolution, Lodge
was constrained to submit a similar
requested that the

u. s.

u. s.

res0lution.

But, he

resolution be withheld in order to

permit the representative of Japan to introduce a resolution
in the Security Council.

Miller has indicateda "The United

States was not at all anxious to have the issue moved to the
General Assembly, and this step was delayed until it was known
that the Soviet Union would introduce a resolution calling for
the move if the United States did not act quickly.

The United

States did not want to put Asian and African governments 'on the
spot' by asking them to vote for a United States resolution, and
the United States did not know whether it could muster the neces54 .. The Lebanese Complaint in the Security Council: Fourth
(U. s.) Statement of July 16 (U. s./u. N. press release 2962),"
in ibid., P• 193,
550 The Lebanese Complaint in the Security Councils First
(U. s.) Statement of July 18 (U. S./U. N. press release 2965),"
in ibid., p. 196.
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sary two-thirds vote for its position. 056

The Japanese resolu-

tion, which the United States supported, requested the secretaryGeneral to make arrangements which would enable the united Nations
to fulfill the purposes of the June 11, 1958, resolution (which
established UNOGIL), and which would. 0 serve to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as to
make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from
Lebanon." 57

On July 22, the Soviet Union, which demanded imme-

diate withdrawal of all

u. s.

Japanese draft resolution.

forces from Lebanon, vetoed the

The ijopelessly deadlocked Security

Council then adjourned sine die, : nd without calling out the
General Assembly.
Thus, in July, 1958, the

u. s.

failed in its efforts to

persuade the United Nations to expand the role of the United
Nations Observation Group, and to induce it to assume the
self-appointed task of policeman in Lebanon.

The

u.

u. s.

N. Security

Council did not sanction American intervention in Lebanon; the
Soviet union vetoed pro-American resolutions.

But, the u. s.

had, at least, succeeded in postponing an emergency special
session of the General Assembly.
The second prong of the American diplomatic offensive was
the dispatching of Under secretary of State Robert Murphy to
Lebanon.

Eisenhower described Murphy's mission in these termss

56Miller, Dag Hammarsk jold, op. cit., p. 189.
5711 Text of the Japanese Draft Resolution (U. N. doc . S/
4055/ Rev. l)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 997, Aug. 4,
1958, p. 199.
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"to achieve the best possible .coordination between the united
States officials on the spot and the Lebanese authorities. 1158
The first thing Murphy did in Lebanon was to call on
President Chamoun at his official residence.

There, he found

"a tired and worried man, who for sixty-seven days had been a
self-made prisoner.

Apparently he had not so much as looked

out of a window during that time, and this undoubtedly was wise
as his chances of assassination were excellent.••

After this

initial meeting, Murphy met with Chamoun once or twice daily.
He was usually accompanied by the American Ambassador to Lebanon,
Robert M. Mcclintock.

He also held daily conversations with

Admiral Holloway, the man in charge of the American force.
Murphy noteds
••• The close cooperation between the diplomatic and
military sides of the American house contributed greatly
to the success of our Lebanese undertaking. We agreed
that much of the conflict concerned personalities and
rivalries of domestic nature, with no relation to international issues. Communism was playing no direct or
substantial part in the insurrection, although Communists
no doubt hoped to profit from the disorders, as frequently
happens when there is civil war. The outside influences
came mostly from Egypt and Syria •••• .(Italics added.)59
Murphy concluded from his talks with Chamoun, Holloway,
Mcclintock and others that arrangements for the immediate
election of a new Lebanese president should be made.

He hoped

that such an election would reduce tensions and permit the early
withdrawal of American forces.

In pursuit of this goal, Murphy

visited with Chamoun, with the head of the Lebanese parliament,
58Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 279.
59Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., PP• 400-404.
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and with Opposition leaders.

To rebel leaders, he stressed

that the American forces were not in Lebanon to perpetuate the
administration of President Chamoun.

On July 31 , 1958, General

Fuad Chehab was elected president of Lebanon. 60

Murphy, who

had an unders t anding with the Department of State, left Lebanon
on the eve o f the election "in order to minimize charges o f
American interference in the voting."
Shortly before the election, President Chamoun had
"finally" told Murphy that he would not seek a second term.
To Murphy's great surprise , Chamoun added that he felt General
Chehab was the only possible choice to succeed him.

Murphy

recalled that, from that moment, he knew "the worst was over. •• 61
Murphy's mission to Lebanon had taken about a month.
At the height of the Lebanese crisis, Dulles gave a background news briefing at the home of NBC radio and TV newsman
Richard Harkness.*

The backgrounder was held at Dulles• request.

Dulles asked Harkness to gather a small group of columnists,
bureau chiefs, and interpretive writers.

The background session--

the first which Dulles had ever asked Harlmess to convene--took
60wright commented: "Applying the tes-t of international law,
in order to justify its intervention in Lebanon, the United States
would have to prove that the troubles in that country inducing
President Chamoun t o request that intervention were primarily due
to 'subversive intervention• ( indirect aggression ) from outside.
The change in the Lebanese Government which took place during the
intervention, resulting in a military government including several
opponents of the Chamoun regime , suggests that this would be difficult to prove." Wright, "United States Intervention In The
Lebanon,'' loc. cit.
61Murph y, Diplomat,
.
op. cit., p. 407.

* For a list
' of the guests, sees Append'ix C •
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place on Monday, July 21, 1958.

Harkness's notes of the back-

grounder provide interesting insights into Dulles• thinking
during the early days of the American intervention.

As was his

custom, Dulles began his remarks with a brief, general statement--this particular one dealt with the reasons for the American
intervention in Lebanon.

The reasons given in this off-the-

record statement--made for the correspondent's general understanding, but not to be reported in any form--differed significantly from the official public reasons given by the White House,
and by Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations.

This is how

Harkness recorded Dulles• opening remarks:
First, let me make clear that the decision to send
troops to Lebanon was based on the plea by Chamoun, and
for that reason alone. We were convinced that, if we
did not respond, not one of the relatively weak free
countries in that part of the world from the Atlantic to
the Pacific would feel--and be--safe from indirect aggression and assassination. We acted to give a feeling of
stability to such governments so they woul d not collapse
almost automatically; so they would feel that being a
friend of the u. s. is NOT a liability; so they would
feel that being our ally is not a threat to the very
lives of their political leaders.
The fall of Iraq caused consternation across that
great area , so we had no choice but to comply with
Chamoun•s plea.
Until the Iraqi rebellion, we believed military
assistance was not needed . The plot in Baghdad changed
the situation. It became important that we preserve
morale in that perimeter. We responded without hesitation. We do not think that our response solves any Mid
East problems . we recognize that, in some respects, the
problems are now more difficult. But we had one overriding considerations to let little countries know that
they are not all to become subjects of civil strife
fomented from without.62
62Dulles Additional
· ·
·
t on U.
Papers, Prince
niv. L'b
i rary,
Harkness, Richard, comp., "Memoranda and Notes on Visits and
Interviews with John Foster Dulles ••• ,•• Off-the-record memo,
July 21, 1958, p. 1. To my knowledge, previously unpublished.
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These remarks differ significantly from the collective selfdefense theory advanced in the official statements issued at
the time.
of

u. s.

Official statements tended to stress the specificity
objectives, limiting them to Lebanon.

In the July 21

backgrounder, Dulles• opening statement echoed more traditional
.
.
o b Jectives
of power poli' t 'ics. 63

h
Te

u.

s. acted to preserve

its interests, not only in Lebanon, but throughout the Third
World.

It was an effort to demonstrate the reality of

u.

s.

power, and the Administration's willingness to use it . to defend
American influence and prestige.

Yet, in its hasty decision to

intervene in Lebanon to prevent the alleged spread of chaos
beyond Iraq, the Administration demonstrated that .,consternation"
was not limited to the ''relatively weak free countries."

Thus ,

the Administration overreacted to the Iraqi revolt by dispatching
troops to Lebanon, which it feared could also fall in an antiWestern coup.
In his notes, Harkness observed that secretary of State
Dulles• explanation was "somewhat broader than but not neces63see alsoa J ohn Foster Dulles Papers , I. Writings ••• of
J. F. Dulles, B. Addresses and speeches, Aug.--24 Sept. 1958,
In folder, Off-the-Record Talk before the AFL-CIO Executive
Council, Bushkill, Pa.--August 19, 1958, PP• 8-10. Dulles
offered a similar explanation of u. s. policy in his background remarks to the AFL-CIO Executive Councils
tt(G)oing in was bad, but, in my opinion, not going in
would have been very much worse. That would have undermined
the competence of a score or more of governments running all
the way from Morocco on the Atlantic to Korea on the Pacific
as to whether we really had the courage and resolution to act
on the appeal of a small government which wanted to defend its
independence. And if we had found excuses for looking in the
other direction and turning our back, the prestige and influence of the United states through all that part of the world-Asia, Africa--would have been gone.••
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sarily contradictory of the explanation" given to him earlier
by Dulles• brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles.

Allen Dulles

had told Harkness that the first revolutionary plot was
uncovered in Jordan, and that it was linked to tjle Iraqi rebellion.

After Iraq, the next target was Saudi Arabia.

To prevent

these governments from being "bowled over like ten pins," the
United States decided to intervene in Lebanon.
Subsequently, Ambassador Robert Murphy surmised that Dulles•
objective in the Lebanese intervention was to make an impact
"on not only ••• Lebanon, but the entire Middle Eastern picture,
which had been in a state of ferment, and to bring about a
stability and ••• a peaceful settlement of some of the issues
.
l ve d • •• 64
th at were invo

In the question and answer session which followed his
opening statement, Dulles remarked that there was "no doubt"
that the anti-Chamoun rebels were directed from outside.

For

Robert Murphy had reported from Lebanon that the rebels were
receiving their "instructions" over open telephone lines from
Damascus •65
Asked about the probable length of stay of

u. s.

troops

in Lebanon, Dulles indicated that he could not give an exact
figure, but that he did not think of this operation in terms of
64Dulles Project, Interview with Murphy, P• 53.
65Murpby, Diplomat, op. cit., p. 402. Murphy wrotea
"(W)hen our Marines tapped the telephone line between t1;ie
capital of Syria and the (rebel controlled) Basta at Beiru~,.
it was proved conclusively that the Basta rebels were receiving
outside support." It must be noted that there is a vast
difference between "support" and ., instructions,•• which Dulles
had charged.
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years.

The United States had no intention--or desire--for a

prolonged stay in Lebanon, which could only result in shooting
incident~ between Lebanese and American troops.

since the

United States no longer had confidence that observers on
Lebanon's borders would be effective following events in Iraq,
the length of stay of

u. s.

troops in Lebanon would depend

upon "our ability to work out the transition from use of our
troops to what both we and Lebanon consider necessary, stronger
UN representation than is now represented by UN observers."
Concerning Japan's compromise resolution, Dulles expressed
the hope that Russia "might abstain and thus let it pass. 0

He

did not believe the Russians would support it.
If the Security Council should prove incapable of action,
Dulles indicated the United States would go to the General
Assembly, where he thought the u.

s.

could muster the votes,

but where he admitted the vote would be "close."

Dulles saw

the principal difficulty in the General Assembly to be the
reluctance of small nations to pay their share of the bill to
finance the cost of UN action to preserve Lebanese freedom, a
step which many of them otherwise would favor.
Before withdrawing from Lebanon, Dulles indicated that
the Administration would insist upon certain minimum requirements from the

u.

N. "We will insist (upon?) the taking by

the UN of measures which reassure the government of Lebanon
that it is not likely to be liquidated by a revolutionary
movement from without or an Iraqi-type coup .
than observers."

That means more

Before determining the strength of any

united Nations force, it would be necessary to have the advice
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of men on the scene, such as Murphy, on how many would be
needed, and the types of weapons they would require.

one is

struck by the apparent lack of sophistication of Dulles•
argument.

How, for example, could any international force

ensure that there would not be an Iraqi-type coup?

Effective

counter-measures under these circumstances of army revolt
would r~quire a sufficiently large counter-force on the scene,
or readily available, and capable of taking affirmative action .
It would have been extremely difficult to obtain United Nations
agreement to such a large force, as seen in General Assembly
reluctance to form a United Nations police force.
In apparent contradiction of his earlier remarks, that the
Lebanese rebels received instructions from Damascus, Dulles
proceeded: "This United Nations force will be a novelty,
something different, never tried before, and it will be a
difficult one because it will be dealing with internal strife."
Internal strife, Dulles argued, not indirect aggression as
officially charged.

Furthermore, Dulles commented; the

believed that the mere presence of the

u.

u. s.

N. would be "a

considerable deterrent to the rebels, especially in a small
country such as Lebanon." 66
Next, Dulles indicated that he recognized that the initial
popular reaction over most of the world to the
vention in Lebanon was unfavorable .

u. s.

inter-

But , privately Governments

66Dulles Additional Papers, Har kness, "Memoranda and
Notes ••• ," Off-the-record memo , July 21 , 1958 , op . cit .,
pp. 2-3.
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had indicated their support for the American action.

Dulles

said that he could not name these Governments, for to do so
might risk their being overthrown politically.

••The Prime

Minister of Sudan showed amazing courage in supporting our
use of troops.

He may pay with his life ••• 'they• are after

him now." 67
On

u. s.

estimates of Russian intentions, Dulles made

these remarks:
We operate American foreign policy on a basic intelligence estimate. That is that the u. s. s. R. does not
want to take any ·. action that might involve a general war.
With our landings in Lebanon, nothing has changed as far
as that estimate is concerned.
Russia undoubtedly will wage a considerable war of
nerves now. It may seem that we are close to a general
war. The Russians are likely to make hostile gestures.
But they will not del.iberately provoke a general war.
How could Russia justify a war? Lebanon and Jordan-they are not great assets. As property, you couldn't give
Jordan away. Our presence in the Mid East is no threat to
anybody. The idea of a general war is grotesque.68
Apparently, Dulles was not always so sure of Russian
intentions.

General Nathan F. Twining, former chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told of an animated discussion with
a doubt-ridden Dulles, one night around eleven o'cl.ock, before
the landing of the Marines.

Dulles told TWining that some of

67J. F. Dulles Papers, I. B., "Off-the-Record Talk Before
the AFL-CIO Executive Council," op. cit., p. 10. Dulles indicated
to the AFL-CIO Executive Council that, excluding the United Arab
Republic and Iraq, every Government in the Middle East and
North Africa had expressed privately support for u. s. intervention in Lebanon. "Publicly they do not dare to do it; because
their public opinion is so inflamed by the radio and press
subversion .....
68 oulles Additional Papers, Harkness, "Memoranda and
Notes ••• ,•• Off-the-record memo, July 21, 1958, op. cit., P• 4.

406

his people in the State Department were telling him that the
United States was making a terrible mistake by sending in the
troops.

To do so would run the risk of bringing the Russians

uaown on top of" the
East.

u. s.,

causing real trouble in the Middle

TWining then told Dulles that,as long as the Adminis-

tration felt that the landing was a politically sound thing to
do, the Secretary of State had nothing to worry about, since
the United Sta tes was clearly superior to the Russians militarily
at that time.

TWining reca lled that be also indicated to Dulles

that the Joint Chiefs thought it was the right thing to do,
and that he was willing to call them in to confirm it.

A

reassured Dulles replied, "No •••• That•s okay. I feel better.
We'll go."

TWining observed that Dulles was "real worried"

about the Lebanese landing, and that he was about to go to see
Eisenhower about calling it off. 69

This is another example of

Dulles entertaining second thoughts after a crucial decision
had been taken.

He displayed similar qualms after announcing

the American decision to withdraw from the Aswan High Dam
project.

{see above: p . 61.)

From the very beginning of the American intervention in
Lebanon, President Eisenhower informed the appropriate Congression· 1 leaders that he did not desire an all-out national
debate on the wisdom of the

u. s.

action. 70

Under the circum-

stances, it is not surprising that Congressional reaction to
69Dulles Project , Interview with General Nathan F . TWining,
U.S. A. F., 16 March 1965, PP• 13 and 15.
70Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., P• 183.
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the American intervention took the form of general support,
with calls for national unity.

Leading the debate in the

Senate, Majority Leader Sena tor Lyndon B. Johnson, Texas
Democrat, expressed the conviction that
will close ranks and will be united.

0

the American people

We will make it clear to

the aggressors t hat this country is determined to maintain
freedom in this world, at whatever cost. 071

Those who backed

the intervention largely restated the Administration's views
in formulating their remarks .
intervening in Lebanon.
0

spirit, 072 did apply.

The President was right in

The Eisenhower Doctrine, at least its
In order to preserve the friendly

Lebanese Government's independence, President Eisenhower had
the right of collective self-defense to combat indirect
aggression.

Furthermore, the President had the right to defend

American lives and property.

Maryland Republican Senator

J. Glenn Beall argued that he would go one step further and
say that "now is the time for us to take a firm position
.
the encroac hme nt of communism."
'
73
against

Senator Jacob K.

Javits, New York Republican , commented that "(i)f legally we
cannot define this aggression in Lebanon as being Communist
inspired, certainly the people of the world understand that
without the backing of the Soviet Union, President Nasser
would not be running the risk he is running .....

Nasser was

710 Landing of United states Marines in Lebanon," Congressional Record--Senate, Vol. 104, Part 11, July 15, 1958 ,
p. 13767.
72 Ibid., Remarks of Senator Javits, P• 13777.
73 1bid., p. 13783.
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behind the disturbances, in this view, and attention was called
to the fact that he had the support of the Communists.

American

action could ipso facto be construed as containing Communism.
Other arguments on behalf of the Administration included
Senator Javits• reminder that one of the problems with the
United Nations Security Council was that "it may not always
. t 'ime. 0 74 And the junior Democratic Senator
be a b le t o ac t 1.n
from Oregon , Richard L. Neuberger , saw the Lebanese situation
as "essentially the same dilemma which confronted President
Truman in the Korean crisis."

(He failed to mention that, by

contrast, there were no teeming hordes of Communists openly
attacking Lebanon.)

And Senator Neuberger called upon his fellow

Democrats to make no

0

politica1 capital" on the crisis, as had

some partisan Republicans during the Korean war.

Neuberger

advocated a course of .,statesmanship and nonpartisanship." 75
In the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the
House would entertain only favorable comments upon the
intervention.
in the Record.

u. s.

An obvious move to muzzle dissent is registered

The following exchange tool~ place between

Representative Emanuel Celler, New York Democrat, and the
Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, Texas Democrats
Mr . Celler. Mr. Speaker , I ask unanimous consent to
address the House for 1 minute.
The Speaker. Not if it is controversial . The Chair is
not going to recognize Members to talk about foreign
affairs in this critical situation.
74 Ibid., p. 13777.
75 rbid., p . 13778 .
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Assured that Celler•s comments were favorable, the Chair
recognized Celler•s right to speak.

Celler indicated that he

felt the President had "seized time by the forelock.

The

situation in the Middle East brooked of no further delay." 76
In the Senate , however, no such gag-rule applied.

senator

Mansfield indicated his belief that the American action was not
taken under any of the specifications of either the Eisenhower
Doctrine or the Tripartite Dec lar ation.

He noted that he had

made his position known in the White House conference of
Congressional leaders with the President the day before,
July 14, 1958.

"However, the President, in his constitutional

capacity as Commander in Chief, and based on the reserved
powers contained therein, has made a decision which in his
opinion , affects the security of our country.

That decision

having been made, I will do my very best as a Senator to
support the action taken." 77
A minority of Democratic Senators were unwilling to
express their support.

Senator William Proxmire, Wisconsin

Democrat, protested Eisenhower's failure to prevent the
development of a situation which, in his judgement, necessitated sending American troops into Lebanon.

He argued that

henceforth it would be "virtually impossible for friends of
the west to enjoy popular support or political power in the
Near East."

Therefore , the u.

s. should press for the United

76 "The situation in the Mideast," Congressional. Record-House, Vol. 104 , Part 11, July 16, 1958, P• 13978.
77 "Landing of united states Marines in Lebanon,•• Congressional Record, July 15, 1958, P• 13769.
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Nations to step into the controversy, and for the

u. s.

to

step out "at the earliest possible mornent . .. 78
The senior Democratic senator from Oregon , Wayne Morse,
was the most persistent critic of

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon .

Morse argued that the Administration had no authorization under
the Eisenhower Doctrine to send troops into Lebanon, since the
doctrine authorized intervention only in the case of aggression by international communism.
Lebanon.
anti-West.

This could not be shown in

"We can be sure that they {the aggressive forces) are
But that is not sufficient to invoke the Eisen-

hower Doctrine."

In his opinion, the only justification for

sending in American troops was in answer to a petition from
the Lebanese Government for the protection of American lives
and property until the troops could bring them out of Lebanon .
Morse continued:
••• While that (U. s.) flag is there, the senior Senator
from Oregon will back the President of the United States,
as connnander in chief, behind the flag, although I believe
the President has made a sorry and historic mistake this
morning. That flag should come out; and United Nations
forces should go in to keep the peace under the United
Nations doctrine, not under the Eisenhower doctrine.
Morse opposed spending American blood for oil, which might be
needed in Europe or anywhere else in the world .

And Morse did

not believe the United States had any right under international
.
. a Le b anese civil
. . war. 79
law to intervene
in
78 Ibid., p. 13777 .
79 1bid., pp. 13778-13779. Oil was, indeed, an imp?~ant
consideration, at least a s far as u. s. support for British
intervention in Jordan was concerned. In his July 21, 1958,
backgrounder, Dulles rather candidly revealed that in his talks
with Lloyd the matter was raised. Dulles stateda "We dealt , in
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Later, on July 17, 1958, Senator Morse continued his attack
upon the Administration's foreign policy in Lebanon.

Morse

suggested that Dulles be replaced as Secretary of State by
Walter Lippmann, who showed such depth of understanding for
Middle East foreign policy issues.
against

u. s.

In support of his arguments

intervention in Lebanon, Morse requested that

the following Lippmann articles frqm the July 17, and 22, 1958,
issues of the Washington Post be printed in the Record as part
of his remarks1 1. "The Marines in Lebanon"; and 2. "Time For
Diplomacy."

Generally, Lippmann's remarJcs paralleled those of

Senator Morse in these instances. 80
Thus, the decision to intervene in Lebanon caused dissent
. . .
. Sena t 0rs. 81 They were in
and criticism
from some Democratic
the minority.
large part, with logistics in Jordan. Jordan is now virtually
cut off from access to the outside world. Oil is the most
important item. We had to think what the situation would be
if the Iraqi oil pipelines got into unfriendly hands. That ·
is no reat concern as lon as other Mid East roducin centers
such as Iran stay in friendly hands. Italics added.
"Iraq probably will not stop selling oil to the West.
Old Mossadegh tried that in Iran. We merely stepped up our
production, and Iran hurt only her own economy. Iraq also
must sell oil--and cannot exact exhorbitant terms. In fact,
we know of certain plots to blow up the pipelines out of Iraq,
but higher forces stepped in and countermanded the plot."
Dulles Additional Papers, Harkness, "Memoranda and Notes ••• ,
Off-the-record memo , July 21, 1958, op. cit., p. 2.
0

80 see1

••American Foreign Policy In The Middle East,,.
Congressional Record--Senate, Vol. 104, Part 11, July 17, 1958,
pp. 14134-14136; and °Crisis in the Middle East.,'' Congressional
Record--Senate, Vol. 104, Part 11, July 22, 1958, PP• 1455414556.
81 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., P• 183.
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The on-Again, Off-Again Summit on the Middle East
Even before the adjournment of the deadlocked United
Nations security Council on July 22, 1958, soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev wrote Western leaders on July 19, to protest

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in

Jordan, and to suggest a summit conference of the H.eads of
Government of the

u. s. s.

R., the United States, Great Britain,

France and India, with the participation of the United Nations
Secretary-General, to meet in Geneva on July 22 "t

take

urgent measures to stem the beginning military conflict."
Further aims of the Soviet proposed conference could be consideration of the question of discontinuing arms deliveries to
the Middle East.

In the Soviet view "this summit conference

should work out concrete recommendations to end the military
conflict in the Middle East and submit them to the Security
Council so that this United Nations body would study them with
the participation of representatives from the Arab states ... 83
Thus began what Eisenhower later referred to as "a voluminous and largely fruitless exchange of correspondence between
Mr. Khrushchev and the West, particularly the United states." 63
Eisenhower responded to Khrushchev's letter by defending the
legality of the

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon.

Regarding the

Russian summit proposal, Eisenhower indicated that in the

u. s.

view what Khrushchev proposed amounted, in effect, to five
82••First Exchange: Premier Khrushchev to the President

(Unofficial Translation)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX,
No. 998, Aug. 11, 1958, PP• 231-233.
83:Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 28'3.
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nations, without the sanction of the United Nations and without
conformity to its Charter, reaching

0

recornmendations" which

would then be submitted to the United Nations Security council.
"(I)n reality such so-called •recommendations' would be decisions and the process would in effect make the United Nations
into a •rubber stamp' for a few great powers.••

Eisenhower

suggested that,if the Soviet leader seriously believed there
was an imminent threat to world peace, he could take the matter
to the security Council where Russia could
nation •

represent a member

.,If such a meeting were generally desired, the United

States would join in following that orderly procedure." 84
Thereby, the

u. s.

bowed to public opinion in Europe

(including Britain) , and in Asia, and acceded to Macmillan's
public suggestion on July 27, 1958, that an emergency summit be
held at the Security Council.

Dulles resisted a summit on the

model of the 1955 Geneva summit.

He · supported the Macmillan

proposal largely because it entailed smaller risks in the event
the conference failed . 85
It was reported at the time that the United States had
agreed to attend what the President and his principal advisers
profoundly and unanimously believed to be

0

the wrong meeting

at the wrong time and place on the wrong subject," and that the
Administration agreed to the summit in the face of strong
British pressure from public and parliamentary opinion.

The

84"First Exchange: The President to Premier Khrushchev
(White House press release dated July 22), .. State Dept. Bul.,
Vol. XXXIX, No . 998, Aug. 11, 1958, PP• 229-231.
85Hoopes , The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., P • 437.
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would have preferred a summit meeting which was: 1. carefully
prepared in advance; 2. dealt with the unresolved European
issues left over from the previous summit; and 3. offered
reason to believe progress could be made. 86
A second exchange of letters followed, in which the Sovie t
Union, on July 23, 1958, repeated its desire for a five power
conference, which it now indicated it was willing to hold
within the United Nations Security Council in New York. 87

And

on July 25, 1958, the United States repeated its readiness to
adhere to the

u.

N. Charter, and to the conditions which it

lays down for participation in the Security council by nonmembers of the Council, under arrangements made by the SecretaryGenera1.88
American agreement to a summit, of sorts, within the United
Nations Security Council, was welcomed by Congressional supporters
and opponents of the intervention in Lebanon.

Senator Javits

was pleased that the President appeared to seel<: more than a
superficial summit meeting on the Middle East.

Senator Hubert

Humphrey repeated his belief that the United Nations was
upeculiarly well adapted to the needs of a summit meeting and
a meeting of the heads of state."

And Senator Mansfield saw

no reason to fear a summit conference, if the Administrati on
86James Reston , ••The Wrong Everything, .. NYT, July 23 , 1958 ,
p. 6 .

87 usecond Exchange: Premier Khrushchev to President Eisenhower (Unofficial Translation)," State Dept. Bul. , Vol. XXXIX,
No. 998, op. cit., pp. 234-235.
88 usecond Exchanges The President to Premier Khrushchev
(White House press release dated July 25)," in ibid., pp. 233234.
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were prepared to move along constructive lines. 89
But on July 28, 1958, Khrushchev repeated his proposal
for a five-power conference.

He withdrew his readiness for

such a conference to be held in New York, where he now argued
the United States would have difficulties ensuring the safety
of the Heads of Governments.

He suggested that the proposed

conference be held in Europe--a point with which, Khrushchev
noted, French President Charles de Gaulle was in agreement-at Geneva , Vienna , Paris , Moscow , or any other place accept. .
a b le to all participants
. 90

De Gaulle h a d formally accepted

Khrushchev's proposal to convene the Summit at Geneva.

The

West was openly dividea. 91
The United States, in its August 1st reply, repeated its
earlier insistence that a special meeting of the Security
council be held.
the

u. s.

Eisenhower indicated that such a meeting, in

view, could be held elsewhere than New York city, but

not in Moscow, where a recent demonstration resulted in

u. s. Embassy. Eisenhower indicated that he had
the u. s. Permanent Representative to the Security

damage to the
instructed

Council to seek a special meeting on or about August 12, 1958.
This would permit direct discussions between Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers.

Eisenhower stated his intention

to personally attend the special meeting, and his hope that
89 "The Situation in the Middle East," Congressional Record-senate, Vol. 104, Part 11, July 25, 1958, pp. 15081-15088.
900 Premier Khrushchev to the President (Unofficial Translation)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 999, Aug. 18, 1958,
pp. 275-277.

91 Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 437.
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Khrushchev would likewise attend. 92
In his news conference of the day before, secretary of
State Dulles stated what he thought could be accomplished by
a summit confe rence on the Middle East held under United
Nations auspices.

He indicated that he felt it would "dispel

the false allegations

0

of united States and United Kingdom

aggression in the Middle East , and it would show the danger
there of "indirect aggression."

Thereby, it would tend to

stabilize the political situation and make possible the more
easy development of economic programs. 93
Dulles also indicated that he did not think it feasi ble ,
at a conference of that sort, to deal, "in a definitive way, "
with the larger problems of the Middle East.
require a considerable amount of preparation.
with the charges of

u. s.

This would
By dealing

and u. K. aggression, and the probl em

of indirect aggress ion, Dulles argued, "the foundation for
dealing with the broader problems" would be laid. 94
Later in the news conference, Dulles indicated that the
election of a new Lebanese President dispelled allegations
that the u .
of Chamoun.

s.

intervened in Lebanon to assure the reelection

He repeated the United States intention to with-

draw from Lebanon when requested to do so by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon, whether or not the United States
92 "The President to Premier Khrushchev (White House press
release dated August 1)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No . 999,
op. cit., pp. 274-275.
930 secretary Dulles' News Conference of July 31," State
Dept . Bul., Vol . XXXIX, No. 999 , Aug. 18, 1958, P• 265.
94 Ibid., P• 266.
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thought it was wise to withdraw at the time.
tration hoped there would be

0

But the Adminis-

a greater measure of political

stability when we came out than was the case when we went in." 95
Following a visit to Communist China, Premier Khrushchev
sent another letter on August 5, 1958, to President Eisenhower,
accusing the United States and Great Britain of evading the
convocation of a five power conference, and noting the previous
inability of the Security Council to assure a solution of the
situation in the Near and Middle East.

Khrushchev claimed that

the United States had transformed the Security Council into an
organ "consisting principally of countries belonging to NATO,
the Baghdad Pact , SEATO, and in which the place of the lawful
representative of the great Chinese People's Republic is
occupied by the representative of the political corpse Chiang
Kai-shek. ••

Therefore, Khrushchev insisted, the Security Council

was "not capable of taking any decision independent of the will
of the United states of America."
Government had instructed its

u.

Consequently, the Soviet
N. Representative

0

to demand

the convocation of a Special Session of the General Assembly
of the UN for the discussion of the question of the withdrawal
of the troops of Great Britain from Jordan. ••96

The State

Department sighed with relief when Khrushchev cancell ed the
summi' t • 97

95.I...!....•,
b'd
p . 271 •
96 "Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to the President (Unofficial
Text) ," State Dept. Bul ., Vol. XXXIX, No. 1001, Sept. 1, 1958,
PP• 342-346.
97Miller, Dag Hammarsk jold, op. cit., PP• 195-196.
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On August 5, 1958, the White House released a statement
by President Eisenhower acknowledging the soviet letter announcing its intention to seek a General Assembly session on
the Near and Middle East.

Eisenhower welcomed Khrushchev's

"agreement" to place the Middle Eastern problem again before
the United Nations, and he expressed regret that the soviet
leader "did not accept the Security Council with the Heads of
Government present as the appropriate forum in view of his
alleged concern over the threat to peace."

Recalling that

Ambassador Lodge had, on July 18, 1958, proposed such a procedure to the Security Council, Eisenhower indicated that the

u. s.

found the General Assembly "completely acceptable. 098
In his August 6th news conference, President Eisenhower

indicated his willingness to participate personally at the
United Nations General Assembly meeting on the Middle East, if
he found it "necessary or desirable," although there were at
that moment "no plans ••• and no particular intention" for him
to do so.
The President noted that the United States, as it had
stated in several notes it had sent, would seek, in the General
Assembly meeting, to discuss

0

the general problems of the

Mid-East with their underlying causes ••• (Y)ou couldn't possibly
confine anything just to ••• Lebanon, because the causes of the
difficulty are so much wider than are to be found merely within
that area ••• You would have to discuss the problems .u
980 statement by President Eisenhower," State Dept. Bul.,
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1001, Sept. 1, 1958, p . 342.
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Eisenhower apparently bowed to pressure from within the White
House staff, from other domestic critics, and from abroad,
that Dulles' July 31 news conference remarks were too negative
(sees Chapter VII.) From within the Administration, then Vice
President Richard M. Nixon,

c.

D. Jackson, a special consultant

on the Middle East, and Presidential Press Secretary James
Hagerty reportedly urged a more positive approach.

c.

Thus, the

President overruled Dulles, who, on July 31, had expressed the
wish to confine the discussion to questions of
0

0

aggression" and

indirect aggression•• ( see aboves pp. 416-417.), and broadened

the scope of discussion

And Eisenhower repeated the

u. s.

intention to withdraw from Lebanon when requested to do so by
the Lebanese Government. 99
On August 8, 1958, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
introduced his three-point plan, which called fora 1. extension
of

u.

N. activities in Lebanon and Jordan; 2. reaffirmation of

Arab non-interference in each other's domestic affairs; and
3. cooperative Arab efforts in joint economic development.
(see above: p. 40.)
The Secretary-General's plan buttressed the position of
the group within the Administration which advocated a positive
approach.

on August 13, President Eisenhower addressed the

General Assembly in the third emergency special session.
a move which represented a compromise victory for those

In

u. s.

99 "The President's News Conference of August 6, 1958,"
Public Papers, 1958, op. cit., pp. 587-588.
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officials advocating a positive approach,lOO Eisenhower outlined
a six-point American plan for peace in the Middle East.

u. s.

The

proposal expanded on the Secretary-General's provision

for Arab joint cooperation in economic development, despite
published reports that American officials recognized that
Hammarskjold had never been able to arouse much Arab interest
in the project.

(see: Chapter VII.)

The Eisenhower plan

called for1
1. u. N. General Assembly consideration of measures to
assure the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon;
2. General Assembly expression of United Nations interest
in preserving the peace in Jordan;
3. The reaffirmation by the General Assembly of the

United Nations policy against inflammatory propaganda broadcasts across national frontiers and the monitoring of radio
broadcasts directed across Near Eastern borders;
4, General Assembly action toward the creation of a

standby United Nations peace force;
5 The establishment of an Arab development institution

on a regional basis--to be run by the Arabs themselves--to
assist and accelerate improvement in the living standard of
the Arab people; and
6. The establishment of au. N, body to see what arms-

control arrangements could be worked out to avoid a new armsrace spiral in the Middle East. 101
lOOMiller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., pp. 199-200.
lOl,.Program for the Near East: Address by President Eisenhower, .. State Dept, Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No. 1001, Sept. 1, 1958,
pp. 337-342.
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In his news conference of August 20, 1958, President
Eisenhower made a realistic response to John Scali, Associated
Press, who, noting that reports indicated little chance for
approval of Eisenhower's proposal for au. N. peace force,
asked whether the President intended to press this proposal
later as a matter of urgency.

Eisenhower replied&

I don't believe you can keep the thing on the urgent
basis too long.
•
•
This thing has always been up to the fore, most
people believing that if the united Nations is going to
be truly effective in many instances, it ought to have
something of that kind. Also, there was the hope that
if that could develop then possibly there would be lesser
need for security forces and the armament race. But it
is one of those things that I think has to develop and
to come about with the growth of commonsense and a little
bit greater tolerance among nations. I think it is a
very fine thing. I think it is one of those things that
probably will not be done exactly at this moment .1 02
On the question of u.
hower recalled that the u.

s.
s.

withdrawal from Lebanon, Eisenhad said that it would leave

Lebanon as soon as the local government said it did not need
the

u. s.,

and "when and in the event that the United Nations

say they are prepared to take the responsibility for peace
and order. 0103
But the united Nations was not prepared to take over the
u.

s.

position in Lebanon.

On August 21, 1958, the General

Assembly passed unanimously a resolution sponsored by ten
Arab countries--Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi
102 "The President's News Conference of August 20, 1958 ,"
Public Papers , 1958, op. cit., pp. 623-624.
l0 3 Ibid., p. 624.
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Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen.

The

Arab Resolution: 1. welcomed the renewed assurances of the
Arab States to respect the systems of governments in member
States of the Arab League and to abstain from any action to
change them; 2 . called upon

u.

N. members to mutually respect

each other's territoriaI .integrity, - and sovereignty, and to
follow principles of non-aggression and of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and 3. requested the
Secretary-General to facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign
troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

The Arab resolution invited

the Secretary-General to continue his efforts on behalf of an
Arab development institute.

Finally, it requested member

cooperation in carrying out the resolution and invited the
Secretary-General to report not later than September 30, 1958. 104
In his General Assembly comments on the Arab resolution,
Secretary of State Dulles compared it point-by-point with the
Norwegian resolution, noting the great similarity between the
two.

Dulles observed that the Arab resolution omitted refer-

ence to the consideration of a standby United Nations peace
force by the then upcoming Thirteenth General Assembly.
indicated that the

u. s.

Dulles

took "much satisfaction° from the

104"Text of (Arab) Resolution (U. N. doc. A/Res./1237
(ES-III)) ," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXIX, No . 1003, Sept. 15,
1958, pp . 411-412. Miller remarked, "The Arab resolution was
a mild setback for the position of the united States ••• Yet the
United States shared Members considerable relief over the way
the issue had been resolved, and other Member states were too
jubilant over the happy ending to consider whether the United
States succeeded or failed in achieving its objectives."
Miller , Dag Hammarskjold , op. cit., pp. 205-206.
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fact that the countries directly involved in the controversy-the Arab countries--found it possible to agree on action to
settle the issues in the Middle East . 105
In a background press conference at the Waldorf Towers,
August 21, 1958, at 7115 p.m., Secretary of State Dulles gave
his appraisal of the joint action of the ten Arab States in
formulating the Arab resolution.

Dulles stated that he thought

the Arab resolution was a reaction to the Norwegian resolution,
for which the

u.

S. had the necessary two-thirds voting majority.

It would have been a close vote, with a favorable margin of two
or three votes.

Support for the Norwegian resolution would

have come largel y from Latin America , Western Europe, and ten
members of the Arab-Asian bloc, without the support of the
principal Arab States.

Thus, in Dulles• estimate , the Arabs

thought it was better to do a "re-write job" on the Norwegian
resolution, and to maJte the dissenting Arabs agree.

Dulles

gave United Arab Republic Foreign Minister , Mahmoud Fawzi,
most of the credit for the success of this maneuver.
Dulles noted further that dealing with this Middle East
problem in the Third Special Emergency Session of the General
Assembly was much better than dealing with it in a summit
meeting .

Dulles expressed his fears of a summit conference

in which the Heads of Governments, confronted with issues ,
either have to agree or disagree , often with very dangerous
10511 statement by Secretary Dulles (U. s./u. N. press
release 2983 August 21), 0 State Dept. Bul ., Vol. XXXIX, No , 1003,
op. cit., PP• 409 -411. Eisenhower wrote: "Fundamentally, this
action in the United Nations (passage of the Arab resolution)
terminated the Lebanon crisis, although American troops were to
stay there for another two months." Eisenhower, Waging Peace,
op. cit., p. 288,
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consequences.

Then, there was the problem of the big powers

imposing their will on others.

In the present situation, the

Arabs had come up with their own solution. 106
Asked whether he thought the Arab resolution had any real
meaning, in terms of the relationship between Egypt , Lebanon,
amd Jordan, Dulles replied that he thought it would.

He

based his reply on informal talks he had had with Fawzi, in
which Dulles had emphasized that, if the Arab resolution was
passed and the situation remained the same, "we" would be made
to look very foolish, particularly if the resolution were
presented by the Arab League.

Thus, the Arabs were seen by

.
.
107
Dulles as prisoners
of th.
eir own policy.
Dulles indicated that he did not discuss with Fawzi the
question of Cairo Radio's inflammatory broadcasts, but that he,
nevertheless, anticipated that there would be change for the
better. 108
Dulles remarked that the interregnum in Lebanon--with
Chamoun on the way out; Chehab on the way in; thus, neither
having full authority--would be a "little" obstacle in working
out the withdrawal of American troops.

But, Dulles indicated

that there was a good chance to arrange some troop reductions .
106Jo hn Foster Dulles Papers, Prince
.
t on Univ.
.
Li. b rary,
IX. Conference dossiers; special subjects, July 1958-1959, in

folders Emergency Session of the General Assembly--New York
City, August 12-22, 1958; Speeches, Schedules1 "Background
Press Conference Held by the Secretary of State at the Waldorf
Towers, Suite 35-A, at 7115 p.m., Aug. 21, 1958,., P• 1.
l0 7 Ibid., p. 2.
lOSibid., P • 3 •
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by Lebanese inauguration time , on or about September 22, 1958.
It would depend on the situation in Lebanon, 109
In response to a question whether he was satisfied that
the Assembly resolution made progress on the six points outlined by President Eisenhower on August 13, 1958 (see above:
pp. 419-420.), Dulles replied, "No," because much of the President's plan could only be dealt with at the Regular General
Assembly, not in an Emergency Session of the Assembly,

The

problems, mentioned in Eisenhower's plan, which Dulles believed
could only be dealt with at the Regular Session, were: 1. a
standby United Nations police force; 2. an Arab economic development fund; and 3, the monitoring of radio broadcasts.
Therefore , this special emergency session of the General
Assembly was not an adequate response.

It dealt with only

three of the basic points in the Eisenhower proposal.

Dulles

felt there was a disposition to deal with the other points
during the Regular session, although there was sharp divergence
of opinion, particularly about f ormation of a united Nations
peace force.

The Indians were "violently" opposed to the

standby force because, Dulles surmised, they feared it might
. Rashrn'i r. 110
some d ay b e use d in

In reply to a question whether he was surprised at the
rather hostile attitude of the Arabs t oward the United Nations
taking the initiative in an economic development scheme for
l0 9 Ibid,, P• 4.
llOibid., pp. 6-7.
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the Arab states, Dulles indicated that he was not surprised.
Both he and the President were aware of Arab suspicions and
attempted to deal with the matter "rather delicately."

It

was not the American intention to dominate the bank; rather,
the Arabs would have to control and direct it • . Dulles
concluded a
The idea that this was something that they would all
fall over themselves to grab was never an idea that we
entertained. We have always been aware of their extreme
sensitivity that this might in some way be a scheme for
getting economic control and through that maybe political
control of the area. You know these countries have had
for so long had to struggle against colonialism, foreign
domination--the Ottoman empire, the British and the French
have been there and the British are still there in various
points around the Arabian Peninsula--they are extremely
cautious about anything which eminates from the West.111
With the passage of the Arab resolution, the American
diplomatic offensive over Lebanon came to an end.
remained but to withdraw American troops.

There

On October 25, 1958,

the final contingent of American troops was withdrawn from
Lebanon.
Concluding Observations
Sherman Adams, former Presidential chief-of-staff,
commented that the Lebanon situation was a frustrating and
an unhappy experience for Eisenhower, who, in retrospect, had
"overestimated the gravity of the Lebanon situation and the
effects of his intervention in that Middle East brushfire." 112
111 Ibid., P• 7.
112sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper, 1961}, p. 293.
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In his November 7, 1958, news conference, Dulles indicated
that two major things were accomplished by the American intervention in Lebanon and the British intervention in Jordan.
It was demonstrated that small countries could get help when
they felt imperiled.

And the actual situation in the Middle

East had, in his opinion, been improved, although it was far
from perfect. 113
It is true that following the Anglo-American intervention
in the Middle East in 1958 the area was quiet, for a while, and
Western interests in the area were preserved,

However, it

cannot be said that the American diplomatic offensive in the
United Nations met with any great success.

The United Nations

did not sanction American intervention by assuming the role
of the Marines.
this day,

Au. N. peace force has not been created to

And President Eisenhower's six-point program for

the Middle East was still-born.

Does it, therefore, follow

that the United States suffered a diplomatic defeat during
United Nations debate of the Lebanon crisis?

Not necessarily.

A review of United States United Nations Security Council
statements, the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of letters,
American General Assembly statements, and Dulles• background
observations on United Nations General Assembly actions makes
it difficult to conclude that the United States seriously
expected, or wanted, to achieve diplomatic agreements through
1130 secretary Dulles' News Conference of November 7," State
Dept. Bul., Vol . XXXIX, No, 1013, Nov. 24, 1958, P• 811,
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the United Nations during the Lebanon crisis,

For example, in

the Security Council, the United States, following the expected
Soviet veto of the American resolution, did not envision
Russian acceptance of the Japanese resolution.

Although Lodge

withdrew an American request for a special meeting of the
General Assembly in order to allow the Japanese to put their
resolution forward , the best the

u. s.

Russia would abstain in the voting.

hoped for was that

And when Eisenhower made

his six-point proposal to the General Assembly, the Administration expected Arab opposition to the economic development
scheme and widespread opposition to the establishment of a

u.

N. peace force.

Nevertheless, the American program was

put forth,
The impression grows that

u. s.

action in the United

Nations was meant to lend an air of diplomatic respectability
to

u. s.

military intervention in Lebanon and to ensure support

on the homefront by appearing conciliatory, reasonable, and
generous.

u. s.

efforts to win

u.

N sanction of American

power politics by its assuming the American role do not appear
to have been serious.

Furthermore, one has the distinct

impression that the Eisenhower Administration anticipated
many of the results

u. s.

actions b rought .

The one big surprise

to the Administration, apparently, was the Arab resolution.
The Eisenhower Administration, essentially, overreacted
to the Iraqi coup.

It intervened in the Lebanon to forestall

the spread of the Iraqi revolt to neighboring Arab states.
American decision was taken unilaterally.

The

The United Nations
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was informed belatedly, on the heels of the American troop
landings.
In the Lebanon crisis, in contrast to the Suez crisis,
the

u. s .

chose not to rely on the United Nations to achieve

its goals in the Middle East.
quick response, the

u.

S

Believing in the need for a

decided upon direct action .

In so

doing, it cast doubt on the sincerity of its Suez posture.
Former United Nations Official, Andrew

w.

Cordier, indicated

that while Dulles had a reasoned regard for the worthwhileness
of the United Nations, on the Lebanon question, the Secretary of
State did not place much faith or reliance in the

u.

N. 114

During the Lebanon crisis there was a noticable decrease
in the amount of

u. s.

moralistic argumentation by American

officials when compared to
crisis.

u. s.

statements during the Suez

The need to justify and defend its power politics

found the United States leaning on broad, legalistic interpretations of national and international law.

The American

intervention did not comply with the terms of the Eisenhower
Doctrine, 115 the Tripartite Declaration, or Article 51 of the
114Dulles Pro1ect,
.
.
.
. h And rew
Princeton,
Int erview
wit
Cordier, 1 Feb. 1967 , p. 19.

w.

115wright commented: ttAn extension of the concept of
individual self-defense ••• to permit armed intervention when
called for by the Monroe Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine,
or other unilateral declaration of foreign policy, clearly
cannot be justified by the Charter. States may declare such
policies and support them by diplomatic representations and
other peaceful methods. But such policies do not constitute
part of the 'self' of a state, and do not of themselves
justify armed intervention in foreign territory. They
justify such intervention only insofar as they are declaratory
of the justifications recognized by international law." Wright,
"United States Intervention In Lebanon, .. loc. cit.
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united Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, the Administration

sought to legitimize its exercise of power politics by
claiming it had the authority to act.

It based its conten-

tion on rather broad interpretation of the Eisenhower
Doctrine and Article 51.

Apparently aware of the weakness

of its legal position, the Administration avoided the appeals
to a higher morality which it had made during the Suez crisis.

CHAPTER VII
AMERICAN PRESS REACTION TO THE LEBANON CRISIS
Preliminary Observations
The Lebanon crisis of 1958 was much shorter in duration
and much less complex than the earlier Suez crisis.

Fewer

nations were directly involved in Lebanon--primarily the United
States and Lebanon itself.

The American press--largely the

newspapers and newsmagazines--were mainly interested in the
crisis from mid-May until the unanimous passage of the Arab
resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on August 21.
Secretary Dulles• comments during his May 20 news conference
signalled publicly the distinct possibility of direct
invoivement in Lebanon.

u. s.

Prior to that, occasional articles on

the Lebanese revolt appeared in the American press.

But, after

May 20, the amount of coverage and editorial comment increased.
United Nations passage of the Arab resolution was generally
interpreted as signaling the end of the Middle East crisis.
By August 25, the expanding ()lemoy-Matsu controversy between
Mainland China and Formosa swept Lebanon from the front page of
the newspapers, and very nearly from the inner pages as well.
occasional articles and editorials appeared after that date.
Generally, they dealt with the success of the Chehab successor
regime, and with the progress of American troop withdrawals.
The amount of total American press coverage of the Lebanon
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crisis was less than that of the Suez crisis.

The shorter

length of the Lebanon crisis and its greater simplicity
apparently contributed to determining the amount of coverage
given it by the American press.
American Newspaper Coverage of the Crisis
This study of American newspaper coverage of the Lebanon
crisis will concentrate on three major American newspapers--the
Christian science Monitor, the New York Times, and the !isl,!
Street Journal. The purpose will be to see whether there was
greater support of Administration policies by these American
newspapers during the Lebanon crisis than during the Suez crisis.
A further aim will be to determine whe ther the Eisenhower Administration kept the American newspapers better informed than it did
during Suez.

An attempt will be made to discern how successfully

the Administration was able to influence newspaper coverage of
events.

And finally, an effort will be made to measure . possible

improvement of the Administration's press image in the area . of
foreign affairs--particularly that of Secretary of State Dulles
whose press staff had undergone significant changes in 1957
with the express purpose of improving his Suez-shattered public
image.
The sampling method will be the same as that employed in
Chapter IV to analyze the Suez materials.
224.)

(see aboves PP• 223-

Special emphasis will again be given to editorial comments

because they reflect the official views of the newspaper and the
policies it supports.

The study will concentrate on American

newspaper coverage of the period May 20, 1958, to August 21,
1958.

Once again, in order to determine whether the Eastern
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papers studied were representative, a check of the editorial
policy of 4 Western newspapers was made.

similarities and/or

differences will be appropriately noted in the footnotes.
The Pre-Intervention Period
Reporting on the May 20, 1958, news conference of the
secretary of State , all three major American newspapers dUly
noted Dulles• proforma remarks that the United states would
not be deterred by soviet threats from undertaking, anywhere
in the world, what the

u. s.

thought to be right and its duty.

In his byline, filed May 20, New York Times correspondent Dana
Adams Schmidt merely mentioned without comment that Dulles had
said it.

On May 20, Neal Stanford, Christian Science Monitor,

observed that the United States had thereby "served notice on
the soviet Union that Soviet threats and bluster will not stop
it (the

u.

s.) from going to Lebanon's support if help should

be requested and considered necessary."

And on May 21, the

Wall Street Journal regarded Dulles• observation as a "not so
veiled warning .. to Nikita Khrushchev and Gamal Abdel Nasser
"to quit stirring up riots in Lebanon." 1
Neal Stanford, Christian science Monitor, commented that,
in his interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine,

i• ~•

the

Middle East Resolution of 1957, Dulles had disclosed that it
"is broader in scope than generally has been understood."
Previously, according to Stanford, it was believed that the
1Dana Adams Schmidt, "Dulles Rejects Change In Policy,"
NYT, May 21, 1958, pp. 1 and 18; Neal Stanford, "Dulles Defies
Reds on Aid to Lebanon," CSM, May 20, 1958, P• 1; and "Dulles
Indicates u. s . would send Troops To Lebanon If Need Arises,"
WSJ, May 21, 1958 , P• 2.
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Congressional resolution applied only to armed assistance, if
requested, to a Middle Eastern coun.try threatened by aggression
from a country controlled .by international conununism--if the

u. s.

President determined its necessity.

But now, according

to Dulles• interpretation, the Doctrine was "apparently •• ,being
extended to cover practically any situation."

Stanford noted

that Dulles had mentioned that Congress had inserted the sentence
which supposedly gave the Administration the authority to act in
Lebanon.

Thus, in Dulles• view, ••congress gave the President

more than he wanted in his Eisenhower Doctrine and now if the
occasion arises the President may decide to use this additional
authority."

Dana Adams Schmidt, New York Times, noteda "Mr. Dqlles

had declared that the Eisenhower Doctrine was •not just one thing,•
that it was not 'confined to · 1aying down · policy ·in case of attack
0

by a nation controlled by international communism.••

And the

Wall Street Journal observed that Dulles told his press conference that the main authority for possible

u. s.

intervention in

Lebanon was "a generally overlooked provision" of the Middle
East Resolution.

All three newspapers recorded Senator Mans-

field's "vigorous reply" to Dulles• interpretation of the socalled Mansfield Amendment.
did not believe direct

u. s.

All noted Dulles• remark that he
involvement would be necessary in

Lebanon. 2
Neither the New York Times nor the Christian Science Monitor
immediately commented editorially on Dulles• broad interpretation
2schmidt, "Dulles Rejects Change In Policy," lac. cit.;
Stanford, "Dulles
fies Reds on Aid to Lebanon," lac. cit.;
and ••Dulles Indicates u. s. Would Send Troops To Lebanon If
Need Arises," loc. cit.
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of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

But, subsequently, both supported

the American military intervention in Lebanon.

In contrast,

the Wall Street Journal took a strong editorial position of
opposition to Dulles• interpretation.

The Journal expressed

doubt that such "an amorphous •mandate'" was intended by
Congress.

"It seems more likely that the words about Middle

East independence being vital were thrown in as pious platitudes
to introduce the quite specific kinds of cases in which we
might intervene in the Middle East."

Since Congress did insert

the "loose language•• ( a reference to the c ongressionally amended
sentences "Furthermore, the United States r egards as vital to
the national interest and world peace the preservation of the
independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."),
and since Dulles was inter preting that language "in a broad way,"
perhaps Congress would clarify the point that the Eisenhower
Doctrine was not meant to empower the Executive to rush troops
into countries--that were not even being attacked--to support
Governments that the

u. s.

might prefer.

"Otherwise there will

be no limit to the messy involvements we will be getting into." 3

3 "Loose Language Loosely Inte.rpreted," Editorial, WSJ,
May 23, 1958, p. 6. The Post-Dispatch regarded Dulles• interpretation as "new and radical." Continuing its earlier support
for the United Nations, the Post-Dispatch commenteda "Unilateral
intervention surely can be only a last resort. Preservation of
Lebanese sovereignty obviously is the concern of the United
Nations." See, "For u. N. Rather Than u. s.," Editorial, SLPD,
May 21, 1958, p 2D. The L, A. Times expressed concern over
Dulles• use ef the Eisenhower Doctrine to support the Chamoun
regime. The loophole Dulles found in the Doctrine enabled the
u. s. to take action (sending police equipment) which won a
short-term victory. But, as a consequence, the u. s. was
"revealed to the Ar abs as the 'imperialist' power they suspected
it was all along, determined to settle the local quarrels of the
Middle East in its own inter est." sees "The 'Mandate• That May
Undo us," Editorial, LAT, May 25, 1958, part II, p. 4.
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When Lebanon filed its complaint of

u.

A. R. intervention,

William R. Frye theorized, in a Monitor article, that Lebanon
had won the first round in the intricate diplomatic battle with
President Nasser.

The United Nations Security council decided

to adjourn to await the results of Arab League consideration of
Lebanon's complaint.

This meant that "the threat of a public

airing was left hanging over President Nasser's head."

It

could be invoked if Lebanon were dissatisfied with the results
of the closed-door sessions of the Arab League.

Frye noted

that prospects for a resolution of the Lebanon dispute outside
the United Nations were considered

0

good enough" that there

was little likelihood of a public debate.

June 3, the date

scheduled for a resumption of Security Council debate of the
issue, was merely seen as an added element of pressure on
Nasser. 4

Frye's assessment was proven altogether wrong by events.

Qubain later argued that the Chamoun Government was not seriously
interested in solving the matter at the Arab League sessions.
By way of explanation, he noteds 1. since Arab League members
were so divided, and since the Leagues past record did not
inspire confidence, there was little reason to anticipate League
success in solving the Lebanese issue.

Thus, Lebanon went to

Bengazi, Lybia, expecting failure; 2. Lebanese Foreign Minister

Dr. Charles Malik did not attend the Bengazi sessions; he went
directly to the security Council meeting i n New York; 3. The
Chamoun Government was interested in exposing Nasser at the
highest international forum; and 4. Chamoun and Malik hoped

for foreign intervention with the resulting possibility of
4william R. Frye, "Beirut Wins Edge on Nasser in UN," CSM,
May 28, 1958, P• 6.
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Chamoun's remaining in the Lebanese Presidency for a second
term, thereby, dealing a double blow--to Nasser and to the
local Lebanese Opposition. 5

There was, therefore, little like-

lihood for a resolution of the Lebanese dispute outside the
United Nations.
Throughout the Lebanon crisis, the New York Times maintained
a strongly anti-Nasser position.

When Lebanon placed its charge

of massive infiltration by the United Arab Republic, the Times
remarked that the Lebanese had every right to be heard, and
that they would be heard sympathetically in most of the free
world.

But, the Times doubted that any specific resolution

would be offered when the debate took place because of the
expected Soviet veto of any resolution which held Nasser guilty
as charged, and which called upon him to desist from his action.
"Naturally Nasser woUld like to bring Lebanon into his orbit by
one means or another, but that he can do so flying in the face
of the world's opinion is doubtful ••• "

Besides, the Times

theorized, Nasser would not care to see the Eisenhower Doctrine
invoked. 6
The nature of the internal strife in Lebanon was variously
interpreted by the major American newspapers, which, in turn,
was reflected in their respective attitudes toward establishment
of the United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL).
Prior to passage of the Swedish resolution calling for creation
5Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 91.
6 ••tebanon•s Complaint," Editorial, NYT, May 26, 1958, p. 28.
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of the Observation Group, the Christian Science Monitor, which
could not make up its mind as to the character of t he revolt,
commented that only au. N. observation group could determine
whether the virtual warfare was an expression of indiginous
hostility to the Chamoun regime, or whether it signified au. A. R.
design "to close in on the most Weste rn-minded republic in the
Middle East and take it over?"

The paper hoped that the Secretary-

General would be able to make arrangements for "a really sizable
observer corp, since nothing less can do the job. And it is
.
• t tune."
.
7 Following passage of the
need e d in
a race agains
r
Swedish resolution by the security Council, the Monitor, on
June 12, welcomed the

o.

N. decision to set up an Observation

Group to report on any illegal infiltration of personnel, arms
and materiel into Lebanon as "highly significant.••

The paper

considered it the "most logical way" of checking on Egyptian
claims of non-interference in Lebanese affairs. 8
The Times, which did not share the Monitor's hesitancy
about assigning blame for the Lebanese revolt to external causes,
welcomed the "gratifying decision" of the Security council. to
send the Observer Group to Lebanon "to stop interference in its
affairs by President Nasser's Soviet-backed United Arab Republic."
Accordimg to the Times, this decision became possible when Nasser
withdrew his opposition to the Swedish resol.ution because he was
"unable to refute the •irrefutable evidence'" of

u.

A. R. inter-

7"Eyes for the UN in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, June 8,
1958, p. 20.
8 "Lebanons The UN Steps In," Editorial, CSM, June 12,
1958, p. 20. For a simil.ar view, see: "Why Fight In Lebanon,"
Editorial, SLPD, June 17, 1958, P• 2B.
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ference in Lebanese affairs. 9 Later, on June 16, 1958, t h e ~
York Times commented that there was no reason to believe there
would have been bloodshed in Lebanon if the Middle East were
not generally in turmoil, and •• if there were not pressures from
Cairo, Moscow and perhaps elsewhere."

Lebanon was democratic

and pro-Western, which irritated the Soviets, who "invited the
active opposition of President Nasser, whose United Arab Republic
would be better rounded and more viable if Lebanon could be
driven into the fold ... lO
Of the Eastern papers studied, only the Wall Street Journal
maintained throughout the crisis that the Lebanese situation was
largely an internal revolt, although it acknowledged the evidence
indicating Nasser's support for the rebels.

The Journal argued

that part of the reason for the revolt was Chamoun•s intention
to seek a constitutionally forbidden second term as President. 11
9 "Action in Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, June 12, 1958, p. 30.
lO.,A Time For Patience," Editorial, NYT, June 16, 1958, p. 22.
11 ••And I f We Do--,., Editorial, WSJ, June 27, 1958, p. 4. Like
the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News argued that there was

not much doubt that the rebellion had been encouraged by the
United Arab Republic, which supplied the steadily expanding rebel
ranks with weapons. It welcomed the security Council vote to send
observers as a vote to localize the struggle. Like the Journal,
the Daily News regarded the rebellion as an internal revolt. The
Daily News commenteds "The presence of a handful of u. N. observers
is obviously not going to bring the civil war in Lebanon to a
sudden halt. But the restraints applied to Nasser ••• should have
some quieting effect." The u. N. vote could also release the u. s.
from the embarrassing dilenuna of insisting that the civil war be
localized while continuing to send war equipment for police
purposes, in the Daily News' opinion. see1 "Lebanon Hot Spot,"
Editorial, CDN, June 13, 1958, p. 10.
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Following the election of General Chehab as President, the
Journal weighed the possibility of a return to order in Lebanon.
It noted that Chehab was the one candidate upon whom both
Government and Opposition forces could agree, and that he ought
to be able to restore order to a country in which all factions
were weary of the revolt. As a potential threat to Lebanon•s
safety, the Journal cited possible subversion from the Syrian
sector of the United Arab Republic.

"That this was ever a

serious threat has not been satisfactorily shown; the United
Nations observers did not think it was ... 12
Both the Times and the Monitor stressed the need to preserve
and defend the integrity of tiny Lebanon.

The Monitor commented

that the secarity Council action of establishing UNOGIL was
hopeful toward achieving that end. 13 To obtain its obj.ective of
adequately policing the Lebanese-Syrian border against infiltra12 "In the Wake of Lebanon's Election," Editorial, WSJ,
Aug . 1, 1958, P• 4.
13 "Lebanont The UN Steps In," CSM, loc. cit. Both the
Chicago Daily News and the Chicage Sun-Times noted that it was
in the United States best interests that Lebanon continued to be
governed by the party sympathetic to the West, but the u. s.
would not be justified in sending in the troops to maintain that
party in power. The best justification the u. s. could have for
such action would be the Eisenhower Doctrine, which would require
that Lebanon be t hreatened by a communist-dominated nation. The
United Arab Republic was not communist-dominated. Thus , the task
was one for the u. N., ttnot for outside interveners, be they the
u. s. or the u. s. s. R." See, "Trnce .in Lebanon, .. Editorial,
CST, June 21, 1958, p. 15; and "'Doctrine• carries us To Brinks
Don•t Send u. s. Troops To Quell Lebanon Crisis," Editorial,
CDN, June 20, 1958, P• 10.
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tion, the Monitor claimed that an observer corps of "possibly
several thousand

0

would be needed, and that it should be given

police powers against gun running.

"The United States should

support the authority of such a force in the UN councils, should
contribute transportation equipment and, if necessary, manpower
to it ...

(This phrase echoed Dulles• June 17 press conference

remarks.

(see aboves pp. 380-381.))

Action through the united

Nations should be .,positive and strong., in order to keep the
disturbances in Lebanon from erupting into a full-scale war.
Referring to Secretary Dulles• concluding remarks at his June 17
news conference, the Monitor noteds "Mr. Dulles has spoken realistically in reserving a decision as to what the United States
would do in case of •other contingencies.•" 14
On June 15, the Times had observeds

0

If Lebanon can be held

for democracy the march of anti-Western fanatacism may be
stopped." 15

Later, commenting on secretary-General Hammarskjold's
·1 ~
observation that "only Lebanon can save Lebanon,'"' the Times
remarked, on July 5, that unfortunately the Lebanon crisis was
not restricted to Leb&non, but was international in scope. "(I)f
Lebanon falls, what remains of Western demoeratic influence
throughout the Arab world will be shattered."

But, if Mr. Ham-

marskjold should be proven wrong by events in Lebanon, by an
upsurge in

u.

A. R. pressure, and by the situation becoming

intolerable, despite the "almost insuperable difficulties,•• a
14.. The American Interest In Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, June 19,
1958, P• 20.
1511 Lebanon•s Hour of Trial," Editorial, NYT, June 15, 1958,
p. 8E.

16Parrott, "U. N. Lacks Proof of Beirut Charge," loc. cit.
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new

u.

N. emergency force should be considered, as should the

idea of a permanent

u.

N. security force, even though "further

off" and "more unrealistic," for. -"this would not be the first
instance of accomplishing the impossible when a crisis of the
times demanded it ... 17
The Wall Street Journal advocated a position diametrically
opposed to that of the New York Times and the Christian science
Monitor on the question of preserving Lebanese independence.
The Journal decried the American tendency t o engage in what at
one point it termed ••unlimited intervention • .,

Following Dulles•

June 17 news conference, the Journal lamented the prospect of
another police action, to which Dulles had all but committed
the U,

s.

"Whether the United States would feel compelled to

talte such action, the Journal found, was less a matter for the

u. s.

to decide than it was the decision of "Chamoun, or Nasser,

or even Khrushchev, whose hand has also been evident in the
Lebanese situation."

Therefore, the Journal explained that the

Administration should "go slowly, carefully and deliberately"
along the policy foad it had chosen. 18
Prior to the

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon, the Journal

argued against such action by raising the question of what the
17"Report From Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, July 5, 1958, p. 16.
Earlier the Times had observeds "The most lo~ical positive move
that could be devised would be in the direction not of unilateral
intervention on the part of the Un ited States but establishment
of a new United Nations border-control force along the lines of
the one that has proved so successful on the Egyptian-Israeli
frontier." "Au. N. E. F. For Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, July 1,
1958, P• 30.
lS"Dabbling With Peril," Editorial, WSJ, June 19, 1958, p. 10.
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u.

s. moral position would

be.

The revolt was largely internal.

President Chamoun had violated the Lebanese constitution by
seeking a second term.

And there was littl.e to indicate that

Chamoun represented majority feeling.

Besides, Chamoun could

not be trusted to remain pro-Western since Lebanese politicians
were well known for changing sides while trying to survive among
greater powers. 19
In the same issue, the Journal connnented that the trouble
with a ,.policy of global intervention" lay in its basic premise
that no Communist gain, or .development which the Communists
might exploit, could be permitted because it might endanger
American security • ."The truth .is that further losses can be
tolerated if necessary, or if the price of preventing them is
too high.

The loss of Lebanon--in this case not even to

Communism--could be borne.

So could that of Indonesia •••

•
.,20
Ind ia
•••

The Wall Street Journal was silent editorially on the
question of au. N. peace force.

Both the New York Times and

the Christian science Monitor supported a United Nations peace
force before the Eisenhower Administration was ready to suggest
the idea publicly.

Both expressed support for the concept prior

to the American intervention in Lebanon.

The Administration

only advocated the concept in the General Assembly, four weeks
after the Marines had landed in Lebanon.

In response to Hammar-

19 "And If we Do--,•• WSJ, loc. cit.
ZO,.Losing our Way," 'Editorial, in ibid., P• 4.
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skjold's optimism about ONOGIL ability to avert war, the Monitor
voiced doubts that "anything less than a UN emergency force"
would be adequate in Lebanon, but it hoped Hammarskjold's
optimism would prove justified. 21
Both the Times and the Monitor expressed early support for
UNOGIL.

Neither failed to remind its readers tha t, in the event

of United Nations failure in Lebanon, the United states stood
ready to act.

The Monitor wrotes .,The possibility must never

be absent that the sixth Fleet will answer a call from President
Chamoun for help unde r the Eisenhower Doctrine if UN efforts
fail to avert a threat t o Lebanese independence and general
peace."

But every effort should be made to assure

u.

N. success

and to guarantee that it possessed every needed strength to
preserve international order.

Thus, the United States and

Britain shoul.d get toge ther with other u. N. members to oppose
Soviet efforts to ext end a communist foothold in the Middle
East.

The

u.

N. membership should call the Communist bluff

and defend the right of an independent nation "to be secure
within its borders from the indirect aggression of imported
. ... 22
revolution

Following Lebanon's appeal for au. N. emergency force to
seal off its frontiers against infiltration of

u.

A. R. "volun-

teers," the New York Times noted that the appeal came amid
indications that the Lebanese rebels were preparing a showdown
210 wi11 Observers Be Enough? , " Editorial, CSM, June 28,
1958, P• 18.

22 "Back the UN in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, June 26, 1958,
p. 20.
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battle.

"Should the pro-Nasser forces win they could well

precipitate a landslide that would put the whole Middle East
under Nasser's, and thus indirectly under Soviet control."

To

meet this threat, the Times found that the Observer Group then
in Lebanon was ~no longer adequate."

The United Nations, which

had saved Nasser during the Suez crisis, now faced a crucial
test--could it stop him in Lebanon?

The threat of a soviet

veto in the Security Council of a proper response to the
Lebanese appeal would place the responsibility on the General
Assembly to take action.

Should the United Nations fail to

act, the only alternative left to Lebanon would be to invoke
Article 51 of the

u.

N. Charter.

"This would mean a call on

the west as well as on the Baghdad powers for armed support,
which could have wider repercussions than anything done under
united Nations auspices." 23

In this editorial, the Times•s

inclination to assess blame for the Lebanese revolt upon Gamal
Abdel Nasser is again clearly evident.

It is equally clear

that the Times was unwilling to await the findings of UNOGIL
regarding the degree of

u.

A. R. interference in Lebanese affairs.

Was it actually necessary for the United Nations to stop Nasser
in Lebanon?

The preponderance of scholarly findings holds that,

although there was infiltration of men, arms and materiel from
the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic, the Chamoun
Government exaggerated its significance.

Scholars have confirmed

the findings of the first UNOGIL report that the majority of
23 ucrisis in Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, June 26, 1958,
p. 26.
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rebels were Lebanese, and that the rebellion was largely of
.
l origin.
. . 24
interna

for the

u.

Therefore, there was no legitimate need

N. to stop Nasser in Lebanon.

Since the Lebanese

revolt was primarily an internal affair, and since there was
no indication of overt aggression from neighboring Syria,
Article 51 of the

u.

N. Charter did not apply.

On the whole question of possible

u. s .

intervention in

Lebanon, Dana Adams Schmidt reported in the New York Times that
Eisenhower Administration policy-makers were in a "quandary"
over when, and under what conditions, the United States would
commit troops to Lebanon.

Schmidt indicated that almost all

state Department officials considered the insurgent movement
in Lebanon a clear threat to United States interests.
insurgents win, ••• Nasser wins, they believe.

"If the

If he wins in

Lebanon ••• he may soon follow up with similar victories in Jordan,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia."

State Department officials, according

to Schmidt, were doubtful that the u. N. Observer Group would
be effective, or that au. N. police force could be formed to
act in time.

There were two schools of thought on intervention

in response to a Lebanese Government request.
contended that the

u. s.

friends "submerged."
prospect of

u. s.

One school

must intervene rather than see America's

The other school was "horrified" at the

troops being used in the Middle East.

Both

24sees Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., pp. 140-142;
Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, op. cit., pp. 178-182; Hoopes,
The Devil and J, F.. D., op . cit., pp. 432-433; and Stewart,
Turmoil in Beirut, op. cit. For an expression of a contrary
opinion, see, Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the
Middle East ••• , op. cit., Chap. V.
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chools of thought were agreed that the Eisenhower Doctrine-which Secretary of State Dulles had sought to "stretch" to
cover broader contingencies--was "a poor guide."
for

u. s.

It provided

intervention in the Middle East against communist

aggression.
prospect." 25

"No aggression that could be so identified is in
Hoopes found evidence of State Department distrust

of Nasser and antipathy towards his Pan-Arabic aspirations.

He

pointed out that in June, 1958, Nasser summoned the American
Ambassador and suggested proposals for ending the Lebanese
dispute--Chamoun should complete his term, then give way to
General Chehab as the strongest candidate acceptable to both
sides.

The rebels should be granted complete amnesty.

Dulles

passed Nasser 's proposals to Chamoun without endorsement, and
Chamoun took no action on them.

Hoopes felts "In retrospect,

Dulles• refusal to see these proposals as the ingredients of a
reasonable settlement, and to use them as the point of departure
for a serious negotiation between Cha.moun and the rebels, perhaps
with UN mediation, was rather clearly a missed opportunity.

The

final settlement consisted almost precisely of these terms, but
there remained in Washington a basic antipathy to Nasser's PanI

Arabic aspirations, a state of mind which preferred militaty
intervention to mediation."

While there was no indication that

Nasser's United Arab Republic was under Communist control,
according to Hoopes , Dulles was convinced "that Nasser was.
wittingly or not, the principle agent of soviet Communist
expansion in the Middle East ," 26
25 Dana Adams Schmidt, "U.

NYT, June 30. 1958, p. 12,

Still, it would have been

s. In Quandary

In Lebanon Crisis,"

26Hoopes, The Devil and J, F. D., op. cit., pp. 433-439.
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stretching the Eisenhower Doctrine to maintain its applicability
in the Lebanon situation.
In keeping with its anti-intervention stand, the!!!!
Street Journal noted Dulles• July 1 news conference statement
that

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon would be "a measure of last

resort," and that the

u. s.

expected the United Nations would

be able to cope with the situation.

that Dulles had recalled that the
right of collective self-defense.

The Journal pointed out

u.

N. Charter recognized the

"The top u.

attempted to calm speculation over possible u.

s.
s.

diplomat thus
moves in

Lebanon while leaving himself room for maneuver in case that
country's Western-oriented government gets in even deeper danger
than it is at present.

In a sense, Mr. DUlles was trying to

dampen down fires he himself kindled ••• (when) Mr. Dulles declared
that the United States would send troops into Lebanon under
certain conditions ... 27
For about ten days preceding the

u.

s. intervention,

American newspaper attention to the situation in Lebanon was
greatly reduced.

Articles were fewer in number and there were

even fewer editorials, which apparently reflected the quieted
situation following the introduction of UNOGIL, and the release
of its first report on the progress of its mission.

The Christian

Science Monitor did feature one editorial on the significance of
27"Dulles sees u. s. Troops In Lebanon Only A Last Resort,"
WSJ, July 2, 1958, P• 4; "Last Resort," Editorial, CDN, July 2,
1958, P• 14; and Johns. Knight, "The Editor's Notebooks It's a
strange Revolution, But Lebanon Is u. N.'s Job," CDN, July 5,
1958, p. 8. Knight argued1 "Having blundered our way into a
situation which apparently we do not fully understand, Mr. Dulles
should now leave the fighting to the Lebanese and the problem in
the hands of the united Nations where it belongs."
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the first report of the United Nations Observation Group which
found no evidence of massive infiltration.
published on July 14, 1958, the day before
vention in Lebanon.

u. s

military inter-

In light of that action, the findings of

the Monitor editorial are most amusing.

u.

'Iihe editorial was

For it found that the

N. Observer Group report cut the ground out from under western

efforts to keep Chamoun in power for the balance of his term.
This was the effect, despite widespread sentiment that the
team's observations "were limited and inconclusive."

u.

N.

For the

West to intervene--even at Chamoun s request--would be to interfere in an "officially proclaimed civil war" and would result in
a wave of Arab anti-Western feeling which could lead to sabotage
of British and American oil installations.

The only hope for

the West was that the Lebanese army could preserve Mr. Chamoun
in power until the end of his term, while the Lebanese Parliament could select a new President satisfactory to Chamoun
supporters and the rebels.

"This would give Lebanon a President

to whom the United States was not explicitly committed, while
removing from the scene the rebels' chief target." 28

When

Nasser suggested a similar series of proposals, Dulles, as we
have seen, failed to take positive steps to implement them.
Yet, following the Marine landings, it was substantially this
arrangement which Under secretary of State Robert Murphy
28 ,.crisis in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, July 14, 1958, p. 16.
Earlier, on July 7, the Post-Dispatch claimed that the first
UNOGIL report warranted a serious reappraisal of u. s. Middle
Eastern policy. The Post-Dispatch found that u. s. policy was
subject to two serious faultsa 1. Attempting to maintain particular governments in power; and 2. The assumption that every movement against a western-backed government was inspired and supported exclusively by Nasser whose every move supposedly was
inspired and supported by Russia. Sees "No Room for Intervention," Editorial, SLPD, July 7, 1958, p. 2B.
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concluded with the two sides in the Lebanese dispute.
In the pre-intervention period, of the Eastern papers
studied, only the Wall Street J ournal took a clearly antiintervention position.
United Nations actions.

But it did not express support for
Its attitude seemed to bes "Let events

take their own course."
While both the Times and the Monitor prefer red united
Nations action, they were not averse to Western i ntervention
on behalf of the Chamoun regime.

Since both supported the

concept of a United Nations police force to meet such emergencies
as Lebanon, they agreed with such Congressional opponents to
Administration Lebanon policy as Senators Mike Mansfield and
Wayne Morse.

(see aboves PP• 378-382 . ) These Senators preferred

a United Nations response, perhaps through the extension of the
United Nations Emergency Force to Lebanon's borders, to a unilateral u.

s.

military intervention.

But, the Administration

was reluctant, at this point, to lend support to a policy
designed to further creation of a United Nations police force,
possibly because it did not believe that such a policy could
succeed.
The American Intervention and Security Council Debate
Since the Eisenhower Administration had amply prepared
the American press and public in advance for a possible Lebanese
intervention, it came as no surprise to the American newspapers
that the Marines had landed in Lebanon.

Bot h the New York Times

and the Christian Science Monitor supported the Administration's
action.

Of the two, the Times was most outspokenly favorable in
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its reaction.

The Times commented that, in the prevailing

circumstances. the landing of Marines was the right move.

Either

the united States (and the democratic West) had to renounce hope
of preventing the entire Middle East from falling into hostile
hands or it had to do something.

The

u. s.

was, therefore,

acting to contain the Nasser-inspired revolt in Iraq.

Noting

the Administration's prior hope that the united Nations observers
would be able to handle the Lebanon situation, the Times
indicated that the intervention represented "an abrupt change
in American thinking."

However, the Iraqi revolution had

altered all previous calculations.

Since the United States

was responding to a Lebanese request for assistance to preserve
its sovereignty and independence, and since the United Nations
Charter recognized the "inherent right of collective selfdefense," helping Lebanon was a defensive step.

Furthermore.

the fate of the Middle East could have been involved.

"If the

West lost its access to the Middle East's oil or were barred
from using the area as the strategic crossroads to Europe , Asia
and Africa, the result could be to make the Soviet union by far
the greatest power in the world."

Thus, the Times concluded that

the debarkation in Lebanon was "a calculated risk worth taking." 29
The next day, July 17, the Times argued that, as one of the
world's two great powers, the United States could not refuse to
act like a great power.

For to ignore appeals from supporters

like Lebanon ••would be to abdicate the role that history and our
29 "Marines in Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, July 16, 1958, p. 28.
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wealth and energy have thrust upon us."

For either the United

States must defend countries like Lebanon and Korea, or return
to isolationism and "become a s econd-r ate power, without allies
and in danger of losing the liberties we do possess ... 30
Neal Stanford, Christian Science Monitor, indicated that
diplomatic authorities in Washington, D.

c.,

discounted the

possibility of a rmed Russian intervention in the Middle East,
despite Moscow ' s belligerent note on t he American debarkation
of Marines in Lebanon.

The Russians, it was felt, were not

willing to risk war "to pull ••• Nasser•s chestnuts out of the
fire."

Stanford observed that the White House "had made the

grave decision that to do nothing at this c r itical moment was
bound to be worse than doing something, however fraught with
unknown consequences . "

Washington acted to prevent not only

the loss of the Middl e East, but also the eventual collapse of
peripheral areas, such as, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and free institutions in Asia and Africa. 31

In his background

news briefing at the home of Richar d Harkness on July 21, 1958,
Dulles made the same points.

(see aboves pp. 399-405.)

Years

later, in his memoirs, Eisenhower repeated much of this argumentation.

Eisenhower commented that in Lebanon ••the question

was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of
nearly all of the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free
World) and in doing so to risk general war with the soviet Union
300 Tbe Consequences of Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, July 17,
1958, p. 26.

31 Neal Stanford, "Soviets Demand Marines Withdraw; u.
Action Faces Rough Water in ON," CSM, July 16, 1958, p. 1.

s.
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or to do something worse--which was to do nothing." 32

Referring

to this statement, Hoopes noted that Eisenhower "set out a
balance sheet of pros and cons that, to say the least, did not
seem self-evidently persuasive in favor of intervention." 33
In the same issue of the Monitor, Joseph

c. Harsch argued

that Washington acted to forestall Nasser' s move to achieve
"What might be called a new Cairo caliphate."

He foresaw the

collapse of all resistance to such a project wi thin days had
London and Washington not deployed their forces in Lebanon and
Jordan.

Harsch saw the real purpose of t he American mission in

the Middle East not merely to save a friendly government in
Lebanon, but "to restabilize" the Middle East. 34
The Monitor commented that, given .the situabiQn, national
leaders could "reasonably" have concluded that no lesser response
to the Lebanese appeal would be "adequate or appropriate ...

The

Monitor found the following positive aspects to the American
action:
It has told the Soviet Union that there is a point
beyond which the United States will not be pushed in
maneuverings to extend Communist influence into the
Middle East.
It has served similar notice to President Nasser •••
that the independence and integrity of Lebanon are of
vital concern to the United States, not to be sacrificed
to indirect aggression.
It has shown that an American promise of support
to a country whose elected officials wish aid in its
defense is not an empty pledge.
The action is the more creditable in that it has
been taken in consultation with Britain, whose support to
King Hussein in neighboring Jordan may also be important.
32Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 274.
33Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 435.

c. Harsch, "State of the Nations:
Middle East,., in ibid., p. 1.
34Joseph

u. s.

in the
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While it was regrettable that Washington acted in advance of
a presentation to the Security Council, and that it ordered
American troops to do more than protect American nationals, it
bore remembering that a Russian veto was "altogether predictable" and that the Syrian border facilitated the munitioning of
Lebanese rebels. 35

This latter observation implied a belated

acceptance by the Monitor of the charges of massive infiltration
from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic.
Following the landing of the

u. s.

Marines in Lebanon, the

Wall Street Journal maintained its earlier opposition to intervention.

In a penetrating editorial, the Journal attempted to

u. s. was fighting against in Lebanon.
the u. s. was in a sense "opposing Moscow,"

determine what it was the
While recognizing that

it pointed out that this was only because Moscow had "shrewdly
and opportunistically-• allied itself with Middle Eastern forces
which the

u. s.

opposed.

"In no sense is this a battle against

Communism as an ideology, or, as in Korea, a war against Communist imperialist aggression."

Rather , what the

u. s.

was

combatting in the Middle East was ''a rising tide of the people's
deep emotions"--Pan-Arabism.
indicate what the

u. s.

The Journal then attempted to

was fighting for, and it found the answer

in the oil fields of the Middle East.

If Middle Eastern oil was,

in fact, what the United States was fighting for, then the
American intervention was "not a crusade against Communism and
aggression ••• but a frank power drive of precisely the kind we
35 .. commitment in Lebanon,•• Editorial, CSM, July 16, 1958,
p. 16.
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have so long deplored in others."

Such a policy of retaining

control of Middle Eastern oil by force of arms was selfdefeating, for it foreclosed the

u. s.

from any other policy.

The Journal did not think that in the long run the United States
could gain by a policy that made it necessary to use force. 36
such rationale did not take into account the fact that the
Administration did not attempt to justify its action by calling
attention to the need to retain control of Middle Eastern oil.
A reading of the documents available leads one to conclude that
of far greater concern to the United States was the restoration
quickly of order to the region and the maintenance of the Western
position in the area.

Eisenhower disclosed that Dulles cited

the probability that the pipeline across Syria would be cut,
and use of the Suez Canal impeded or denied. 37

Nevertheless,

Dulles had been prepared to recommend intervention, 38

if

Eisenhower had not already decided to send in the Marines.
Earlier, on July 18, the Journal found that the American
intervention endangered

u. s.

prestige, for there were signs

that many nations long friendly to the

u. s.

saw the United

States as using its forces to prop up unpopular governments
and of compelling foreign countries to accept the American
36 "The Use of Force," Editorial, WSJ, July 22, 1958, p. 10.
All the Western papers studied opposed the u. s. intervention in
Lebanon. Sees "A Major Blunder, Marine Lebanon Landing To Inspire
Hate for u. s.,•• Editorial, CDN, July 16, 1958, p. 12; "U. s.
Marines In Lebanon," Editorial, CST, July 16, 1958, p. 25; .. What
Are We Doing Anyway?," Editorial, LAT, July 17, 1958, part III,
p. 4J and "The Decision to Intervene in Lebanon," Editorial,
SLPD, July 16, 1958, P• 4.
37Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., P• 271.
38nu11es Project, Interview with Harr, p. 53.
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concept of order. 39

As the Journal saw it, not only did the

Administration miscalculate the reaction of America's friends,
it incorrectly evaluated the impact of
Lebanon.

u. s. intervention in

Although the Administration evidently envisaged

advantages in a show-of-force, things did not work out that
way.

Popular resentment in Lebanon to the American action had

lost the

u. s.

supporters there and had strengthened the hands

of the rebels. 40

The Journal's position contradicted reports

such as that filed earlier, on July 16, by Christian science
Monitor reporter Harry B. Ellis to the effect that the Marines•
mission was beginning to succeed in Beirut itself.

For the

first night in nine weeks, not a shot was fired there, as rebel
leader Saeb Salam issued orders to the rebels not to fire on
the Lebanese army. 41
All three major Eastern newspapers agreed that

u. s.

forces

should be withdrawn as soon as a reliable successor could be
elected President and the country stabilized.
and the Monitor advocated a
assume the

u. s. role.

Both the Times

o. N. peace force be established to

Both recognized the difficulty of getting

Soviet and Afro-Asian support for the idea, but they felt the
effort should be made.

The Times noted that Administration

insistence on this point represented a "reversal" of its earlier
390 The Uncalculated Risk," Editorial, WSJ, July 18, 1958,
p. 4.

40 --The Lebanese," Editorial, WSJ, July 22, 1958, p. 10.
41 Harry B. Ellis,
July 16, 1958, p. 1.

0

u. s.

Intervention Takes Effect," CSM,
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position of support for Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold who
contended that noth ing more than an Observation Group was
necessary in Lebanon . 42

The Monitor claimed that there was a

need for a stronger organization than the 135-man u. N. Observer
Group.

What was called for was au. N. Emergency Force comparable

to the one along the Gaza Strip between Egypt and Israel.

"The

authorization of a body to assume the responsibility which the
United States says it is willing to yield could be one of several
important recent steps towards a reliable world order.~ 43

In a

later issue, the Monitor argued that the United Nations must
face its responsibility by providing a force with weapons and
the authority to use them.

This would "warrant" the withdrawal

of troops by both the united states and Great Britain.

"Only

when the members of the UN shoulder their share of the responsibility for peace and security can America.~ and Britain step
aside from the stand they have taken." 44
420 Temporary Duty," Editorial, NYT, July 18, 1958, p. 20.
43 "The UN's Role in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, July 17, 1958,
The Post-Dispatch expressed its conviction that: 1. the

p. 20 .

u. s.

had forfeited the high moral ground of its Suez position;

2. Article 51 did not apply; and 3. Eisenhower had substituted

his own judgement for that of the u. N. , whose Observers had
indicated that Lebanon's troubles were largely internal. Then,
the Post-Dispatch concludeds "In view of all these factors, it
is fortunate that the President is asking the u. N. Security
Council to authorize an emergency force ••• If the security Council
fails to act, he is honor bound to go to the General Assembly,
just as he did in the case of Suez. And if the Assembly fails to
authorize international police action, he is honor bound to
accept that body's collective judgement as to just what should be
done." sees "The Decision to Intervene in Lebanon," SLPD, loc. cit.
44"The UN Must Face Its Responsibility," Editorial, CSM,

July 19, 1956, P• 18.
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The Wall Street Journal, unlike the New York Times and the
Christian Science Monitor, did not advocate a United Nations
assumption of the American role in Lebanon.

Rather, it looked

to developments in Lebanon to provide the way out.

Thus, it

felt that the July 31, 1958, election of President Chehab
"should prepare the way for a rapid American withdrawal." 45
The New York Times observed that United Nations Security
Council debate was destined to end in frustration by the
disposition of votes and the veto powers.

While the Times found

that the right in international law of the American and British
interventions was generally acknowledged, it believed that the
terms on which the diplomatic battle was fought were "fogbound."
The real power politics and economic factors behind the actions
could not be used to their full value •

.,Everyone knew that the

basic issues were whether the Middle Eastern countries still
independent of Nasser's domination were going to remain independent, and whether the priceless sources of oil were going
to be jeopardized and perhaps lost to the West."
also the question of

u. s.

prestige.

There was

Thus, the votes on the

American and Russian resolutions were predictable.

The Japanese

resolution, although more logical, was being put forward too
late . . . It seems unlikely to have any better success than the
other resolutions ...

Therefore, the United Nations General

Assembly should be given a chance to deal with the Middle Eastern
.
46
issues.
45 ••In

the Wake of Lebanon's Election," Editorial, WSJ,
Aug. 1, 1958, P• 4.
46 Frustration at the
1958, p. 14.

u.

N., .. Editorial, NYT, July 19,
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Throughout the period of United Nations security Council
debates and the later General Assembly debates of the American
intervention, the Christian Science Monitor echoed Dulles•
pre-intervention statement that Lebanon was not like Suez.
(see aboves PP• 383-384.)

In Lebanon, the United States was

responding to a request for help from the duly constituted
government.

At Suez, the British and French were not invited

by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The Monitor observed:

"The difference between intervention by invitation and without
an invitation may sound like a technical and legalistic distinction but to the soldiers on the beach it made the difference
of being greeted by machine-gun fire or by a wave of the hand
. • 1 ian
·
b a th.ers." 47 The New York Times also stressed
from civi
the legitimacy of the

u.

s. action without comparing it specifi-

cally with the Anglo-French action at Suez.

And the Wall

Street Journal continued to question the need for the intervention and its effectiveness.
47"Lebanon Is Not Suez," Editorial, CSM, July 28, 1958,
p. 14; and "'The UN's Rol.e in Lebanon," CSM, loc. cit. By
contrast, the Western papers could see little difference between
the Suez and Lebanon crises. The Post-Dispatch charged, "The
unhappy truth is that the United States has forfeited the high
moral. ground which it took in the Suez crisis." sees "'The
Decision to Intervene in Lebanon," SLPD, loc. cit. The Daily
News cl.aimed that the Marine landings were "an error nearly
comparable in magnitude with•• the Suez landings. See, "A Major
Blunder ••• ," CDN, loc. cit. The L.A. Times commented, "(T)he
bitter reality of the intervention obtrudes. Most Americans,
along with their government, denounced the British-French-Israeli
attack on Suez two years ago. The ironr, the tragic irony, is
that our intervention now is not very different •••• (A) disinterested observer might fairly say that we are warmongering." Sees
"What Are We Doing Anyway?, •• LAT, loc. cit.
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The Abortive Summit Conference and United Nations General
Assembly Debate of the Lebanese Intervention
Before the United Nations Security Council debate of the
Middle Eastern interventions had ended in deadlock, Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent his first letter to Western
leaders suggesting a five power summit conference on the Middle
East situation.

(see aboves pp. 412-418.)

Even before the

Eisenhower Administration reluctantly agreed to a summit conference under united Nations auspices, the New York Times expressed
its opinion that a summit conference could be used to define
just what the United States would yield and would not dare to
yield "for fear of the everlasting loss of our freedoms."

Clear

definition of these parameters might enhance prospects for
international peace. 48
American agreement to convocation of a summit meeting in
the

u. N. security council was welcomed by all three major Eastern

American newspapers.

The Times was gratified that "the risk of

a hot war•• following the debarkation of the Marines was lessened. 49
48 "A Time For Decision," Editorial, NYT, July 21, 1958, p. 20.
49 .. The Struggle in the u. N.," Editorial, NYT, July 23, 1958,
p. 26. Not all American newspapers, however, responded favorably
to American agreement to convene a summit meeting. To the L.A.
Times, the Lebanon intervention, "an impulse of the moment," had
confounded Dulles, who had skillfully evaded a summit conference
for many months. Dulles had opposed a summit "on the sensible
ground" that it would be impossible to come to any agreement with
the Russians. But because of the Lebanon intervention the u. s.
must have such a conference, "with Mr. Khrushchev editing the
guest list." Sees "Arrangement by Mr. Khrushchev," Editorial,
I.AT, July 25, 1958, part III, P• 4.
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The Wall Street Journal expressed its conviction that the
President acted correctly in going along with the summit
proposal.
of

u. s.

It found that the determin ing factor was the attitude
friends and allies , including Britain, who had looked

more favorably than the

u. s.

on a summit meeting .

The United

states could not afford to deny the desires of other Western
nations.

"So we go reluctantly to the summit ... so

This and other reports at the time that the United States
was reluctant to go to the summit conference, and that the

u. s.

was using delaying tactics in the hopes of postponing the conference were acc urat e .

Richard Goold- Adams found that the western

powers were not prepare d to be s t ampeded into a summit conference
such as Khrushchev proposed , at which they would be placed on
the psychological defensive .

On July 22, Macmillan proposed

that a summit be convened at a special session of the
security council in New York.

u.

N.

The Eisenhower Administration,

after twenty-four hours of intensive consultation , expressed
willingness to accept the Macmillan proposal "if such a meeting
were generally desired."

Dulles had not meant to go that far.

When, on July 23 , Khrushchev accepted the Macmillan proposal
with the specific suggestion that the summit begin on July 28,
Eisenhower stated that that would be "too early for us . "

Goold-

Adams remarkeds "Dulles h ad in fact y i e l ded r eluctantly to the
idea of a summit , in order to avoid another r i ft between London
and Washington, but since he never wanted it , so long as American
SO,.Reluctantly to the summit," Editorial, WSJ, July 24,
1958 , P• 8.
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troops were in Lebanon, he managed to stall successfully." 51
In the contemporary American press, fears were expressed that
the summit meeting sould be little more than a propaganda
battle between the Russians and the West, and, the press
explained, therein lay U. s. opposition to the talks. 52
Both the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor
argued that rather than retain official

u. s.

reluctance to

attend a summit conference, the Administration should take
full advantage of the occasion to present a clear case for the
West.

The Times argueds "The summit conference should be

looked upon as an opportunity, not an ordeal."
should be faced with "confidence." 53

The meeting

With proper conduct by

the American press and public, the proposed summit conference
need not be a Communist victory, according to the Monitor,
which noted that some sections of the press were charging it
would be. 54
Concerning the Eisenhower-Khrushchev public exchange of
letters on the summit conference, the Christian Science Monitor's
Josephine Ripley observed poignantly: "The sparring has been
sharp, but not without some restraint.

In other words, it has

been directed as much to the world at large as to the official
51 Goold-Adams, The Time of Power, op. cit., pp. 281-283.
52Reston, "The Wrong Everything," loc. cit.; "What's News-World Wide,,. WSJ, July 28, 1958, P• 1; "Baghdad Pact Nations
Likely To Get Broader u. s. Aid; u. s. Prepares For Summit Talk,
Hopes It Won't Come," WSJ, July 28, 1958, p. 3.
53 ..Approach to the Summit," Editorial, NYT, July 25, 1958,
p. 18.
54••UN Meeting vs. Khrushchev Show," Editorial, CSM, July 28,
1958 , p. 14; and "TO the Summit--Confidently, .. Editorial, CSM,
July 24, 1958, P• 14.
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to whom the notes have been addressed. 1155
Unlike Administration reluctance to attend the summit,
which was opposed by the Eastern papers,
were, at times, actually endorsed.

u. s. delaying tactics

For example, the New York

Times, on July 24, 1958, quipped that it seemed as though no
day or night was complete without a new Khrushchev offer, or
acceptance, of a summit conference.

"The trouble has been

recently that Mr. Khrushchev has named dates too near for
comfortable preparation, has attached conditions not always
easy to meet and has accompanied his offers of peace with language not ordinarily associated with polite diplomacy."

What

was Khrushchev's goal--a new propaganda line, or an earnest
desire to talk peace?

,.A little time is needed--perhaps more

than four days--to clear up these points. 1156
Neal Stanford interpreted Administration delaying tactics
as an effort by John Foster Dulles to expose the lacunae in
Khrushchev's efforts to
his terms."

0

stampede the West into a summit on

And Stanford concluded that Dulles• tactics might

pay off for "(h)is •stop-look-and-listen• signs are beginning
to impress more and more diplomatsl"

This in turn might explain

why the tone in Khrushchev•s letters became "shriller and their
flow faster." 57
55Josephine Ripley, "U.
Aug. 2, 1958, P• 1.

s.

Sees No Quick Arab Truce," CSM,

56 "Mr. Khrushchev's Latest," Editorial, NYT, July 24, 1958,
p. 24.
57Neal Stanford, "Conflict of Approachess An Intimate
Message from Washington," CSM, Aug. 2, 1958, p. 20.
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Reacting to Eisenhower's explanation for dispatching
troops to Lebanon, the Wall Street Journal commented on the
clear implication of the President's reasoning--that the United
States might henceforth intervene in any country whose government felt itself threatened from whatever quarter, Communist
or non-Communist.

The Journal cautioned that this was a strange

position for a nation with a revolutionary past to take, and
that the United States would have its hands full if it let the
Lebanese precedent "establish the principle of unlimited intervention."58
When the United States seemed to momentarily have won
Soviet agreement to a summit conference under u. N. auspices,
the Times commented that, while earlier it seemed Khrushchev
was winning on points in the propaganda battle, "President
Eisenhower, obviously in cooperation with Secretary Dulles, won
back some of the lost ground .. by suggesting the summit be held
in the Security Council.

Thus, if Khrushchev came to the United

States for au. N. summit conference, he would be subject to
certain u. N. rules of order.

He would not be able to dictate

who would be present, or what procedure would be followed, ·or
when the meeting would be held. 59
58 "An Un1'imi'te d Dimension,"
'
'
Editorial, WSJ, July 28, 1958,
p. 6.

59,.The President Explains," Editorial, NYT, July 26, 1958,

P• 14.
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The Lebanese election of President Chehab to replace
Camille Chamoun raised hopes of stabilization in Lebanon.

The

reaction of the American newspapers to the election varied.
The Wall street Journal argued that, coupled with the comparative calm in Iraq, it created the best conditions for American
withdrawal.

Prompt recall of United States troops would strengthen

the American position at any summit conference on the Middle East
by eliminating the basis for Soviet charges of

u. s.

aggression.

The fact that the new Chehab government would certainly be less
pro-West than the Chamoun government would make it difficult

u. s. intervened in
the u. s. could not make

for Khrushchev to convince many that the
Lebanon "to preserve a 'puppet.'"

But

as good a case for its charges of attempted Soviet subversion of
small countries as long as American troops were still in Lebanon. 60
In contrast, the New York Times did not regard the Lebanese
election as sufficient grounds for the early .withdrawal of American
troops.

The Times felt that the problem of internal security

should be settled, and there should be assurances that Lebanon
would be able to maintain its sovereignty and independence.
These conditions should have first been met before the
withdrew its troops.

u. s.

Too hasty withdrawal might give the impres-

sion of a retreat under Soviet and Egyptian pressure, or that
the

u. s.

intervened to impose a President of its own liking in

Lebanon. 61
60 "In the Wake of Lebanon' s Election," Editorial, WSJ,
Aug. 1, 1958, p. 4; and "Some Nice Eisenhower Touches," Editorial,
LAT, Aug. 2, 1958, part III , P• 4.
61 "Election in Beirut, .. Editorial, NYT, Aug. 5, 1958, p. 8.
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On July 31, 1958, secretary of state Dulles gave a news
conference in which he explained what he thought could be

u.

accomplished by a surmnit under
be the topics of discussion.

N. auspices, and what should

Dulles indicated that the summit

should be limited to charges of

u. s.

and

u.

K. aggression and

the problem of indirect aggression, thereby, laying "the
foundation for dealing with the broader problems."
pp. 416-417.)

(see aboves

Dulles• comments sparked some heated comment

both at home and abroad.
Journal editorials

Examples appeared in Wall Street

On August 5, 1958, the Journal reminded

its readers that the American case for indirect aggression in
Lebanon was "not especially impressive in terms of international
politics."

While the

u. s.

talked about soviet indirect aggres-

sion, the Soviets would be accusing the Americans of direct
aggression in Lebanon.

"The charge is baseless, but the presence

of American troops in Lebanon makes it seem plausible to many
people in the world." 62

On August 8, the Journal cautioned that

before the United States injected discussions of indirect aggression into international conferences, it would be well advised
"to say exactly what we mean, and learn precisely what others

mean, by a term that is so unlimited as to be almost meaningless. •• 63
62 "on Saving the World," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 5, 1958, P• 8.
630 Indirect Aggression," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 8, 1958, p. 41
and "Better None at All, .. Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 5, 1958, P• 2B.
The Post-Dispatch argued that if the summit were to develop along
the lines Dulles suggested, ••it would be better ••• not to hold a
conference at all." Furthermore, it noted that for the u. N. to
deal with indirect aggression it would have to first identify it.
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When, following his trip to Peking and his discussions
with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev
backed out of the sunnnit conference and called instead for a
special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly,
on August 6, the New York Times observed candidly, "(O)n our
Government's part it would be less than honest to make believe
that we were anxious for a summit meeting at the security council,
or anywhere else.
nobody wanted.

This had become, in fact, the meeting that

Mr. Khrushchev's letter merely delivered the

coup de grace." The Times found the decision to go to the
a positive factor for the

u. s.

and Britain.

"good one,'' their legal position was ••strong,"

u.

N.

Their case _was a
Western Middle •

Eastern policies were "more defensiblett than Russia's--the West
was interested in protecting the sove·r eignty, independence and
integrity of the Arab states and in their peaceful development.
Dulles would have an opportunity to air his complaints about
"indirect aggression" by Russia and the United Arab Republic.
And the

u. s.

could put forward a constructive economic program

for the area. 64

On August 8, the Times saw the call for a

6411 The sunnnit Recedes," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 6, 1958, p. 24.
Western newspapers were not very pleased with the American agreement with Khrushchev to go before the United Nations General
Assembly. The Post-Dispatch argued that Eisenhower had done well
to accept a General Assembly meeting. "Just what the Assembly
can accomplish remains in doubt.•• It hoped the debate would be
helpful. Sees "Noise, Not Negotiation," Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 6,
1958, p. 2C. The Daily News claimed that the move to the General
Assembly represented a Russian propaganda victory. ,.In the u. N.
Assembly, there is every chance that debate can be prolonged
until Russia feels that the last drop of propaganda has been
milked." Sees "Khrushchev's u. N. Strategy, Russ(ian) switch to
Assembly Keeps u. s. on Defensive," Editorial, CDN, Aug. 6, 1958,
p. 22. The L.A. Times lament.eds uso here we are ••• maneuvered
into the most futile kind of a conference, a parliament of cuckoos.''
Sees ,.A Parliament of Cuckoos?," Editorial, LAT, Aug. 7, 1958,
part III, p. 4.
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special

u.

N. General Assembly emergency session as evidence

that the danger of war was "receding ."

The

u.

N. was the only

forum available for such talks, which demonstrated once again
,
. d'ispensi'b'1.lity."
,
65
1.ts
"1.n
The controversy resulting from Dulles• July 31 news
conference led to widespread reports of demands within the
Eisenhower Administration to broaden the scope of discussions
at the United Nations.

critics within the Administration were

reported to feel that Dulles• remarks were too "negative .. and
had alienated opinion abroad.

Those urging the fresh approach

were then Vice President Richard M. Nixon,

c.

D. Jackson, a

Time-Life official and one time psychological warfare adviser
to the President, who had returned to serve as consultant on the
Middle East, and White House Press Secretary James c. Hagerty. 66
The President himself, it was reported, would present the new
American approach in a "dramatic" personal appearance in the

u.

N. General Assembly.

The new

u. s.

plan was to lend support

to the approach advocated most recently on August 8, 1958, by

u.

N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.

The Hammarskjold

proposal called for joint action by the Arab States themselves
in improving their own economic development.

As the Times

observeds "The difficulty with the Hammarskjold plan is that
65 "Calling In The Assembly, .. Editorial, NYT, Aug. 8, 1958,
P• 18.

w. Kenworthy, "U. s • ,Leaders Split on Mideast Aims,"
NYT, Aug. 9, 1958, pp. 1 and 3; and William H. Stringer, "Eisenhower and UN Chief Shape New Mideast Plans," CSM, Aug. 9, 1958,
66E.

p. 1.
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he has never been able to arouse much interest in it among the
Arab states, (American) officials ••• noted • ., 57
Editorial reaction to the President's United Nations
General Assembly proposal (see abovea pp. 419-420.) was generally favorable.

The Christian Science Monitor hailed the

proposal as representing "several forward steps" in
policy.

u. s.

The regional economic development institution--the

"heart" of the plan--moved beyond direct binational agreements,
which many countries feared tied them too tightly to American
purposes.

The Eisenhower plan stressed u, N, sponsorship of

the multinational organization, which would be administered by
the Arabs themselves--"its goals must be Arab goals."

The

Monitor hoped that it would receive "a thoughtful hearing and
careful consideration in the Middle East ... 68

The New York Times

found that the Eisenhower proposal was "a good, constructive
framework which offers the Arab nations what they should be
wanting, which stays within the principles of the United Nations
Charter, and which safeguards United States interests."

The

American plan was "high in its aims" and "admirable" in content.
While recognizing that it would be difficult to win Middle
Eastern agreement to the economic development institution, and
that creation of au. N. peace force was at best a task requiring
67 rbid., Kenworthy and Stringer; and "Eisenhower to Appear
at UN Today to Present u. s. Plan for Achieving Permanent Peace
in Middle East," WSJ, Aug. 13, 1958, P• 2,
68 "A Strong Lead in the Mideast," Editorial, CSM, Aug. 14,

1958, p. 18; and "Before the Assembly," Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 13,
1958, P• 20.
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a good deal of time, and that restricting arms flow to the
Middle East could not succeed as long as the Russians insisted
on including Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in a disarmament plan,

u. s.

the Times argued that the

plan deserved

0

serious and

thoughtful consideration from the General Assembly, and especially from the Arab members." 69

The Wall Street Journal

found that the Pr esident's six points did contain "some germs
for further discussion."

The Arab administration of the eco-

nomic development institution was a step in the right direction,
since it renounced the "tired" notion that the

u. s.

could win

Arab friends or solve Arab problems merely by handing out u.
foreign aid.

s.

The development of au. N. peace force was

"probably a prerequisi t e" to au. N. solution of the real
problems in the Middle East, such as defining and enforcing
boundary security.

Furthermore, by making this proposal, the

President had "rescued the
stubbornly •anti-Arab.' 0

u. s.

from the posture of being

Eisenhower's plan was only a begin-

ning--"a working paper"--for the u.

s. and the u. N.

"But in

any problem so difficult as the Middle East a working paper
.
•
70
i s a necessary b eg1nn1ng."

69 "The Eisenhower Doctrine," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 14,
u. s. Aims: Ike's Mid-East
Plan Is Superior Statecraft,•• Editorial, CDN, Aug. 14, 1958,
p. 18; and "Ike Speaks For Peace--Khrushchev Balks," Editorial,
CST, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 43.
1958, p. 28; "Fine Statement of

7o..A Working Paper," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 6;
and "More Steps Forward Than Back,., Editorial, LAT, Aug. 14,
1958, part III, P• 4.
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The Wall Street Journal questioned the validity of Eisenhower's equating the Lebanese intervention with

u. s.

actions

against clear Communist aggression in Iran, Greece and TUrkey,
the Berlin blockade, Korea and the Formosa Straits.

The Journal

observed that there was "very considerable doubt" that Communist
aggression, direct or indirect, was a factor in Lebanon, and
that

u.

A, R. infiltration played any significant part. "Prima-

rily, the trouble seems to have been a mixed-up political
situation within Lebanon itself,"
Lebanon and the other cases of
why

u. s.

The difference between

u. s.

intervention explained

involvement in Lebanon "was not applauded in the

world," and why the soviets had been able to exploit it to
promote war hysteria.

"(T)he unhappy fact is that in this case

the United States, because it was on uncertain ground, gave the
Soviets a sizable propaganda opportunity."
hower's reservation of the

u. s.

Concerning Eisen-

right to intervene on behalf

of small nations, the Journal wished that this had been clarified to refer to nations "menaced" by Communism.

"It is one

thing to resist Communist aggression, open or disguised.

But

as Lebanon suggests, the United States will find itself in
formidable future difficulties if it acts without being absolutely sure exactly what it is opposing." ur

While the Journal

was thus urging caution, the Times was hailing the President's
reservation of the
nations as

0

u. s.

right to intervene on behalf of small

a milestone in the development of American foreign

71.,Questions and Precedents," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 14,
1958, p. 6.
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policy which further commits us to the cause of peace and
freedom. 072
When on August 18, 1958, the Norwegian resolution calling
on the united Nations Secretary-General to work out arrangements
to ease Middle Eastern tensions was put forth, the Christian
Science Monitor noted that the United States and Great Britain,
although not among the formal sponsors, "had a leading part in
drafting the proposal and were prepared to give it full support ... 73
The Norwegian resolution was supported editorially by both the
New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor, which respectively found it a "wholesome, constructive and practical plan,"
and a "reasonable course toward resolving the impasse ...

Both

recognized the difficulty of getting the necessary two-thirds
majority for passage in the face of strong opposition from the
Communist -bloc, and members of a split Asian-African bloc. 74
The Wall street Journal ignored the Norwegian resolution
editorially.
United Nations General Assembly unanimous passage of the
Arab resolution (see above: pp. 421-423.) was variously interpreted by the three major American newspapers.

The Christian

Science Monitor was enthusiastic in its assessment of the
resolution.

The Monitor found that once again the United Nations

had shown its "usefulness as a fo rum in which international
72 ••Th.e Eisenhower Doctrine II,'' Editorial, NYT, Aug. 15,
1958, P• 26.
730 Mideast Plan Put Before UN," CSM, Aug. 18, 1958, P• 10.
74 ,•Line-Up in the U. N.," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 19, 1958,
p. 26; and "Toward a Mideast Solution," Editorial , CSM, Aug. 20,
1958, p. 16.
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problems which contain the seeds of war can be resolved by
bringing together the interested parties in an atmosphere of
mediation."

The Arab resolution, which the General Assembly

adopted unanimously, constituted a significant "triumph" for
peaceful negotiation. 75

The New York Times and the Wall Street

Journal were more skeptical.

Noting the "surprising climax••

which the passage of the Arab r e solution represented, the Times
commented that it was the best available solution at the time-"if it will work.''

The United Nations had assumed the grave

responsibility of guarding Middle Eastern peace and security,
and "one can only hope that it will prove equal to it." 76

The

Journal regarded the Arab resolution as "so couched in generalities as to leave many of its meanings unclear."

Nevertheless ,

the United Nations had accepted the Arab pledge to refrain from
attempting to change established systems of government.
the

u. s.

had also voted to accept the Arab resolution, the Jour nal

concluded that the
Lebanon.

Since

u. s.

should begin to withdraw its troops f rom

"Now we can withdraw with good grace and, very l i kely,

with the respect of the world.

Otherwise it may well be a long

voyage home." 77
75 "Dawn In The Middle East," Editorial, CSM, Aug. 22 , 1958,
p. 20; "By the Middle East, 0 Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 22, 1958,
p. 2B; and "An Achievement For U. N. 1 Arab Unity Won the Day
For constructive Plan," Editorial, CDN, Aug. 22, 1958, p. 16;
and "Arabs Write Their own Ticket," Editorial, LAT, Aug. 22,
1958, part III, P• 3.
76 ••An Arab Plan for the Arabs," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 22,
1958, p. 20.
77 ..,rhe Long Voyage Home," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 25, 1958,
P• 6.
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The adoption of the Arab resolution effectively ended the
Middle Eastern crisis.

American newspaper coverage of the

situation all but stopped, except for an occasional backpage
article or editorial dealing with the progress of the Chehab
regime and of the American withdrawal.
Summary Remarks On Newspaper Reaction To The Crisis
During the Lebanon crisis, both the New York Times and the
Christian Science Monitor supported the American intervention
and most of the Administration's United Nations moves.

The

Wall Street Journal opposed the intervention, and was largely
silent on
supported

u. s.
u. s.

United Nations diplomatic efforts, but mildly
agreement to a United Nations summit conference.

Both the Times and the Monitor favored United Nations assumption
of the American r ole in Lebanon, and the retention of

u. s.

troops in Lebanon until the United Nations acted to replace them.
The Journal favored an indiginous Lebanese solution to the
problem, and the early withdrawal of
upon any

u. N. action.

u. s.

troops not dependent

Thus, during the Lebanon crisis, the

Journal retained its opposition to Western intervention in the
Middle East, as evident during the Suez crisis.

Although both the

Times and the Monitor had opposed the Suez invasions, both later
supported the American intervention in Lebanon.
that the

u. s.

Both argued

acted in response to a lawful request from the

legitimate Lebanese Government; during the Suez crisis there
had been no such invitation from the Egyptian Government.
During the Lebanon crisis, of the Eastern papers studied,
the Times and the Monitor were less representative of major
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American newspaper r e action to the crisis, than they were
during the Suez crisis.
u.

All Western papers studied opposed

s. intervention in Lebanon, and most were not favorably

disposed to au . N. General Assembly session.
Prior to u. s. intervention, most Eastern and Western
papers favored au. N. solution in Lebanon, after the intervention, the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor
supported the Administration--the rest of the papers did not.
All papers reacted favorably to Eisenhower's six-point
proposal to the United Nations General Assembly.

The Western

papers reacted more favorably to the Arab resolution.
The Los Angeles Times most nearly resembled the Wall Street
Journal, except on the question of pre-intervention support for
the United Nations.
In its support for the United Nations, the St. Louis PostDispatch approximated the New York Times and the Christian
Science Monitor. In its opposition to

u. s.

intervention, it

agreed with the Wall street Journal.
The Chicago Daily News and the Chi cago Sun-Times retained
their editorial independence, lying somewhere between the
Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times on the one
hand, and the Wall Street Journal on the other.
In conclusion, during the Lebanon crisis, the Wall Street
Journal was the most representative of American newspaper
coverage among the major Eastern papers studied.
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American Newsmagazine Coverage of the Lebanese Crisis
Compared to coverage of the Suez crisis, there was much
less newsmagazine coverage of the Lebanon crisis.
came in the months Jul.y and August , 1958.

Peak coverage

Our analysis of

American newsmagazine coverage will concentrate on the issues
beginning the last week in May , when news of Secretary Dulles •
May 20 press conference might be expected to appear , until the
last week in August/first week in September , when news of the
Arab resolution appeared .

There were occasional articles on the

Lebanese revolt in the mid-May issues of the American newsmagazines.

Following publication of news of the unanimous

passage of the Arab Resolution by the United Nations General
Assembly , the American newsmagazines featured occasional articles
on the restoration of order to Lebanon and the progress of u.

s.

troop withdrawals.
Newsmagazine Pre-Intervention Coverage
The four American weekly newsmagazines of our study-Business Week, Newsweek, Time, and u.

s.

News and World Report--

all saw the hand of united Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel
Nasser as an important factor behind the revolt in Lebanon .
Opinion varied on the degree of Nasser influence .

Business Week

took the extreme position that the Lebanese revolt had been
"inspired and supplied from neighboring Syria--partly by Soviet
agents and partly by stooges of the united Arab Republic ' s
Presi'den t Nasser." 7a

Earlier it had charged that the Lebanese

revolt was part of the broader movement for Arab unification
78 "Why Lebanon Needs Help," Business Week, June 28 , 1958 ,
p . 27.
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backed by Nasser who had Soviet support for his endeavors. 79

u. s.

News and World Report's John Law reported that the

Lebanese rebels were showing greater strength due to a "steady"
flow of men, money and weapons across the border from the
Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic.

Law noted that

"the buildup ••• is being masterminded by Gamal Abdel Nasser."go
Newsweek chargeds"

volatile Moslem opposition, incited

by inflammatory propaganda and subversive agents from Egypt and
Syria, had turned a wave of local strikes and riots into a

. ·ae, arme a.insurrection."
.
sr
nat1onw1.

Time took a more moderate

position by arguing that the Lebanese revolt had been "indeed •••
aggravated by the shrill symphony of hate orchestrated from
Radio Cairo," and the Lebanese rebels had been "mischievously
bolstered" by men and arms infiltrated from Nasser's Syria, but
the solution to Lebanon's troubles was "still to be found
'
'd e its
'
1.nsi
own bo r d er." '82·

Closely related to the question of

u.

A. R. involvement

in the Lebanese revolt, was American newsmagazine analysis of
the causes of the revolt.

Business Week argued that the "imme-

diate" cause of the rebellion was the alleged intent of President Chamoun to run for a second presidential term after obtaining
79,•International Outlook, 0 Business Week, May 24, 1958,
p. 109.

'80John Law, "Nasser Tries A Squeeze Play: A Firsthand
Report on Lebanon's Civil War," u. s. News, June 27, 1958, p. 58;
and John Lawi "Lebanon: What the Shooting•s All About," u. s,
New$, July 1 , 1958, PP• 60-62.
81 "The Mi ddle Easts Pulling the Trigger," Newsweek, May 26,
1958, p. 44.

82"Lebanon: Posing the Right Question," Time, July 7, 1958,

p. 18.
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the amendment of the Lebanese constitution by the Lebanese
Parliament.

But "(t)he real cause was the effort of disgrun-

tled feudal chiefs and ambitious political bosses to a1ign
Lebanon closely with Nasser's Pan-Arabic movement."

The

primary objective of the Opposition was "the substitution of a
pro-Nasser government for the Chamoun-led government that has
tried to make Lebanon a meeting ground between East and west." 83
Newsweek tended to regard the division within Lebanon as
along primarily religious lines of Moslem versus Christian,
revolving around "Christian" President Chamoun•s "plan" to
amend the Lebanese constitution to assure his reelection. ·8 ~

u. s. - News regarded the struggle as primarily between t he
pro- Western Chamoun government and pro-Nasser anti-government
rebels who were vying for control of the tiny Middle Eastern
republic.
1

A rebel victory could convert Lebanon into a
.

'Nasser satel l ite."

85

Time first attributed the Lebanese rebellion to the struggle
between pro-Western Chamoun, a Christian, who had claims upon

u.

s. good will because he "led his little country from its

Swiss modeled neutrality ••• to all out espousal of the Eisenhower
Doctrine," and the rebel politicians, "some of them professional
Moslems who have been photographed in the forefront of practi83 ••Lebanon Gets the Squeeze Play," Business Week, June 7,
1958, p. 119.
84 "The Middle Easts Pulling the Trigger,•• Newsweek, May 26,
1958! p. 45; and "Crumbling Revolt?, .. Newsweek, June lb, 1958 ,
p. 4 •

u. s. News, May 30.1 1958, p . 58; and "WorldNews, June 20, 1958, p. SY.

85••worldgram,"

gram, ..

u. s.

479

cally every Arab nationalist gathering that Nasser has assembled
over the last few years in Cairo."

Between the two sides was

the largely Christian-officered Lebanese army which opposed any
·

outcome other than compromise.

86

Later in the crisis, Time

leveled scathing charges at Lebanese President Camille Chamoun
who "insisted on turning Lebanon's internal troubles into an
international crisis."

Time found Chamoun to blame for Lebanon's

difficulties because he upset the traditional political balance
at a time when Nasser was launching his drive for one united
Arab nation.

Chamoun "abandoned Lebanon's traditionally neutral

foreign policy," he amassed a three-fourths majority in Parliament through corrupt elections.

And his friends planned to

force a constitutional amendment through Parliament enabling
Chamoun to run for a second term.

And in the eyes of his out-

raged opponents, both Christian and Moslem, he sought to use

u. s.

h'is political
. .
.
support to ach ieve
goals. 87

Generally the American newsmagazines assessed prospects of
a rebel victory as a threat to Western influence in the Middle
East.

Business Week feared a rebel victory "would be inter-

preted as a major decline of
East." 88

u. s.

influence in the Middle

Time, backing Dulles• June 17 contention that there

were "other contingencies" for

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon

86 "Lebanon: When Compromise Is Victory,"~, June 2,
1958, p. 24.

81 "The Answer Is Independence," Time, July 7, 1958, pp. 1819.
88"International outlook," Business Week, June 21, 1958,
p. 24; and "International outlook," Business Week, June 28,
1958, p. 85.
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besides under United Nations auspices, felt that it was a last
resort that neither Lebanon nor its friends could overlook.
"If Lebanon's pro-west regime were to fall, the whole

u. s.

position in the Middle East would be jeopardized ... 89
Despite the supposed dangers to Western interests in the
Middle East, the American newsmagazines all hoped for a peaceful
settlement.

u, s.

News commented earliest on the possibility

of a compromise resulting from the "standoff" between Government
and Opposition forces.

It saw a chance that the revolt would

be settled by politicians rather than armies. 90
Newsweek reported that the intensity of the rebellion was
reduced.

Factors contributing to the lessening of violence

were1 1. The Moslem revolt was "stalled"; 2. The nationwide
antigoverrunent strike had failed; and 3. Moslem

0

fanatics 0 were

disillusioned by Syrian disenchantment with membership in the

u.

A. R.

The Arab League had fowid no answer, and the United

Nations Security Council "offered little hope."

Newsweek

concludeda "Everything pointed to an internal solution ... 91
Time questioned the usefulness of all-out
Chamoun regime.

For

u. s.

u. s.

aid to the

police equipment and tanks seemed

"unlikely to promote order where order finally depends on a
balance between religious, social and political forces none of
89 "Lebanont Five Stages to Peace," Time, June 30, 1958,
p. 21; and "Lebanon1 Posing the Right Question,•• Time, loc. cit.
9 o"Worldgram,f•

u. s.

News, May 30, 1958, P• 58.

91 "crumbling Revolt?," Newsweek, loc. cit.
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which is strong enough to dominate the country."

While Dulles

publicly supported Chamoun•s claim of Nasserite interference
in Lebanese affairs, privately, the Department of State hoped
that Lebanon would not press its complaint before the United
Nations.

Time saw in reports that Chamoun was showing some

inclination to agree to a peace-making government headed by
Army Chief Chehab hope that "the fundamental

u.

s. objective of

maintaining an independent Lebanon in delicate Moslem-Christian
balance, would be better served than by widening the chaos." 92

u. s. officials, who refused
to talk about the conditions which might lead to direct u. s.
intervention in Lebanon, were hopeful that u. s.-British interBusiness Week reported that

vention could be avoided.

The officials hoped that the United

Nations would be able to seal Lebanon's rugged border by
organizing a special police force, thus, creating a military
stalemate in which a political compromise could be arranged.
Business Week noted Administration reluctance to become involved
militarily in Lebanon because of further Arab antagonism against
the West, and because of concern that the
with the Soviet Union.

u. s. might collide

There seemed, however, little hope of

effective Security Council action because of "an almost certain
veto from Moscow."

Business Week concluded, "Still, at midweek

you couldn't rule out the possibility that the rebels would
force the Chamoun government to ask for direct

u. s. help, and

get it ... 93
92 "Lebanont When Compromise Is Victory," Time, loc. cit.
93 ••International Outlook," Business Week, June 28, 1958,
p. 85; and ••International outlook,,. Business Week, June 21,
1958, p. 124.
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All four of these American newsmagazines expressed grave
doubts that the United Nations Secretary-General and the Observation Group could find a solution to the Lebanese situation,
and adequately police Lebanon's 180 miles of mountainous border
with Syria.

Time and

u. s.

News carried estimates that to

successfully police the Lebanese border a 5,000-man United
Nations force would be needed.

The handful of men currently

assigned the task could scarcely succeed in doing it.

Newsweek

did note, however, that similar symbolic action had succeeded
in "quieting" the Egyptian-Israeli frontiers at Gaza.

94

In the pre-intervention period, Newsweek offered an interesting assessment of official
alleged motives in Lebanon.

u. s.

interpretation of Nasser's

When Lebanqn earlier made its

charges of massive infiltration from Nasser•s United Arab
Republic, Newsweek reported that Washington disputed Lebanon's
clai

that

u.

A. R. intervention was massive enough to invoke

the Tripartite Declaration.

"But none doubted that Nasser's

United Arab Republic, aided and abetted by the Connnunists, was
capitalizing on Lebanon•s explosive political crisis.

Neverthe-

less, Washington did not believe that Nasser seriously wanted
"to absorb Lebanon with its large Christian population ... 95 Later,
following establishment of UNOGIL, Newsweek reported that Washington believed that all Nasser wanted was a "'less unfriendly'
94 "Lebanons On the Border," Time, June 23, 1958, P• 18;
"Worldgram," u. s. News, June 20, 1958, p. 59; "International
outlook," Business Week, June 21, 1958, ibid.; and "Double Cross
in the Mideast?, Pro-West Lebanon Aflame," Newsweek, June 23,
1958, p. 46.

95 "The Middle Easts Pulling the Trigger," Newsweek, loc. cit.
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Lebanese Government." It also believed he was anxious to kee p
Moscow from rushing to his side in the dispute with aid he didn't
want but could hardly refuse ...

Newsweek saw the problem now

revolving around whether Nasser could stop the rebellion, or
"was the situation out of control?"

It cited battles in Beirut

and Tripoli as indication that things were indeed getting out
of control, and that "Lebanon's rebels clearly were determined
to have at least one last go--even if they now had to go it
alone." 96
Business Week and

u. s.

News and World Report were appar-

ently not much impressed by the remarks of

u.

N. Secretary-

General Dag Hammarskjold on July 3, that there was "no foundation"
for a judgement of

u.

A. R. massive infiltration into Lebanon,

or by the first UNOGIL report that the "vast majority" of rebels
were Lebanese.

(see aboves pp. 384-385.)

Neither newsmagazine

mentioned them.
The remarks of the Secretary-General and publication of
the UNOGIL report were followed by a pronounced change in
Newsweek's interpretation of the character of the Lebanese
revolt.

Previously, Newsweek had argued that the "Moslem"

opposition was "incited" by
(see aboves p. 477.)

u.

A. R. agents .and propaganda.

Following Hammarskjold's statement upon

returning from the Middle East, Newsweek noted1 1. Lebanon's
crisis was "essentially a domestic matter--even though ••• Nasser•s
soviet-supported United Arab Republic has been subverting
960 nouble cross in the Middle East?s Pro-West Lebanon

Aflame," Newsweek, loc. cit.
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Lebanon's Moslem elements and providing military aid for the
rebels."

u.

A. R. interference and other (unspecified) inter-

national i~;l .ica,tions appeared to have been .. exaggerated";
2. President Chamoun•s following had "dwindled"; and 3. Lebanese

Army Commander-in-Chief, General Fuad Chehab, refused to commit
his troops against the rebels.

Newsweek opined that there was

little chance of Anglo-American intervention--except in the
"unlikely eventuality" of invasion or danger to America's
"5,000"--twice as high as most other estimates--nationals
resident in Lebanon.

Newsweek commenteds

The u. s. and Britain were aware that as goes Lebanon
so might go Jordan, Western-allied Iraq, and the Persian
Gulf sheikhdoms that supply most of free Europe's oil.
They planned to continue aid to the Lebanese Government.
But the Western Powers hardly could dispatch troops just
to save Chamoun from Lebanon's opposition, even if that
opposition might be more pro-Nasser than pro-Western.
Any such move would all but destroy Western prestige in
the Afro-Asian world. And Moscow, Western chancellaries
believe, is spoiling for any blowup that would harass
the west, increase Nasser's dependency on the Soviets,
and divert world attention from a likely Kremlin showdown with Poland.
Thus, Western strategy now was to support the actions of the
United Nations, whose secretary-General believed that a 100-man
observer team, aided by helicopters, could adequately quarantine the Lebanese border. 97

Newsweek's claim that a Western

dispatch of troops to Lebanon would all but destroy Western
prestige in the Afro-Asian world seems a bit overdrawn.

The

Administration recognized that its action would incur deep
97 .,A very Strange Revolution," Newsweek, July 7, 1958,
pp. 30-32.
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resentment of most of the Arab world (and some of the rest of
the Free World). 98

Nevertheless, the impact of such action

would be; in all likelihood, temporary.

There was also a

tendency to overproject the consequences of the fall of the
Lebanese Government.

There was no guarantee that other Middle

Eastern nations would follow suit.

Western strategy of support

seemed to stern from the realization in Washington that the quarrel
between Government and Opposition leaders in Lebanon was essentially a domestic one.

The

u. s.

could not totally discount

infiltration, nor could it ignore the continuous
casts inciting the Lebanese against Chamoun.

u.

A. R. broad-

Nevertheless,

since Lebanon had internationalized the conflict by going before
the

u.

N. Security Council, the

u. s.

Nations a chance to find a solution.

wanted to give the United
By late June, 1958, the

Administration had adopted a policy of watchful waiting,
restraining President Charnoun and discouraging him, temporarily,
,,. 99
from requesting,!..united. . states•·. trc,Qps.
A week later, Newsweek reported on Lebanese and American
adverse reaction to the first UNOGIL report.
supporters were deeply bitter.

Even

Chamoun and his

u. s. officials, "still

chary of Western intervention," privately disputed UNOGIL's
98Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 274.

99Meo, Lebanon1 Improbable Nation, op. cit., PP• 194-197.
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observations and claimed that there was significant
interference, "though mainly psychological."

u.

A. R.

Hammarskjold's

stand had "closed the legal door" to intervention by either
the United Nations or the United States.

Western officials

were reportedly convinced that General Fuad Chehab was the best
choice to head a compromise government until the Lebanese
Parliament had a chance to elect a new President.

These same

diplomats feared that pro-Nasser rebel success before the
expiration on September 23, 1958, of pro-Western Chamoun•s
term would look too much like a defeat for the West.

u. s.

HPrivately,

officials gloomily concede that neither side is strong

enough to break the stalemate and that a compromise regime
(i. ~• a less pro-Western one) is the only peaceful solution
in sight."IOO
Time supported Dulles• contention that the

u.

N. presence

in Lebanon had slowed infiltration of arms and men frQm the
United Arab Republic . l(Jl
Dulles• observations during his May 20, 1958, news conference on the extension of the Eisenhower Doctrine to encompass
the Lebanon situation went unreported by these American newsmagazines.

Nevertheles~, it was clearly evident to all four

that there existed a clear possibility of Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon.

It cannot be said that any of the four

lOO"Torn Lebanon--Stalemate Now?,ff Newsweek, July 14,
1958, p. 35.

lUl"Lebanon1 sea Change," Time, July 14 , 1958, pp . 22-23 .
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major Ameri can newsmagazines opposed the conce pt of
intervention in Lebanon .

u. s.

No editorial opposition was expressed,

and only Newsweek seemed to feel that the Hammarskjold

state-

ment · nd UNOGIL report precluded an Anglo-American intervention
in Lebanon.

All four newsmagazines were hostile to

u.

A. R.

President Nasser and saw his influence at work in Lebanon.

All

claimed to see a threat to

u. s. Middle Eastern interests in a

rebel takeover of Lebanon.

Perhaps, for these reasons, they

did not oppose a possible Anglo-American intervention.
Newsmagazine Post-Intervention Coverage
All four American newsmagazines supported, in varying
degrees, the American intervention in Lebanon.
editorial dissent were uttered by them.

Few words of

American newsmagazines

referred to the Administration decision to intervene unilater.
.
10,2
103
ally in Lebanon as a "calculated risk,"
a "desperate risk,"
or a .,calculated gamble,••

l,'04

but all agreed that it was a step

worth taking.
Time, which had been before the American intervention so
highly critical of President Chamoun •s regime, dropped its
criticism of the Lebanese President.

During the Suez crisis

Time had supported American foreign policy almost without
question (See Chapter V) .

So too following the Lebanon landing,

1. 2nwashington Outlook," Business Week, July 19, 1958, p. 40.

l<QlHWhere Do We Go From Here," Newsweek, July 28, 1958, p. 15.
l'O 'Presi'dent Eise
'
nhower1 The Man In The News, Story Of A
Decision," u. s. News, July 25, 1958, p. 68.
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Time staunchly supported Administration policies.

Thus, Time

now parrotted Administration claims of assistance to a friendly
government.

Time noted that "the

u. s.

had moved swiftl.y to

answer the cries for help from the friendly government of a
small nation--Lebanon--that stood in imminent danger of overthrow from subversion."

Echoing Secretary Dulles• background

remarks of July 21, 1958 (see aboves pp. 399-405.), Time
reasoned that

u. s.

policy-makers believed that permitting the

crisis to spread t hrough Lebanon and Jordan would weaken the
West's whole system of alliances and also the security of small
pro-Western governments from Morocco to the Pacific.

Time

concluded, "Under the circumstances ••• the President's duty to
act promptly was clear.

So was his duty to act with enough

force to handle any eventuality in the area."
envisioned by

u. s.

The next task

policy-makers was to extricate

u. s.

troops

from Lebanon, transferring the "fireman function" to a United
Nations force. 105
Newsweek, which during the Suez crisis had taken no clearly
favorable or unfavorable position on Administration foreign
policy, following the American intervention in Lebanon, was
very obviously in agreement with the Administration's actions.
Newsweek reported that the American mission in the Middle East,
then in its second week, had thusfar been successful.

In both

Lebanon and Jordan, previously in danger of being "delivered
into the eager hands of Egypt's empire-hungary Nasser , " stability
had been restored.

"(D)isaster had been averted with not a

lOS,.The Nations Fighting Fire," Time, July 28, 1958, P• 9.
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moment to spare."

Newsweek theorized that the mission, a

••desperate risk, .. had deterred "war and conquest by subversion-which was its larger purpose.••

Thus, Newsweek contradicted its

pre-intervention position that the Lebanese crisis was "essentially a domestic matter, .. and adopted the Administration's
argument of "indirect aggression," or, in Newsweek's words,
"conquest by subversion." 106
Business Week and

u. s.

News and World Report offered

similar explanations for the American intervention.

Both

argued that the Administration acted: 1. to check the spread
of Soviet influence in the Middle East; 2. to halt Nasser's
move to gain control of the area; and 3. to stop the spread of
chaos signified by the Iraqi coup.

The United States was faced

with a choice between the complete loss of Western influence
in the region or firm action to maintain some Western control.
"U.

s.

world leadership itself was at stake" as the Allied,

uncommitted and neutral countries of Africa, Europe, Asia,
and the Communist bloc watched to see what action the

u. s.

would take. 107
Editorially, Business Week took the frank position that in
as much as the

u. s.

intervention was dictated by "purely"

national interest, "Eisenhower's move is strictly power politics."
10611 Wb.ere Do we Go From Here," Newsweek, loc. cit.

107 ,.washington Outlook," Business Week, July 19, 1958,
p. 40; "International Outlook," in ibid., p. 81; qnd "Big War?1
Why U.S. Risked A World Blowup," U, S. News, July 25, 1958,

PP• 40-46.
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It argued that Americans should not cringe at the thought of
employing power politics in international affairs.

such tactics

were justified so long as the Soviet Union pursued its goal of
world power, for the

u.

s . must be prepared to halt further

erosion of the free world.

"By our intervention in Lebanon,

Washington has warned Moscow that we intend to keep both the
Middle East and Africa out of Soviet hands. 010 8

u. s.

News editor David Lawrence found that Anglo-American

action in the Middle East was "a step in time." 109
issue,

u. s.

In the same

News charged that as a result of the Lebanon crisis

the United Nations faced its greatest challenge since Korea •.
The United States and Great Britain were compelled to order in
the troo~s in order to halt the indirect aggression and subversion known to be taking place.

It was

u.

N. "refusal" to do

anything about this aggression which forced the Americans and
the British to act.

The question was "how long the

u.

N., as

the world peace organization, can survive failure on a crucial
test in the Middle East ."

On the positive side,

u. s.

News

welcomed Anglo-American cooperation in the current Middle
Eastern crisis.

There was no trace of the former

split over the Suez invasion.
Governments were working,

u.

u.

s.-British

To indicate how closely the two
s. News noted correctlya

Joint u. s.-British planning is the rule, almost on
a minute-to-minute basis.
l0'.8.,The Trends Facing the Middle East Crisis," Business
tte~k, July 19, 1958, P• 120.
lO David Lawrence, ••A Step In Time,"
1958, p. 120.

u. s. News, July 25,
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Transatlantic phone calls between Washington and
London are keeping top officials in unusually close touch,
much as during World War II.
Within hours after the Iraq coup, u. s. and Britain
agreed on a plan. The decision was made then that u. s .
troops would go to London, that Britain•s forces would
be deployed and alerted for possible moves elsewhere.110
Alone of the major American newsmagazines,

u. s.

News charged

that the Middle East crisis of 1958 was caused by United Arab
Republic President Nasser, who emerged as an Arab hero, and a
Soviet ally, following his salvation during the Suez crisis by
the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States had

helped Nasser get his start when it stopped the Anglo-FrenchIsraeli invasion in 1956.

Therefore, Suez was the place where
the Lebanon crisis started. 111 u. s. News•s charge was based
on an inaccurate perception of the origin and character of the
Lebanon crisis.

Most scholars have subsequently agreed that

the Lebanese revolt was primarily indigenous.

Its origins lay

mainly in Chamoun•s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and
his quest for an unconstitutional second term as President.
While it is true that Nasser encouraged the Opposition through
inflammatory propaganda broadcasts, he did not cause the revolt. 112
The issues were so volatile,in terms of Lebanese politics, that
there would probably have been a revolt even without
agitation.

u.

A. R.

The second term of the Presidency of Beshara al-

1100 worldgram,"

u. s. News, July 25, 1958, p. 57.
111 ,,suez--Where It All Started, u. s. News, July 25, 1958,
0

p. 67.

112see, Qubain, crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., pp. 140-142;
Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, op. cit., PP• 178-182; Hoopes,
The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., pp. 432-433; and Stewart,
Turmoil in Beirut, op. cit.
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Khouri--made possible in 1948 by a constitutional amendment-was prematurely ended because of domestic opposition in 1952,
before the ascendency of Nasser.

Chamoun, a leader of the

opposition to al-Khouri, assumed the Presidency. 113 While
u.

s. Suez policies elevated Nasser's prestige in the Middle

East, it seems exaggerated to claim that Suez was the place
where the Lebanon crisis started.

s.

The American newsmagazines saw the danger that the u.

Marine landings could involve the United States in a wider war
caused by Soviet counter-intervention.
was discounted.

This threat, however,

Soviet rocket rattling was _regarded correctly

as a propaganda gesture which would not be matched by appro.
priate
ac t 'ion. 114
united Nations Security Council debate of the American and
British landings went largely unreported by these American newsmagazines.

All four were more concerned with analyzing the

impact of the landings on the Middle East, and with discussing
the motivations for the American action.
News of the Soviet invitation to a summit meeting was
received skeptically.

Business Week, Newsweek, and

u.

S

News

and World Report were not very enthusiastic about the prospects
for a meaningful summit conference in which concrete solutions
to Middle Eastern problems could be reached.

All three expressed

113Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle
~ - Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 400-408.
114 "Washington Outlook," Business Week, July 19, 1958,
loc. cit.; and "Where Do We Go From Here?," Newsweek, loc. cit.

493

fears that Soviet Premier Khrushchev would turn the conference
into a major propaganda spectacle.

He was looking for an

opportunity to pose as a champion of the Arabs and of world
peace.

Yet, all three saw hope that the summit would prove an

opportunity for the West .

Business Week envisioned that it

could lead to a temporary stabilization of the Middle Eastern
situation, despite the fact that Khrushchev was "riding high,"
and that Dulles would be on the defensive due to his failure
••to develop positive

u. s. policies for dealing with the West's

declining influence in the Middle East with the rise of Soviet
world prestige." 115

Furthermore, Business Week editorialized,

President Eisenhower prevented a split in the Western camp when
he agreed to a summit conference.

0

We took a firm, even

righteous, position against the British and French when they
landed troops at Suez.

This time we were on the defensive--

since many people in Europe saw Lebanon as a parallel to the
Suez affair."

This threatened a split which Khrushchev had

hoped to exploit. 116

Newsweek hoped for positive results based

upon President Eisenhower's insistence that he would not tolerate
''a radio-televised bawling out by Khrushchev over the Middle
East crisis."

It was the United Nations responsibility to see

that this did not happen. 117

u. s.

News editor David Lawrence

115 "International outlook," Business Week, July 26, 1958,
p. 73.

116 ••The Trends The Tension Begins to Ease, " in ibid., P• 104.
117 "Toward a summits K, the u. N., the West," Newsweek,
Aug. 4 1 1956, pp. 14-16; "Khrushchev's Game In New York," u. s.
News, Aug. 1, 1958, PP• 19-22; and "Next In The Middle East--,"
U:-S. News, Aug. 1, 1958, pp. 25-26.
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continued his anti-communist mission by reminding his readers
that Khrushchev was guilty of murder on a grand scale in
Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and by questioning
the intention of the Soviet Union to adhere to any agreement
Khrushchev might conclude.

Lawrence maintained that the

u. s.

should assure the personal safety of the Soviet Premier, but
the American people "should din in his ears daily the case
against murder and tyranny."

"Kinsmen of the patriots of the

captive states" should parade flag-draped coffins down New York
streets to remind Khrushchev that Americans do not glorify
murderers.

"Let the placards read t

• "Welcome,••

Murderer! • ,. l l 8

Time alone saw no indication of a Russian propaganda
victory and saw nothing to fear in a summit conference, for
the

u. s.

had managed tos "1) placate

u. s.

allies, 2) keep the

Middle East crisis from slipping out of the Security Council's
hands, and 3) put upon Khrushchev the burden of either rejecting
the summit meeting or accepting on

u. s.-u.

N. terms."

While

it was ••undoubtedly true" that the Administration was reluctant
to agree to a summit conference, a meeting within the Security
council on the terms set forth by President Eisenhower, "need
not bring the

u. s.

any discomfort. 0119

Later, Time supported

Dulles• efforts to restrict the summit talks to aggression in
the Middle East.lZO
118oavid Lawrence, "'Welcome,• Murdererl,"
Aug. 1, 1958, P• 88.

u, s.

News,

119 "Toward the Summit," Time, Aug. 4, 1958, pp. 9-10.
lZO"Week of Words," Time, Aug. 11, 1958, p. 10.
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It cannot be said that American newsmagazines regretted
the Russian decision to withdraw from the summit conference,
which the Soviet Union had initially proposed,

Business Week

envisioned that the upcoming General Assembly session would
accomplish "little," and that the talk would be "mostly propaganda."121

u. s.

News could not decide who was ahead in the

propaganda battle over the Middle East.

It foresaw "more words,

more crises short of war," and predicted that "trouble aplenty"
remained for the West in the Middle East. 122

Both Newsweek

and Time were more optimistic in the ir assessments.

Both saw

Soviet withdrawal from the summit conference as an advantage for
the United States.

Time chided pundits who "dimvie.w:ed" the

special General Assembly session as a ''mere propaganda brawl"
in which the

u. s.

stood to gain nothing,

Time reminded its

readers that, in his August 6, 1958, news conference, President
Eisenhower had umade it clear,,.that the

u. s.

will strive to

get the 'underlying causes• of Middle East disorder discussed
in the Assembly, will urge economic programs to deal with those
causes.

'Troops are never going to win the peace,• said he." 123

Newsweek predicted accurately that the

u. s.

could be

expected to express its hearty agreement with the Hammarskjold
plan.

"It seems probable that the

u. s.

proposals will take

the form of implementing the Hammarskjold outline, particularly

121 "International Outlook," Business Week, Aug. 9, 1958,
p. 71.

u.

122 "For A Troubled World--A Week of Talk and Threats,"
s. News, Aug, 15, 1958, pp. 42-43.

123 "Foreign Relations: K's Bad Week," Time, Aug. 18,
1958, P• 11.
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in the economic field,

This c a n be expected to take precedence

over Dulles • brief against Soviet

indirect aggression --a

stand which some Administration advisers have feared might
provoke an angry and inconclusive wrangle , 0124
Generally , these American newsmagazines supported President
Eisenhower ' s program for the Middle East as put forth in his
United Nations General Assembly address of August 13
(see above: pp. 419-420 . )
efforts as

0

1958 ,

Business Week saw the Presidents

a dramatic bid" to have the United Nations assume

responsibility for building a lasting peace in the Middle East .
The

u. s.

plan was "obviously" an attempt to persuade the Arabs ,

Nasser included, that their aspirati ons for independence, unity
and economic developmen t c ould best be assured by cooperation
with the West .

Business Week regarded the Eisenhower plan as

" a last desperate effort" to save Western interests in the
area without resorting to "outright" power politics .

It was

hoped this could be done by removing the taint of colonialism
by having the United Nations take over from the United States
in Lebanon, and from Britain in Jordan, and through the adoption

of an Arab-run Arab development organization, which mi ght remove
Arab fears of Western economic controi . 125
Newsweek regarded the American position, as set forth by
Eisenhower, as "both hopeful and conciliatory."

Noting that the

1240Now Hopefully--Face-to- Face , 0 Newsweek , Aug . 18,
1958, pp . 34 and 36 .
125 .. Giving u. N. The Arab Problem , " Business Week ,
Aug . 16 , 1958, p . 31 .
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President had put aside recrimination, Newsweek opined that
he concentrated his efforts on "a widely heralded but dramatic
development in

u. s.

policy."

Newsweek noted that reaction to

the speech was mixed, with Western European nations favorable,
while the Arab states and the 28-nation Afro-Asian bloc were
unable to adopt a common approach.

Concerning secretary-General

Dag Hammarskjold's remarks to an aide--"God help me from my
friends"--Newsweek observed that Eisenhower s plan was so close
to Hammarskjold's own that the secretary-General "feared his
status as an impartial mediator might be compromised."

But, by

the weekend, it was clear that the General Assembly was again
preparing to transfer its burden to the Secretary-Genera1. 126
Time argued that in the space of his 30-minute address
Eisenhower had regained diplomatic ground lost in the exchange
of letters with the Soviet Union, which had left all parties
••somewhat soiled."

Following Eisenhower's speech, the

u. s.

reemerged, not as guardian for the Middle East status quo, but
as a power "devoted to orderly international evolution."
the process, the Soviet picture of the

u. s.

In

and Britain as

aggressors in the Middle East was modified, and the General
Assembly was returned the task of finding a solution to the
.
h Anglo-American
h
problems tat
led tote
land'ings. 127

El sewh ere

in the same issue, Time noted that it was predictable that the
General Assembly would not adopt any comprehensive program for
126 "A Mideast Compromise Shapes Up," Newsweek, Aug. 25,
1958, pp, 32 and 34.

127"United Nations a Elemental Force,'' Time, ·Aug- • .25 ~
1958, P• 18.
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implementing the

u. s.

proposals.

All the Eisenhower Adminis-

tration expected was an Assembly resolution which woulds 1. call
for au. N. "presence" in Lebanon and Jordan; 2. mention favorably other points in the

u. s.

program, however vaguely; and

3. instruct Secretary-General Hammarskjold to examine practical
possibilities.

Time felt that the

u. s.

the United Nations in the week ahead.

could achieve it in

Beating loudly the drums

for patriotism, Time concluded that the real value of Eisenhower's program lay in the fact thats "the President set forth,
in terms whose echoes shou.ld linger long, the

u. s.

stand in the

worlds firmness in the face of 'balListic blackmail,' steadfast
opposition to aggression, loyalty to the

u.

N. Charter, friend-

ship toward other nations and readiness to help them achieve
their real and legitimate aspirations, 0128

u, s.

News and World Report carried the text of the Eisen-

hower General Assembly address, accompanied by the usual
carefully worded introductory comments.

These announced the

President's proposal for an Arab development institution as
"a program_ more ambitious than any ever before attempted," and
depicted reception of the

u. s.

proposals in this ways

In Nasser's Egypt, leader of the Arab nations--the
cold shoulder,
In most countries of the free world--a warm welcome.
Soviet Russia's reaction? Communists did everything
they could to try to jam radio broadcasts spelling out
this u. s. program.129
128 "The Presidencyc Points for Peace," in ibid,, P• 10.
129 npeace In The Middle East--The Eisenhower Formulas U. N.
Police Force ••• Aid to Arab Lands ••• control of Arms," u. s. News,
Aug. 22, 1958, PP• 80-83.
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The American newsmagazines were divided in opinion about
the suddenly offered Arab Resolution which caught them all by
surprise.
favorably.

Business Week and Newsweek reacted somewhat
Business Week stated that the Arab ••gentlemen's

agreement" to not interfere in each other's domestic affairs
wouJ.d give Secretary-General Hammarskjold "a free enough hand"
to obtain Arab acceptance of a United Nations peace force, and
to initiate action on an Arab economic development institution,
which seemed a "1ong way off," pending withdrawal of.. Western
troops and the establishment of au. N. "fire brigade." 130
Newsweek noted that the surprise "go-it-alone agreement"
of the Arabs ••saved everyone• s face--except Russia• s."

For

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko had been demanding
the immediate withdrawal of British and American troops, while
the Arab delegations were busy formulating their resolution.
The Arab resolution "evoked heartfelt sighs of relief from
Western delegates who had feared a bitter stalemate."

Newsweek

credited Nasser with doing most to make the Arab resolution
possible, for, Newsweek theorized, he stood more to gain by
diplomacy than through subversion and indirect aggression, which
had only provoked Anglo-American intervention, stirred Arab
hostility towards the
interference.

u.

A. R., and brought unwanted Soviet

Still unanswered was how the u.

s. and Britain

would react to Nasser's new tactics, for "Nasser's objectives-control of the West's Mideastern oil supplies--had not changed." 131
130 "International Outlook," Business Week, Aug. 23, 1958,
p. 70.

131 .. Why Nasser switched Signals," Newsweek, Sept. 1, 1958,

pp. 23-24.
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This was an apparent reference to Nasser's Egypt's Liberation s
The Philosophy of the Revolution. (see aboves PP• 302-303 ,
footnote # 34.)
Time and

u. s.

News and World Report were not very

enthusiastic about the Arab resolution.

Time regarded it as

a "shrewd blend" of the Norwegian resolution and of Dag Hanunarskjold's plan for the Middle East.
"something for almost everyone."

The Arab resolution contained
Arab pledges of non-interference

in each other's internal affairs were a "sop" to
concern over indirect aggression.

u. s.

and British

Time recorded the Israeli

complaint that the Arab resolution made "the Middle East's prime
troublemakers--Nasser and the Arab League--into its policemen."
Following its rhetorical question why anyone should put any faith
in Egypt's reaffirmation of pledges it had previously broken
systematically, Time noted:
••• some diplomats thought that Nasser would think twice
about inheriting the creaky state of J ordan if he felt that
Israel would fight to keep Jord an out of his hands. Nasser' s
economic and political difficulties in absorbing Syria may
also have persuaded him that out-and-out annexation of the
Arab countries is a poor idea. Provided that he can bring
the rest of the Arab world under his sway--as he has already
done in Iraq and Saudi Arabia--the Egyptian dictator might
be content with a loose federation of Arab States rather
than one imperial Egyptian-run nation. These were the
reassuring possibilities.
Time did not share the diplomats• optimism.

What miffed Time was

that it appeared that the west had decided to no longer fight
Arab nationalism, but to help "legitimate" it.

"The trouble is

that the controlling interest in Arab nationalism is now owned by
Nasser.

u.

In winning a breathing spell in the Middle East, the

s . and Britain had all but conceded hegemony of the Arab

501

world--at least during reasonably good behavior--to a man and a
nation steeped in hostility to the West. 0132

u. s. News found that the big powers had produced little more
than "an Arab-dictated stopgap" which relieved the tension but
solved nothing.

Among the deficiencies noted by u,

s. News were

that, 1. Little remained of Eisenhower's program; 2. The idea of
au. N. peace force was "all but dead"; 3. Plans for a regional
economic development institution were "barely breathing"; and
4. Monitoring of inflammatory radio broadcasts was ruled out by t he
General Assembly.

In their place was the resolution drafted by t he

Arabs themselves, which "made it plain that they want to settle
their own affair--wi th the help of Mr. Hammarskjold.''

Few ,, realists

expected Hammarskjold to arrive at any lasting formula. 133
Thus, following American intervention in Lebanon, these
four American newsmagazines generally supported u.
action in the Middle East, and
United Nations .

u. s.

s. military

diplomatic efforts in the

During the Suez crisis, Newsweek commentators

were, at times, quite critical of Administration policies.

But

during the Lebanon crisis, Newsweek commentators reacted very
favorably to Administration policies.

Ernest K. Lindley, who,

Lisagor noted , saw Dulles frequently (see above, p. 209.),
was a strong supporter of Administration Lebanon policy.
Concerning the landing of American troops, Lindley observed:
"(T)he President acted very late.

But he may have acted in

132 "Middle Easts While Thousands Cheered," Time, Sept. 1,
1958, P• 18.
133 "Dag Harnmarskjolds The Man In The News, The Next Round
In The Middle East," u, S, News, Aug. 29, 1958, PP• 30-31.
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time to save not only Lebanon but at least temporarily several
other weak nations threatened by the same aggressors." 134
Later, Lindley backed Eisenhower's efforts for a summit conference under United Nations auspices, noting that the

u.

N. was

"the right forum" for a high-level meeting on the Middle East.
According to Lindley, the
the

u. s.

objective should be to persuade

u. N. to take responsibility "for stopping the aggression

against Lebanon and assuring its future as an independent nation."
g:h

u.

s. should also encourage fo rmation of au. N, police force . 13

Following Eisenhower's General Assembly address, Lindley argued
that the President• s six-point proposal was ••sound and constructive. 0

Lindley regarded as "no less important" Eisenhower's

"reaffirmation that the

u. s.

remains determined to resist aggres-

sion and reserves the right to answer t he appeal of any nation
'
d'1.rec t or in
' d'irec t ... 136
th reatene d b y aggression,
Another Newsweek newsanalyst, Raymond Moley, noted that the
American intervention conformed to a foreign policy pattern of
preventing Connnunist domination of the world, which was established in the days of the Truman Administration .

Whether the

landings were premature or belated, there would have to have
been a stand somewhere,

Otherwise, the Eastern Mediterranean

134Ernest K, Lindley, "Washington Tides1 To Live or to Die,"
Newsweek, July 28, 1958, p. 47.
135Ernest K. Lindley, "Washington Tides1 No False Front,"
Newsweek, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 34. For Lindley•s proposal of the

appropriate u. s. position at the pending emergency special
session of the General Assembly, sees "Washington Tidess
Let's Say Stopl," Newsweek, Aug, 11, 1958, P• 22.
136Ernest K. Lindley, "Washington Tides, Aftermath of
a Speech," Newsweek, Aug. 25, 1958, p, 29.
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and the Middle East might have been lost entirely by the Western
powers • . Moley felt that the West must take the risk that the
Anglo-American landings would precipitate a general war.

Moley

also expressed some sentiments which were undoubtedly fairly
common at the time among supporters of

u. s.

Suez policya

Now we may know that the President and those, including
this writer, who believed him right in the Suez crisis were
wrong. For Nasser, we now know, is a man capable of
arousing millions of Arabs, backed as he is by Soviet
conniving. He might have been erased if we had not stopped
Britain and France in 1956. The British Conservatives who
passed under a cloud then will now enjoy a big political
boost.13?
Opinion Journal Interpretations of the Lebanon Crisis
As they had done during the Suez crisis, the American
opinion journals of our study--Commonweal, The Nation, The New
Republic, and The Reporter--published some of the most critical
comment on Administration Middle Eastern policy during the
Lebanon crisis.

As in Chapter V ( ee above I pp. :33(7-~5:7), our

analysis will concentrate on editorials which appeared in the
four journals.

While articles on the Lebanon crisis appeared

occasionally, they were few in number and generally conformed
to the editorial position of the journal in which they appeared.
As during the Suez crisis, editorial comment on the Lebanon
crisis appeared irregularly in the four journals.
pass without mention of crisis related events.

Weeks might

All four jour-

nals were once again strongly critical of Administration foreign
policy.

The Nation and The New Republic remained very critical

137 Raymond Moley, "Perspectives After Certain Events,"
Newsweek, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 72.
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of Secretary of State Dulles.

Although there were points of

convergence, which will be noted , each of the four journals
continued to pursue independent editorial positions.

At times,

the individual journal advocated policies quite similar to those
it advocated during the Suez crisis.

For example, Commonweal

repeated its earlier accusations that there was no clear cut

u. s.

policy for the Mi ddle East, and reiterated that such a

policy was needed.

And The Na tion maintained its strong support

for the United Nations, and declared the necessity for American
cooperation with the United Nations.

All were again opposed to

Western military intervention in the Middle East.
Commonweal analyzed the Lebane se revolt as stemming from
a variety of factors, the identification of the Chamoun regime
in the popular mind as pro-American; news that Chamoun supporter s
were seeking a Constitutional amendment to enable Chamoun to
run for a second term; the assassination of a prominent antiChamoun journalist; the infiltration of men and arms from the

u.

A. R.; and inflammatory

u.

A. R. radio broadcasts.

All of

which were aggravated by the religious issue.
The Lebanese troubles, Commonweal commented, implied that
Americans erred by presuming that substantial financial aid would
be enough to "offset Communist, pan-Arab, and neutralist pressures

among peoples who are swept along by authentic desires to have
their place in the reawakening Arab world."

At best, the most

that could be expected, in future, from trade and aid programs
with Lebanon would be "to strengthen the possibilities of its
independence."

The

u. s.

would have to lower the level of

its expectations because of the developments in Lebanon .

"It is
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hard to see how Americans can any longer hope for anything
beyond the continued independence and genuine neutrality of
heavily threatened Lebanon. ,, 138
Following the American intervention in Lebanon., Commonwe al
'

rebutted the major arguments in defense of the Eisenhower
Administration's action.

It found the assertion that Lebanese

independence was menaced from without was
supported by much real evidence."

0

unfortunately not

The fact that previous

Lebanese requests for support were denied., ·reduced the ·f orce of
the argument that the

u. s.

was responding to a legitimate

request.
Commonweal commented that the American intervention
weakened the American position in the Middle East.
Western feeling had increased.

Anti-

"Whatever moral leadership

the United States once exerted, in the Middle East., in the

u.

N. and throughout the world, has been seriously impaired,"

If the

u. s.

were to escape total reliance upon armed force,

it must withdraw its troops f rom Lebanon.

The basic American

problem in the Middle East had been "the lack of any clear or
consistent policy."
factions., the

u. s.

Confronted by the rivalries of various
had vacillated between support for first

one group, then another.

In future, the

u. s.

must stop

"'allowing matters to develop'"; it must adopt a Middle Eastern
"commitment" which would be not only "rational and coherent but
true to our nation's conception of itself."

Au. s. policy

which contradicted America's beliefs in freedom., justice and
self-determination could "hardly be right., has assuredly not
138 "Embattled Lebanon," Editorial ., Commonweal., Vol. LXVIII,
No. 9, May 30, 1958, PP• 220-221.
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been successful." 139
News of the proposed summit induced Commonweal to observe
that the Middle Eastern crisis had enabled Khrushchev to i•pose
as a great peacemaker ...

Consequently, Commonweal anticipated

the summit meeting "With small expectation and little enthusiasm.0

u. s.

Because

u. s.

intervention in Lebanon had placed the

in such a critical position, it might be better that a

summit conference be held.

For an American refusal to partic-

ipate, even under unfavorable conditions, could be more damaging than an unsuccessful summit conference.

It might not

be too late for the West to fashion a policy for the Middle
East which would contain measures that would withstand "the
pressures of the future as well as immediate harsh criticism."
The summit should discuss the Middle Eastern crisis in the
large context--Communist penetration of the Middle East , Arab
nationalism, Nasserism, the export of oil, and Arab-Israeli
relations.

Western policy should also come to grips with

these issues.

"The summit meeting will reveal to all that the

West has a consistent, developed policy which can contain and
accommodate these issues, or it will confirm the makeshift
policy which has, apparently, been ours to date ... 140
Commonweal greeted the "shift" to the General Assembly
and noted that the delay in the meeting was definitely to Western
advantage.

Commonweal was highly critical of Dulles• expressed

139 "Reaping The Whirlwind," Editorial, Commonweal, Vol. LXVIII,
No. 18, Aug. 1, 1958, pp. 435-436.

t 4 o.,Returning to the Summit?," Editorial, Commonweal,
Vol. LXVIII, Nov. 19, 1958, P• 460.
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intention to attack the "indirect aggression" of both Nasser
and the Communists, noting that the term presented "grave if
not insuperable obstacles."
defined?

How was "indirect aggression"

How was it substantiated?

Should the West succeed in initiating au. N. plan, it
would undoubtedly take the form of u. N. observers and commissions which would assume the policing job in the Middle East.
This would be at best "a .tem~rary measure."

But Commonweal

did find cause for hope in President Eisenhower's remarks at
his August 6th press conferences
••• sounding like one of his own critics, he (Eisenhower)
stated that "troops ·are never going to win the peace.
We have got to do something positive, and this must be
in the field of moral and spiritual and economic strengthening of all these areas ... After all this time it is
too much to expect that a full-fledged positive program
wi11 emerge at the Assembly. But the beginning of a
foreign policy which corresponds to the President's statement would be as welcome as it is long overdue.14!
Later Commonweal attacked Eisenhower's six-point proposal
because it was not integrated in an over-all policy for the
Middle East.

The regional economic development scheme had

already encountered Arab opposition because it was "very
similar. to plans advanced years ago by the Arabs themselves."
Nowhere in the Eisenhower plan was theie clear indication of
the nature of the

u. s.

"stake 0 in the Middle East.

"What •••

is our attitude toward Arab nationalism, whether or not it
is shaped by Nasser?

How far will we go in order to maintain

Jordan? Or to ensure Israel?

To what extent are the armed

141 "Back to the Assembly," Editorial, Commonweal,
Vol. LXVIII, No. 21, Aug. 22, 1958, pp. 507-508.
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forces a proper extension of policy in dealing with the problems
of Middle Eastern countries?"

Such questions were largely uncon-

sidered in the Eisenhower proposal, but, according to Common~ . a policy for the Middle East must ultimately cope with
them. 142

Commonweal's insistence upon clearly defined policies

on such critical issues does not appear realistic.

If the

Administration had yielded to such criticisms and defined
the American position on these issues, it would have robbed
itself of policy options and imposed a rigidity on

u. s. Middle

Eastern policy which could well have clashed with American
national interests i n the future.
With passage of the Arab resolution, according to Commonweal, the United Nations General Assembly emergency session
concluded with results much better than had been expected.
surprise Arab resolution broke the Great Power deadlock.

The
The

Middle Eastern situation itself, which had deteriorated so far,
augured well for the effectiveness of the Arab resolution, for
the nations involved , by virtue of self-interest, would require
the restoration of order.

Neverth less, the United States should

reevaluate its policies for dealing with Arab nationalism.
Current policies had not been very successful.

"Meantime, it

is right, even essential, that the Arab nations themse lves
take the lead in working out the problems of their own region .
If they do not, the Middle East will become even more of an
East-West battleground, and the United States will find itself
deeply involved in something which cannot be solved by sending
142 "The President's Proposals , " Editorial , Commonweal ,
Vol. LXVIII, No. 22, Aug. 29, 1958, PP• 532-533.
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in the Marines ... 143

While theoretically it might have been

desirable for the Arabs to be sole masters of their own affairs,
Commonweal apparently wished to overlook the harsh reality that
there was little chance that the United States could leave the
Middle East to its own devices in the face of the quite obvious
increase of Soviet involvement in the area since 1955.

The

fragmented and divisive character of inter-Arab relations
invited great power interference.

As one of the two Super Powers ,

the United States could be expected to seek to perpetuate its
interests in the region, and to balance, or offset, Soviet
advances there, through use of the military, if the Administration deemed it necessary.

It would do so even at the risk of

total war.
The Nation was incensed at the prospect that Mr. Dulles
was "hankering" for an invitation to intervene in Lebanon

under the Eisenhower Doctrine, "that leaky umbrella" which
Dulles had attempted to extend over the entire Middle East.
To apply the Doctrine to Lebanon "would require twisting it
into a military-diplomatic pretzel."

The Eisenhower Doctrine,

as originally promulgat ed, was to apply in cases of aggression
from nations controlled by international Communism.
its gun-running, the
nist-dominated.

u.

For all

A. R. could not be construed as Commu-

Nor was the situation in Lebanon a clear-cut

case for intervention.

u. s.

compliance with a request to

intervene would look like "one of the Marine Corps landings
in central America in the days of • dollar diplomacy. • ••

Thus,

143 "The Middle East," Editorial, Commonweal, Vol. LXVIII,
No. 23, sept. 5, 1958, pp. 556-557.
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The Nation regarded the United Nations as offering "the best
way out," provided the American Secretary of State did not
attempt to tell the Secretary-General what to do.

The

u. s.

should support UNOGIL efforts to patrol the Lebanese-Syrian
border, and, upon request, properly provide equipment such as
helicopters and liaison planes.

"But our Marines should stay

on their ships." 144
Rejoicing at the Hammarskjold report that there was "no
foundation" to the Lebanese charges of "massive infiltration,"
The Nation opined that "prompt and skillful action" by the

u.

N. had reduced Lebanese tensions to the point that direct

British-American intervention seemed "most unlikely."

Thus,

Mr. Dulles has once again been "rescued from the brink of

disaster."

Once again, as during Suez, the United Nations

had shown that it was the only instrument that could be applied
in many contemporary crisis situations.

"Despite the limita-

tions of its charter and the half-hearted support it receives
from the great powers, the

u.

N. remains the world's indispen-

sable institution. 11145
Following the American intervention in Lebanon, The Nation,
like Commonweal, advocated the early withdrawal of Western
troops from the Middle East.

The Nation commented that the

first phase in ending the Middle Eastern crisis was to
withdraw the troops.

This should be worked out through the

144••Another Job for the u. N. ," Editorial, The Nation,
Vol. 186, No. 26, June 28, 1958, pp. 573-574.
145 "The Indispensable Institution," Editorial, The Nation,
Vol. 187, No. 2, July 19, 1958, PP• 21-22.
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United Nations.
ment, then the u.

If the Security Council could not reach agree-

s. should be prepared to accept u. N. General

Assembly recommendations.

The Nation commented wrylyc "'Under

the circumstances,' the editorials drone on and on, the President had no alternative to intervention.

And so he didn t--

if he was to adhere to the course which Mr. Dulles had set for
American policy in the Middle East.

Military intervention was

the logical end result of that policy."
Marines into Lebanon, the u.

But by sending the

s. did more than threaten world

peace, it struck a severe blow at the united Nations and the
principle of collective security.

"No •armed attack' had taken

place and nothing in the General Assembly's 'Peace Through Deeds•
resolution authorizes unilateral action against indirect aggression."

How did the United States find itself in the position

of negating its own values, "of citing specious reasons in the

u.

N. to justify the crassest power politics?"

The Nation

apparently chose to overlook the fact that power politics has
often been as much a part of the American tradition as the more
noble reasons for which Americans have struggled.

Often the

baser motives have been strangely intermixed with the higher.
What must have been particularly perturbing to The Nation, and
others, was that the American action came so close on the heels
of what it considered to have been the proper American response
to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956.

~

Nation found a partial explanation for this enigma in the refusal
of American policy-makers to accept the proposition that stability
in the Middle East depends upon Arab self-government.
the Middle Eastern challenge, the

o. s.

To meet

must formulate a new
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policy for the region.

Although Commonweal also made this

point, The Nation offered a more detailed proposals
1 . The

u. s.

should recognize Arab nationalist legitimate

aspirations to unify, as long as Arab unity was "freelynegotiated";
2 . Legitimate Arab aspirations (which did not include
Israel's destruction) should be encouraged to identify with
American policies;
3. The

u. s. should encourage Arab neutrality.

uwe will

only continue to spread Soviet influence in the Middle East
if we elect to support a collection of rickety sheikdoms,
dynasties and emirates that are destined for the dustbin of
history";
4 . The

u. s. should apply American power and influence

primarily through the United Nations as the safest American
Middle Eastern policy.

The

u. s.

should encourage the

u.

N.

to attempt to solve Middle Eastern problems, such as the
refugee issue;

s.

"A limited accord with the soviet Union , recognizing

its legitimate interest in the region and implementing the
soviet suggestion for an arms embargo, would help"; and
6. The

u.

s. should encourage the utilization of oil

wealth for Arab development.
In future, The Nation argued, the primary test of the
legitimacy of governments should be popular support.

Like

Commonweal , The Nation was concerned to know how, with our
revolutionary background, the

u. s.

could launch "a holy war"
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against revolution in the Middle East. 146
The Nation argued that adoption of the Arab resolution
represented a defeat for the West.

United Nations approval

was not given to the "armed occupation° of Lebanon and Jordan.
u. N. support was not given to Dulles• charge of "indirect
aggression."

Au. N. peace force was not established.

guarantees of

0

u. N.

the permanence of existing states and the regimes

in power" were not forthcoming.

Instead, the United Nations

recognized the Arab states• "first responsibility in Middle
Eastern affairs, and calls upon the secretary-General to secure
an •early withdrawal' of the occupational forces."

The one

plus that The Nation found in the Arab resolution was the
renewed emphasis and support given to the concept of a regional
economic planning and development institution under United
147
.
.
Na t ions
auspices.

Responding to a charge by columnist Joseph Alsop that the
Administration had betrayed its friend, President Chamoun, The
New Republic argued that the American mistake was not
reluctance to rush troops to aid Chamoun, but "official reluctance to recognize that Chamoun•s defeat need not be a defeat
for the West."

The Lebanon crisis resulted from Dulles•

"mania for 'firm allies'" in the Middle East, rather than
friendly states.

The Lebanese President and his Foreign Minister

had been "too good friends of the

us

for their own good--and

146 "What Now?," Editorial, The Nation, Vol. 187, No. 3,
Aug. 2, 1958, pp. 41-44,
147 "Peace--For a Time--at the u. N.," Editorial,~
Nation, Vol. 187, No. 5, Aug. 30, 1958, pp. 81-82.
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ours,"

By actions such as accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine,

they cut off their domestic sources of strength.

The New

Republic took hope from the knowledge that the SecretaryGeneral had denied a Lebanese request for a U, N. police force,
and that the Pentagon had let it be known that it opposed
unilateral

u. s.

military involvement.

"The Eisenhower Doc-

trine has not been heard of in many weeks.

The West thus

refrains from taking on additional commitments from .which it
could only beg off later ... 148
Following the American intervention in Lebanon, The New
Republic denounced the .,nearsightedness" of

u. s.

and its "limited understanding" of world events.

leadership,
In the case of

Dulles, there was "that persist ent itch to moralize about events,
rather than to work to turn those events to the best account,"
The New Republic acknowledged, with Dulles, that force was an
indispensible tool in the struggle to maintain

u. s.

security •

•• •~ , unilateral military intervention, whatever its legal
or moral justification, requires practical justification,
"Limited war," as Henry Kissinger has commented, "is no
better an instrument of policy than the political environment from which it springs and the political goals toward
which it leads , and in both these respects • • ,our action
in Lebanon has been deficient."
The New Republic, which did not believe the

u. s.

morally or practically justified, argued that the

intervention

u. s.

action

had given Khrushchev "another opportunity to star in the role
of defender not only of Arab nationalism but of world peace,"
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's stature had also
148 "Hands-off Lebanon," Editorial, The New Republic,
Vol. 139, No . 1-2, July 7, 1958, p. 7.

515

been enhanced.

Fortunately, the Lebanese themselves would

eventually provide the circumstances for

u. s.

departure,

for the Lebanese could not afford to quarrel too hard lest
their country fall apart .

The rebellion had been stalemated

before arrival of the Marines.

The rebels had achieved their

purpose of preventing Chamoun•s reelection.
corps was already at work.

Au. N. observer

Thus Ambassador Murphy found all

factions ready to be "cajoled" into electing a compromise
President.

The New Republic commented furthers
Regrettably • • • a parallel is bound to be drawn in

the UN and elsewhere between the Anglo-French endeavors

to justify their intervention in Suez in terms of principle (recall their claim that they were acting on behalf
of the United Nations) and our dependence upon a somewhat forced interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter-which recognizes "the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain peace and
security." It is more than awkward that the United Nations
Observer team had failed to find evidence of substantial
outside intervention in Lebanon before we sent the Marines.
We should not be surprised if a large part of mankind
·takes as evidence of our hypocrisy the fact, also, that
our intervention was timed by events in another country,
i. ~• Iraq, and that after calling a meeting of the
Security Council to deal with the crisis we professed
to see developing, we did not wait for the meeting before
we acted on our own. (The New Republic's italics.)
Like Commonweal, The New Republic anticipated that little
of n1asting or profound value" could be achieved by a summit
meeting in the framework of the United Nations Security Counci1. 1 49
The New Republic, like Commonweal, was not thrilled with
Dulles• charges of "indirect aggression."

The New Republic

14 "P_ickiog ourselves Up,. •• Editorial, The New Republic,
Vol . 1 3 6, No. 5- 6 , Aug . 4, 19::> 8 , pp. 3-4.
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charged that when Dulles made such charges and demanded that
Khrushchev and Nasser stop it, he cast the u.

s. in the role

of "the bawling child who insists on winning a losing game."
The game to which The New Republic referred was the Cold War
in which both sides obviously resorted to bribes, subversion
and propaganda--"indirect aggression."

The best that could

be said of Dulles• "hypocritical gambit" was "that the Administration had nothing else to use."

When it became clear that

the united States would have few supporters for this line in
the United Nations, Dulles

0

soft-pedalled •indirect-aggression ...

Both Nasser and the Soviet Union generally, when they were
successful, went where they were invited by dominant public
opinion--where they could practice good politics in contrast
to

u. s.

political iheptitude.

The United States must, to be

successful, learn to play the politico-economic game.

u. s.

the game has been lost, the

When

must recognize that to rush

in the Marines only makes matters worse.

"And finally, when

it has been lost, we must learn not to bawl--as we are doing
when we belabor self-righteous charges which, as Walter Lippmann points out, •amount to a demand that in the weapons of
the Cold War, our adversaries shall disarm.,.,lBO

In line

with its anti-intervention stand, The New Republic argued
that the last "flimsy bit" of an excuse for the presence of

u. s.

Marines in Lebanon would ·"disappear" when President-

elect Fuad Chehab assumed office on September 24. 161
lfSO.,Crybaby Diplomacy, Editorial, The New Republic,
Vol. 137, No. 7-8, Aug. 18, 1958, p. s.
11

lBt,,When the Marines Go," Editorial, The New Republic,
Vol. 139, No. 12, Sept. 22, 1958, P• 7.
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The Reporter, like the other opinion journals, was opposed
to the American intervention in Lebanon.

Prior to the inter-

vention, The Reporter argued, "Life would be much gayer for
the communist leaders if there were massive United States
military action in the Middle East," for it would draw world
attention away from their own internal problems.
that

u. s.

Hopeful

leaders had learned from their mistakes during

the Hungarian uprising and the Suez fiasco, The Reporter was
encouraged by the fact that the
than it had been in 1956.

u.

N. role was vastly different

In the Lebanon case, it had no

function other than to observe.

As a result of its observa-

tions, UNOGIL might have concluded that Lebanese politics was
"a stinking mess."
the

u. s.

The Reporter then intimated its hope that

Embassy in Beirut had also concluded that Lebanese

politics was "a stinking mess," and had "suggested to the State
Department that the tenure in office of President Camille
Chamoun is not indispensible to the cause of freedom ... 152
Like The New Republic, The Reporter did not consider the preservation of Chamoun rule as essential to

u. s.

interests.

Max Ascoli, editor of The Reporter, regarded the American
intervention in Lebanon as the "latest traumatic experience"
since the end of the fighting in Korea.
by lack of action.

It was caused not

"Rather, we have found ourselves acting in

Lebanon as if in a trance."
Americans to intervene.

For there was no basis for the

The Lebanese were on the verge of

152 "The Reporter's Notes, They Do It Again," Editorial,
The Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 1, July 10, 1958, p. 2.
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reaching a compromise.

Ascoli was taken aback by the unan-

imous approval given by responsible Americans to the Eisenhower decision.

"It was a case of patriotic support given

for patriotism's sake to an action that had been taken for
action's sake." 153
In a later issue, editor Ascoli found that "the paramount
factor in the present Middle East situation is Russian nonintervention rather than Anglo-American intervention."
taking military steps, the

In

u. s. appeared to the world like

a hopelessly decaying colonial power defending its empire-an empire which the

u. s. never had--while Khrushchev was

enabled to pose as the champion of peace.

"(C)lever inaction

paid infinitely better dividends than impulsive action ... 154
How convincing Khrushchev's posture as a champion of peace
was, in view of the then recent executions of various leaders
of the Hungarian uprising, is difficult to say.
hard to accept Ascoli's analogy that the

It is equally

u. s. appeared to the

world to be "a hopelessly decaying colonial power defending
its empire--an empire which the

u. s. never had." u. s. colo-

nialism, in the classic sense of direct rule, was shortlived.
But, the phenomenon of American economic imperialism has long
been a subject of discussion.

That

u. s. intervention could

have been construed as an effort to protect American economic
investments in the region is not unlikely.

In addition to

153Max Ascoli, "The Worst Yet, .. Editorial, The Reporter,
Vol. 19, No. 2, Aug. 7, 1958, P• 10.
154Max Ascoli, "Substitute for the Summit," Editorial,
The Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 3, Sept. 4, 1958, p. 8.
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economic interests, such factors as the preservation of free
institutions, power politics, and military-strategic considerations were also involved.

That this

u. s.

move paid poored

propaganda dividends, in some quarters, is not easy to gainsay.
The question is, how lasting was the Soviet propaganda victory?
In all probability, it was temporary, since many Third World
leaders are, with reason, extremely skeptical of the actions
and intentions of both Super Powers.
All four American opinion journals studied regarded the
Lebanese revolt as largely an internal matter in which
"indirect aggression" was not the most significant factor.
All implied that rather than intervene the

u. s.

should have

let the Lebanese work out their own solution.
The Scholarly Journals and the Lebanon Crisis
During the Suez crisis, it was found that the American
scholarly journals analyzed gave comparatively little attention
to the crisis.

Even less coverage was given to the Lebanon

crisis by the same journals.

Only the American Journal of

International Law, Current History, and the Middle East Journal
made any mention of the crisis.
In the American Journal of International Law, Pitman B.
Potter gave editorial support to the Administration's action
by finding the American intervention legally justified.
"most plausible ground" for the

u. s.

The

intervention was the

invitation of the Lebanese Government, for: 1. there was no
evidence of American pressure on the Lebanese Government to
invite

u. s.

intervention; 2. there was evidence of external
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aggression; and 3. there is no right of revolution in the absence
of illegal action on the part of the established government.
The second plausible basis for
protection of

u. s.

u. s.

intervention was the

nationals and their property.

"(T)here

seems to have been actual and serious danger to United States
citizens and their interests, and some inability, though not
unwillingness, on the part of the Lebanese Government to protect
them."

u. s.

The

position that it was acting for collective

self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the

u.

N. Charter

encountered the difficulty that Article 51 referred to "armed
attack, .. which could not be alleged in the Lebanon situation.
Therefore, the

u. s.

intervention was justified in two of

the three cases. 155
Current History featured a series of crisis related
documents which were introduced by a brief statement that
repeated Administration explanations for

u. s.

intervention,

i. ~• it was at the request of the pro-western Chamoun government to strengthen its position against pro-Nasser infiltration.
The documents included weres
1. "The Iraqi Coup Announcement"--text of the announcement of the fall of Faisal's government and the establishment
of the Iraqi Republic;
2. "U.

s.

Troops Ordered to Lebanon"--text of President

Eisenhower's message to Congress announcing dispatch of

u. s.

Marines to Lebanon;
-

155 Pitman B. Potter, "Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, "
Editorial, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 52, No. 4,
October 1958, pp. 727-730.
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3. "Statement of the Baghdad Pact Nations"--text of the
declaration of Baghdad Pact nations meeting in London, July 28,
1958, as signed by Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Great Britain and
the

u. s.;
4. "The Peiping Communique"--excerpts from the joint

Sino-Soviet communique of August 3, 1958, following discussions between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Chinese Communist
Chairman Mao Tse-tung; and

s.

"Eisenhower's Middle East Program"--section from Eisen-

hower's August 13, 1958, address to the special emergency
session of the

u.

of his proposal.

N. General Assembly listing the six points
156

And the Middle East Journal featured comments and a
chronology of developments of the quarter.

In the comments,

the Middle East Journal found that the Arab resolution indicated:
"As initiators of policy, the Arab states have rejected the
role of passivity, so important a psychological factor in the
imperial-colonial relationship.

To use the words of Senator

Styles Bridges, it marks 'the emergence of the Arab people
as masters of their own destiny.'"

Another striking factor,

as seen by the Middle East Journal , was the fact that the Arab
resolution was worked out through the Arab League, which many
.
. t ution.
.
157
h a d 1 ong consi'dere d a mori'bund insti

156 nworld Documents," current History, Vol. 35, No. 200,
October 1958, pp. 242-246.
157 unevelopments of the Quarter: Comments and Chronology:
The Assumption of Responsibility," The Middle East Journal,
Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer, 1958, pp. 295-317.
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Summary Remarks
A number of things become apparent through study of the
American press during the Lebanon crisis.

First, there was an

appreciable difference in levels of newspaper support for the
Eisenhower Administration's policies during the Suez and Lebanon
crises.

During the Suez crisis, most newspapers tended to

support Administration policy, most of the time; during the
Lebanon crisis, they did not.
newsrnagazines supported
American Lebanon policy.

Second, three of the four

u. s. Suez policy; all four backed
Third, the opinion journals opposed

Administration policies in both crises.
Of the publications studied, only the four newsmagazines,
the New York Times, and the Christian Science Monitor supported
the American intervention in Lebanon--it might be significant
that they all were published in the Eastern United States.
The Western newspapers, more isolationist than their Eastern
counterparts, opposed the intervention, thereby, conforming
to their earlier Suez postures.
There seems to have been a greater degree of contact between
the Eisenhower Administration and the American press--daily newspapers and newsmagazines, in particular--during the Lebanese
crisis than there was during the Suez crisis.
press apparently was better informed of

The American

u. s. intentions. This

is evident both in the amount of prior knowledge of pending

u. s. actions--such as, the Eisenhower General Assembly address-and in the accuracy of prediction as to the content and form
of

u. s. policy.

This might be accounted for by the greater
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degree of direct

u. s.

responsibility for events in Lebanon

than in Suez , where the United States was a reactor to policies
of other governments, more than an initiator of its own actions
and a determiner of events.

Consequently, it had less to fear

from a too open courting of the press.

Perhaps, too, the

Administration had recognized the liability of an improperly
informed press during the Suez crisis.

Regarding press relations

of the Department of State, it bears remembering that there had
been a changing of personnel with the express purpose of improving
relations with the press.

Exemplary of the new policies pursued

by Dulles• new press secretary and his staff might have been
maintenance of closer contact with members of the press during
the Lebanon crisis.
It bears noting that Secretary of State Dulles was not
attacked as much during the Lebanon crisis.

A factor which

might account for this phenonenon was the apparent success of
Berding•s and Crowe•s efforts to improve Dulles• image.

CONCLUSION
The relationship between the American Government and the
American press is complex.

The Government and the press are

dependent upon each other; they serve and influence each other.
On the one hand, the press--particularly in the realm of domestic
affairs--provides the Administration with useful information
about the effects of governmental policies and actions, and
public reaction to them.

On the other hand, the press depends

upon the Government to supply it with much of the news it prints.
The Government generally decides how and what information in its
possession is released to the press, or is deleted and suppressed-excluding, of course, unauthorized leaks.

During the Suez crisis,

for example, the Government used its power to withhold news when
it did not reveal to the American press its concern over the
widening British, French and American rift.

Consequently, the

press was surprised by the Anglo-French involvement in the
hostilities in the Middle East.
The fact that the Government is a major source of news has
a direct impact upon the accuracy with which the attitudes and
aims of national political leaders are transmitted by the press
to the American people during international crises.

Both the

nature and the volume of information the Administration releases
have a bearing on the workings of the press and its reactions.
Because the Eisenhower Administration kept it better briefed,
524
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the American press reflected Administration attitudes and goals
more accurately during the Lebanon crisis than it did during
the Suez crisis.
But, the Administration usually did not attempt to control
the manner in which information was used and interpreted by the
press.

However, the Administration did not hesitate to contact

members of the press when it took strong exception to the way
the press presented the "facts."

In such cases, the Adminis-

tration sought to enlighten the newsmen in question, and to
obtain more favorable press coverage for their policies.

Nor

did the Administration shrink from making direct contact with
representatives of the press in order to improve the press
relations of Secretary of State Dulles.

{see aboves pp. 168-179.)

Such efforts apparently bore fruit, for Dulles was less harshly
criticized by the American press during the Lebanon crisis than
he was during the Suez crisis.

Nevertheless , during both Middle

Eastern crises, the American press demonstrated considerable
independence from governmental influences .

There was ample

press criticism of Administration Middle Eastern foreign policies.
In neither crisis was there any indication that the American
press either voluntarily restricted its freedom to criticize
natioual policy, or was censored in order to further national

unity in the achievement of foreign policy goals.

In both crises,

the American press presented the issues on their merits, as each
publication interpreted them.
The Administration was not impervious to press coverage and
criticism.

Press reaction to

u. s.

Suez policy and Secretary

Dulles' conduct of it was instrumental in forcing the replacement
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of Carl

w.

Mccardle by Andrew H. Berding in March, 1957.

Although

the Administration was capable of functioning for a considerable
period of time in the face of adverse press coverage, it could
not indefinitely ignore an unfavorable press.

Concessions to

press and Congressional critics were apparently made during both
the Suez and Lebanon crisesJ the first, the Eisenhower Doctrine;
the second, Eisenhower's six-point proposal to the United Nations
General Assembly.
In both the Suez and Lebanon crises, however, the press
knew mainly what the Administration wanted it to know.

so

effective was the system of news management (see aboves pp. 122135 and 196-198.), that little information was leaked.

Press

reports and editorial c omments were replete with references to
the public and background s tatements of fact and interpretation
made by administration spokesmen.

Thus, for example, Time

magazine (pp, 325-326. ) and Western newspaper editorials (p, 279,
footnote #140.) echoed Dulles• charge of Anglo-French-Israeli
collusion raised during his October 30. 1956, backgrounder.
And Lindesay Parrott•s explanation of

u. s.

hopes for the United

Nations Security Council session on the Suez dispute, put forth
in his October 7th front page article in the New York Times,
closely paralleled Dulles• interpretation of
at his October 5th . backgrounder.

u. s. expectations

(p, 254.)

Because of its lack of inside knowledge of the normal
·functioning of the Eisenhower Administration and the DullesEisenhower relationship, press comment on
missed the mark.

u. s.

policy often

During the Suez crisis, Dulles was caught

between Eisenhower's desire for a peaceful settlement of the
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Canal dispute and Eden's bid for a violent solution.

Dulles,

who apparently was less opposed than Eisenhower to the ultimate
use of military force to secure a satisfactory resolution of
the issue, had a difficult time reconciling the orders of his
Chief Executive with the requirements of his Allies ,

He grasped

at stratagem after transparent stratagem (SCUA) to delay the day
of reckoning in the futile hope of preventing its ever taking
place.

Dulles• diplomatic gyrations on that account incurred

much press criticism.
efforts failed .

And, in the end, all Dulles• inventive

But the American press never detected Dulles•

dilemma; it blamed him indiscriminately for

u. s.

Suez policies,

even when he was not responsible for them, but was merely
attempting to implement Eisenhower's decisions.
IV and

v.)

(sees Chapters I,

Long after the dust of Suez had settled, journalists

persisted in their beliefs of Dulles• nearly complete responsibility for

u. s.

foreign poliey.

(pp, 211-213.)

Without possessing inside knowledge of Administration
functioning, the American press attacked the symbol of

u. s.

foreign policy--Secretary of State J ohn Foster Dulles.

Even

the public statements President Eisenhower made in defense of
the beleaguered Dulles (pp. 178-179,) did not shake the opinions
of the press during the Suez crisis .

The ultimate result was

not difficult to predict--calls for Dulles • replacement, such as
that made by The New Republic. (pp. 355-356.)
It must be recognized that not all press criticism of Dulles
for

u. s.

foreign policy decisions was misdirected.

Dulles was

primarily responsible for the decision to renege on the American
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offer of financial assistance to the Egyptians for construction
of the Aswan High Dam project.

Press criticism of Dulles for

this decision was justified, as were the fears of some pressmen
that the move would result in increased Soviet influence in
Egypt. (see aboves pp. 224-227.)

Furthermore, Dulles compounded

his difficulties with the American press by making imprudent
public statements of policy, such as his proclamation that the

u. s.

did not intend to shoot its way through the Canal, and

his declaration that the

u. s.

would send its ships around the

Cape if Nasser were to block the Canal.

Within two weeks, Dulles

had to admit that Western non-use of the Suez Canal would not
adversely affect the Egyptian economy.

(pp. 79-83.)

Dulles did not always understand the potential impact of
his words on the press, or which would make the headlines.
(pp. 174-175.)

And he was not often willing to soften his remarks

to win a more favorable press.

He preferred to make his point

strongly (p. 205.), and appeared willing to suffer the consequences.
Some members of the press distrusted Dulles• moralistic
judgements and suspected him of deviousness.

(pp. 198-200.)

When one contrasts the stark realism of Dulles• October 30, 1956,
background remarks with the moralistic argumentation of his
December 6, 1956, background statements, it is easy to understand
why some newsmen felt the way they did.

In his October 30 back-

grounder, Dulles cool-headedly analyzed the effects of AngloFrench-Israeli collusion upon
powers.

He rejoiced in the

u.

u.

s. future ties with the three

s.•s newly won ability to pursue

independent foreign policies, free from the taint of European
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colonialism.

u. s.

In his December 6 backgrounder, Dulles defended

adherence to principle and its support for the United

Nations during the Suez crisis.

(see abovea pp. 153-165.)

During the Lebanon crisis, a similar contrast was evident in
the public statements of Administration spokesmen at the time
of the intervention and Dulles• background remarks at the home
of Richard Harkness on July 21, 1958.

u. s.

Public statements of

spokesmen tended to stress the point that the United States

was responding to a legitimate request for assistance from the
Lebanese Government.

Dulles• background remarks emphasized

more traditional power politics rationale.

(pp. 388-405.)

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of Administration news
management of facts in the crucial area of foreign affairs during
these two Middle Eastern crises left the American press no
alternative but to second guess the Government.

It was necessary

to interpolate the "facts" in order to derive underlying causes
and to critically interpret Administration policy rationale.

The

impressive thing is that the press, taken as a whole, performed
its task so well.
American press interpretations of the two crises appear to
have been only marginally influenced by the Eisenhower Administration.

In this realm , the press exercised considerable

independence of judgement.

The degree of parallelism of press

interpretation and offici al explanation often seemed related to
the ideologi cal predisposition of the individual publication
t o the Eisenhower Republican Administration.

This did not

guarantee unquestioning support for Administration policy, however,
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among the favorably inclined, as press reaction to United Nations
sanctions against Israel and the response of some American newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times,
to the Lebanon landings indicate.
American press evaluations of Administration policies during
the Suez and Lebanon crises covered the gamut, from near unquestioning support to harsh opposition.

Press objections to

u. s.

policy were voiced by friends of the Administration and foes
alike.

For example, during the Suez crisis,

u. s.

News and World

Report, a newsmagazine usually favorable to the Administration,
objected to the Administration-backed United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF), which it feared would accomplish little if President
Nasser's demands were complied with.

(see above, pp. 321-323.)

During both crises, newsmagazine reaction to Administration
policies was generally favorable.

The daily newspapers tended

to be much more c r itical, particularly during the Lebanon crisis.
The opinion journals were highly critical during both crises.
Scholarly journals scarcely made mention of the crises at the
time they occurred.
Newspaper journalists often displayed considerable independence of interpretation from the editorial positions of the
papers in which they were published.

Their reports often con-

tained more realistic assessments than the more optimistic,
more pro-Administration editorial comments of their papers.
Thus, the initial reaction of New York Times reporters Kennett
Love and Homer Bigart to the Suez Canal users' Association was
skeptical.

But the initial editorial response of the Times

531

credited Dulles• flexibility and willingness to modify SCUA
with eliminating the danger that force would be used to keep
the Canal open.

(see above: pp. 243-245.)

The Christian

Science Monitor gave editorial support to the American ceasefire resolution in the united Nations Security Council, while,
in the same issue, Joseph
u.

c.

Harsch bemoaned the fact that the

s. did not support the Anglo-French ultimatum, which, according

to him, would have permitted the West to establish a buffer zone
between Egypt and Israel. (pp. 261-262.)
The American newsmagazines tended to overreact to the brief
Suez War, and to overproject its long-range implications for the
Western alliance.

They overstressed the danger of total war

inherent in the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt; they
were taken in by Administration rhetoric and Soviet propaganda.
(pp. 312-319.)

As we saw in Chapter I , despite the evaluation

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that soviet Russia would be unable
to intervene in the Middle East, .even by way of dispatch of
"volunteers,•• Dulles and Eisenhower both encouraged war alarmism,
apparently to increase the pressures on the British, French and
Israelis to cease-fire and withdraw, and to stimulate domestic
support for their policies .

The newsmagazines took up the cry,

which serves to indicate the impact and sometime effectiveness
of Administration efforts to orchestrate news coverage of events.
Administration and press protests during the Suez crisis that
Nasser should not be allowed to get away with his seizure of the
canal, and that the Canal should not become the instrument of the
politics of any one nation or group of nations, were basically
empty.

While both the Administration and the American press
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outspokenly supported a peaceful Suez solution, they apparently
failed to perceive that such protests effectively eliminated
the possibility of achieving it.

For, in order to obtain

Egyptian compliance with western schemes, at least the threat
of force should have been retained,

Hazlitt perceptively noted

the gratuitous character of Eisenhowerts and Dulles• imprudent
statements of peaceful intent.

He observed that such commen ts

were likely to encourage the Egyptians and the Russians in the
pursuit of their policies.

Years later, Heikal confirmed the

accuracy of Hazlitt's concerns.

(see above: pp. 327-329.)

The cries of the American press for

u. s.

reliance upon

the United Nations during both the Suez and Lebanon crises often
appeared myopic.

Frequently, the press failed to recognize that

the United Nations could be no more effective a peace-keeping
force than the two Super Powers, the
would permit it to be.

u. s.

u. s.

u. s. s. R.,
that the u. N.

and the

News alone noted

succeeded at Suez because the United States backed its efforts.
(pp. 320-321.)
Prior to the Marine landings in Lebanon, segments of the
American press tended to overemphasize Nasserts role in the
revolt, blaming him for starting it and keeping it going .

They

also exaggerated the amount and significance of Soviet involvement.
and

The New York Times and the newsmagazines, Business Week

u. s.

News and World Report, were particularly guilty in

this regard.

(pp. 437-439 and 476-479.)

While at the same

period of time, the Western newspapers, the Wall Street Journal,
Time magazine, and the opinion journals were presenting a more
accurate picture of the true character of the Lebanese revolt
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as largely an internal struggle.

(see above: pp. 435, 439-440,

448-450, 477-479, and 504-519.)

Time did an inter esting about-

face following the

u. s.

intervention. {pp. 487-488.)

Despite the handicaps Administration news management i mposed
on the functioning of the news media, the American press published
some rather telling critiques of Administration policies.

The

newspapers performed a particular service by pointing out t he
probable impact that the renege on the Western offer to help
finance the Aswan High Dam project would have on Soviet-Egyptian
relations, forcing Egypt closer to Russia.

u. s.

(pp. 224-227.)

News clearly foresaw the danger that UNEF could come

under effective Egyptian control and would, therefore, ultima tely
fail.

(see aboves pp. 321-323.)
The Western newspapers and the opinion journals pointed

out the contradictions between American Suez policy and American
Lebanon policy.

Agreeing with the earlier policy of Western

military non-involvement in the Middle East, they condemned the

u. s.

Marine landings in Lebanon.

But the New York Times, the

Christian Science Monitor, and the newsmagazines supported the
Administration's actions.

There was a clear difference of press

opinion on the propriety of the
divisions within the press over

u. s.
u. s.

move in Lebanon.

The

Middle Eastern policy were

even greater during the Lebanon crisis than they were during
the Suez crisis.
While the press was regularly correct in its predictions of
the consequences of certain policies, it bears recognizing that
the long-range policy alternatives advocated by segments of the
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press (see above: pp. 329-331, 342-343, and 351-353.) were as
little likely to be effective as the very policies they criticized.
For they frequently assumed powers--which the
have--to control other nations and events.

u. s.

does not

And they often

incorrectly assessed the politics and needs of Middle Eastern
states, and the probable areas in which agreement could be reached.
Although the Administration, in the words of Senator Dirksen
(p. 382.), had daily working knowledge of the whole foreign field,
that did not keep it from erring during both crises.

Not only

was the Administration remiss in projecting the possible consequences of its withdrawal of the American offer, it was grossly
unprepared to counter the Egyptian reaction--nationalization
of the Suez Canal.

The Administration did not adequately grasp

the importance of the maintenance of a strong Anglo-French
presence in the area to the perpetuation and strengthening of
America's own global power.

By refusing to support the Anglo-

French invasion the Eisenhower Administration hastened the
decline of European influence and weakened the world position
of its Allies.

In the process, the long-range interests of the

United States were damaged.

While many members of the press

expressed dissatisfaction with

u. s.

Suez policies, none of the

publications studied suggested that the United States should
have supported the Anglo-French action.
lamented the folly of the hasty

u. s.

Only Joseph

c.

Harsch

cease-fire resolution and

voiced the fear that the British and French would consequently
be unable to establish themselves along the Canal.

(pp. 261-262.)

During the Lebanon crisis, the Eisenhower Administration
overreacted to the Iraqi coup d'etat.

Without sufficient know-
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ledge of the Lebanese situation (see above: p. 389.), the
Administration rushed in the Marines.

It attempted to justify

its action by leveling charges of "indirect aggression" against
the United Arab Republic.

The newsmagazines, and the New York

Times and the Christian science Monitor echoed Administration
charges .

But the western papers, the Wall Street Journa l, and

the opinion journals voiced serious reservations about the v alidity
and propriety of such expansive accusations.

The New Republ ic

summed up the matter when it labelled Dulles' allegations of

u.

A. R. indirect aggression a "hypocritical gambit"--the bes t

that could be said for it was "that the Administration had nothing
else to use." {pp . 515-516.)
Despite many telling observations on the weaknesses of
Administration policies , press optimism was clearly evident
during both crises.

At times , obvious efforts were made to

look at the bright side.

Thus.

u. s.

Suez policy independence

often was said to have preserved Western interests in and ties
with the Third World (pp. 274, 319-320, 342-343 and 346-347.),
and Eisenhower's six-point address to the United Nations General
Assembly was widely praised.

(pp. 469-470 and 496-499.)

All of which leads to the two central questions: 1 . How
successfully did the Eisenhower Administration manage the news?;
and 2. How well did the

u. s.

press perform its self-appointed

task of informing the citizens of our representative democracy?
While the Administration had rather effective control of
both the amount of information and the manner in which it was
released, it was not singularly successful in fostering favorable
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press coverage for its Suez and Lebanon policies.

During both

crises , many aspects of Administration policies were severely
criticized , although the broad outline of

u. s.

Suez policy

at least had general support.
Within the informational limitations that it operated during
the Suez and Lebanon crises, the American press, viewed as a
whole, made valient efforts to expose the several sides of the
crises to the scrutiny of the reading public.

However, no one

publication, including the highly respected New York Times,
presented an accurate, unbiased account of the crises and/or
the motives and intentions of the nations and national leaders
directly involved.

Nevertheless, by reading a broad cross section

of the American press, the informed American citizen could obtain
a reasonably accurate picture of the crises and their complexities.
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APPENDDCES
APPENDIX A
TABLE I
FORMAL AND INFORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND

THE

AMERICAN PRESS

I. Formal Channels:
A. Daily press conferences of:
1. White House--held by Press Secretary Hagerty or
by Assistant Press secretary at 10:30 a.m. and
4:00 p.m.
2. Department of State--held by News Division Chief
at 12t30 p.m.
B. Regular press conferences ofs
1. Secretary of State--held on Tuesday mornings at
11100 a.m.--usually weekly
2. President--held on Wednesday mornings at 10130 a.m.
c. Radio and television addresses--held on an irregular
basis--three held during the Suez crisis
1. August 3, 1956--Dulles• report on nationalization
of canal and tripartite London conference
2. October 31, 1956--Eisenhower•s report on Eastern
European and Middle Eastern situations
3. February 20, 1957--Eisenhower•s report on Israeli
refusal to withdraw forces from Sinai and on
u. s. readiness to support "pressure" in u. N.
D. "The People Ask the President"--held irregularly
II. Informal Channels (used by Presidential Press Secretary
Hagerty and Secretary of State Dulles),
A. Background briefings--held irregularly on a need basis
B. Dinner and/or cocktail discussions--held irregularly
on a need basis
c. Personal (exclusive) interviews--held irregularly,
1. Initiated by Administration
2. Initiated by newsmen
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APPENDIX B
TABLE II
GUEST LISTS OF DULLES' BACKGROUNDERS, OCT. 30, AND DEC. 6-REARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY BY INSTITUTION*
October 30, 19561
December 6, 1956,
American Broadcasting co.
Richard Rendell
Associated Press
Associated Press
William Beal
William Beal
Chicago Daily News
Peter Lisagor
Christian Science Monitor
Christian Science Monitor
William H. Stringer
William H. Stringer
Columbia Broadcasting System
Ted Koop
Cowles Publications
Dick Wilson
International News Service
International News Service
Joseph Singer
Arthur Herman
National Broadcasting Co.
Richard Harkness
Newsweek
Ernest Lindley
New York Herald Tribune
New York Herald Tribune
Roscoe Drummond
Roscoe Drummond
New York Times
New York Times
James Reston
James Reston
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Peter Brandt
Tom Phillips
Scripps-Howard
Frank Ford
Time-Life
Time-Life
James Shepley
James Shepley
United Press
United Press
Don Gonzales
Lyle Wilson
.u. s. News & World Report
u. s. News & World Report
John R. Fleming
David Lawrence
Washington Evening Star
Washington Evening Star
Ben McKelway
Ben McKelway
Earl Voss
Washington Post
Washington Post
Chalmers Roberts
J. Russell Wiggins
J. Russell Wiggins
*Compiled from mimeographed guest lists included in the
John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings of J. F. D., H. Engagernents • • • 1596, 1957.
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APPENDIX C
TABLE III
GUEST LIST OF DULLES• JULY 21, 1958, BACKGROUNDER AT 'llIE HOME
OF CORRESPONDENT RICHARD HARKNESS--REARRANGED
ALPHABETICALLY BY INSTITUTION*
American Broadcasting System
Associated Press
Baltimore Sun
Chicago Daily News
Chicago Sun Times
Cleveland Plain Dealer
Christian Science Monitor
Kansas city Star
Louisville Courier Journal
National Broadcasting co.
Newark News
Newspaper Enterprise Assn.
Newsweek
New York Herald Tribune
New York Times
Providence Journal
Ridder Newspapers
st. Louis Post Dispatch
Time, Inc.
United Press International
u. s. Information Service
U s. News and World Report
Wall Street Journal
Washington Evening Star
Washington Post

Ted Koop
John Hightower
Paul ward
Pete Lisagor
Fred Kuh
Jack Leacocus
William Stringer
John Cauley
Robert Riggs
Richard Harkness
rt Sylvest~r
Peter Edson
Ernest Lindley
Roscoe Drummond
Edwin Dale
Fred Collins
Walter Ridder
Raymond Brandt
Jack Beal
Stew Hensley
Eugene Staples
Charles Folty
John Gibson
Earl Voss
Chalmers Roberts

*Compiled from mimeographed guest list included in the
John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings of J . F . D., H. Engagements • •• 1958, 1959; undated .
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APPENDIX D
TABLE IV
PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES
Months In
Yearly
Office
Number
Average
Roosevelt

998

147

81.48

~rumam

324

93

41.76

Eisenhower

190*

96

23.75

*A discrepancy exists as to the number of Eisenhower news
conferences. The figure used here is based on a letter from
Press Secretary Hagerty to James E. Pollard on May 9, 1960 •
. ic
d Friedman, in Editor & Publisher, Jan. 14, 1961, p. 14,
oa
the number up to then as 191. With the final one on
Januarr 18, 1961, the total would be 192. But both the New
ork Times and Herald-Tribune gave the final number as 193.
Sources James E. Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press, The Final
: hase," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring, 1961,
;,

181.
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APPENDIX E
TABLE V
EISENHOWER PRESS CONFERENCES BY YEARS
1953

23

1954

33

1955

19

1956

24

1957

25

1958

20

1959

31

1960

14

1961

1

Sources James E. Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press1 The Final
Phase," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring, 1961,
P• 181.
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